R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME SEVEN

DOCTOR EXIMIUS ET PIUS

R. P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

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DISPUTATION XLIII

ON POTENCY AND ACT

The Manifold Meaning of Potency. Aristotle wrote about this matter in book V of the Metaphysics, chapter 12, and more extensively ex professo throughout[1] book IX of the Metaphysics. But there he takes the name "potency" more broadly than we shall take it in the present disputation. For as St. Thomas noted in Opusculum 48, chapter 3, On Quality, potency can be taken in one way transcendentally, in another way predicamentally, that is, insofar as it is a species of a certain category. In the former way, every being is customarily said to be divided by potency and act, or, as others speak, this is said to be one of the disjunctive properties of being, according to which being is divided, especially created being, into being in potency and being in act. This division was explained by us above in disputation XXXI, sections 2 and 3. And there we also explained in passing what objective potency is; for that, if it is anything, or whatever it is, pertains to this transcendental potency, concerning which objective potency we also said some things above in disputation XIV, explaining that axiom: "Potency and act are under the same genus." Again, from potency taken transcendentally, a thing is denominated possible, either by logical potency through non-

[1] 1 toto, 1960; ed. Vivès om."Esta papalbra falta en la de Vivès." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 269.

repugnance, or by physical potency through extrinsic denomination from active or passive potency, as has also often been touched upon in the above discussions. Finally, real potency taken broadly, whether active or passive, is predicated of any principle of acting or being acted upon, and thus it is attributed to substantial principles, such as prime matter insofar as it is a receptive potency of forms, and to substantial form insofar as it is the principal principle of acting, and to God himself insofar as he is omnipotent. This name is also attributed to habits, which are principles of operating; for thus Aristotle in Metaphysics IX, chapter 5, numbers arts and virtues among potencies. Qualities of the third species also, such as heat and cold, which are proximate principles of acting, are comprehended under this transcendental acceptance of potency. And finally, whatever is a principle of acting or receiving is called potency by this general notion; concerning which acceptance enough has been said while disputing about material and efficient cause. But we here dispute more strictly about potency, namely about potency as it is the second species of quality. For since enough has been said about the other acceptances in the cited places, this alone remains and is proper to this place, as we noted in the preceding disputation. But because act corresponds to potency with proportion, therefore we shall speak simultaneously about the act accommodated to this potency, although that pertains to the first species of quality, as was said above. Concerning this potency, therefore, we must first see what it is and how manifold, then how it compares to act.

SECTION I

WHETHER POTENCY IS CORRECTLY AND SUFFICIENTLY DIVIDED INTO ACTIVE AND PASSIVE, AND WHAT EACH IS

Disputation XLIII

1. Although potency in general is one species of quality, Aristotle never assigned one common definition of it; for in the category of quality he declared this kind of species not so much by a definition of the thing as by an interpretation of the name, saying that another genus of quality is that according to which we are said to be apt for wrestling, running, or health. But in Metaphysics V, chapter 12, he first divides potency into agent and patient, and then defines each, saying that active potency is a principle of transmuting another insofar as it is other; passive potency, however, is a principle of being transmuted by another. These definitions were explained by us in passing above while disputing about efficient cause and the principle of acting. But now this division must be explained more carefully. Concerning which many things must be investigated. First, whether potency is sufficiently divided into active and passive. Second, whether those two members are always distinct in reality, where we shall also explain whether there is any potency purely active, or passive, or any including both notions, from which the definitions of active and passive potency will be more clearly declared. Finally, we must see what common notion of potency, as it is a simple subaltern species of quality, can be assigned.

Whether Objective Potency is Active or Passive

2. Concerning the first difficulty, the principal reason for doubt is usually because of objective potency, which is considered by some to be distinct from active and passive potency. But if the things said a little before are considered, this creates no difficulty for us, both because objective potency is not a determinate species of quality, concerning which potency we now treat; and also because either it is not physical and real potency, but only logical and a certain non-repugnance, or insofar as it is real and physical, it is not distinct from active and passive, but is predicated through repugnance or denomination from them.

3. Another reason for doubt could be because there are certain potencies that are neither passive nor active, but have a more eminent notion in which they participate in something of both of those members, whence St. Thomas in question 1 on Virtues, article 1, seems to make that division threefold. But this difficulty must be treated extensively in the second point proposed, and therefore it is enough now to say that third member is easily reduced to the other two.

4. Reason for Doubt Concerning the Potency to Resist. In the present case, therefore, a single reason for doubt presents itself, taken from resistive potency; for that is true real potency, and yet it is not active, nor passive; therefore a third member is given besides those two; therefore that division is not sufficient. The major premise is established first from Aristotle in the Categories, in the chapter on quality, where in the species of potency he places that potency which someone has so as not to suffer easily, as, for example, hardness, through which a body is able not to be divided easily; but this is nothing other than the potency of resisting, as is evident per se; therefore. Next, it is a common axiom of philosophers that natural action follows according to the proportion of the activity of the agent and the resistance of the patient or medium, which is taken from Aristotle in Physics IV, chapter 8, text 71, and book VII, chapter 5, and On the Heavens IV, chapter 6, and On Generation I, chapter 10, and was declared by us above while we disputed about the agent cause. Therefore, just as activity bespeaks some real potency in the agent, so resistance in first act bespeaks some real potency in the patient. And this is declared from the acts themselves; for just as actually acting is something real, so also is actually resisting; and just as a thing even when it is not acting is apt to act, so also when it is not resisting, it is apt to resist. Therefore the power of resisting is a certain real potency, which nature has implanted in things so that they might protect themselves from contraries.

5. But the minor proposition is proved. And first, that resistive potency is not active. This is clear first because to resist is not to act; for a thing resists even while it is not acting on another; therefore the potency of resisting, as such, is not the potency of acting; for as the act is, so is the potency. Second, because it happens that the same thing is less active and more resistive, and conversely, as was said in the above discussions; therefore the potency of resisting is not the potency of acting, nor conversely. And by the same reasons it can be shown that the potency of resisting is not the potency of being acted upon; for to resist is not to be acted upon, but rather is to impede passion. Whence insofar as one is acted upon, one cannot resist; but one resists in that one impedes or retards passion; therefore the potency of resisting is not the potency of being acted upon, but rather is opposite; therefore a third genus of potency is given, distinct from active and passive.

Sufficient Division of Potency into Active & Passive

6. Nevertheless it must be said that every real and predicamental potency is either active or passive, and thus the given division is sufficient. This assertion is established first by the authority of the Philosopher and all authors and interpreters. Then it will be established from the solution of the proper difficulty; for if we shall show that resistive potency either is not a proper and special real potency, or is not distinct from active and passive, we shall clearly conclude that there is no other genus of potency besides those two, because no other genus of potency has been devised up to now. Finally, a reason can be given, because potency, as such, is a certain first act, which bespeaks a relation to a second act; but the proximate and immediate second act of any potency is nothing other than either action or passion; therefore potency also can only be either active or passive. The minor premise is clear, because only two relations of act to potency can be understood, namely, as to the principle from which,

or in which or from which it comes to be; of which the former constitutes action, the latter passion.

On the Potency of Resisting

7. Soncinas's Opinion. What Difficulties It Suffers. Concerning the potency of resisting, therefore, Soncinas in Metaphysics IX, question 6, says that it is the same according to reality as agent potency, but is distinguished according to diverse notions, and that this is sufficient so that the same quality may be more resistive than active, or conversely. Just as (he says) the same potency is intellect and memory, and yet is more perfect in the notion of intellect than in the notion of memory; and similarly (he says) the same act can be love of end and of means, and yet is considered greater love with respect to the end than with respect to the means, because that on account of which each thing is such, is itself more so. But in this response two difficulties remain: one is that, although it often happens that the same thing is the power of acting and of resisting, nevertheless it is not always so; for whiteness, for example, resists the introduction of blackness, and yet has no power of acting another whiteness or the remission of blackness; hardness also and density seem to have no power of acting, and yet they greatly resist or impede action. The second difficulty is that, just as the power of resisting is sometimes the same really with active potency, and distinguished from it by reason, so also passive potency is sometimes the same really with active potency and distinguished only by reason, as we shall show below; therefore if distinction of reason suffices to distinguish potencies, that division would have to be given as threefold; or if it does not suffice, neither would passive potency be distinguishable from active.

8. What It Is to Resist, and in How Many Ways It Happens. Therefore, so that this matter may be understood more exactly, it must first be declared what it is to resist; for from this it will be established

in what the power of resisting consists and why it is not numbered among proper potencies. In two ways, therefore, it happens that one thing resists another: first, formally through immediate repugnance; second, radically and as if through diminution of the power of the other thing. In this latter way the heat of fire resists cold water, preventing its action as much as possible and diminishing its powers; just as among men one is said to resist another if, by anticipating a wound, he cuts off his hand, or in some other way diminishes his powers. This resistance, therefore, is really nothing other than a certain action and differs only in denomination or relation; for it is called action insofar as it is from an acting principle, but resistance insofar as it diminishes the powers of another so that it cannot act. And thus concerning this mode of resisting, it is most true that the potency of resisting is not distinct in reality from the potency of acting; and although it may be distinguished by reason or denomination, nevertheless it does not constitute a peculiar member in the division of potency, either because the potency of resisting is not outside the formal latitude of the potency of acting, but something added to it, or better, because such potency is not per se instituted for resisting, but that is something consequent and concomitant to the power of acting. Just as the potency of generating the similar and corrupting the contrary are not two potencies, because the potency is not instituted for corrupting, but has this consequently, by the fact that it is a potency of generating. But it is otherwise concerning proper passive potency, which can be equally primarily instituted for receiving, as we shall declare later; and from this it is understood that, concerning this mode of resisting, the power of acting and resisting in any quality is equal, because it is one and the same according to reality, and insofar as they can be distinguished by reason, one follows from the other with proportion and equality, for the more strongly and efficaciously one quality can act on its contrary, the more it weakens its powers and consequently resists it more in this mode of resisting.

9. But truly the other mode of resisting does not consist in action, as the reasons made in the beginning convince. Whence, neither per se primarily nor consecutively does this mode of resistance arise from active potency as active, as that reason also convinces that this mode of resisting belongs even to those qualities that have no power of acting. Therefore it can only be said very improperly and materially concerning the power to resist in this way, that it is the same as the potency of acting, because this is neither general, nor, when it belongs to something, does it arise from the notion of active potency as such, but from elsewhere; and therefore also in this mode of resisting alone is it true that the same quality is more active and less resistive. Concerning this mode of resisting, therefore, it must be said that it does not consist in any positive act arising from that power which is said to be the power of resisting, but consists rather in the privation of act. Whence such resistive power is rather impotency, or a certain incapacity, than proper potency, and therefore that third member ought not to have been added in the division of potency.

10. This whole opinion is explained, for this actual and formal resistance consists only in this, that the subject through a quality or disposition existing in it impedes another form or action from being introduced into it, which impediment does not consist in any action that such a patient effects, either in another agent or in itself, as is clear from what has been said; for such resistance is common to non-active qualities, and because no such action can be feigned or declared. Therefore it consists in a certain formal incompossibility or repugnance, from which it comes about that the action of a contrary agent is either completely impeded, or retarded and made more remiss. Thus therefore this actual resistance does not consist in any positive second act arising from resistive power, but rather in the lack or retardation or remission of contrary action. And therefore that power of resisting is not some faculty per se ordered to that lack or retardation of action; because natural potency is not ordered per se to any privation; and therefore we say this is not so much potency as

impotency and a kind of incapacity, which is consequent to the formal effect of some quality or disposition. Therefore such resistive power does not constitute a certain species of quality, but can accompany any quality, or even form, which by affecting and disposing the subject formally repugnates a form and action contrary to itself. Just as there can also be attributed to forms or qualities a power or faculty for formally expelling qualities or forms repugnant to itself, which power does not constitute a peculiar notion or species, but accompanies each form insofar as it is apt to confer its formal effect. Thus therefore it is established that resistive potency, in whatever way it is taken, does not pertain to a peculiar species of quality or potency distinct from active and passive potency.

11. How Activity and Resistance are Related. Whence Inequality in Resisting Arises. And from this it is understood that concerning this latter mode of resisting it is true what is commonly said, that one quality can be more active than resistive, and conversely; because this resistance does not follow activity, but precisely information or disposition. Whence (as I have often said) a quality can be resistive in this way even if it is not active; and therefore even if such a mode of resisting belongs to active qualities, it is not necessary that resistance and activity maintain proportion or equality among themselves, because such resistance does not belong according to the mode of acting, but according to the mode of informing. But it is not easy to explain in what it consists, or whence it arises, that one quality is more resistive than another in this latter way, since this resistance consists only in formal incompossibility or repugnance. For if we compare, for example, heat and cold among themselves, heat formally repugnates cold just as much as cold repugnates heat; for they are equally incompossible in the same subject and in the same degrees; why therefore is coldness said to be a more resistive quality than heat? And the same argument applies to dryness and humidity, and to other similar qualities.

12. But it must be said that this excess or inequality of resistance can be explained in various ways. First, from a diverse mode of union, for one quality can be of such a nature that through its information it is united more firmly and immovably to the subject, not because of greater intensity alone, but also in individual degrees of intensity compared proportionally, so that this arises from the very species of union, not from intensity; for there is no repugnance in this, and with this posited it is excellently understood how one form because of its very formal union resists action repugnant to it more than another. And in this way also hardness resists division more than softness[2], because it unites the integral parts themselves more and more firmly. For just as in artificial things, parts that are connected by some glue are divided with more difficulty the more power the glue has of uniting them or of uniting itself to them, so it can be understood proportionally in natural qualities.

13. Second, this greater resistance can arise from the fact that from such a quality follows inequality in some condition required for acting; as, for example, density in a patient contributes to greater resistance, because by reason of it more parts of the patient are united more among themselves to resist a contrary agent, which cannot act equally on all those parts so applied simultaneously, as it could on individual parts if it were applied to them one by one. And perhaps for this reason dryness resists more when it contributes to greater density, as in earth and other terrestrial bodies, for in fire perhaps it does not happen so; and the same is perhaps true of hardness, which always has density mixed in, and for that reason contributes to greater resistance.

14. Third, this inequality can be reduced to some genus of activity, so that the prior mode of resisting is conjoined with the posterior. But this activity can be twofold. The first is the natural resultance of a quality from its form, as if someone should say that

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[2] mollitudo, 1960; multitudo, ed. Vivès et aliae. "Inexplicably, various editions, including the Vivès edition, substitute multitudo for mollitudo." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 277.

coldness in water resists its corruption more than in air, because in water it resists not only through its information, but also through natural emanation from the very form of water; which emanation is a certain activity, as we saw above. And in the same way someone could think that even comparing two properties emanating from their forms, there can be inequality between them in the mode of emanation, so that one emanates with greater power or activity than another. As if someone should say that touch, for example, emanates more strongly from the sensitive soul than the other external senses; and in a similar way it can be understood that a heavy body existing in its place resists non-natural motion, namely, because through its gravity it actively retains or conserves existence in such a place, through which activity it resists a contrary mover, by which it cannot be overcome unless it has greater power of acting.

15. Another mode of this resistance through activity can be through reaction against another agent, in which way also something heavy resists what moves or carries it, pushing toward a contrary place; and something hard resists a dividing body by blunting it, and perhaps also by actively detaining it so that it may not enter such a place. Nevertheless it is true that this mode of resisting pertains to the former one declared above; but we say that this inequality of resistance sometimes arises from the fact that the former mode is conjoined with the latter, and conversely the very resistance through activity is greater because of the peculiar disposition of the patient itself, which disposition is therefore said to have greater power of resisting, or to be more apt for resisting. And thus far concerning resistive potency, which is established not to constitute a peculiar species of quality; and therefore from this source the number of potencies is not increased, but they are sufficiently contained in active and passive.

SECTION II
WHETHER ACTIVE AND PASSIVE POTENCY ALWAYS DIFFER IN REALITY, OR SOMETIMES ONLY IN REASON

1. Some Potencies are Given that are Purely Active. Now it remains to explain what was proposed in the second place concerning the distinction of those members among themselves. And first I suppose that some purely active potencies are given, which are certain to be distinguished both in reality and in essence from truly and properly passive potencies, whether they are purely passive or not. The first part is clear in all potencies that are per se primarily ordered to acting through transient action, as complete principles of such actions in their order, as is, for example, the agent intellect, the motive potency of a living thing, or the attractive potency that is in a magnet, or the impulsive potency that is in expelling force, and similar ones; for these potencies are principles of acting, as is established, and they are not principles of being acted upon, because they neither suffer by receiving their proper act or action, since they do not act by immanent action, nor do they suffer by receiving anything by way of a first act by which they are completed in the notion of a principle of acting; because, as I suppose, they are complete principles in their order, that is, proximate, or instrumental, and do not require a further act by which they are intrinsically completed for acting. Nor does it matter that such faculties sometimes need the application or motion of another potency so that they may exercise their actions, as the locally motive potency of an animal needs the motion of appetite; for this motion does not come about through physical action and passion concerning the very motive potency itself, but comes about through sympathy of potencies of the same soul; and therefore this does not

prevent such a faculty from being, physically and properly speaking, purely active.

2. Purely Active Potencies Really Differ from Passive Ones. But the other part, namely, that such potency is distinguished both in reality and in essence from passive potency, is easily established both by induction and also from the proper nature and end of such potencies; for the end is so diverse as to indicate sufficiently essential diversity in such potencies. For if a potency is purely passive, it has a function primarily diverse from purely active potency; whence they are distinguished among themselves no less than matter and form differ among themselves, by the fact that one potency is passive and the other is formal act. But if a potency is not purely passive, it will be active through immanent action; but a potency that is only a principle of transient action differs entirely from a potency that is a principle of immanent action, since such actions and such modes of operating are entirely diverse, as is evident per se. And so in this part there is no reason for doubt, nor does any difficulty of any moment occur.

Whether Any Quality is Given that is a Purely Passive Potency

3. But whether conversely there is any purely passive potency that constitutes a proper species of quality can not undeservedly be inquired. But I say that constitutes a proper species of quality, because (speaking simply) in the whole latitude of being there is no doubt that there are some purely passive potencies or capacities, as matter is in the genus of substance, and in its way quantity in relation to many corporeal accidents. Nevertheless neither does the potency of matter pertain to the genus of quality, but of substance, nor is the passive capacity of quantity any quality, nor does it have any proper specification of being diverse from quantity itself; because that thing which is quantity is not per se primarily instituted for that function, but has this as if consequently or concomitantly in virtue of its entity,

as was declared in the above discussions, especially disputation XIV. From which also in the preceding disputation we noted that only that faculty pertains to a determinate species of quality which is per se primarily instituted and ordered by its nature to some act. Here therefore we inquire whether there is any accidental potency that is per se primarily instituted by its nature only for receiving some accidental act; for if such potency is given, it will be properly purely passive, and will pertain to this species of quality and will be most properly distinguished from active potency.

Arguments of the Affirmative Part

4. That such potency is given can be persuaded first from the very division handed down by Aristotle. Second, because substantial potency is given that is purely[3] passive, per se primarily ordered to substantial act; why therefore could there not be given a similar genus of potency in the order of accidents? Third by induction, for Aristotle in On Generation II says that heat and cold are active qualities, but humidity and dryness are passive. Thus in air transparency is considered to be purely passive potency for receiving light. Fourth, because St. Thomas in question 1 on Virtues, article 1, touching on this division, makes it threefold; for he says that one potency is purely active, another purely passive; but others (he says) are both acting and acted upon. And in the second order he places sensitive powers; therefore the senses are purely passive potencies. Fifth, we can argue because to every natural active potency corresponds a passive one, and conversely, as Aristotle testifies in Metaphysics IX; therefore, if accidental potency is given that is purely active and ordered to accidental act, there will also be given accidental potency purely passive proportioned to it.

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[3] pure, 1960; alit. om. "Missing in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 281.

The Negative Part is Persuaded & Defined

5. Humidity and Dryness are Neither Potency nor Purely Passive. And this opinion indeed can easily be defended without inconvenience, [4]especially if such a mode of potency can be convinced by some sufficient experiment. But I have not yet found any quality that is instituted only for this function of receiving only other qualities or accidents. But the material or passive dispositional reason must not be confused with properly receptive potency; for quantity is in its way a material and passive disposition with respect to substantial form, and can in no way be called a receptive potency of it; and in qualities of the third species, very many are material dispositions to substantial form, and are not receptive potencies. The reason of disposition, therefore, consists only in proper information with a certain proportion to the effect of another form, not however with proper reception of the very form to which proper receptive potency ought to be ordered. Whence what is adduced from Aristotle concerning humidity and dryness is of no moment, both because it is established that these are active qualities, although not with as much efficacy as cold and heat, in comparison with which they are called passive; and also because none of these first qualities is placed properly and essentially under the proper species of quality, which is potency, as we now discourse about it, which was declared and proved in the preceding disputation; and finally because dryness and humidity are not such qualities as receive in themselves other qualities or forms by which they are actuated, in which the proper notion of passive potency consists; but they dispose matter for the reception of substantial form, or also of other accidents, and under that notion they are called passive, not indeed passive potencies, but passive qualities, which pertain to the third species; in

[4] talis, 1960; aliquis, ed. Vivès et aliae. "In other editions aliquis." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 282.

which way also heat and cold are passive qualities, although in comparison with others they are named active.

6. Transparency is not Passive Potency. And in the same way transparency seems to be a disposition of the subject for receiving light, and not a proper receptive potency of such act, nor instituted per se primarily for this end by its nature. A sign of which is that that property of transparency is connatural to many bodies that neither have innate light by their nature, nor postulate it for their connatural state, as is established concerning air, and glass, and similar things. But if they had connatural potency per se primarily ordered to receiving such act, the act itself would also pertain to perfection connaturally due to such things. Therefore transparency is not such potency[5], but at most is related as a necessary disposition of such bodies so that they can receive light, although it is not received immediately in transparency itself, but in corporeal quantity; just as it is also a disposition for receiving visible species; or just as rarity is a disposition for receiving species of sound, or odor, or even for receiving perfect heat. And frequently one quality is a disposition to another, even if it is not a receptive potency of it. And so in the whole order of natural qualities none appears that is per se primarily instituted to be only passive potency; but in the order of vital qualities or potencies, some are passive potencies, nevertheless not purely passive, as we shall see; therefore, speaking simply, no quality is essentially pertaining to the second species that is pure passive potency; for transparency and similar qualities rather pertain to the third species.

7. Nor can anything be gathered to the contrary from Aristotle's division, both because he does not speak only of potency that is a determinate species of quality, but generally and transcendentally about potency insofar as it is predicated of any active or passive aptitude, in which way we have already said some purely

[5] potentia, 1960; alit. om. Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 283.

passive potencies are given; and also because, even if we understand the division concerning potency taken in the former property, it is not necessary to understand that member concerning purely passive potency. For intellect and sense are called passive potencies by Aristotle, even if they are not purely passive, but have some activity. Indeed, in this way the division seems to be explained more conveniently; for if there were some purely passive potency and another purely active, a third member of potency would have to be added, as it were mixed or embracing unitedly the notion of active and passive potency, as St. Thomas signified in the cited place; but truly if no potency is purely passive, we understand excellently that every potency that is per se primarily and as if ultimately ordered to receiving is called passive, even if it has some activity. It is true that this reason per se does not suffice to show that no potency is purely passive; for with that posited, it could be said that under that member are comprehended both that potency and also any other that is per se receptive, even if it has some activity from elsewhere. Or certainly it could be said that that potency which is simultaneously active and passive either pertains to those two members under diverse notions, or certainly pertains to that member whose notion it more participates in; as sense is called absolutely passive potency, because it is more passive than active. But appetite conversely can be called active potency, because it is more active than passive. Nevertheless it is declared sufficiently from the discourse made that the given division is most conveniently explained, even if no quality is given that is pure receptive potency.

8. No Substance Needs a Quality that is Purely Passive Potency. And a sufficient reason can be given why such potency is not necessary to substances. For spiritual substances through themselves are immediately capable of all accidents that can be in them and are not vital acts or habits proximately ordered to them. But for receiving these acts or habits, they indeed have passive potencies, nevertheless not purely passive, because they are vital potencies that necessarily

have some activity. Nor do they need a peculiar passive potency, not vital, for receiving the very potencies or for any other accident; because by the same reason they would need another for receiving that very potency, and thus one would proceed to infinity. But corporeal substances, because they are substantially composed of essential act and potency, need first as the foundation of their being (so to speak) substantial potency purely receptive primarily and per se of substantial act; nevertheless that very potency consequently is receptive, or the sufficient and proximate reason of receiving some accident, namely quantity; but through quantity the corporeal substance is (as far as pure reception is concerned) sufficiently apt for receiving other accidents, which are either common to inanimate bodies, or immediately follow form as informing matter, as faculties, or material potencies of it; for for receiving these no other peculiar potency can be required, lest one proceed to infinity because of parity of reason. Therefore only for certain peculiar acts, namely vital and immanent ones, are accommodated receptive potencies required, because of their singular condition and nature; nevertheless those potencies cannot be purely passive, since they are vital. Therefore no cause occurs why such quality should be necessary in the nature of things that is per se primarily instituted only for the function of receiving; and therefore it seems more probable that there is no such accidental purely passive potency.

Response to the Arguments

9. But all the reasons proposed to the contrary are solved from what has been said, except the fourth and fifth. To the fourth therefore it is said that St. Thomas there does not divide potency in general, but agent potency, for he says another is potency only acting, another only acted upon or moved; but another is both acting and acted upon. From which words it is plainly established that the first and third members contain active potencies. But explaining the

second member, he says: "But those potencies are only acted upon, which do not act except when moved by others, nor is it in them to act or not act, but they act according to the impulse of the moving nature." In this way therefore St. Thomas places the senses in that second member; for he could not think that sensitive potencies lack all activity, since they are vital potencies, and therefore St. Thomas himself often teaches that their acts are immanent, I, question 54, article 2, and I-II, question 31, article 1. But we shall say more about that division of St. Thomas in the following disputation, section 1.

The Axiom is Explained: To Every Active Potency Corresponds a Proportioned Passive One

10. The fifth objection is founded on that principle, that to every active potency corresponds a passive potency, and conversely. Which under these terms I have not found expressly in Aristotle, and needs some interpretation. For first, if we speak of active potency absolutely and simply, as it comprehends even divine potency, to it corresponds no passive potency that is as it were an adequate receptive of its action; because it can act outside every passive potency, and can effect the very first passive potency itself; but there corresponds adequately whatever is possible by objective potency, or logical potency, or through non-repugnance of being. Whence also with respect to that action which it can effect in a subject or from a subject, natural passive potency does not correspond adequately, but simply receptive potency, whether natural or obediential, as theologians dispute more widely. And concerning this we think the same concerning the potency of a creature, insofar as it can be assumed by God as an instrument above all laws of nature, concerning which elsewhere.

11. But if we speak of natural active potency or connatural to some created agent, thus, speaking absolutely, it is true that there is no active potency connatural to a creature to which some passive potency

connatural also to some creature does not respond, and which can naturally receive such act or effect. And the reason is that no created active potency (as we suppose from what was treated in the above discussions) is active except from a presupposed subject, because it cannot act from nothing; therefore if such active potency is natural to some creature, it is necessary that there respond in created things also some receptive potency of that effect. Because active potency regards an effect or action simply possible, but an action or effect[6] essentially depending on a subject is not possible unless there is in the nature of things a subject capable of such action, from which such effect can come to be; because a thing is not simply possible unless all causes that are necessary for such a thing are possible. Again it is necessary that the capacity or potency of such subject be natural, that is, to a connatural act, because a natural agent cannot effect a supernatural act or form. But this reason proves not so much that passive potency is given in act, if active is given, as that it is possible. Nor is this surprising, because science and demonstration abstracts from actual existence. Consequently, however, it is shown by sufficiently probable philosophical reason that it is consonant with the natures of things and the perfection of the universe that if natural active power is given in it, there should also be given matter or subject concerning which such power can naturally operate; because otherwise such power would be superfluous in the nature of things, since it would necessarily lack its action.

12. And by similar reasoning it is also gathered conversely that if passive potency of some order is given, in the same order there is given, properly speaking, proportioned active potency, through which it can be reduced to act. Both because that potency also regards an act simply possible; and also because otherwise such potency would be superfluous in the nature of things. But I say properly speaking, because it can happen accidentally that natural passive

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[6] effectus, 1960; alit. actus. "In some editions actus instead of effectus." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 287.

potency cannot be reduced to some act by any natural agent; as matter, for example, cannot receive from a natural agent a form that it once had and lost; for this is considered as if accidental, from the defect of some circumstance necessary for that action. But per se it is enough that that potency, taken absolutely, could be reduced to such act by the power of a natural agent, especially because it is not necessary that passive potency, which adequately regards some degree or latitude of acts comprehending several diverse both in species and number, should be able in fact to be reduced to all those acts in species and number by some natural agent; because, if it is reduced to several of them, that potency will not be superfluous in the nature of things. Whence it seems likely to me that prime matter can receive more forms, either distinct in species or number, than can now be made by the power of natural causes of this universe, for from this matter God could (as I think) procreate other elements distinct in species, and consequently other compounds. He could also establish other heavens, which could induce other forms in this matter, which these heavens cannot; for they do not have infinite power of acting; but the potency of matter is in a certain way infinite. Therefore only divine potency, as it has the power of educing form from matter, seems to be simply adequate to its capacity.

13. But from this as if mutual relation between active and passive potency it cannot be gathered that, if a quality is given that is pure active potency, there must also be given a quality that is pure passive potency. First indeed, because, so that active potency may regard and exercise its proper possible act, it is enough that it have proportioned passive potency, whether that be pure passive or not; for this makes no difference to the activity of the other. As the agent intellect is purely active potency, to which the possible intellect sufficiently responds as passive, which behaves purely passively with respect to that action, although it otherwise has some power of acting. Then, because it is not necessary that, if active potency is a quality per se instituted for acting, passive potency should also be a quality per se

primarily instituted for receiving; for heat, as it is an instrumental power of fire, acts immediately on the substantial potency of prime matter, educing substantial form from its potency; but as it is the principal power of heating, it acts on a body as affected by quantity, nor does any other peculiar passive potency respond; and thus it happens almost always in other physical and active qualities by transient action. And the reason is that it is not necessary that to accidental act should correspond receptive potency of the same genus, as was shown above in disputation XIV. Also, because so that the power of acting may be conveniently instituted and be able to exercise its proper function, it is enough that it have in nature a proportioned patient, whether such subject has passive potency per se primarily ordered to that function, or only consequently and secondarily according to the doctrine handed down in the aforesaid disputation XIV.

Whether There is Any Potency Both Active & Passive

14. The Same Thing Can Be Both Active and Passive Potency. Finally it remains to be said whether there is any potency that is neither purely active nor purely passive, but embraces both notions. In which there can be partly a question pertaining to the thing, partly to our mode of speaking or conceiving. For it can be asked whether the same quality can be simultaneously and through the same entity a power of acting and of being acted upon, either with respect to different things, or with respect to itself. And in this sense I consider the affirmative part to be certain. And indeed concerning the former part, namely, with respect to different things, I find no controversy or disagreement among authors. And it is clear by induction, for the possible intellect is passive potency with respect to the agent intellect, and is active with respect to intellection. And the reason is that with respect to different acts there is no repugnance that the same thing be a principle of acting one thing and of receiving another. But

concerning the other part, namely, with respect to itself, there is controversy among authors; for in this sense this question coincides with that one, whether the same thing can act on itself according to the same respect, which we treated extensively above in disputation XVIII. Nevertheless, as far as pertains to the present matter, there can scarcely be diversity of opinions; for although it is controversial whether the same thing can be the proximate and adequate principle, both active and passive of the same action, nevertheless, that the same faculty in number simultaneously has the power of acting and is the principle of receiving the action that it elicits, cannot be doubted with any probability, supposing the true doctrine concerning immanent acts, which are received in the same potencies from which they are elicited, whether for that effection they need some other co-principle, such as species or object, or something similar, or not. For whatever is thought in this matter, it is nevertheless true that the same faculty according to reality is simultaneously active and passive potency with respect to the same act and with respect to itself, insofar as it both receives and elicits the same act. And the reason is that that very quality, insofar as it has actual perfection of such species, can be a power eminently or virtually containing another act, and can be formally actualizable through the same act, as we said more extensively in the aforesaid disputation XVIII. Nor does a new difficulty occur in this that was not treated there.

15. Whether a Thing Both Active and Passive Should be Placed in One or in a Double Species. But with these things concerning the thing itself being supposed, there can be a question whether that thing is placed in a double species of potency, or in one that simply and unitedly embraces both notions. And I consider this to be more a question about our mode of conceiving or speaking than about the thing. For in reality I think there is no actual distinction and from the nature of the thing between that potency as active and as passive, because that quality essentially includes both notions so that it is impossible even by God's absolute power that that thing be

conserved without having both notions simultaneously, or that one be separated from the other; therefore it is a sign that there is no distinction in reality. Also because that entity, for example the will, is adequately instituted for acting and receiving the act of willing, because both are per se and simply necessary for willing; therefore with respect to that entity one of those notions cannot be considered essential and the other an accidental mode, because there is no greater reason for one than the other; therefore both are essential to the same entity; therefore there is no actual distinction and from the nature of the thing between them. The consequence is clear, because, as we showed in disputation VII, such distinction does not intervene except between a thing and a mode that is in some way accidental and outside its essence.

16. And from this it comes about that by adequately and completely conceiving and defining the essence of that quality, there is truly only one unique potency unitedly and simply including the notion of active and passive potency, for it is simultaneously and per se primarily instituted to be the proximate principle of acting and receiving such act. This mode of potency is found only in cognitive and appetitive powers, because these alone have immanent acts, for which alone such a genus of potencies is necessary. But whether insofar as that quality or potency can be distinguished by our inadequate concepts into active and passive, it should be said to have a double formal notion of potency and to be constituted in a double species of quality or potency, I consider to be a question of little moment, and to pertain more to the mode of speaking than to the thing.

17. Whence someone can easily think and defend that just as action and passion, although they are distinguished only by reasoned reason, constitute diverse genera, so the proximate principle of acting and being acted upon, although sometimes they are not distinguished in reality, but by our concepts, pertain to diverse predicamental species of potency. Just as also memory and intellect are customarily

numbered as diverse potencies, although they are distinguished only by reason; thus therefore someone can speak about intellect insofar as it is active or passive. For it can easily be defended that in the genus of quality and under the species of potency this is only one simple species, which by virtue of its ultimate difference, by the fact that it is vital and perfect potency, comprehends both notions of eliciting and receiving its act. For that these respects can be prescinded by our concepts is not sufficient for distinguishing species of potencies, because from neither of those respects taken precisely is the perfect nature of such potency completed. Which is especially true considering physically the essence and species of such potency, and thus we speak more frequently about these potencies; for the will is one potency, even if it is simultaneously active and receptive of its act. In this way therefore we shall always speak; for we consider these things more according to their proper and adequate essences that they have in reality, than according to the precision of our mind, as we also noted among the four species of quality to be explained.

18. The Ultimate Resolution of the Question is Elicited from What Has Been Said. And from this we further gather how great the distinction is between the members of that division. For if someone wants to distinguish species of active and passive potency in all things, however they may be found in them, and thus to expound that division, he must consequently say that those members taken in general are distinguished formally, abstracting from formal distinction, which is through mental precision, and from that which is through distinction of things. But speaking more physically and really, as we speak, it must be said that those two members are distinct in reality, but in such a way that from potency which is called passive, not all activity is excluded in reality itself. Thus therefore active potency is said to be that which is elicitive of its action or act, but not receptive, but passive potency is that which is receptive of its act, even if it is also elicitive of it; but in this way it is established that such potencies are

always distinct in reality, since from one the function of receiving is excluded in reality itself, as was declared above.

19. The Definition of Active Potency is Explained. And according to this interpretation the definition of active potency that Aristotle hands down is easily accommodated to this division, namely, that it is a principle of transmuting another insofar as it is other; for speaking of purely active potency, it is established that it is a principle of acting in another potency distinct from itself, otherwise it would not be purely active. In this sense therefore this potency is always a principle of acting in another. But whether it is also necessary that potencies be distinguished by supposit or at least by subject, according to diverse parts of the same supposit, so that for this reason also the potency may be said from the part of the subject to be a principle of transmuting another, was treated ex professo above in disputation XVIII. Now it is sufficiently established from the force of the formal notion of active potency that, however purely active it may be, this is not necessary; because, although it may happen that receptive potency is in the same supposit, and in the same part of the subject in which active potency is, nevertheless active potency will be purely active, and will be a principle of transmuting another insofar as it is other, not only distinguished by reason, but also in reality itself, at least according to the principles of acting and being acted upon, which is sufficient.

20. The Definition of Passive Potency is Explained According to What Has Been Said. But truly the definition of passive potency handed down by Aristotle is accommodated with more difficulty to the other member of that division according to the exposition given; because passive potency, as declared by us, is not always a principle of transmutation or passion from another insofar as it is other. For animal or spiritual potencies, even if they are passive, change themselves. Indeed, speaking of passive potency that is a proper species of quality, it is never a principle of transmutation from another, because it is never purely passive, as we said. But concerning this

matter we have already said many things, both in the Aristotelian index, and also in the said disputation XVIII. And therefore it must briefly be said that first Aristotle did not define passive potency in that property in which it pertains to a peculiar species of quality, but absolutely and as if transcendentally, for that definition also suits prime matter and quantity as passive potency. Whence it can easily be said that that definition was given by Aristotle concerning purely passive potency, and consequently in those definitions he did not mention those potencies that are as if mixed or active simultaneously and passive, because perhaps he only treated of potency as it is a principle of transient action, and of physical and sensible transmutation. Or second it must be said that, when it is said that passive potency is a principle of transmutation from another insofar as it is other, it is not excluded that the very thing that is passive potency can also actively concur to that transmutation, but it is indicated that besides that something else is always required, whether as an integral principle of action, or as partial, or as complement of the principle, or as in some other way exciting and moving such potency to acting. Or certainly it can be said that that particle "from another" is corrected and limited by the disjunctive particle "or insofar as it is other"; for through it is signified that distinction in reality is not always required, but formal or virtual distinction is sometimes sufficient, which consists in this, that the principle of being acted upon is always in formal potency to the act to be received. But if sometimes that same thing is the active principle of such act, it is not under that notion, but insofar as that thing virtually or eminently contains such act, as was more extensively treated and explained in the said place.

SECTION III

WHAT IS THE DIVIDED TERM OF THAT PARTITION, AND WHAT IS ITS DEFINITION

Section III

1. This question also is easily defined from what has been said. For we can define potency in general, which is the divided term of that partition, thus.

Potency in General is Defined

2. Potency is the proximate principle of some operation to which it is instituted and ordered by its nature. In this description the genus of quality is understood, in which potency agrees with other species of this category, and is distinguished from things of other categories. But through that particle "proximate principle, etc.," there is declared first the reason why such potency is quality and is peculiarly distinguished from substantial form, which, although it is a principle of operation, is nevertheless not proximate, but principal, as was shown in the said disputation XVIII. Where we also treated by what reason proximate principles of actions in creatures are things distinct from substances or substantial forms, from which it clearly follows that they are qualities; for that they cannot be placed in any other genus of accidents is evident per se. But by the name of operation, in that definition can be understood both action and reception, so that the definition may be common to active and passive potency. Although if it is true that no pure passive potency pertains to this species of quality, we can correctly understand by the name of operation what the name itself properly signifies, namely, action or act properly emanating from the very potency or faculty; which is twofold, one going out from the potency and passing into another subject, another remaining in the very potency that is the proximate principle of it, and thus twofold potency is distinguished, one purely active, the other also receptive or passive, as has been sufficiently declared. But it is not necessary to add that the operation be accidental, as some signify; because, although more frequently such operation is of this kind, nevertheless even if it be substantial, as is the generation of substance, nevertheless the potency that is the

proximate and not principal principle of it will be accidental quality, according to what was said above in disputation XVIII.

3. But it must be understood in that definition that such proximate principle ought to be a principle of operation as to its substance, so that through this potency may be distinguished from habit, which is also a proximate principle of operation, nevertheless it is not per se required for the substance, but for the mode of operation, in which it differs from potency. Or perhaps it is better and more universally to be understood concerning proximate principle that on the part of operation it is first and as if radical in that order; for this is customarily called simply and as if by antonomasia proximate principle. For although proximate principle in comparison with principal is not first nor radical, but second and rooted in the first, nevertheless when in the order of proximate principle several things concur subordinated among themselves, one of them is first and radical in that order, and that properly has the notion of potency, but the rest are habits or dispositions of such potency. And in this way not only acquired habits, but also infused ones, and intentional species, and whatever is of this kind, are excluded from the notion of potency. But I said, if such principles are subordinated among themselves; for if they are only partial and concurring equally so that one is not an affection or disposition of another, then both will have the notion of potency although incomplete and partial, from both will coalesce one adequate and first proximate principle in that order.

4. It was added finally in the aforesaid definition that this principle that has the proper and special notion of potency ought to be per se primarily instituted and ordered by its nature to operation, so that through that particle may be excluded those qualities that, although they are proximate principles of their actions, are nevertheless not per se primarily instituted for that function, but only for formally disposing and perfecting the subject, from which consequently or concomitantly they have that they can act something similar to themselves; for these qualities are essentially constituted in

the third species of passible qualities, and do not have proper specification of potency; and therefore they are not comprehended by us in the definition of potency that is a peculiar species of quality, concerning which we now dispute.

From What Sign a Quality Primarily Ordered to Operation May Be Known

5. But you will ask by what sign it can be known whether an active quality is per se primarily instituted or not for that function, or for its act, so that thus it can also be discerned whether it is in the proper species of potency, or of passible quality. I respond that a general rule can scarcely be assigned, but this must be weighed from the formal effect, and mode, and necessity of such qualities. For when a quality is such that, setting aside its action or act, it is per se necessary to the substance because of its formal perfection, then it is a manifest sign that such quality is not per se primarily instituted because of action, but because of its formal perfection, and of this kind are heat, cold, and similar ones. But when a quality is such that, setting aside the necessity of action or act, it would be considered not only not necessary, but even superfluous in nature, then it is a manifest sign that such quality is per se primarily instituted because of operation; as, for example, the agent intellect would be superfluous in nature, if the action of intelligible species were not necessary, or if it could be conveniently reduced to another connatural principle; this therefore is a sufficient sign that such quality is per se primarily instituted because of that action. Then in this order are placed all passive potencies that are active in themselves of their operations, as are intellect and will, and similar sensitive potencies; for all these potencies are such that without their acts they have an imperfect state, and would be considered entirely superfluous, unless both such acts were possible and they were necessary because of those very acts, which is

sufficiently established from the common concept and nature of such potencies.

6. But among purely active qualities, when they proximately effect others similar to themselves through univocal action, it is a sufficient sign that such qualities are not per se primarily instituted for acting; because no individual of one species is per se primarily ordered to another, especially in absolute things or qualities; nor can the essential nature of such species consist in that relation, since nevertheless the essential nature of potency, which is per se primarily instituted to act, is posited in that relation, as we shall say below. Thus therefore heat, which is proximately active of other heat, is not per se primarily instituted by its nature for that action, but has this as if concomitantly by reason of such perfection as it contains in its formal being, and the same is true of similar qualities. Therefore so that potency may be per se instituted to act, it is necessary that its action be in some way equivocal or of diverse nature as to its term; although it is not licit to infer from this by simple conversion the opposite or contrary rule, namely, that whenever a power has action of diverse nature it is per se instituted for it, because this universal proposition is not true. For not every equivocal power is per se primarily ordered to its actions; for divine power is most equivocal with respect to its effects or external actions, and is not per se ordered to them; and the same perhaps is true of the light of the sun, with respect to its effects, and considering the intrinsic nature and essence of it (for now we do not treat of the extrinsic intention of the agent), and of the same nature perhaps are other forms or qualities that are per se for formally adorning or perfecting their connatural subject, but consequently are communicative of their being, whether univocally or only equivocally. But qualities that do not act to communicate their being, but are only instrumental powers, as that which is in seed, or only serve for some use or motion, these seem to be per se primarily instituted for action, even if they are otherwise purely active.

SECTION IV
WHETHER EVERY POTENCY IS NATURAL, AND NATURALLY IMPLANTED

1. The reason for doubt can be because Aristotle, in the chapter on Quality, assigning the second species, calls it natural potency. But what is natural, is naturally present. But to the contrary is that besides natural potency many posit neutral potency in the order of nature, such as is considered to be in heaven for motion. Others add obediential potency, either in the order of nature to artificial things, or in the order of grace to supernatural things. Some potency can also be acquired, or added extrinsically and not implanted by nature, as impetus impressed on a stone. Therefore not every potency is natural.

The Sense of the Question is Explained

2. I suppose the question is about true and real potency, which can generally be called physical, whether it be active or passive, for logical potency, since it posits nothing of entity in reality, is neither natural nor violent, but is a certain non-repugnance; whence it is called obediential potency by some, because it is indifferent of itself; but by others it is called objective potency; but it matters not by what name it is called, provided it is established that it is not real potency. But we can add that this non-repugnance, in the way that it is called potency, can sometimes be called natural, either because it is consonant with the natures and essences of things, or because it is founded in them. For there is another non-repugnance that is through non-implication of contradiction alone, to which the name of obediential potency in this signification can be more accommodated, which is rather negative than positive; for this potency does not so much obey as not resist, since nevertheless to obey in the present

speech or metaphor seems to be in some way to execute the command of another or to cooperate with it.

3. Again real and physical potency, whether active or passive, can be taken either transcendentally or predicamentally, as we declared above, and the present question can be about both; and although we principally treat of predicamental potency, we shall nevertheless speak of both in passing. But potency can be called natural in various respects or reasons: first, because it is in itself of natural order, and thus is distinguished against supernatural. Or because it is implanted and congenital with nature, and thus is distinguished against acquired or extrinsically implanted. Or potency can be called natural by comparison to act, so that if it is active, because it can exercise such act by natural power without any extrinsic and preternatural concourse, but if it is passive, it will be called natural if either it postulates such act by its nature, or certainly if it can receive it through natural causes. But natural cause is not taken here as it is distinguished against free, but as it is distinguished from supernatural, which operates beyond the order of causes of the universe consonant with the natures of things.

Resolution of the Question

4. I say first: if active potency is taken transcendentally and generically, not every active potency is natural according to every respect, although none is given that does not have some respect of naturalness; but there are also given in this order supernatural and obediential potency. I declare first by induction, for first divine potency, in comparison to the very supposit whose potency it is, is connatural, as is evident per se; nevertheless in comparison to effects or subjects that it can change, it is not only natural, but also supernatural, or neither precisely, but eminently both in some way. For it can, as far as transient actions are concerned, act in natural and physical mode, educing form from the natural potency of matter, and

it can also act in ultra-natural mode, namely through creation. Although by virtue of this mode of acting through creation that potency cannot always be denominated supernatural; for although it always exceeds the natural mode of acting of other agents, which is to act from a presupposed subject, nevertheless it does not always act otherwise than the nature of things postulates, and therefore insofar as it operates consonantly with the natures of things, it can be called natural. But furthermore divine potency, whether through creation or through eduction, can operate beyond what is natural to things, either as to the mode of making, or also as to the form or being made; and in this respect that potency is called supernatural. Thus therefore divine potency, because of its amplitude and unlimitedness in the order of its actions, is neither precisely natural nor supernatural, but has a certain eminent notion of potency, in which it embraces both.

5. But created active potency is sometimes natural, that is, implanted by nature in the subject, but sometimes not at all, but superadded, and this again, although it is not congenital, but acquired, is proportioned to natural powers and capacity of the subject, as acquired habits, namely, arts, etc.; for all these things are comprehended under active potency in this aptitude, as is established from Aristotle; and stopping in natural reason no other mode of active potency in creatures can be known; and therefore Aristotle mentions no other. But truly according to the principles of theology there are given other active powers, which not only are not congenital with nature, nor naturally emanate from it, but also exceed the capacity and natural powers of it. And these indeed cannot be called natural potencies with respect to the subject, but are simply supernatural, nevertheless with respect to their proper acts they are connatural principles of them, and therefore according to that notion they have some respect of natural potency. In which way theologians say that intellect illuminated by the light of glory connaturally sees God. Indeed the most powerful reason for positing those powers is, so that the operator may have intrinsic principles connatural to such acts.

6. But besides these there is in a creature potency to cooperate with God as his instrument for effects or actions surpassing the whole order of nature, as the truer opinion of theologians teaches; therefore that potency cannot not be real, since through it a thing influences a real effect, nor can it not be active, since it is a principle of acting at least instrumentally, and compared to the effect or action it cannot be called natural, since such action is entirely above the nature of such instrument. Nevertheless in itself and in its entity it is not of itself supernatural entity, but is such as the entity of the creature itself was, because in reality it is entirely the same with it, and does not confer on it any proper specification. Whence also it is necessarily congenital with the entity whose potency it is, according to which relation it can be called natural. Nevertheless simply and according to the relation to the effect, and considering the mode of acting, it is excellently called active obediential potency, not only negatively, but positively, because it truly positively executes the command or motion of the superior agent, to which it actively cooperates, and cannot operate otherwise; concerning which potency we disputed copiously in the first tome, part III, disputation XXI, sections 5 and 6.

7. From these things therefore the whole conclusion remains sufficiently proved, and how in this order natural, supernatural and obediential potency are given. But the reason is no other than because, since active potency is here taken transcendentally, it is necessary that it embrace under itself all orders of possible potencies, but all the aforesaid orders are possible from what has been said; for they are consonant partly with the natures of things, partly with divine potency and the subordination that the creature ought to have to the creator. But that none of these potencies is given that does not have some respect of connaturality, is also clear from what has been said, because either it has connaturality with respect to action, or at least with respect to the subject, insofar as it is naturally congenital.

8. Only it can be objected against this last point because there can be given a quality supernatural in itself and infused that does not

have the power of acting any connatural act, but can be an instrument of supernatural actions, such as many theologians think the character to be; therefore that quality will have obediential potency, which is natural neither with respect to the subject, nor with respect to natural action. I respond that, even if that potency is not connatural to the subject of that quality, it is connatural to the very quality, insofar as it cannot be separated from it; for although this quality is supernatural, it nevertheless has its own proper essence, according to which it can have attributes connatural to itself and necessarily congenital to it.

9. A Small Doubt is Resolved. Again it can be doubted concerning that conclusion, why among active potencies none is said to be violent actively, that is, inflicting violence, since this relation of potency to act is found in things, as is established, and is diverse from the rest numbered above. It is responded first that the violent is not properly taken actively, but passively, as is established from the usage of all and from the common definition of Aristotle. Then action cannot be violent to the agent as such, for if it acts by natural power, that action is conformable to natural inclination; but if it acts by supernatural or obediential power, the action will not be against the inclination of nature, but above it. But that action is violent to the patient, this is not enough so that active potency may be called violent, especially because, if we speak formally and per se about the patient as patient, action is not violent to it, since it is in potency to it, but it is violent to it insofar as it is affected by contrary form or quality, which is accidental to the notion of active potency.

Second Assertion

10. I say second: if passive potency is taken transcendentally, not every passive potency is simply natural; for some is obediential, or also neutral, although no such potency is given that according to some respect is not natural. This assertion is to be declared and proved in the same proportion as the preceding; but it does not have place in

God, but only in creatures, because in him there is no passive potency, but this is proper to creatures. Which can be compared, either to the subject in which it is present, or to the act that it receives, because the act is sometimes such that not only can potency naturally receive it, but also has natural inclination to it; but sometimes the act is such that it can be given by the power of natural causes, but is not due to such passive potency, nor from its intrinsic and natural inclination. Again sometimes the act can be such that it is neither from the inclination of the patient, nor can it come to be through natural causes; but it can be induced into such subject by a divine and supernatural agent.

Resolution Concerning Neutral Potency

11. First opinion. When passive potency is both innate and connatural to a subject and also has a connatural inclination toward the act which it can receive through natural causes, then it is most properly and in every respect a natural potency. Thus matter is a natural potency with respect to form, sight with respect to species or acts of seeing, and so forth. Sometimes, however, there is a potency that is indeed innate and intrinsic to a subject, but the act that is received in it is not such that it belongs per se to the perfection of such a potency, or proceeds from its inclination, even though it might be induced by created causes operating within the order of nature. Scotus called this potency "neutral" in question 1 of the Prologue and in Book II, distinction 2, question 6, at the end. He applies the example of the passive potency that the heavens have toward their circular motion, which he says is neutral because the heavens are of themselves indifferent to that motion, since it pertains nothing to their particular perfection—which was the opinion of Avicenna in Book IX of his Metaphysics, chapter 2. Scotus says that similar is the potency of an angel toward motion or toward existing in this or that place, and the potency of a surface toward whiteness or blackness, because although

a surface is apt to receive these forms, it is nevertheless indifferent to them.

12. Second opinion. Others, however, are unwilling to admit this kind of neutral potency, such as Cajetan in his short works, volume III, treatise III, question 1, and Soto in Book II of the Physics, question 1, ad 2. Their foundation is that potency is compared either to an adequate act or to particular and inadequate acts contained under it. In the first way, neutral potency cannot be given, because every potency is instituted for the sake of act, especially the adequate act, which it therefore regards per se primarily and toward which it is inclined, according to the teaching of the Philosopher in Book IX of the Metaphysics, texts 13, 14, 15, and 16, where he therefore says that every potency is defined through act. If, however, potency is compared to inadequate acts, although it may be in some way indifferent to receiving this one or that one, it cannot simply be called neutral, but rather connatural to each one, at least per se in the second mode, because in each one is found the common nature of the object or adequate act. Otherwise matter would only be in neutral potency toward individual forms, and sight toward acts of vision, etc., and thus potency, as it exists under act, would never be natural potency, because it never exists except under one singular and determinate act.

13. Some neutral potency must necessarily be asserted. But it cannot be denied that some potency may be called neutral, and this in two ways, namely, either as it exists under some act, or according to itself. This is explained thus: prime matter can be considered in two ways: first, as it exists under some form, for example, of fire; second, precisely and according to itself. And the same twofold consideration has place in any passive potency. Therefore, matter, as it exists under one form, can be said to be in neutral potency to acts indifferent to such a form; although this is more properly said of the whole composite, insofar as it is in potency to such acts. Thus certainly fire (whatever may be the case for now concerning the heavens) is in neutral potency either to be moved circularly in its natural place or to

rest, because the form of fire has inclination or repugnance to neither of these, but is only naturally inclined to existing in its place, and this is as it were the primary and adequate object of that inclination; but the manner of existing with motion, or without it, is accidental, and is not properly an act contained per se under the primary object, but a concomitant and accidental condition. In the same way I judge that air can be said to be in neutral potency to light, because the form of air has no natural inclination to it, even if it is not repugnant to it; and similar examples are easy. Nor does the foundation of the second opinion proceed against this part, because this potency is not so much called neutral in comparison with the passive potency itself as with the form, which inclines to neither of those acts.

14. But considering in the posterior way matter or passive potency according to itself, thus I judge another distinction should be used; for either the potency is per se instituted and ordered to an act, or it only has aptitude for such an act as it were concomitant to its entity, so that it does not pertain to its primary end. When the potency is of the prior kind, whether it is compared to the adequate notion of its act, or to the specific and singular ones contained under it, the potency cannot be called neutral, but natural, as the foundation of Cajetan and others correctly proves. But truly when the potency or capacity is only of the posterior character, it is correctly called neutral potency, because it truly postulates no such act from natural inclination, neither adequately nor inadequately, because that capacity is not present in such a thing because it is per se ordered to that act, but only concomitantly. Thus I think the surface is in neutral potency to colors and not only to individual colors, but also to color absolutely, because it has no natural inclination to it. Hence in heaven there is surface without any color, and in simple elements, and it has as natural a state as in mixed things, where it is colored. But if in mixed things it cannot naturally be without color, this is not by reason of itself, but by reason of the form. In almost the same way I think quantity is in neutral potency to various figures, because they pertain nothing at all

to its natural perfection or inclination according to itself. Thus also according to the opinion and way of speaking of all philosophers, natural things are not said to be in natural potency to artificial forms, which are certain figures, but in obediential, which in those things is of the same character as neutral; but why it is called obediential, I shall explain immediately. And I think the same happens in prime matter with respect to some accidents, insofar as they regard it, because prime matter is per se primarily for the sake of substantial form; but accidents (besides quantity, which is a property connatural to it) it regards only mediately through the substantial form, or by reason of it. Hence, if there are accidents which contribute nothing to the substantial form nor are postulated by reason of it, with respect to those prime matter can be said to be in neutral potency, as to motion or rest, density or rarity.

15. Nor does the foundation of the other opinion proceed against this part, because such potency is not per se ordered from its nature to this kind of form or accidents, neither in particular nor in common, but is per se to an act of another kind, but concomitantly has capacity for the rest. But this reason or denomination of neutral potency does not exclude that such capacity be connatural from the part of the subject, as necessarily concomitant to the nature or entity of such a thing, indeed in the thing itself indistinct from it, except according to reason.

16. Passive obediential potency is not mere non-repugnance. And hence it is easily understood what should be said about the potency which created things have for receiving some acts of divine and supernatural power, which they cannot receive through natural causes, as is the capacity of the soul for grace and of the intellect for the light of glory. For there is no doubt that such potency is positive and real, and founded in the entity of the thing itself. For it cannot be said that it is mere non-repugnance; for, although this also intervenes, yet alone it is not sufficient for the real material causality which such things have around the act which they receive in themselves, for it is a

true and real subject of it on which such accidental act depends in being and becoming. Therefore there is in such a subject real passive capacity for such an act. Concerning this capacity, therefore, theologians dispute whether it should be called natural; and Scotus, In II, where cited above, and his disciples call it natural. But Cajetan, I p., q. 1, and 12, a. 1 of both, and other Thomists call it obediential, and they speak better, although there may be disagreement in the mode of speaking alone. For it is certain that this potency is not some thing superadded to the natures of things, or distinct from them in the thing itself, for it would be necessary to suppose another capacity, about which the same question would return. Hence according to this respect such potency can be called natural to the subject, because it is both naturally congenital with it, and is the very natural entity of it. As St. Augustine said, De Praedestinat. sanct., c. 5: "To be able to have faith and charity is natural to the faithful"; and St. Thomas, III, q. 113, a. 1, in the same sense says the rational soul is naturally capable of grace; and I, q. 48, a. 4, he says the soul's aptitude for grace follows its nature. But truly in comparison to the act and to the agent, from which potency is simply denominated, this potency cannot be called natural, as St. Thomas correctly says, In I, dist 14, q. 9, a. 2, both because that act is simply and in itself supernatural; and also because it cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent; and moreover because neither is such an act owed to such potency from the nature of the thing, nor does it have natural inclination to it, according to the more true opinion of theologians. And therefore this potency is usually called obediential, or potency of obedience, as I have treated extensively in I tome of I-II parts, disp. XXXI, sect. 6. And moreover St. Thomas can be seen, q. 29 de Verit., a. 3, ad 3, and q. unica de Virtutibus, a. 10, ad 13, and q. 1 de Potent., a. 3, ad 1; and Capreolus, In I, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5 contra 4 concl.; and Ferrariensis, III contra Gent., c. 102, where St. Thomas, ratione 4.

17. What kind is the potency which is in physical things to artificial forms. And in this way some philosophers speak about the

passive potency which is in natural things to artificial forms, and this way of speaking is taken from St. Thomas, II Phys., lect. 1. Because that potency also is not for its perfection or natural inclination. Hence under this aspect such potency can also be called neutral, because it neither inclines to the act naturally, nor is repugnant to it. But because it is not reduced to act by a merely natural agent, but by an intellectual one, operating both through art, which is in some way superadded to nature, and through the motion of the will, which is usually called command, therefore such potency is called obediential; for, as we said above, passive potency corresponds to active, hence it also receives a denomination proportionate to it. But there is a wide difference between obediential potency to artificial and to supernatural forms, for the former can be reduced to act by a created agent operating through natural powers, but the latter only by an uncreated agent, at least as principal. Likewise, because the action concerning the former potency, although it is not merely natural, as natural action is distinguished from free, nor is it natural as owed to nature, is nevertheless absolutely contained in the order of nature, as distinguished from the order of supernatural grace, and not miraculous, for in that action no effect or motion intervenes which cannot be made through natural virtues and potencies. Nor through that action is any form made which pertains to a superior grade or order of things. But the posterior potency is not reduced to act except through supernatural or miraculous action, either in mode or in substance. Finally the prior capacity is very limited, and to imperfect forms; but the posterior is most ample, so much so that it cannot be fully satisfied and filled, even by the absolute power of God, as is taken from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 7, and q. 29 de Verit., a. 3. For whatever God operates in it, it always remains capable of receiving more, for this very thing pertains to the infinite power of God.

Various Doubts are Resolved Incidentally

18. What potency prime matter has to the rational soul. And hence that question is easily resolved, what kind of potency matter has to the rational soul and whether it should be called natural. For it should be said that it is truly and properly natural potency, because the rational soul truly and naturally is the act of matter. Nor does it matter that that soul can be made only through creation, both because matter is not in potency to the creation of the soul, but to union, and this can be made by a natural agent; and also because God does not create that soul as a supernatural agent, but as pertaining in its order to the complement of natural causes.

19. Likewise there is easily defined from what has been said the question, namely, whether in matter or subject there is natural potency for receiving an act which it once had and lost, even if it can no longer naturally receive it. For it should be said that as to the entity and capacity of such a form the same potency remains, both because it is not in itself diminished, since it is indivisible, and also because for whatever reason such an act is restored to that potency it will embrace it by natural force. But truly as to the mode of receiving there is not in such a subject proximate capacity, that is, having all conditions required so that it can recover such an act from a natural agent. And therefore in this respect such potency can be called obediential. Nor is it inconvenient that potency in itself, and with respect to the act as if in the terminus, be natural, and yet that with respect to the way or mode of receiving it be obediential; for this respect is accidental from the presupposition of prior generation and corruption; but for natural potency it suffices that per se and absolutely that act could be obtained in a natural way and manner.

20. What potency is in physical things to physical forms producible by art alone. Again from this arises and is briefly resolved another question, namely, whether in natural things there is natural potency to certain substantial forms which, unless human art and industry is applied, cannot be introduced, and therefore seem rather to be made through art than through nature, as are the form of bread,

flour, and similar things. For it should be said that this does not prevent there being natural potency in things to those forms, which is none other than the potency of prime matter itself, which includes these forms also under its adequate object; but because of the peculiar dispositions required for such forms, peculiar industry is necessary in applying active to passive things so that the dispositions required for such forms can be introduced. Rather, there are scarcely any substantial things accommodated to human uses which do not require human industry so that they can be generated in a suitable manner; but all this industry is exercised in applying agent or patient causes. But some of these things depend more on art, because they can never be generated by things similar to themselves; but the power of introducing those forms per se is only in universal causes, which do not act unless matter is suitably prepared and applied through art.

21. Whether any passive potency is violent. Finally it can be inquired concerning this conclusion, whether there is given violent passive potency. For some deny this, because action is never violent from the part of passive potency alone; for this is of itself indifferent to opposites, as Aristotle testifies, lib. X Metaph., c. 6, text. 14. But Cajetan, in the opuscule cited above, although he denies neutral potency, nevertheless says that passive potency is distinguished into violent and natural; for the passive potency which a stone has to be moved upward is violent. But distinction is needed: for passive potency can be considered either according to itself, or as it exists under some act. In the prior way truly no passive potency is violent, because since it is of itself capable of such an act and no opposite act is supposed in it, it has nothing from which to be repugnant to it, but rather either inclines to it, if it is per se instituted for it, or at least is not repugnant to it, but is indifferent, if it has that capacity only concomitantly. But if potency is considered as it exists under some act, thus it can be said to be violent potency to the opposite act, with respect to the whole composite in which such potency remains; for such an act is violent to it, not to the potency itself according to itself.

But such potency is called violent, not because it violently exists in the composite, for rather it is natural, just as it is natural for a human to be mortal; but it is called violent because it is for an act violent to the supposit itself. Hence it happens that such violent potency is not distinguished in reality from natural, but only by relation to diverse acts. Add that although passive potency with respect to several positive acts, of which it is receptive, is not according to itself considered violent to either of them, because it determines neither to itself from its natural inclination, but from some form, nevertheless, if comparison is made not between positive acts, but between a positive act and its privation, thus it can happen that passive potency according to itself is violent to the lack of act, as when from natural passive inclination it determines such an act to itself as owed to it, in which way the matter of heaven would be violent without its proper form, concerning which matter I touched on some things in I tome III parts, disp. VIII, sect. 4.

Third Assertion About Predicamental Potency

22. I say third: predicamental potency is always natural potency in comparison to its act, but not always in comparison to the subject in which it exists. This assertion is easily gathered from all things said so far; for first of all every potency which is a species of quality is per se primarily instituted and ordered to act; therefore it is natural potency to its act. Primarily indeed and per se with respect to its adequate act, secondarily also with respect to inadequate acts which are contained under the adequate object. This can also be easily confirmed by induction in all potencies, both proper to the soul, which are simultaneously active and passive, and in others purely active, which always incline to their actions. Then it is clear by excluding other members; for obediential potency from the force of its notion is never a particular predicamental potency, but accompanies any things according to their mode. Hence, if sometimes obediential

potency is a thing pertaining to the second species of quality, as is, for example, the obediential potency of the rational soul to the light of glory, which is none other than the intellect itself, such (I say) potency is not therefore a species of quality because it is obediential, but because it accompanies a certain entity and is the same as it, which otherwise according to its proper notion is natural potency, and the same is in all similar cases.

23. Again in this kind of predicamental potency neutral potency is not given, because these include opposite notions; for neutral potency is that which does not incline to act; but predicamental potency, since it is per se primarily instituted for act, inclines to it, either per se primo, or per se secundo. But if we grant that in the same thing it can simultaneously happen that it is per se primarily instituted and inclined to some genus of acts, and that concomitantly it has capacity for some acts to be received to which it does not incline, as we said above about prime matter with respect to some accidental acts, it should first be said that such potency is not neutral insofar as it is predicamental, but as it concomitantly includes some transcendental capacity. Then we add that there is no predicamental potency which properly has such neutral potency, but obediential. And the reason is because there is no purely passive predicamental potency, as we said; but purely active potency can naturally only effect actions proportionate to itself, to which it is not neutral potency, but natural; but that it be elevated to other actions, this can only be through obediential potency. And for the same reason the potencies of the soul, insofar as they are active, do not have neutral potency. Nor also as they are passive, because they receive from themselves, and thus receive connaturally. But if sometimes they behave merely passively with respect to some acts which they receive naturally from others, this is always in order to perfecting their proper acts, and therefore they also receive those acts connaturally, unless they are elevated through obediential potency to superior acts.

24. No potency of the genus of quality is violent with respect to its act. And hence a fortiori it is concluded that there is no violent potency in this order with respect to act, since it naturally inclines and is ordered to it. But I say with respect to act, because with respect to some subject it can be violent, as if it is not innate to it, but externally added, as we shall explain immediately. For thus should be understood and limited what we said above about active potency. You will say: vicious act is violent to the will, for it is against its nature, as is clear from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 71 a. 2; therefore the potency of the will to such an act is violent; and yet it is proper and predicamental potency with respect to such acts. It is answered first that such an act is said to be against nature, because it is against the most perfect inclination of nature, not because it is against every inclination of nature; for the will itself also has some inclination to the body and to sensible goods, and therefore that act is not simply violent, which is also clear from the fact that it is absolutely voluntary. Add also that that act, as it is act, is not properly against nature, but as it has some defect or privation, and as such pertains not to potency but rather to impotency.

25. Some potency of the genus of quality is violent to its subject. Finally the last part of the conclusion is easy. For regularly such predicamental potencies are proper passions, and thus also from the part of subjects they are natural potencies innate and flowing from the essences of substances, as is evident per se; but sometimes they are externally adjoined, which seems to happen only in certain active virtues which are instruments of external agents, as is clear about the impetus impressed on a stone so that it be moved upward. Therefore because of these instrumental faculties I said that predicamental potency is not always connatural to the subject; for these faculties pertain to this species of quality. But they can sometimes be violent, as in the example given; sometimes however supernatural and divinely infused; and sometimes they can be indifferent, although they are from created causes, as if an impetus is impressed on fire by which it is

moved circularly in its sphere. Nor does any special difficulty occur in this.

SECTION V
WHETHER TO EACH POTENCY A PROPER ACT CORRESPONDS AND HOW

1. I suppose that it is one thing to compare a thing in potency to a thing in act, another thing truly to compare potency to act. For in the prior comparison the agent or patient potency is not compared to its act, but the same possible thing as possible to itself as actually existing; which are not properly related as potency and act, but as thing in potency and thing in act, which is very different. Concerning this distinction we spoke above, disp. XXXI, where we also treated whether the essence and existence of a creature are compared as true potency and act according to reality, or according to reason only. In the present therefore we do not compare thing in potency to thing in act, because we do not treat of objective or logical potency, as we saw above; but we compare real potency, which is only active or passive, to its proper act. Concerning these potencies also we can treat either broadly and as it were transcendentally, or strictly and predicamentally, that is, insofar as such potencies pertain to the predicament of quality. And we shall explain both; for although here we treat of potencies only in the posterior respect, nevertheless, so that the matter may be exactly understood, it is necessary to touch on all modes of potencies and acts and to compare them among themselves.

Resolution of the Question

2. I say therefore first: to each potency, both active and passive, a proper act corresponds, but diversely; for to passive potency

there always corresponds some formal act actuating and perfecting it; but to active potency as such there does not correspond an act formally actuating it, but flowing from it. The first part of the assertion is taken from Aristotle, IX Metaph., where he explains every potency through relation to act, as we shall say more broadly in the following section. Moreover it is established from the very name and notion of potency, to which operation corresponds, or certainly the thing operated, or terminus of operation; but operation signifies act, as is manifest per se.

3. The second part also of the conclusion is sufficiently clear per se from the proper notion of passive potency, which is ordered to receiving; for in this it is distinguished from active, as such; but proper and physical reception consists in the adherence or union of some formal act. But I say proper and physical, because water is also said to be received in a vessel, and the located in place; but that reception is only extrinsic, through a certain contact, hence to it there does not correspond proper passive potency, of which we speak; proper reception therefore or passion is that which is made through intrinsic union and actuation of potency. Therefore it is necessary that to passive potency there correspond a proper act formally actuating such potency; actuating (I say) either in aptitude or in act. For it is not of the notion of passive potency as such always to be under its act, as we shall say more broadly in the following section. But it is of its notion that there correspond to it a formal act proportionate to it, and which is possible according to the proportion of the potency itself, namely, that if the potency is merely natural, the act also be naturally possible; but if it be only obediential potency, the act be possible either through art, or through supernatural force, according to the mode of obediential potency, and according to the rule set above, that to passive potency corresponds active potency with proportion.

4. Then concerning this act of passive potency it should be considered that a twofold notion distinct from the nature of the thing is found in such an act (especially when the act is not congenital): one

is the notion of actual passion, the other is the notion of form in completed being. For that these two notions are distinct from the nature of the thing, and intervene in the reduction of passive potency to act, will be established below, when we dispute about passion. But that under each notion there is formal act of passive potency, is clear, because under each it intrinsically adheres to passive potency and reduces it from potency to act. Hence Aristotle, defining motion (which in reality is the same as passion), says it is the act of being in potency. But defining form or soul, he says it is the act of matter or body. Nor is it repugnant that one and the same potency be actuated in two ways, because those are mutually ordered, and where one is for the sake of another, there is only one. Wherefore just as becoming is ordered to being, and way to terminus, so the act or actuation of passion is ordered to the act of form or information. Hence, although in the way of generation passion is the first and immediate act of passive potency, nevertheless in the way of intention and perfection the prior act is the form itself, or terminus of passion. And therefore to it primarily and per se the passive potency is proportioned, and from it takes its proper notion and species, according to what we shall say below.

5. And hence the last part about active potency and its act is easily established; for active potency as such is not for receiving, but for acting; therefore the corresponding act should not be by way of reception or information, but by way of emanation only. And it is confirmed and explained; for, just as to passive potency corresponds passion or the terminus of passion, so to active potency corresponds action and effect or terminus of action; but concerning the effect it is established that, speaking per se, it is not an act informing the agent potency, indeed not even properly its act, as I shall say immediately. But concerning action Aristotle, III Phys., IX Metaph., teaches that it is not the formal act of the agent itself. And although he speaks especially of transient action, nevertheless below when disputing about action we shall show formally that this is true of all action as

such, because, although immanent action is formal act of its active potency, nevertheless it does not have this from the fact that it is action, but from the fact that it is simultaneously passion of such potency, as it is passive. Just as also the terminus or effect of that action is formal act of the same potency, not from the fact (speaking formally) that it is its effect, as of an efficient principle, but from the fact that it is form respecting the passive capacity of such potency; therefore universally the act of active potency, as it is active, is not its formal act.

6. On account of which St. Thomas, 1, q. 25, a. 1, ad 1, says active potency is not divided against act, but rather founded in it, in which he seems in some way to be repugnant to the first part of our assertion; but it is not repugnant, because he speaks of informing act, or intrinsically giving being; but we have spoken more abstractly. Therefore he means that to active potency there does not correspond an act which properly actuates it; to which it is not repugnant that there correspond an act which is from it, which is not so much its act as of another, namely, of the effect or passive potency.

7. The proper act of active potency is action rather than effect. From which it can be understood, since from active potency two things distinct from the nature of the thing flow, namely, action and terminus or effect, that action itself is more properly or formally said to be the act corresponding to active potency, than its terminus. In this there seems to be some difference between active and passive potency, the reason of which is that, although the effect is per se primarily intended and action is ordered to it, nevertheless it does not so formally respect the agent with intrinsic and transcendental relation, as action itself, and therefore through action as such active potency is constituted in the notion of actually acting, and not through the effect, and therefore properly and formally action is said to be the act corresponding to such potency. But truly in passive potency, not only passion, but also the form which is its terminus respects such potency with intrinsic and transcendental respect, and actuates it. You will say:

therefore the act responding to active potency is its formal act, for action as such is formal act of the agent. I answer that it is formal act by denomination, not by information, because it does not respect the agent as that in which it is, but as that from which it is; and therefore although in the mode of denominating it imitates formal act, nevertheless in reality it is not such an act.

8. Inference from what has been said. From which it is inferred that not every potency is compared to act, as proper subject of it, but only that which is passive. This is easily proved from what has been said, because only the act of passive potency is act informing or actuating it. Which also the very notion of passive potency bears before itself; for, since its office is to receive, that alone is what has or constitutes the notion of subject of some act. But here immediately there insinuated itself the question, whether transient action is in the agent potency as in a subject; but now we suppose the negative part as true, and universally that action as action is not received in agent potency as such, but if sometimes it remains in it, this is insofar as it is simultaneously patient, which never happens unless when it receives the terminus of action in itself. Concerning this matter we shall speak extensively below, when disputing about action and passion.

9. Objection against the inference is solved. But it can be objected here: for every act is received in some potency; therefore especially in that of which it is the act or to which it has relation; therefore, conversely, every potency is subject of its act. It is answered that act should be distinguished, for, as I said above when disputing about the existence of a creature, act is sometimes said absolutely, that is, without respect to agent or receiving potency, and is opposed to objective potency and excludes the state of existing only in potency, and thus God is called act both of intelligence and of actual existence. Therefore it is not of the notion of such act that it be in a subject; but now we do not speak of that act. But in another way act is taken relatively to agent or patient potency, and concerning this also distinction should be made; for the act of passive potency is properly

and formally in a subject, because this is its proper relation to its potency; but the act of active potency formally and according to its proper notion is not in a subject, because according to its proper notion it does not express the relation of inexisting in its potency, but of emanating from it. But according to reality, if the action be accidental, it inheres in that subject in which the passion inheres; but if it be substantial, it is not necessary that it always have a proper subject, but it suffices if through identity it is joined to the terminus as its mode, all of which will be explained more broadly in disp. XLVIII, and something was touched on above, disp. XVIII.

Last Assertion About the Distinction of Act From Potency

10. Finally it should be said that, although to each potency there responds an act proportionate to it, nevertheless there is always something distinct in reality and in essence and species from it. The prior part about proportion is manifest from the terms themselves; for if potency respects act and act responds to potency, it is necessary that they maintain proportion among themselves. Likewise, if potency be passive, it is necessary that it have capacity for receiving the act, and that the act have aptitude for actuating it, and this is the proportion required between such potency and act. But if potency be active, it is necessary that it in some way contain in itself its action and force and perfection for eliciting it, and this is the proportion required in such potency.

11. But the other part about distinction in reality can also easily be proved. First in general, because the relation of potency to act is real. Then in particular, because active potency is effective principle of its act; but there is no true efficiency except between those which are distinguished in reality. But receptive potency is material cause of its act, and conversely act is formal of such potency, truly and intrinsically making it; therefore such act and potency are necessarily

distinguished in the thing itself. Hence Aristotle, lib. IX Metaph., c. 3, takes as manifest that potency and act are one thing and another, so that from this he concludes that a thing which is in potency is not always in act, against the ancients who asserted the opposite. From which a new confirmation is taken: for potency is separable from its act in the thing itself; therefore they are distinguished in reality. Wherefore when Aristotle, VIII Metaph., c. 6, says potency and act do not make many, but one, the sense is not that they are one and the same, but that they compose one; for he speaks of receptive potency and formal act. And in almost the same sense he says there, that what was previously in potency, afterwards is in act, not because the receptive potency itself becomes act, but because the same thing which previously lacked act, afterwards is constituted under it. Although it can also be understood not of potency and act concerning which we now speak, but of the thing which is said to be in potency through non-repugnance, or through denomination from agent or receiving potency; for thus that same thing which was in potency, is reduced to act when it is made, which was explained above when we treated of the division of being into being in potency and in act.

12. But here it should be observed that this distinction between act and potency is not always equal; for sometimes it is properly and rigorously real, sometimes modal distinction suffices; for also a mode is act by way of form of that thing which it modifies, and can also be made by it effectively. But when this distinction is real, when truly only modal, should be gathered from the particular nature of each act and potency, and from other effects or signs. But if someone should say that sometimes act and potency are distinguished only by reason as genus and difference, we shall answer that this has place in logical or metaphysical act and potency, but we speak of real and physical potency compared with its proper act.

13. Finally the last part about essential distinction is easily established from what has been said, for potency and act are distinguished according to reality, and differ according to completely

diverse and opposite relations; therefore they differ according to essential notion. You will say: also action and passion differ according to diverse relations, and yet in reality they do not differ. It is answered that also action and passion, in the way in which they are conceived as diverse, are distinguished essentially, since they are distinguished by genus and predicament. But that they are not distinguished according to reality, is because those relations are not opposite, but rather necessarily connected in one and the same change; but act and potency not only express diverse relations, but also opposite ones; indeed they regard each other as termini of those relations, and therefore, and because those relations are of diverse natures it is necessary that act and potency not only be distinguished in reality, but also be diversified in their formal or essential notions. Which can also be shown by induction, whether potency and act are taken transcendentally, as is clear in matter and form and in any active principle and its action, or predicamentally, as we chiefly speak; for intellect and intellection differ essentially, and so concerning the rest.

14. Act and potency whether always under the same genus. But here immediately occurred the question, granted that potency and act differ in species, whether they should necessarily be under the same genus; for this question is usually disputed extensively, especially because of Aristotle, Metaph., c. 5, saying that the same are the principles of things in all genera, namely, act and potency. But this matter was disputed extensively by us above, disp. XIV, and the same should be said briefly that active potency and act are not necessarily of the same genus; indeed, if speech be of the proper and immediate act which corresponds to it and which is action, they are always of diverse genus, since the principle of acting is always substance or quality; but if the terminus itself or effect is called the act of such potency, sometimes it will be of the same, sometimes of diverse genus, according to the character of univocal or equivocal agent, as is sufficiently established from what was said above about agent causes. But truly passive potency taken transcendentally is not always of the

same genus with its act, but only then when the potency is per se primarily ordered to the act, as we explained extensively in the cited place. Wherefore predicamental potency, if it be passive, is always of the same genus with its formal and perfect act; for such passive potency, as we explained, is only that which is simultaneously active through immanent act; but immanent act is of the same genus with its potency, since it is true quality, as was shown in the preceding disputation.

SECTION VI

WHETHER ACT IS PRIOR TO POTENCY IN DURATION, PERFECTION, DEFINITION AND KNOWLEDGE

1. All these comparisons between act and potency were made by Aristotle lib. IX Metaph., c. 8 and following. And we made almost the same ones above between cause and effect, and afterwards between substance and accident. Concerning which almost the same reasoning is as concerning act and potency; for among these also some relation of cause and effect intercedes. But always that distinction should be kept before one's eyes, that it is one thing to compare the thing itself which is said to be in objective or logical potency, to the thing existing in act; another thing truly to compare real potency to real act corresponding to it. For Aristotle, in the said place, sometimes seems to speak in one sense, sometimes in the other. But the reasoning is far different in these, and therefore these comparisons should be spoken of individually and briefly.

The Thing In Potency is Compared to Itself Existing in Act

2. In the prior sense therefore, whether we speak of act and potency in general, or in particular of the same thing as in potency, compared to itself as in act, it is clear that act is prior to potency in perfection, because it is better for each thing to be in act than in potency; indeed without being in act there is no true and real perfection, which is something in the nature of things, as we explained above when treating of existence. And therefore also simply comparing act to potency, act is better from its genus; wherefore, other things being equal, the more a thing has of act and the more it is separated from potentiality, the more perfect it is. And hence it also happens that other things being equal, the less a thing is composed of act and passive potency and the more actual it is through itself, the more perfect it is, because the more it is removed from being in potency; for such being in potency is either maximally founded in passive potency, or in logical potency with extrinsic active potency of an agent cause.

3. Act is prior in knowledge than potency. Again according to this comparison also it is certain that act is prior to potency in knowledge, which can be taken in a twofold sense: first, comparing diverse things, so that that is judged prior in knowledge which has more of act and includes less potentiality; which is true, if by that priority is not understood some order among such things, so that one should be known before another; for this is not necessary, as is evident per se; but that priority is understood to consist only in a certain greater aptitude which is on the part of such a thing to be known, in which way Aristotle said, II Metaph., text. 4, as something is related to being, so it is related to being knowable. Which is also true considering the merits of things according to themselves; as to us it does not always so happen, as we said more extensively disp. IX, sect. ult. In the second way the assertion is understood by comparing the same thing in potency to itself in act, and thus we chiefly speak; and this Aristotle signifies above, c. 11, saying that things which are in potency cannot be understood, unless they are reduced to act, because

act is the principle of knowing each thing. Which is true also of the act of existence, and speaking per se of science, insofar as it is compared or had from things themselves. Which is manifest in us; for we cannot achieve knowledge of things, unless we take a beginning from existing things. For we do not know possible things, except from actual ones, nor past or future ones, except from those which were sometimes present; nor do we know privations, except from positive things, nor beings of reason, except from real ones. And the reason is clear in us, because we derive science from things, indeed we receive it also through sense; but the senses cannot be changed except by things actually existing.

4. Nevertheless not only in us, but also in God himself this is true, if it is correctly and aptly understood, because God himself also has all his knowledge primarily and per se concerning a thing actually existing, or from a thing actually existing; for first and per se he knows himself, who necessarily exists in act; then, although he knows possible creatures independently from their actual existence, nevertheless he does not know them except through himself and his known virtue as eminently containing in its actuality all possible creatures. Because although God does not receive science from things outside himself, he receives (so to speak) science of things outside himself from himself, as from a primary object known.

5. But the reasoning is different concerning the knowledge of angels, which is as it were middle between divine and human, and can sometimes be of possible things in themselves immediately. And the reason is because angels have knowledge through infusion of species from the first cause, and in this respect they somehow have knowledge through teaching rather than through investigation. And therefore I said that the speech is of science insofar as it is compared and had from things themselves. Hence also in us it can happen that through teaching we have knowledge of possible things, even if through their actual existence they do not move our sense and intellect. And the reason is because, when knowledge is had through teaching or

infusion, it already supposes knowledge of the same things in another teaching or influencing, in which there is knowledge from things or from some thing actually existing; and thus also in knowledge through teaching it is true that at least mediately it comes from some thing actually existing, and thus extends to the knowledge of possibles.

6. In which there is also to be noted the difference between human and angelic knowledge, that human knowledge, which is acquired through teaching, can never be perfect and have the character of science, unless it is simultaneously taken in some way from things actually existing and known, because human intellect cannot from the force of discipline alone form proper concepts of things, because a human teacher cannot impress proper species of things, but only speak with words and signs ad placitum, which do not suffice for forming proper concepts of things. Wherefore it is necessary that sometimes the disciple be helped by experience of the senses. On account of which Aristotle said, I lib. Poster., c. 14, that he who lacks some sense, cannot achieve perfect knowledge of those things which can be perceived by that sense alone, and II Phys., c. 1, he says that one blind from birth who reasons about colors, discusses names, for he cannot conceive the thing itself. Therefore a human, even when he learns through teaching, should be helped by the senses, which are only concerned with singular and existing things, so that he can acquire knowledge, although after once acquired knowledge he can perfectly retain it, and use it perfectly concerning a non-existing thing, as is known per se, and Aristotle teaches, II de Anim., c. 4, and lib. III, c. 4. But truly angelic knowledge can be perfect concerning a possible thing, even if it was never known by angels as existing, nor through another thing objectively known as existing, but immediately through its species. And the reason is because angels receive from their Teacher God proper and perfect species of things simultaneously with intellectual light connatural to them, which are perfect principles of proper knowledge of such things. But it is true nevertheless that these possible things themselves are not known according to true being of

essence without some relation to actual being of existence; for, as we said above, real essence is only that which is apt to exist. And according to this consideration it can also be said that act is prior in definition to potency, because neither can be defined, nor perfectly understood what it is to be in potency, except through being in act or through relation to it.

Things in Act & in Potency are Compared in Duration

7. Finally it should be said in this comparison that it is not simply necessary that being in potency precede being in act in duration, nor, conversely, that being in act precede being in potency, neither in the same individual, nor in diverse ones in the same species; nevertheless in fact in all things outside God being in potency precedes being in act in duration, both in species and in individual things, although necessarily virtual or eminent being in act of God himself precedes not in time, but in nature any being in potency. The prior part of this assertion follows from the opinion of Aristotle positing the world eternal; for thus not only in God, but also in creatures (speaking in general and confusedly, and not in particular of this or that creature) being possible did not precede being in act in duration, because from eternity creatures are posited to have actually existed. And although that assertion of Aristotle is false, it is nevertheless not impossible in every respect, and therefore we said it is not necessary that being in potency precede being in act in duration. But those who deny that any creature can be made from eternity, consequently will say that being in potency is necessarily supposed in the order of duration before being in act, in those things which can be in potency; in God also this comparison does not have place because from intrinsic necessity he is in act. But we do not think this opinion true except in successive things, and therefore, speaking absolutely of creatures, we do not judge it necessary that being in potency precede

the production of a thing in duration. For any species of permanent things could be produced from eternity, and thus the species itself could always be in act by reason of one or several individuals, and any individual also, speaking divisively, could from eternity be in act according to God's choice.

8. All things outside God first existed in potency in duration, than in action. But truly in fact, since from faith it is established that all things were produced in time, it happens that all species and all individuals of created things were first in potency than in their proper and formal act. But Aristotle, because he posited perpetual succession of generations, said, lib. IX Metaph., c. 8, although with respect to the same subject being in potency precedes being in act, nevertheless with respect to the whole species or collection of all individuals, before any being in potency some being in act precedes, because that which is in potency could not be reduced to act unless it supposed another existing in act. But this opinion, as I said, proceeds from a false foundation. But the reason touched only proves the last part of our conclusion, namely with respect to the whole species existing in potency, an eminent virtue is necessarily supposed in act from which that potency can be recalled to act. For the species of creatures could not be in potency unless some agent preceded in whose virtue they were contained, and therefore it is necessary that they were not first in potency than in some act in which they were contained virtually or eminently, which act had to be of itself and entirely necessary, otherwise it also would have been first in potency than in act. Hence also it should have been contained in another eminent and virtual act; and since one cannot proceed to infinity, it is necessary to stop at some act per se necessarily containing by virtue all things which have being in potency. And thus in the whole latitude of being, being in act is first of all, and from it in some way has origin that some things are in potency. And although being in act of the necessary being does not precede in duration before being in potency of other possible beings,

because as soon as it is, from its virtue the rest are possible, nevertheless it precedes in the order of nature for the same cause.

Each Potency is Compared to its Act

9. Concerning the other comparison between real potency and its act, which more pertains to our purpose, we can further distinguish between potency taken broadly and transcendentally, and proper predicamental potency; nevertheless lest we linger in an easy matter, we shall speak simply and in general, and simultaneously indicate if something is proper to predicamental potency.

10. The act of an agent as such is not more perfect than the potency. First therefore it should be said that the act of agent potency as such, from its genus is not prior in perfection to potency, indeed nor does it add perfection to such potency as such from the fact that it exercises such act. This is proved: for such act is either action of this potency, or terminus of action; but action as such is something imperfect, as is evident per se; the terminus also of action, speaking per se, does not exceed active virtue, unless perhaps that be only instrumental, as Aristotle touched, lib. VIII Metaph., c. 7. Therefore active potency from its genus does not have that it be less perfect than its act; indeed, since from it proceeds its act, and from it participates whatever perfection it has, it is necessary that from its genus it be more perfect, and that the most perfect active potency surpass in perfection any act which can flow from it; although in particular some active virtue can be of equal perfection with its act as to the terminus of action, as in univocal agents; but sometimes it is less perfect, as in instrumental virtues.

11. The effect of a transient agent adds no perfection to it. Transient action does not perfect the agent. But that such act does not perfect the potency itself, concerning the terminus of action all confess, unless it be received in the potency itself from elsewhere; for then it will perfect it, not because it is terminus of its action, speaking

formally, but because it is formal act of it, and thus is compared to it, not as to agent potency, but as to receiving. But excluding this relation, the terminus of action as such is a thing extrinsic to the agent potency itself, and, as I said above, is not properly its act, because per se it does not have relation to it, but through mediate action; it is therefore not its perfection. But concerning action first this is established concerning the active potency of God and his action, which properly is only action ad extra; but it is not better or more perfect for potency to act in act than not to act. But concerning the action of created active potency some doubt, or feel the opposite; nevertheless if action be transient, it is not formal act of the agent potency itself, but only extrinsically denominates it as acting in act; but extrinsic denomination is not proper and formal perfection; for although it is called by some extrinsic perfection, nevertheless in reality this is not to be perfection, except in name only. Because if it is extrinsic, it confers no real being to the denominated thing; therefore nor real perfection; for this is not without real being, concerning which we shall say more below when disputing about action. But if we speak of immanent action, that indeed is formal perfection of that potency from which it flows, because it remains in it, and therefore it is not so much its perfection as it is agent, as it is receiving; and consequently action does not perfect as action, but as reception or passion. And thus it happens that agent potency from its notion is not perfected by its act, but rather it effectively perfects its action, and through it perfects either the patient or the effect.

12. The operation of active potency, whether it is prior in knowledge than potency. Then it should be said that the operation of active potency, speaking per se, is not prior in knowledge or definition to the potency itself, but rather conversely, except only in predicamental potency, which is per se primarily instituted for such action. The prior part is proved, because active virtue from its genus is more eminent than its action, and can be a completely absolute thing, even from transcendental relation to its act; therefore knowledge or

definition of such virtue per se does not suppose knowledge of its action, nor per se require it in its absolute definition. Rather conversely, since that action, insofar as it is such, expresses relation to such a principle, per se it requires that it be known and defined through order to it. And conversely, because that virtue is per se cause of such action eminently containing it, such virtue being perfectly known, through it as through a cause its action will be able to be known; therefore from itself such potency is rather prior in knowledge to its act than conversely.

13. Objection is solved. You will say: the active potency of God, although it be most perfect and most absolute of all, cannot be exactly known or apprehended, unless its action is known, at least as possible; therefore exact knowledge of potency depends on knowledge of action; therefore from this reasoning such action can be said to be prior in knowledge to its potency. There are those who deny the assumption; but I judge that it should be admitted, and the consequence denied, because this is not on account of dependence but on account of eminence of cause and necessary consequence. For just as in the above we often said that sometimes it happens that one thing cannot be without another, not because it depends on it properly as from cause and from prior, but because through emanation or another way it is necessarily conjoined to it, so in the present it should be understood that one thing can necessarily be known with another, not because it is prior in knowledge, but rather, conversely, because from the force of the other it is necessarily known. But I said in the assertion speaking per se, that is, considering the order or mode of knowledge which things themselves according to themselves postulate; for with respect to us, often it happens that operation is prior in knowledge than potency, because we do not know things a priori, but through effects. But the exception was added of those potencies or qualities which are per se primarily by their nature instituted for action; for since their essence includes transcendental relation to their act, it cannot be known or defined

except through it or in order to it, as we shall say immediately of passive potencies; for in this the reasoning of both is the same.

14. Active potency is prior by nature than act. Whether also prior in duration. Third it should be said that active potency is simply prior by nature to its act, it can also be prior in duration, although this is not always necessary. This whole conclusion is taken from Aristotle, in the cited place, and the first part is established from what was said above about causes; for active potency is efficient cause of its act; therefore also simply prior by nature to it. But concerning the order of duration, it is established first that potency cannot be posterior in duration to its act, since it is supposed to it as its principle. But Aristotle excepts those potencies which are acquired by use, as is art; but those are rather habits; but we treat more strictly of potency as it is distinguished against habit. And the habits themselves, although they suppose acts, nevertheless not those which they elicit, but others similar as to substance or species, which necessarily suppose natural potency from which they are elicited. Then it is certain that agent potency per se does not depend on its act. And therefore from this part it is not repugnant to precede in time. But from elsewhere potency does not always proceed to act from necessity, either because it is free, or because, although from itself it acts from necessity, nevertheless it does not always have applied all things requisite for acting, or certainly because action itself is successive, and therefore it is necessary that at least through an instant it suppose potency, all of which were said more extensively above, disp. XXVI.

15. And hence easily conversely it is shown that it is not necessary that agent potency always precede its action in duration; for if action from itself is neither made with resistance of a contrary, nor includes succession intrinsically, but can be made suddenly, it will be able to be simultaneous in time with its potency. For such potency in the first instant of its being can have simultaneously conjoined and applied all things requisite for acting; therefore if it be free, according

to its freedom it will be able simultaneously to exercise its action; but if it be natural, from necessity it will have action coeval to itself.

16. All these things are true comparing in the individual each potency to its act. But comparing in general or in species and with respect to diverse individuals active potency to its act, some think, from Aristotle, V Metaph., c. 8, it is necessary that potency precede act in time. Nevertheless Aristotle there does not compare active potency to its act, but being in potency to being in act, which comparison in the present applied can only have this sense, that if in some individual there is agent potency only in potency for acting, necessarily in another there preceded similar potency acting in act; as if Peter is in potency for generating, in another there preceded potency eliciting generation in act. In which sense such an assertion supposes first the false opinion about the eternity of the world; otherwise it is established that Adam was first in potency for generating, than he had generated any human. Then also positing that principle, that comparison formally has place, only in those potencies of which one proceeds in some way from the act of another, as happens in that example of generative potencies, or in heat, which receives the power of heating through prior heating. But truly in other actions this is not necessary, speaking formally; as, for example, although Peter is in potency for eliciting love of God, and humans were from eternity, it is not necessary that there preceded in some similar potency under act, because that act per se contributes nothing to the series of generation. Therefore neither in the individual nor in species is it per se necessary that active potency precede its act in time.

17. Nor also in fact is this true in all created potencies, as is clear in the potencies of angels, and also of the first human, as is more probable, at least as to intellect and will, and consequently also as to interior sense; and concerning external ones, at least as to sight, it is more likely not only in humans, but also in other animals. The same also appears in the action of light, but concerning other created virtues nothing is established. But in the creator potency for acting preceded

every external action of his in duration, although this was not from necessity, as I said, but from his freedom.

18. Passive potency cannot follow its act in duration. And in almost the same way (lest it be necessary to repeat this) reasoning should be made concerning the order of duration between passive potency and its act; for such potency cannot from the nature of the thing be posterior in time to its act, since it is supposed to it. Nor is it necessary that it be prior in time to it; for it can have it congenital; nevertheless from its genus it is not repugnant that it precede in time, either divisively any signated act, because before any it can be under another, or collectively, because it can sometimes be only in potency and under no act, as is clear in human intellect and similar things, although in some potency from special reasoning this is repugnant, at least from the nature of the thing, as in prime matter, all of which were said more extensively above, disp. XXVII, comparing material cause to formal.

19. Passive potency as such is less perfect than its act. Fourth it should be said that passive potency, insofar as it is such, is less perfect than its act, not because it is always simply a less perfect being, but because it is better disposed with its act, especially perfect, than without it. Almost this whole conclusion was also treated above comparing material cause to formal; for these comparisons are of the same reasoning. Hence the sense of the first part of this assertion is that passive potency as to some condition is always less perfect than its act, because passive potency expresses something inform and actuable; but it is formed and as it were completed and actuated through its act; therefore according to this reasoning it is always less perfect than its act. But this comparison is only secundum quid; hence from it it is not licit to gather that passive potency in its entity is simply less perfect than its act. But this is indeed true in substantial potency compared to its substantial act, because such act gives being simply, and constitutes complete substance, as was said in the above comparing matter with substantial form.

20. But truly in passive potency to accidental act distinction is needed: for either such potency is not per se primarily by its nature ordered to such act, which we call potency transcendentally, or it is proper predicamental potency, per se primarily ordered to act. Concerning the prior no universal rule can be given, because since that thing, which has such capacity, does not have thence its specific and essential character, it is not to be measured in perfection from the capacity of such act, but from elsewhere from proper principles. Hence it happens that sometimes it is more perfect than the act, sometimes less perfect; as substance, which is proximately capable of some accidents, is more perfect than them; but quantity, which is passively compared to light, perhaps is less perfect than it. But the posterior potency proper and predicamental is never purely passive, as I said, but is simultaneously active principle of its acts, and therefore, as I think, it is always more perfect than them (I speak of natural acts, so as to omit comparison to supernatural ones, which does not pertain to us) as eminent and equivocal principle of them; concerning which matter more extensively in the books de Anima, for such potencies are found only in the soul.

21. Potency is better disposed under act than without it. Aristotle's limitation. The last part of the conclusion is also easily proved from what has been said; for since the act of passive potency is its formal perfection, when it is conjoined it adds to it perfection which the potency from itself did not have; therefore potency under such act will be more perfect than if it lacks it. You will say: the composite from it and act will be more perfect than the potency alone; but it itself will not be more perfect, because it always remains the same entity distinct from act. It is answered: just as potency is informed and actuated through act, so also it is perfected through it, not because the simple entity of potency grows in its essential perfection, but because perfection is intrinsically added to it, which is as it were its complement and constitutes it in the best and most perfect state. And in this sense chiefly Aristotle says, IX Metaph., c. 9,

act is more perfect than potency, because potency is more perfectly disposed under act than without it. But this part Aristotle seems immediately to limit, ibid., c. 10, saying that in good things indeed, act or being in act is to be preferred to potency, but not in evil things. And he gives the reason, because the same potency is of contrary acts, of which one is good and the other evil; for always one of contraries has the character of privation, and thus has the character of evil with respect to potency; and therefore potency under good act always is more perfectly disposed, because it is better to be good simply and in act, than to be in an indifferent state toward good and evil; but conversely it is better, or less evil, to be in an indifferent state toward good and evil, than definitely to be already in a worse state.

Whether it is Better to Lack Every Act Than to Have A Depraved One

22. But a difficulty occurs concerning this, because act, whatever it may be, adds some perfection to potency; therefore if potency nude and existing in potency alone is compared precisely to such an act, it is better to be under that act than entirely to lack act. Although such act compared to its contrary is worse and has the character of privation, nevertheless compared to nude potency, it always has the character of greater perfection. And it is confirmed, because otherwise prime matter should be judged to exist in a worse state under the form of stone than if it lacked every form, because in this posterior way it would be indifferent to imperfect and perfect form; but in that state it is already definitely under imperfect form which has repugnance and some opposition with more perfect form.

23. The small doubt is resolved and Aristotle is explained. It is answered first, this assertion of Aristotle can be understood concerning good and evil morally; for thus it is better not to operate, than to operate badly, and thus the proposition is true, especially concerning the act of agent potency as such. For good and evil moral

is not attributed to something formally as it is patient, but as it is agent; but if passion is sometimes denominated evil, it is only insofar as through evil action it is voluntary. And thus the difficulty touched ceases; for it only proceeds concerning physical and entitative perfection, which is added to receptive potency through any real act. But although the doctrine of this response is true, nevertheless Aristotle both speaks of the act of passive potency as such, and more broadly of good and evil natural act, as is clear from the examples which he uses, namely, to be able to be healthy, and to be sick, etc.

24. Wherefore second it can be said that in imperfect act two things can be considered, namely, positive perfection, according to which it actuates potency, and some privation by reason of which it has the character of evil; from the prior heading it can be conceded to the argument made that it is better to have such act than entirely to lack act, because that act as such does not have the character of evil, but of good, but otherwise under the posterior reasoning, because, as such, it does not posit perfection, but takes away. But I add, to explain this more, that receptive potency can be compared to some contrary or repugnant acts in two ways. First, as being entirely indifferently disposed to either of them, as that which from itself postulates neither definitely, as matter is compared to all substantial forms, and consequently also to contrary or repugnant accidental ones, and in this way the argument concludes that such potency is better under any act, even most imperfect, than without any, because that act does not have the character of evil, but of lesser good. But there is another potency which although it can receive contrary acts, nevertheless either one is connatural and the other violent, or one is simply owed to the perfection of such potency, but the other, although it can be admitted or received in such potency, is nevertheless repugnant to the perfection owed to it, whether this comes from another act conjoined to such potency, or from some intrinsic inclination of it. As in a stone there is passive potency to motion upward and downward, but by reason of form one is owed and the other repugnant. The will also is in

potency for receiving acts of virtue or vice, of which the prior is owed and the other repugnant to the most perfect inclination of the will itself as such. Therefore with respect to such potency it is better to lack either act than to be under an act repugnant to it, which properly has the character of evil; for in this way the perfection of act is not attended to from the entitative perfection alone of that form, which is act, but maximally from the proportion between act and potency. Hence, although heat is simply more perfect than cold and water can be under either act, nevertheless it is not better for it to be under heat than under cold, because it is not so owed and proportionate to it. And in this way chiefly Aristotle spoke in the cited place.

25. Passive potency primarily ordered to act is posterior in knowledge and definition than it. Finally it should be said that passive potency is posterior in knowledge and definition to its act, not only as to us but also according to itself and its nature. This conclusion is understood of passive potency per se primarily instituted on account of act, such as is prime matter in substantial things; concerning whose knowledge through form was said in disput XIII and XV. But in accidents truly there are such potencies which are ordered to receiving immanent acts, as is established from the above; but these potencies are proper to animals or superior living things; wherefore the demonstration of this conclusion chiefly pertains to the science concerning the soul, where it is shown that potencies are specified by acts. From which principle the said assertion should be proved, because principles are in some way prior in knowledge than those things which are from principles; but act is in some way principle of potency insofar as it is specifying it, and insofar as it is that on account of which such potency is primarily instituted; therefore act as such is prior in knowledge. Again, that, through which something is defined, is prior in definition than the defined itself; but potency of this kind is defined through act as taking species from it; therefore act is prior in definition than potency. But that principle, that such potencies take species from acts, is now supposed by us as commonly received; for it

should be disputed more fully in the book concerning the soul. Now we only say that it should be understood that potency is specified by act, not as by an intrinsic difference, but as by a terminus of the intrinsic relation of potency to act; it should also be understood concerning adequate act, either according to reality, or according to some common notion with respect to potency. And thus the matter is without difficulty; for the same reasoning is in this respect concerning potency, which is concerning any thing including transcendental respect to another, as we said above concerning matter and form, and we shall say below concerning habits, where we shall explain this more, and we shall say something when treating of relation, and of action and passion.

26. An objection is satisfied. But you will say: potency and act are correlatives, and just as potency cannot be known except through act, so neither can act except through potency; therefore act is not more prior in definition than potency, but at most they will be simultaneous in knowledge. It is answered that act and potency, as we now speak of them, are not predicamental relatives, but transcendental; but in transcendental relatives it is not repugnant that the terminus of relation be simply prior in knowledge, than the transcendental relative itself. Then I concede that act and potency, concerning which there is now speech, have between themselves mutual dependence in knowledge and definition; and for that reason either they are in some way simultaneous in knowledge, or rather they are mutually compared as prior and posterior in diverse genera of causes, nevertheless simply act is judged prior, because it is that which determines and as it were gives ultimate species. But we speak of actuating act; for, if there be speech of act simply, thus there can be given act abstracting from every potency, which through the same is in no way defined. See Cajetan, I p., q. 13, a. 7, ad 2 Scoti. And these things suffice concerning potency and act, for the other things which could be disputed concerning these are proper to the science concerning the soul.

DISPUTATION XLIV

ON HABITS

What is here understood by the name habit. The signification of this name "habit" has been sufficiently declared above when explaining the species of quality, and from what was said there I take that our present discourse concerns habit insofar as it is a certain proper species of quality proximately ordered to help a power in its operation, and consequently insofar as it is according to reality and essence a distinct species both from power, and from act, and from the two ultimate species of quality. For although certain qualities that well and permanently affect and dispose the subject according to some accidental being are customarily called habits, nevertheless those qualities according to their proper essence rather pertain to the third species of passible qualities; and therefore they do not require proper disputation, and it is necessary to pass them over, lest ambiguity of term impede the course of disputation. Concerning habit, however, insofar as it signifies clothing or being clothed, there will be special disputation below. Concerning these habits, therefore, we must first see what their necessity is, what their essences, and what their causes or properties; afterwards we shall touch upon certain things concerning their distinction, unity, or multiplicity, relegating the specific and particular consideration of them to their proper places.

SECTION I
WHETHER HABITS EXIST, AND WHAT THEY ARE, AND IN WHAT SUBJECT THEY EXIST

1. The first two parts proposed in the title can most easily be dispatched from what was said above; for that certain habits exist is beyond controversy, from the common consensus of all philosophers, and in theology it has particular certainty from infused habits.

In What Ways it is Established that Habits are Given

2. Habits exist in the nature of things. The first knowledge of these habits was taken from experience of human acts; for we experience that through use and custom of acts we acquire a facility in operating, which facility, since it is a certain real effect in us and remains after the acts have passed, requires some real and permanent form that is in us when it was not there before; but we call this a habit; therefore it is established by experience that there are habits in us.

3. How the intentional species is proved. But that we may proceed more distinctly and restrict the disputation more, let us distinguish two genera of qualities that are added to our powers so that they may be helped for their operations: some are for joining the object to the power, which are said to be required on the part of the object, and are only necessary in cognitive powers; others are those which are added to the power to augment its strength in operating, from which they have the effect of giving facility in operation, as I shall say below, which is more evidently established in the will; for it does not need qualities on the part of the object, and yet by use it acquires facility in operating. Both genera of these qualities, therefore, are contained under the species of habit, as I said above; yet the existence or necessity of each must be proved from different principles. For the

former qualities, speaking simply, are presupposed for acts as altogether necessary for them from the nature of the thing; but the latter follow from acts, for now we are not dealing with habits infused per se. In the present discussion, therefore, we only intend to deal with habits taken in the latter mode, for the former, which are properly called intentional species, are considered in the science of the soul. Hence to prove that there are habits in that sense, we would have to use those means by which philosophers, against Durandus and others, prove that intentional species are given, which are taken partly from what we experience in the external senses, especially in sight and mirrors, partly and principally from memory and abstractive cognition of things, partly from the mode of cognizing of such powers through representation, to which they cannot be determined except by objects through the mediation of species. Therefore in this sense it is sufficiently established both that habits exist and where they are, namely in any cognitive power according to its proportion and capacity, and also what they are; for they are certain qualities that are like seeds or instruments of objects, through whose mediation they join their strength to cognitive powers in order to determine them and constitute them in first act for effecting cognition of themselves. Nor do we need to say more about these habits in this treatise.

4. Therefore that other genus of habits, concerning which we are presently dealing, is known only by the aforementioned experience, because such a habit, speaking per se and in the natural order, is never presupposed for acts. Hence Aristotle, in Metaphysics IX, chapters 5 and 8, says that there are certain powers, that is, active principles of operations, which cannot be had except through acts; and he applies the example in art. So much so that even habits infused per se, insofar as they are presupposed per se for acts so that they may be done in a connatural mode, are more judged to have the nature of powers than of habits. That habits of this kind exist, therefore, can only be known by us from acts, insofar as they leave some facility, and consequently some new faculty of operating in the powers. From

which it is also clear in passing that the necessity of these habits is not necessity simply, but for better being, or ex suppositione, or in order to such an effect. For absolutely the power is sufficient for effecting the act without such a habit; otherwise an act could never precede a habit; nevertheless that it may operate more easily and promptly, a habit is necessary; which is rather a certain utility, which is also called necessity for better being; and the same is what is usually said, that these habits are not necessary for the substance of acts, but for the faculty; for this particular effect, namely promptitude in operating, they are necessary. From which it also happens that ex suppositione of acts such a habit is necessary, because it follows as a necessary sequel and by natural activity (whatever that may be). All of which is taken from Aristotle, Ethics III, chapter 5.

5. Why nature gave to powers and acts strength for the production of habits. From this can also be gathered the reason why nature gave both to the powers themselves capacity for these habits, and to the acts themselves some strength and efficacy so that these habits might follow from them, because namely, a power from itself is potent and indifferent to various acts, and sometimes also to repugnant ones, or on account of some imperfection it does not have the total determination and propensity that it can have to some act. Since therefore nature intends the optimum mode of operating according to the capacity of each thing, and these powers cannot have from their nature the total strength necessary for operating their individual acts with complete promptitude and facility, therefore they have from nature some aptitude and strength so that at least by use and exercise of acts they may acquire such facility. And these things suffice concerning the question whether there are habits of this kind; for if any objections can be made, they are easy, and are solved from this last observation, and more from what we shall immediately say about the subject of these habits.

Essence & Definition of Habit

6. Secondly, it must be said what a habit is, which is also very easy from what has been said; for it is a certain permanent quality, stable of itself in the subject, ordered per se primo to operation, not giving the first faculty of operating, but helping and facilitating it. This entire description is established from the interpretation of the name already given, and from what was said above about the species of quality. Therefore, that the form which acts leave and which gives promptitude in operating is quality, is evident both from the common definition of quality posited above, and also because it can be placed in no other category. But this quality is called permanent and stable to distinguish it from the acts themselves, which are said to be as if in continual becoming, because they depend on the actual influx of the powers, and therefore are not only qualities but also actual operations of vital powers; but a habit does not have this dependence, but remains when the actual influx of the soul in which it is ceases, not as second act, but as first act, for it is caused in the soul for this purpose, that it may render it prompt for eliciting second acts. Hence the same experience that proves there are habits of this kind proves that they are permanent qualities in this mode, because from acts this facility is left in man even after he ceases from operation; for when he later returns to operating, he operates with greater promptitude and facility; therefore a quality giving such promptitude remained in him. And in this sense it must be understood when it is said that habit is difficultly movable, if by that particle what is essential and general to habit, and not some accidental status, or some special property of some habit or virtue, is to be signified, as is more clearly established from what was said when disputing about quality in common and its species.

7. But we add that such a quality ought to be ordered per se primo to operation, because, as I noted at the beginning of the disputation, we are dealing with proper habits, really and essentially distinct from the other species of quality; but none are of this kind except those which are made on account of operation. For if some qualities are called habits because they well or badly and stably

dispose the subject in order to being, those according to their proper essence rather pertain to passible qualities. Finally, the aforementioned experience by which we prove these habits simultaneously declares that the primary end of these habits is to give facility in operating; for this reason, therefore, we say they are ordered per se primo to operation.

8. But because this is common to the powers themselves in which habits reside, we add in the definition that a habit is not ordered to operation as giving the first faculty of operating. Where by first faculty we understand not only the principal or radical principle of operation, which is the soul, but the proximate faculty which absolutely confers the first power of operating; for a habit presupposes this, as we said, and helps and promotes it so that it may operate more easily. And thus it is sufficiently established what a habit is in common. And although in explaining the description we have looked principally to acquired habits, nevertheless it is common of itself also to infused ones, for they too are ordered per se primo to operation, and although they do not give facility alone, but simultaneously in some mode faculty and connaturalness of operation, nevertheless they absolutely presuppose a prior proximate power and elevate it to such a genus of operation. Finally, it is usually added that habit is that by which a power is well or badly disposed to operation. Which can be taken from Aristotle in the Categories and Physics VII, chapter 3. Nevertheless in that disjunction not only the definition but also the division of habit is comprehended; for among habits are virtues and vices, or some are consonant with nature, others repugnant, and therefore some are called good, others bad; yet it is common to all that they tend per se to their operations and provide facility. Therefore it was sufficient to place this common notion in the definition.

Subject of Habit

9. In the third place it can easily be defined from what has been said in what subject such habits are. For it must be said that they are only in intellectual living beings, and proximately are only in powers elicitive of immanent acts, and which are rational or in some mode participate in reason. The prior part is established from the posterior, for since the aforesaid powers are proper to rational living beings, if habits can only be in such powers, they will also be able to be only in the aforesaid living beings. But here it could be doubted whether this is to be understood of men alone, or also of Angels. But because this depends on the proper mode of operating of Angels and its cognition, therefore we shall omit that part to the Theologians and speak only of men. The posterior part, therefore, about the proximate subject, that it can only be a power elicitive of immanent acts, is proved because it is of the nature of habit that it incline the power itself to operating, and in this mode render it easy and prompt; therefore it is necessary that the habit be proximately in the very power which is the elicitive principle of operation, because unless it inform it, it can neither incline it nor constitute it in ulterior first act. Also, because every accident ought to be in a subject proportioned to its end; but the proximate end of habit is operation and promptitude to it; therefore its subject is the very power which is the proximate principle of operation; for that alone has due proportion to that end.

10. Hence therefore it is necessary that the power in which a habit proximately resides be both active and passive; for it cannot be the proximate principle of eliciting acts unless it be active, nor can it receive habits in itself unless it be passive. But only that power is simultaneously active and passive which can elicit immanent acts; therefore. And it is confirmed, for the act leaves a habit in that power in which it itself is, because it renders that very power, and not another, easy for operating. But the habit remains in that power which is the proximate principle of such an act; therefore the act itself remains in the same; therefore it is both an immanent act, and the power which is its principle is elicitive of immanent acts. Hence these

acts by which habits are produced are such that, speaking per se, they effect nothing outside their proper powers, which is proper to immanent acts. This part can also be confirmed by induction; but this induction will easily be established from the following point.

11. Which powers are capable of habits. The will is capable of habits. Therefore it remains to be proved that this power ought to be rational or in some mode participant in reason, as are the intellect or will, or also the human sensitive appetite, and phantasy or the cogitative. And indeed, that habits can be in powers, besides experience, is established from both natural and moral philosophy, for in the intellect are intellectual virtues, and in the will moral ones, which in part are judged also to be in the sensitive appetite; and consequently something proportional responds to them in the phantasy. But the reason a priori is that these powers have by their nature some indifference or indetermination in operating; but they are determined by their acts; therefore they are also capable of habitual determination or inclination left by acts. The assumption is manifest in the will, for it is a power free from itself, and consequently indifferent to operating and not operating, and to contrary acts or objects. Hence both from its part it is not sufficiently determined to either side, and from the part of objects it is accustomed to suffer difficulties, because with some reason of good another reason of evil is joined. The will also has, because it is the universal appetite of man, various inclinations both to those things which are good and honest per se, and also to those things which are commodious to man, among which inclinations there is sometimes repugnance, from which arises difficulty of operating, which difficulty is overcome by use and custom of acts, which does not happen except through the generation of habit; therefore this power is a subject capable of habits.

12. The intellect is receptive of habits. And nearly the same reason has place in the intellect, for although it is not so indifferent a power as the will, nevertheless it participates in indifference in some mode; first, in making judgment about those things of which it does

not attain evident cognition, as are those which fall under faith or opinion; hence it is established by experience that man is difficultly removed from those things of which he has inveterate faith or opinion. Then, although from the part of objects, when their truth is evidently shown, it is naturally determined to judgment, nevertheless our intellect often suffers great difficulty in demonstrating the truth, and therefore by use and exercise of acts it acquires facility in this, which a habit alone confers, as we also declared concerning the habit of first principles in the first disputation of this work. Finally in practical habits, especially in art, this is most evident; therefore Aristotle, in Metaphysics IX, and wherever he deals with powers of acting which are only acquired by use, principally places the example in art; but those powers are nothing but habits, as I have often said.

13. The sensitive appetite of man is capable of habits. Then the same part can easily be proved concerning the sensitive appetite of man from the opinion of Aristotle, Ethics I, final chapter, and Ethics, chapter 3; and St. Thomas, I-II, question 50, article 3. And the reason is that, although the appetite of man is not simply a free power, it nevertheless has some mode of indifference, by reason of which it can be held in office by reason and will; although, as Aristotle said, it obeys not despotically but politically. From which it happens that also in this appetite there are various inclinations, and in some mode repugnant ones, for from the force of its genus it is naturally inclined to sensible and delectable things; nevertheless from the force of conjunction and emanation from the rational soul it has inclination to obeying reason, and to appetiting those very sensible goods, not only insofar as they are delectable or commodious to the body, but especially insofar as they are judged simply good for man. From which double inclination it arises that this appetite also does not have from nature all the determination to its acts that it can have, and therefore it can acquire a habit by which it may be more inclined to one part. Which is most necessary with respect to those acts which are in some mode contrary to sensible delights or commodities of the body; not

because the natural inclination to these acts in this appetite is less, but because sensible objects, which are more proximate and proportioned, move more vehemently. On account of which certain moral virtues are also usually placed in the sensitive appetite, as St. Thomas teaches, I-II, question 56, article 4. How this is to be understood does not pertain to this place; now it will be sufficient to assert that habits are necessary in the appetite by which it is rendered prompt and easy to obeying reason in the matter of these virtues, namely temperance and fortitude, and others which are contained under them. And in this mode we say, or also experience, that the passions of this appetite are mortified or reduced to mediocrity by exercise of virtues, which does not happen except through acquisition of habit. And by similar reason, through contrary acts habits are acquired augmenting the impetus of passions; for although the inclination to sensible objects seems most natural and most easily brought to work if it is not contained, nevertheless we experience that by custom it is augmented and acquires strength to resist reason, which can scarcely resist the appetite when it is drawn to these sensible things by excessive custom; therefore there is no doubt that in this power there is aptitude for generating and receiving habits in itself.

14. The phantasy of man is capable of habits. Finally, the same is to be held consequently concerning the phantasy or cogitative of man, as St. Thomas also teaches, in the aforementioned question 50, article 4. But how this is to be understood we shall explain below from the solution of objections.

15. Which powers are capable of habits. In the last place the other exclusive part must be proved, namely that these powers alone are capable of habits. But the reason is that all other powers besides these operate merely naturally; but by merely natural operations no habit is acquired, because powers determined to one thing simply from their nature are not capable of habits; for as the Philosopher said, Ethics II, chapter 1, nothing of those things which are by nature is accustomed otherwise, as a stone to be carried upward, or fire

downward; and similarly neither does a stone move more swiftly downward, even if it had descended a thousand times before. It can also be shown by induction, for other powers either act only by transient action, and these are not capable of habits, as we showed; or by immanent action, and these either are external senses, concerning which it sufficiently is established by experience that they do not acquire habit by operating; or they are phantasy and appetite of brutes, and in these there is somewhat greater reason for doubt, as we shall immediately touch upon in the objections; but now we also suppose concerning them, since they are powers altogether determined to one thing, that they are not capable of habits. Hence St. Thomas, I-II, question 69, article 4, says that a power is not capable of habit unless in some mode it has itself indifferently to many things; for this reason natural powers do not perform their operations through the mediation of any habits, because according to themselves they are determined to one thing. And thus he declares that every habit is a disposition, although nevertheless disposition (according to Aristotle) is the order of that which has parts, because, although it is not necessary that the very power receptive of habit have parts in itself, it is nevertheless necessary that it have order and some indifference to many things, so that thus it may be determined by habit to one thing rather than to another.

SECTION II

WHETHER HABIT IS ACQUIRED IN THE POWER MOVING ACCORDING TO PLACE

1. But concerning what has been said, and especially concerning the last part, certain objections remain. The first is that the power moving according to place is not active by immanent but by transient action, and nevertheless it is capable of habit; therefore. The major is evident, because although progressive or animal local motion

is usually said to be immanent insofar as it remains in the same supposit, nevertheless properly and as we now speak it is not immanent, because it does not remain in the same power, indeed not even in the same part of the subject, according to Aristotle, because an animal does not move itself per se primo but by one part moves another. Especially because the argument proceeds not only concerning the power by which man moves himself or parts of his body, but also concerning that by which he moves some extrinsic body, like the strings of a cithara or a brush. Therefore the minor is proved, because we experience that through use of art a facility and certain determination is acquired, not only in the mind but also in the members of the body. A sign of this is also that although someone may optimally learn the rules of art, if he does not exercise those external actions of art, he will never acquire promptitude and facility in exercising them; indeed he will scarcely be able to exercise any action of them artificially. Again there is another sign, for one who has long exercised such actions afterwards exercises them externally with almost no attention of mind, and with the greatest facility; therefore it is a sign that those actions are immediately done from habit which is acquired in the very member. But if someone perhaps responds that that facility does not come from habit but from some other quality, first he weakens all experience and reason by which we prove habits to exist. Then he ought to explain what kind of quality that is, which will not easily be done.

2. Hence on account of this reason certain theologians concede that habit is also acquired in such members, as Scotus, in III, distinction 33, unique question, § Ad 1, in the solution ad 3; Gabriel, in III, distinction 23, question 1, article 1, doubt 1; Ockham, Quodlibet III, question 17. Who consequently say that for an executive power to be capable of habit, it is sufficient that it be indifferent to effecting various motions, so that it may be determined by use itself to one motion through acquired quality.

Resolution of the Question

3. Nevertheless I think it should be said that in such a power and in external members a habit is not properly acquired. Thus St. Thomas teaches, I-II, question 50, article 3, ad 3, and the Thomists follow this, Almain, in III, distinction 23, question I, and in Morals, tract I, chapter 17. And it is proved from the principle posited, that habit is only received in a power elicitive of immanent act, which seems sufficiently proved by us. And it is further declared in the present case, for if habit is acquired in external members, either it is received immediately in the very active power of motion which is in the members, or not. The first cannot be said, because that power is not receptive but merely active. Also because it is an instrument obeying appetite at command and by necessity of nature, and thus as far as it is from itself, it is altogether determined, if it is applied to acting by a superior power, and only has indifference as it were passive, to be inclined to one part rather than to another, for which it does not need habit in itself, but in the moving or commanding power. But I say "as it were passive" because this motive power, while it is applied through appetite, does not receive anything in itself, but only by natural subordination obeys despotically. Since therefore it does this by natural and complete necessity, it does not need a habit determining and inclining it, nor is it capable of it.

4. But if that habit is not received in the very power, but in the same subject in which the power itself is, either that quality is active strength or only passive disposition; the first cannot be said, first, because that quality will not be habit but a certain power, because it does not inhere in the power nor incline it or render it easy in itself for operating; hence it does not per se compose one principle of operation with it. Second, because that quality will at most be by the mode of a certain impetus, which does not last long after the motion has passed, nor will it ever be found in nature that from the force of

local motion alone can be caused an active strength similar to motion, which may be a permanent and stable quality by the mode of habit. But if the second is said, it openly follows that that quality is not an operative habit of which we now speak, but is a certain material disposition, which it is probable is acquired in these members through use of art, and is consonant with St. Thomas, in the aforementioned question 50, article 1, where he says that dispositions to operations are principally in the soul, but secondarily can be in the body, insofar as the body is disposed and enabled to promptly serve the operations of the soul. But this disposition does not seem to be other than those which either pertain to modes of quantity or to first qualities, or others which follow from those. Hence we also experience in the external instruments of art themselves that sometimes they are made more apt by use and exercise itself, either because they are perfected as to figure, or because they are made more smooth or soft. In this mode, therefore, it can be understood that members of the body are rendered more apt for motion by use, because the nerves themselves either are relaxed or contracted more, or by some other similar cause. Just as also the nutritive powers themselves by custom become accustomed to abstinence or moderation, only because either the first qualities are remitted, or the very parts of the body are dried out, and thus also resist more.

Answer to the Reason for Doubting

5. Nor does the objection made prove anything more; for we admit that through use of these actions habit is acquired, not however in the organ of the body, but in the powers of the soul commanding and directing the motion of the body. But that this habit is not acquired perfectly without use of external actions has a double cause. The prior is what we said about passive disposition: when the members operate externally, there intervenes an interior act, either of the will, which is called active use, or of the intellect, which is practical

direction of such use, which acts generate internal practical habit accommodated to such external action; but these acts are not exercised by discourse alone, or discipline concerning the rules of art; indeed not even through use of another only attentively inspected and considered, and therefore although these may contribute to acquiring some internal habit, nevertheless not so perfect that it gives facility in external use. But what was objected, that these external actions are sometimes exercised artificially without internal acts, from habit left in the very members, I judge to be false; indeed it is more probable in philosophy that even as to substance this animal motion cannot be done without actual act of phantasy and appetite, much less as to artificial mode. Therefore direction of art always intervenes, although sometimes, either on account of great facility, or because it is done without any reflection, it is not perceived by experience.

SECTION III

WHETHER THERE ARE HABITS IN BRUTES

1. Reason for doubting. The second objection is about the internal senses of brutes; for they seem to acquire habits, at least those animals which participate in memory and experience, as Aristotle taught in book I of this work, chapter 1. For experience is not made without acquisition of some habit. Perhaps someone will say that in these brutes there are species and phantasms which remain in the absence of objects and these suffice for memory and experience. But if those are called habits, there will be equivocation in the term, for we said above that we do not speak here of intentional species. But this does not satisfy, because often species of sensible objects do not suffice for the aforesaid experience. Which I declare thus: for when a brute from natural instinct, having apprehended a sensible object, immediately judges it to be harmful and judges it to be fled from, for such an act, besides the species of the object, a strength innate to the very power is necessary, from which that judgment may arise; but

sometimes a brute by use of many acts acquires facility or strength of thus judging concerning some object, concerning which it did not have that innate strength or instinct of nature; therefore it acquires not only species of objects, but also habit, which from the part of the power supplies that strength of judging or estimating. For the species of such a sensible object per se alone is indifferent and insufficient to determine the phantasy to such judgment or estimation.

2. And in this mode St. Augustine says, in the book of 83 Questions, question 36, that brute animals become tamed and gentle by custom. But it is the same to say by custom as by habit. And St. Thomas, I-II, question 50, article 3, ad 2, says that although brute animals according to themselves are not capable of operative habits on account of the natural determination they have in their works, nevertheless, insofar as these same animals are disposed by the reason of man through a certain custom to operating thus or otherwise, in this mode habits can in some way be placed in brute animals. But why he says "in some way" he explains below, saying that they fail from the notion of habit, because habit is that which we use when we will, from the Commentator, On the Soul III, comment 18. But brute animals cannot use these qualities when they will, because they do not have dominion of their actions. But this seems rather to pertain to the moral notion of habit than to the physical nature, because to be subjected to the will is extrinsic to an operative quality.

Resolution of the Question

3. Nevertheless I think it should be said that in these brutes there are no habits distinct from sensible species or phantasms. And the general reason is that in all their acts they are determined to one thing from the force of objects as they are represented to them. Which I declare individually in the individual interior powers of them, for concerning external senses there is no doubt. In appetite, therefore, they do not need habit, because they cannot appetite anything until

the judgment of phantasy determinately proposes the object as to be pursued or fled from, and, such judgment being posited, they necessarily appetite or flee from necessity. Hence they do not need habit for such motions any more than the heavy for descending downward.

4. Again through phantasy they also always naturally apprehend or judge according to the mode and quality of the species by which the object is proposed to them. Which indeed is manifest when estimation or judgment is made in the presence of the object, and especially if no custom has preceded. And the reason is clear, because apprehensive powers have less indifference than appetitive ones; if therefore they have natural determination in appetite, a fortiori in phantasy. Hence it happens, if it sometimes occurs that various species of objects concur to a brute, of which none suffices for determining apprehension or practical estimation as it were about fleeing or pursuing an object, that it cannot be determined until the representative species is somehow changed; hence if in a journey a brute first hesitates and fears to proceed, but if it is more strongly pricked, it is immediately moved, this is because by the species of pain it is more vehemently excited and determined. Therefore in the presence of objects this apprehension is always made merely naturally on the part of the power, given sufficient species on the part of the object.

5. From which it is easily understood that they are determined in the same mode in the absence of objects, even from custom, because they do not require less efficacy on the part of the phantasm in absence than in the presence of the object, as much after custom as in the beginning of it; therefore they are always naturally determined, given such a phantasm; therefore they do not require another habit, nor are they capable of it. Custom therefore in these animals will not serve for acquiring a habit which inclines the power, but so that the phantasm representing thus or thus may adhere more firmly. And thus it happens that without other custom, from the force

of the phantasm alone of some sensed object, they do not apprehend anything insensed, nor judge it to be fled from or followed. But custom intervening, because a brute more often experiences in the presence of such an object that it suffers pain or something similar, the species of that sensible object is retained in memory as representing that object as pain-bearing. And thus from the force of phantasms, which by repetition of acts adhere more firmly to memory, all those things happen which brutes seem to acquire through custom or experience; therefore another habit is not necessary for them. For although we might imagine a habit in the phantasy of a brute, if the species does not represent the object with all the circumstances requisite for determination, the act will not be able to be determined. But if the species represents the object with all circumstances, it will be naturally determined even if it does not have a habit; therefore such a habit is impertinent, and custom only effects that the species represent the object under these or those circumstances. And this I think St. Thomas meant when he said that habits are in some way in these brutes, as can be established a fortiori from the solution ad tertium. And we can also add that this very imperfect hability or custom does not properly have place in them except insofar as they are in some mode capable of discipline through subordination to human reason, for in experience alone that is merely natural they less imitate the mode or use of habit, but operate only from memory repeated by natural instinct.

Concerning Man's Cogitative & its Habits

6. You will say: therefore the same can be said of man's cogitative, that it acquires no habit besides species conserved in memory and representing in this or that mode. It is answered: thus St. Thomas seems to teach in the aforementioned article, ad 3, where, speaking of man, he only says that in the interior sensitive apprehensive powers of him habits can be placed according to which

he may be well memorative, cogitative, or imaginative. And he brings forward the Philosopher, On Memory and Reminiscence, chapter 3, saying that custom works much for remembering well. Therefore St. Thomas does not seem to place another habit in our interior sense than that which serves memory, which does not seem distinct from more or less perfect species.

7. Nevertheless it seems more probable that in man's cogitative a habit distinct from species is acquired, giving facility and inclining the power to some acts determinately. The reason is that man's cogitative is not so simply determined to one thing as the phantasy of a brute, for it can in some mode be moved and determined to operating from the command of reason, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place; and therefore just as the sensitive appetite for this reason is capable of proper habit, so also the cogitative, that it may more promptly and easily obey reason in its apprehensions and cogitations and judgments proportioned to it concerning sensible things to be fled from or appetited. And I think St. Thomas comprehended all this under those words, that man may be well memorative, cogitative, and imaginative.

SECTION IV

WHETHER THERE ARE PROPER HABITS IN THE INTELLECT

1. Reasons for doubting. The last objection occurs concerning the intellect of man, for since it is a power naturally operating, it does not seem to need another habit besides intelligible species. For if those sufficiently represent the object, the intellect naturally assents; but if they represent insufficiently, either it cannot provide assent, or only according to the sufficiency of the species. And it is declared in this mode concerning the habit of science or of first principles, for if the intellect exactly apprehends the reasons of the

terms of which an immediate proposition consists, it will provide assent by natural necessity; if not, it will not be able to provide it; therefore for such assent no habit is necessary besides species exactly representing the extremes of the proposition. Similarly, if someone evidently knows the scientific middle term and applies it by assenting to the major and minor proposition, he will elicit scientific assent of the conclusion by natural necessity, and thus does not need a habit. But if he does not consider the scientific middle term, or does not sufficiently apply it, he will not be able to have scientific assent of the conclusion; therefore such a habit is impertinent, besides species of terms sufficiently and rightly coordinated.

2. Opinion of some. On account of this objection certain Thomists think thus about habits of the intellect, Soncinas, Metaphysics V, question 9. And it seems to have been the opinion of St. Thomas, question 24 On Truth, article 4, ad 9, where he says that habit of the intellect is some ordination of species. The same he holds in question 10, article 2, where after he proved that intelligible species remain in the possible intellect after actual consideration, he adds, and the ordination of these is the habit of science; the same he signifies I-II, question 67, article 2, where he says that the formal in science is intelligible species, but the material is phantasms; and III, question 12, article 2, he holds that the augmentation of the habit of science proper and according to its essence consists in augmentation or addition of species.

Resolution of the Question

3. Reason for the conclusion. Nevertheless the opinion which we proposed is more true, namely that proper habits distinct from intelligible species are generated in the intellect inclining it to proper acts and to convenient use of species. And this is the opinion more received in the school of St. Thomas, which Capreolus holds, in the Prologue of the Sentences, question 3; and Cajetan, I-II, question 54,

article 4; Ferrara, book I Against the Gentiles, chapter 56, and is also taken from St. Thomas in other places. For I-II, question 51, articles 2 and 3, he says intellectual habits are acquired through acts of the intellect; and question 14, article 4, ad 3, he says the habit of science is perfected through act, when it is extended to new conclusions, and then another habit is not generated; but intelligible species are not made through acts, but rather the species themselves are principles of acts, and when science is extended to new conclusions, it is certain that new intelligible species are acquired. Finally, in the aforementioned question 54, article 4, he expressly says that habit is a simple quality, and not a collection of many. But it is proved by reason, because intelligible species is not required on the part of the power, but on the part of the object; hence it is simply necessary for operation, and not only for better being, like the habits of which we now treat; therefore besides intelligible species, habits are necessary in the intellect which help the very power from its part and render it easy and prompt for assenting and judging. The consequence is evident, because the intellect suffers difficulty in making judgment even after acquiring species of objects; and therefore in the beginning it needs great inquiry and consideration; but after custom or frequency of acts, it experiences great facility; therefore it is a sign that habit is acquired.

4. Secondly the same is declared by induction, for in the intellect some are habits which are called virtues, and others which are not virtues, as we shall say below. And similarly some are called practical, others speculative; but these distinctions can scarcely or in no way be applied to intelligible species. Again, concerning habits which are not virtues, it cannot be denied that they are distinct from species, because even after species are acquired, indeed even after actual consideration of the middle term or reason for assenting, still the intellect is indeterminate; therefore it is capable of habit by which it may acquire facility and promptitude in that determination. You will say that determination is from the will moving the intellect, and therefore habit is not necessary in the intellect, because, given the

motion of the will, the intellect assents from necessity. It is answered that even if in these acts the will in some mode moves the intellect, it also postulates optimal disposition on its part, that it may promptly and easily obey, especially since the intellect is not moved by the will to assent except in a rational mode. And thus in the assent of divine faith, besides the habit of pious affection which is in the will, Theologians place in the intellect the habit of divine faith, and proportionally is given an intellectual habit of human faith or opinion.

5. Moreover the intellectual habits which are virtues are placed by Aristotle, Ethics I, chapter 13, and book II, chapter 1, and five are numbered, book 6, chapter 3, of which two are practical, namely art and prudence, which certainly it is established do not consist in species alone, which are easily acquired and also committed to memory, but in another habit acquired by great use and practice. Hence Aristotle often equates these two habits to moral virtues in this respect, as is evident from Metaphysics IX and Ethics II, chapter 1. Finally concerning the other speculative virtues, although less necessity appears on account of the natural mode of assenting, nevertheless on account of the imperfection of our intellect, which suffers difficulty in attaining these truths, a habit providing facility is necessary, which we declared above in disputation 1, in the very habit of principles, and in the habit of metaphysics, which is natural wisdom. But there is the same or greater reason concerning the habit of science, which will be more clear below in solving the arguments.

6. Third, this opinion is proved because intelligible species taken according to themselves only represent simple and incomplex things; therefore from those alone, or from any collection of them, man does not become knowing or prudent, but from facility and promptitude of using these species conveniently, and composing and discoursing, and especially judging concerning things apprehended or represented through them. You will say that therefore it was not said by the authors of the prior opinion that habit is species or a collection of species, but species rightly ordered, or ordination of species. But I

ask what this ordination of species may be, for species are only certain qualities inhering in the intellect in first act, among which according to themselves no order can be understood, neither according to position, since they are in an indivisible subject, nor according to the mode of inhering, because one does not inhere through the mediation of another, nor according to any other genus of causality or succession, as is evident per se. Therefore ordination of species can be nothing but the ability which the intellect acquires for using these species in an orderly way and judging rightly according to them.

St. Thomas's Opinion is Explained

7. And in this mode I think St. Thomas is to be interpreted whenever he calls the habit of science ordination of species. For he did not place species alone in the intellect, as is established from other places; nor could he understand that ordination to be something real added to species and existing intrinsically or formally in them, because such ordination is not intelligible, as I showed. Therefore it ought to be understood concerning ordination as it were effective or extrinsic, which species have from the force of the habit of science, of which they are like instruments. Nor does it matter that in the prior place On Truth St. Thomas says that some ordination of species effects habit. Indeed if these words are taken in rigor, they rather favor us, because he distinguishes habit from species. Hence by ordination of species there we can understand not habitual ordination but actual, that is, the ordered use of them by which we acquire habit. And in the same mode he calls species the formal of science, by which mode of speaking he especially uses when comparing species to phantasms, for these are compared to science remotely and as it were per accidens, on account of the conjunction of soul to body; but intelligible species immediately and per se on account of the conjunction of object. Hence, because the object itself is as it were formal with respect to cognition and science, therefore for this reason also species can be

called formal in science, but not because they are formally the very habits of science. But what St. Thomas says, that the habit of science is augmented by acquiring new species, is not to be understood formally but causally, because namely by acquired new species acts are made by which the habit may be augmented. But it is not inconvenient to admit that sometimes by the name of science the very habit is signified with its species, and in this mode some denominations are taken by reason of species, nevertheless the habit distinct from species is not therefore excluded.

Answer to the Reason for Doubting

8. To the difficulty therefore posited it is answered that although the intellect is a naturally acting power, nevertheless on the part of objects and middle terms which it uses for making judgment about things, it is often not sufficiently determined nor necessitated; and then a habit is useful for inclining the intellect to one part rather than to another. Then also when the reason or middle term for asserting is evident, it is not always actually and formally applied or considered; but habit serves so that judgment may be made without express and formal application of the middle term. As in that example concerning the act of science, although before habit is acquired one cannot provide evident assent to the conclusion unless formal and express demonstration is applied, nevertheless after habit is acquired he does not always need that formal discourse, but the truth being proposed, immediately from habit he provides evident assent to it. And if someone later wishes to apply demonstration, habit will also be useful for this, that he may much more promptly and easily be able to use species for applying the proper middle term by which such truth is to be demonstrated. Just as also for scientific assent evidence is necessary not only of the premises but also of the inference, and nevertheless it is not necessary that whenever assent of science is to be elicited, an express and formal judgment be made about the goodness

of the inference, but it suffices that the intellect do this from habit, as something certain and evident; and habit of dialectic serves much for this. Finally for the same reason, habit can also be acquired concerning first principles, because although they are per se known in themselves, we nevertheless often suffer difficulty in recognizing them. Hence such a habit serves so that by properly composing the very terms apprehended through species, we may more easily intuit the truth in their immediate connection.

SECTION V

WHETHER HABIT IS FOR EFFECTING AN ACT

1. Intention of the author in this section. In explaining this doubt the final cause of habit must be explained, whence its necessity or utility will be more established. And because in those things which are like instruments ordered per se primo to operation, end and effect coincide in the same thing, we shall simultaneously explain the effect and efficiency of habit. And finally because these principles ordered per se primo to operation have their essence with transcendental relation to that to which they are ordered, and from this take their notion or their species, therefore consequently it must be seen how habit can in this way be compared to act, if conversely act is its effect; and in what mode in this habit and act adequately and mutually correspond to each other.

2. Habit in some mode ordered to operation. First therefore, given the signification of this word "habit" handed down above and that here we only deal with proper habits of powers of the soul, it cannot be doubted that they are in some mode for operation, for they are left in the power from the force of preceding acts for this purpose, that they may render it easy for similar acts; otherwise habits would be superfluous, as is sufficiently established from what has been said so far. From which is gathered a double causality of habit: one is formal, insofar as through itself it immediately affects the power inclining it to

acts or objects; the other is concerning the acts themselves, for by inclining the power to them, it is the cause that they are done more promptly, easily, and delightfully. And in what we have said so far there is not (as far as I know) diversity of opinions. But the whole controversy is in explaining the mode of this causality.

First Opinion, Denying the Efficacy of Habit

3. First argument for the proposed opinion. Therefore there is a first opinion which denies that habit properly and per se effects an act, but only remotely and by the mode of some disposition is a certain condition, which being posited, the power alone more easily exercises the act. This was the opinion of Aureoli, as Capreolus reports, in I, distinction 17, question 1, article 2, in the beginning; and Scotus inclines to it, there, question 12, and Durandus defends it more broadly, in III, distinction 23, questions 2, 3 and 4; Paludanus, there, question 2. Their foundation is that there is nothing in act which can per se be made by habit; therefore habit is not a per se effective principle of act. The antecedent is evident, because in act we can consider either its substance, or intension, or goodness, or facility or promptitude, or delight with which it is done; but nothing of these can be from the efficiency of habit; therefore. The minor is proved as to the individual parts, for the substance of act per se is made by the power alone, both because it has sufficient strength for this, as is sufficiently established from acts which precede habit, which are of the same substance; and also because these habits are not posited for the substance of act; for we deal with acquired ones, which differ in this from those infused per se. And nearly the same reason is concerning intension, both because intension of quality is not something distinct from the substance or entity of the quality not intensified and taken individually, as we shall say below; but act is made individually, as consisting of so many degrees of intension. And especially because the power from the force of habit cannot make a more intense act; rather

just as habit presupposes the act from which it is made, so intense habit presupposes an intense act from which it may be intensified, and cannot be the principle of an act more intense than itself; therefore the power is a sufficient principle of the entire intension of the act. Again goodness, if it be moral, neither is it common to all acts which are done from habit, nor does it have special reason; but if it be transcendental goodness, it adds nothing of reality beyond the substance of each entity; therefore it cannot be made per se by habit any more than the entity or substance of the act itself. But facility or promptitude, which is the same, is not some entity or real mode in the very act, but is a certain denomination coming from the part of the operator, insofar as on account of some condition or disposition he is more expeditious for operating; therefore by reason of facility habit cannot per se influence the act. Rather, from the fact that these habits are only for facility, it is clearly gathered that they do not concur as per se effective principles of acts, but only as dispositions of the operator himself according to that saying of the Philosopher, Ethics II, chapter 5: Habit is that by which we are well or badly disposed to acts. And the same is more evidently established concerning delightfulness, for this is not something added to the act, but comes from diverse apprehension or disposition of the operator himself.

4. Secondly we can principally argue, because habit is not an inclination of the power to act; therefore neither is it a principle of acting the act. The consequence is evident, because a per se principle of act is inclined to it, and consequently inclines the subject or power in which it resides. But the antecedent is evident; for that inclination either is an act elicited by the very habit; and this is not so, as is per se known, both because we inquire about inclination to act; but if that were an act, there would also be inclination to it, and so to infinity; and also because this inclination is from habit alone, but an elicited act cannot be from habit without the power. Or that inclination is only by the mode of first act, and this also cannot be said, because to incline signifies more than to inform or affect; otherwise every form would

incline its subject; hence gravity does not incline except by effecting some second act: therefore.

5. The third and principal argument is that act effects habit, since habit is generated from frequency of acts; therefore habit cannot effect act. The consequence is evident, for in equivocal causes there cannot be reciprocation, because since cause and effect differ in species, the cause must be more perfect than the effect; therefore the effect cannot effect something of the same nature as its cause, because it cannot effect something more perfect than itself. Thus therefore in the present case, since act and habit differ in species, and act effects habit, it is a sign that it is more perfect than it; therefore habit cannot conversely effect act.

True Opinion & Resolution

6. Nevertheless it must be said that habit together with the power effects act, and this is its proper end. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, I-II, question 49, article 3, in the body, joined with the solution ad 1, and question 51, article 2, ad 3; Cajetan holds it there, and Capreolus above. Hervaeus, Quodlibet 1, question 13. The same Ockham, Quodlibet 3, question 20; Gabriel, Maior and others, in III, distinction 23; Almain, tract I of Morals, chapter 11; and it is taken from Aristotle, Ethics II, chapter 1, where he says thus: All habits are made from similar operations, therefore it is fitting to render such operations; and chapter 6, he says that virtue is a habit from which man becomes good, and by which he will render and effect his own well; and Ethics VI, chapter 4, he distinguishes habit into active and effective, in that sense in which action is usually distinguished from effection, as we shall see below in its place. And thus he calls art a factive habit, prudence active; and Metaphysics V, chapter 12, and book IX, in the beginning, he numbers art among powers, that is, among principles of acting, as we noted there.

7. And it is proved by reason, because habit confers to the power that it may more easily, promptly, and with greater propensity effect act; but it cannot provide this unless because it helps the power for effecting act; therefore together with the very power it truly per se effects act. The major is admitted by all, and is established by experience, and because that is the unique reason for positing these habits. The minor with the consequence is proved, because neither can it be understood how habit helps the power except by effecting with it, nor also how it confers facility to it in acting except by helping it. Which moreover I show thus: for in four modes it can be understood that an agent is helped by another for operating more easily. First, by averting impediments; second on the part of the patient, by disposing and applying it better; third, by augmenting its active strength; fourth, by co-effecting with it. But habit cannot help the power only in the first mode, because often there is no impediment which it removes; as science, for example, does not help by removing error or something similar, but by removing privative ignorance, which is not removing but rather positing a form which per se confers to the work, for if the form itself does not confer per se, the privation of it as such will be no impediment. The same argument is concerning art, opinion, and other habits of the intellect; but in habits of appetite, that removal of impediment seems to have more place, insofar as through habit contrary affects or passions are repressed. Nevertheless even in those the removal of impediment cannot be understood unless first is understood the collation of strength per se conferring to proper acts or affects. Because habits of appetite formally and per se do not moderate affects as to the very motions of the body, because such habits are not in members of the body, nor do they affect or dispose the very humors by which such motions are accomplished; therefore habits moderate proximately the very appetite and its affects, and in it as in root they moderate the motions which are excited by it. But in the very appetite there is not always a positive impediment which must be removed through habit, because often a habit of virtue

is acquired, for example, where there was no contrary vice, or conversely vice is acquired where there was no virtue; then therefore the acquired habit does not help by removing something. Nor can it be said that it helps by impeding contrary acts, because habit per se and formally does not repugn an act; for they are of diverse natures; if therefore it repugns or impedes, it is because it confers something per se to contrary acts; therefore the causality of habit in act cannot be understood through mere removal of impediment, but because it per se and positively disposes the power to act.

8. But that this disposition cannot be only passive, or on the part of the patient as such, as Scotus contends, is proved first, because there the patient is not made more proximate to the agent, since act and power are intimately united per se, and thus such powers operate on themselves when they elicit these acts. Then there is not necessary there a disposition removing contrary or repugnant dispositions, because, speaking per se, there are none such in such a power; and therefore, speaking per se, it effects its operations in an instant, according to Aristotle, Ethics X, chapter 4. Finally, neither intervenes there a disposition per se uniting the act with the power, for the very power, considered per se nakedly, is united to the act before it has habit; and insofar as it is passive, it is per se most apt for that union. Nor does it confer any impediment or difficulty for this. Hence on account of this disposition alone there would be no necessity of such habits. But Durandus says that habit, even if it only disposes materially, confers to facility of act on the part of the object, because by reason of such disposition the act is apprehended as more convenient and connatural. But this first does not have place in habits of the intellect, which do not tend to the object under the notion of good or convenient, but under the notion of true, to which connaturalness of act matters little, especially in speculative and evident truths.

9. Then repugnances are involved in that response, for if habit otherwise does not confer per se to act, there is no reason why by

reason of it the act should be more connatural, for connaturalness comes either from natural passive power or from natural active strength; but Durandus himself denies that there is in habit connatural effective force of act, and it is shown that it does not have passive causality per se, which is especially true if it does not have active causality; therefore it has no source from which it may be more connatural. Or conversely the argument can be retorted: the act is effected more connatural by reason of habit; and not on account of passive force alone; therefore on account of active natural force. And it is confirmed, because if habit is not a principle of act, and otherwise does not dispose physically to it, as is shown, therefore it in no mode inclines to it; therefore neither does it have order per se to it; in what mode therefore can it be the cause or occasion that by reason of it the act is apprehended as more convenient and connatural? Especially since that connaturalness ought to be objectively apprehended, to move to operating more promptly or delightfully; therefore it is fitting that it be known by some experience, or that something precede moving to that apprehension; but this cannot be other than the very facility in operating which habit confers by its nature; therefore this cannot be founded altogether in that apprehension alone.

10. Habit cannot help the power to act except by effecting something. Therefore it remains that habit cannot help and facilitate the power to act except by augmenting the per se effective strength of such act. But it does not augment the very strength of the power, as if intensifying it, because the power in itself is indivisible and intrinsically cannot be intensified or augmented; indeed, if such intension were possible, another act would not be necessary; just as strengths infused per se which participate in a certain mode of power, because they can receive intension, through the same they receive augmentation of strength, and consequently facility to prior acts. But powers of the soul cannot be augmented in this mode, as is established; therefore habit augments per se the effective strength of act through addition or multiplication of strength, because namely it

itself actuates the power as a strength influencing per se in act. And from this discourse many other arguments can be constructed, partly from induction, partly from the formal effect of the very habit, partly from the proportion between power and habit, both among themselves and with respect to act, for in order to act both are compared as first act, but among themselves as perfection and perfectible; therefore habit perfects the power according to the relation it has to its act, more inclining it and providing some strength of acting.

SECTION VI

WHAT A HABIT EFFECTS IN AN ACT

1. The opinion of some. It remains to be explained (which is also sought in the arguments of the contrary opinion) what a habit effects in an act. For it is the opinion of many that it effects the mode of the act, not its substance. Some think that mode is a greater intensity of the act itself; and Godfrey is cited for this opinion in Quodlibet IX, question 4. Others say that mode is the facility of the act, which opinion is attributed to Henry in Quodlibet IV, question 22; but there he says nothing other than that these habits confer facility in operating and that they are chiefly acquired for that end. St. Thomas is also cited in IV Sentences, distinction 46, question 1, article 1, chapter 2, question 2, ad 2, where he says: "In an act two things must be considered, namely, the substance of the act, and its form, from which the act has its perfection; therefore according to substance the principle is natural power, but according to its form the principle is habit." But what that form of the act might be, St. Thomas does not further declare.

2. Habits do not contribute per se primarily to the intention of the act. The reason for the conclusion. It must be said first of all that habits do not confer, properly speaking, upon the powers in which they exist the force to effect more intense acts than those powers could

effect by themselves, nor can they concur effectively to the intensity or mode of an act without also effecting its substance. Durandus proves the first part of this conclusion at length above; for the arguments by which he proves that habit does not effect the intensity of an act could be admitted in this sense, although they are solved by Cajetan in I-II, question 49, article 3; and by Capreolus in III Sentences, distinction 23, article 3, not far from the beginning. He sometimes signifies there that a habituated power can elicit a more intense act than one not habituated. But I judge the opposite to be true, properly speaking, which I prove because just as habit is generated by acts, so it is also intensified; but it is not intensified except by more intense acts, as we shall say below; therefore just as in the power alone there is virtue for effecting acts by which it generates habit in itself, so there is also virtue for effecting more intense acts by which it intensifies habit; therefore habit per se does not confer upon the power that it might be able to effect more intense acts.

3. The evasion of some. It is disproved. It can be responded that a power without habit can only effect an act up to a certain degree of intensity, for example, as four, and by similar acts acquire for itself a habit, also up to the fourth degree; but a power already perfected by habit as four can effect an act as five, which it could not effect by itself alone. But this way of speaking is not true, because a power from the force of habit cannot effect a more intense act than the habit itself is, because no remiss form can per se confer to a more intense effect, as was treated more fully above in disputation XVIII. And although it is probable that this can sometimes happen, if an agent concurs only partially, this is only when in the other partial agent there is virtue for that greater intensity. But in the present case it is supposed that in the power itself, which is like the other partial agent, there is no force for a more intense act; therefore a remiss habit with such a power will not be able to effect a more intense act. Whence confirmation is also taken: for from two remiss things nothing more intense is made; but the power from itself is posited as a quasi remiss virtue defined to such

an act, and the habit also considered per se is remiss in comparison to such an act; therefore from such a power and habit there cannot be made one virtue capable of a more intense act.

4. Someone will say that in univocal forms it is true that a remissive form cannot per se effect an intense one, but in equivocal ones it sometimes can; and that habit is compared to act as an equivocal principle. But against this: for whatever may be the truth of that limitation, at most it has place when the equivocal form is essentially more perfect; but in the present case it is more probable that an acquired habit is less perfect than the act itself, as we shall see below. Then not only because of the inequality of perfection, but also because of the necessary proportion between habit and act, a remiss habit cannot per se effect an act more intense than itself, because habit only inclines to acts similar to those from which it was generated, as Aristotle testifies in Ethics II, chapter 1, and experience also testifies; for we operate as easily as we are accustomed, both in the species of works and in the mode. And the reason is that habit is nothing but a kind of impulse or weight left in the power from the force of preceding acts; but preceding acts do not have the force to incline the power to more perfect acts, but at most to similar ones. Otherwise, if the same acts produced an inclination in the power to more intense acts, by equal reason it could be said that equal acts intensify the habit itself, nor would any reason remain for proving the opposite.

5. Again, it also follows that virtue for effecting more intense acts can grow infinitely in the power from its own virtue, which is per se incredible. The consequence is clear, because by acts as four, which are supposed to be adequate to the virtue of the power taken nakedly, a habit as four is acquired, and compared to this the power now has force for acts as five; but by those acts that habit can become as five; therefore by a habit as five, it will become capable of acts as six; and in the same proportion it can proceed further without any limit that can be designated by probable reason. Finally, also in infused habits theologians commonly teach that from the force of those habits, the

power cannot effect acts more intense than the habits themselves, although in them there could be greater reason for doubting, either because such habits are more perfect than their acts, or because they give not only facility but also power. Nevertheless, because they are truly habits and are given with due proportion to acts, so that from their force acts are made in a connatural mode, therefore, as much as is from the intrinsic virtue of such habits, the power is not able to effect acts more intense than the habits themselves, but if it sometimes elicits them, it is by reason of another divine aid, concerning which elsewhere. Therefore much more should this be said of acquired habits, both because of the reasons made, taken from due proportion and from lesser perfection; and also because these habits are not per se quasi proper faculties of operating, but by their nature are certain affections of the faculty of operating; and therefore per se they do not substantially increase (so to speak) the force of producing a nobler effect, but only perfect the same force that was before in the power, in the way we shall immediately explain.

6. Habit concurs physically to the intensity of the act effected by the power. In this sense therefore it is true that habit per se does not confer to the intensity of an act; nevertheless it must not be denied that, when the power through habit effects an intense act, the habit effects that intensity, at least as to the degree proportioned to the habit, because in that such an act has similitude with the preceding ones from which the habit was generated. But then the habit cannot effect intensity alone unless it also effects the substance of the act itself; because intensity in actual being is not something distinct from the substance of the act, as I shall show below. And it is briefly declared, because if the power with habit as four elicits an act as four, that habit equally concurs effectively to the first as to the fourth degree of such an act; because it is equally proportioned to all, and because it was generated by similar acts according to similar degrees; but the substance and entity of such an act consists entirely in those degrees of

intensity; therefore habit cannot effect with the power the intensity of an act unless simultaneously effecting its substance.

7. Whether habit concurs to the total act more intense than itself. There can be some difficulty when a power affected by habit elicits an act more intense than the habit itself, whether the habit concurs effectively to the act according to its total intensity, that is, according to that degree in which it exceeds the habit. For it seems difficult so to divide the effection of the same act that according to some degrees it is made by the power alone, but according to others by the power with habit. Just as conversely it cannot happen that some degrees are made by the power with habit, and others by habit alone. Nevertheless it must be said that then the habit does not concur to that degree of intensity in which it is exceeded by the act, by per se and directly effecting it, for the reasons given, namely, because the habit does not have proportion with an act so intense, and because it could only effect acts similar to those from which it was produced. Therefore that degree of greater intensity is made from the virtue and efficacy of the power alone. Nor is this singular in this action; for the same happens whenever a remiss agent concurs with a stronger one to a more intense effect. And therefore there is no similar reason concerning habit as concerning power, both because power is a stronger virtue than habit, especially a remiss one; and also because power has integral virtue for the total act and for any degree of it, but habit has integral efficacy for no act, as I shall immediately say. Although habit does not directly effect that greater degree of intensity, nevertheless it helps indirectly, so that the power may more conveniently and easily be able to effect it, for when the power is helped by habit concerning the effecting of lower degrees, it remains more expeditious to be able to apply its efficacy to more intense operation, because its virtue is less occupied concerning the lower degrees.

When Habit Concurs to the Substance of an Act

8. And from these things the second part of the conclusion is finally sufficiently confirmed, namely, that habit effects the substance of an act; which Cajetan and Capreolus hold above; and almost the other authors cited above in the second opinion; and openly Scotus in IV Sentences, distinction 49, questions 1 and 2, in the solutions of arguments. And it is proved, because if habit does not effect the substance of an act, there is nothing that it can effect in an act, for if there were something, it would be intensity at most; but this it either does not effect, or if it concurs to it, it is only by effecting the substance of the act as to some degrees. Nor can any other mode in an act be devised that is made by habit without influence on the substance of the act. For facility or promptness is not an intrinsic and physical mode of the act itself, but is only a certain denomination from the agent so disposed, or having greater virtue for operating.

9. An objection is dissolved. You will say: in physical and successive motions this greater facility can be understood to consist in greater velocity; for that agent can be said to move more easily which, other things being equal, moves more swiftly; whence since velocity is something intrinsic to motion, that facility will also be something intrinsic. It is responded first that even there it cannot happen that some cause per se effects the velocity of motion unless simultaneously effecting the substance of motion itself, because that mode which is velocity is so intrinsic to such motion and undistinct from it that they cannot be separated in effection. Whence the argument is made that the same must be said in the present case, even if facility were something intrinsic in the act itself. Then it is said that it is not similar, because this facility does not consist in velocity, for these acts, whether with habit or without it, are made in an instant, as was said above with Aristotle in Ethics X, chapter 4; they are not therefore made more swiftly when they are made more easily. Nor do they receive in themselves either better entity or some better physical and real mode; for no such can be understood. Therefore an act is said to be made more easily only by denomination from the agent, namely,

because it is made by a power that now has greater force of acting, and consequently greater propensity to the act and less to the contrary; therefore neither can such a mode be made per se by habit, since it is really nothing in the act; nor can habit confer that facility unless by augmenting the effective force of the act itself according to its substance.

10. And the same is true of whatever property that is attributed to these acts and is considered to be like a mode of them, such as goodness or something similar. For if it is intrinsic and real goodness, this is not in reality distinct from the entity and substance of the act itself; and therefore it cannot be made except by one who effects the substance of the act. But if it is extrinsic goodness, or denomination taken from elsewhere, this is made per se in the act by no principle, but can result from the change of another; as, for example, an act made from habit is said to be more delectable, certainly not because it has in itself whence it more delights, if it is otherwise supposed to be equally intense, but because the disposition of the one operating is different; for while he operates more easily, he also more easily apprehends it fitting and consonant for himself so to operate; and therefore he more delights in that work. Therefore the efficiency of habit can consist in no way unless it influences per se the entity and substance of the act. And this is per se sufficiently consonant with the nature of habit itself; for it was generated by acts according to their substance, and inclines to similar ones of the same substance and entity; but it effects that to which it inclines, and similar to that from which it was generated.

11. But they say, if habit effects an act as to substance, therefore it is a true power, since it is a principle of acting upon a thing as to its substance. Also, either such a habit is simply necessary, or it is superfluous; because if in the power there is sufficient virtue for the total substance of the act, the habit is superfluous that is effective of the same act; but if the power needs a co-principle for the substance of the act, such a habit will be simply necessary, which is contrary to

what was said. Whence Durandus also argues, because either power and habit concur as total causes, or as partial ones; and he attacks both parts. Finally, in this way there would be no difference between acquired habits and those infused per se.

12. It is responded that habit, although it influences the substance of an act, has its proper mode of virtue and influence, in which it falls short of the nature of power, for power, as we said above, in the nature of proximate principle is the first faculty for operating, but habit intrinsically and by its nature supposes a prior faculty which it affects and by which it is applied in its own way to acting. Whence such habit is such a virtue, and has such a mode of effecting, that per se alone it can effect nothing without power, nor can the soul use it immediately for operating, but only through the mediation of power. For this reason therefore it is not a power, even if it agrees with it in some way in having virtue of acting. To the other part it is responded by denying both members; for habit is not necessary simply, properly speaking, because in power there is integral virtue necessary for the act, as was proved above, nor is the efficacy of habit therefore superfluous, because it confers that the power can operate more easily. Whence when power operates with habit, although it otherwise has sufficient total virtue for effecting such an act, nevertheless then it does not use that adequately (so to speak), because not itself alone totally influences the act, but with the habit cooperating.

13. Whether power and habit concur as partial causes with respect to the elicited act. Whence to Durandus's argument, although Capreolus and Cajetan respond that power and habit do not concur as partial causes, this must be understood of partial causes entirely co-distinct and which do not have among themselves such subordination of act and potency that from them one total principle more perfect can arise. But truly, presupposing this mode of subordination, it can truly be said that power and habit concur as partial principles, because when action proceeds from them, even if the whole is made by each, nevertheless it is not made totally by either, because it is so made by

one that it necessarily depends entirely on the other, and conversely. But I add that sometimes an acquired habit, especially in the intellect, is a necessary principle so that the power elicits an act without another principle. As, for example, the intellect per se cannot elicit assent to a scientific conclusion unless it has assent to principles, either actually or at least virtually by reason of acquired habit. Thus therefore, although for eliciting the assent of science habit is not necessary, nevertheless for eliciting without formal discourse and express assent of premises, habit is necessary. Nor is this against the nature of acquired habit, because simply this habit is not necessary to the power for the substance of the act, but for its mode; for the power could effect the same act without habit, but by another means or another mode. And in this way art is considered simply necessary, not only because of species, but also because of such a mode of operating. But concerning infused habits the reason is far different; for without them the power has no intrinsic principle, connatural and proportioned to the proper acts of such habits.

SECTION VII

WHAT ACTS A HABIT EFFECTS

1. Immediately there occurs the question what acts a habit can effect, and especially whether it can effect acts of diverse species; from which also depends that question whether and how habit takes its species and unity from acts. But because these questions depend much on the two immediately following, therefore now only two things briefly need to be said.

Resolution of the Question

2. A habit only effects acts of the power it informs. The first is that habit cannot per se effect except acts of that power which it informs. The reason is because habit alone is not a sufficient principle

of an act without power, as was said above; but no power can use the habit of another power for eliciting its own acts, because it is not constituted in first act by the habit of another power; therefore. And it is confirmed first, because habit formally and per se only renders easy for operating that power which it affects; therefore it only gives to that power virtue for effecting its own acts; for it has been shown that it gives facility insofar as it gives virtue of acting; therefore it cannot per se effect except acts of such a power. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is evident, because habit does not render a power easy for operating unless simultaneously inclining it to work; but it only inclines by affecting and informing; therefore it only renders easy for operating that power which it informs. It is confirmed second, because an act does not effect habit except in that power from which it is elicited; therefore neither does habit effect an act except in that power which it formally perfects. The consequence is proved, because habit does not act except acts similar to those from which it was generated, as we shall immediately say. And the antecedent is evident, because, as was shown above, an act does not effect habit except insofar as it is immanent, which St. Thomas also taught in question 1 On Truth, article 1; therefore it effects habit only in that power in which it remains. And both the antecedent and consequent can easily be shown by induction.

3. How virtue of one power is said to elicit an act of another. I know that some moral philosophers so speak that they say virtue of one power elicits an act in another, as temperance existing in sensitive appetite elicits temperate choice in the will. And virtue of religion existing in the will elicits in the intellect an act of prayer or vow. But for these to be true in some way, they must be understood in some moral manner, not of proper and per se physical efficiency. For in this way neither can the material habit of sensitive appetite per se influence a spiritual act of will; nor can a habit of will similarly influence an act of intellect, which in its own way is of another order and tends toward an object under a diverse formal aspect. Whence a new reason is

taken, because just as power, so also habit cannot transcend and operate outside its own object; but the object of habit is enclosed under the object of that power in which the habit exists, and is proportioned to it; as in the said example, just as the object of will is good, so also the object of religion is some good; therefore every act properly elicited by religion tends proximately to an object under some aspect of good; therefore it cannot be an act elicited by intellect. Finally, when a man prays without the habit of religion, the will alone then effects whatever it would do with the habit of religion if it had it; but then the will alone does not elicit an act of intellect; therefore neither when it operates with the habit of religion does the habit itself elicit an act of intellect. And the reason for both is because will, whether without habit or with habit, does not immediately affect intellect, but through the mediation of its own act; for in what way will the will make the intellect pray or vow unless by willing? Therefore the act which is properly and per se made by will and its habit is the very willing by which it moves another power. Which motion, properly speaking, should be called command or application of another power to work, but does not properly and per se effect acts of one power into an act of another; therefore neither does habit, because habit does not operate into an act of another power except through the mediation of its proper act; whence also in that mode of efficiency, habit itself concurs only remotely to an act of another power.

4. Because of this kind of motion, virtue of one power will sometimes be said to elicit in a moral way an act of another power, especially when in the act of another power there is no moral goodness except that which pertains to such virtue. In what way the act of prayer is compared to the virtue of religion. Which way of speaking chiefly has place in virtues of will, because from the act of will and of another power proportioned to it is composed one moral act having only one moral goodness; and therefore such an act is said to be morally elicited by such a habit. Wherefore that locution, even exposed in a moral way, can very improperly be applied to a habit of

appetite with respect to an act of will, because appetite does not directly move will, but can only indirectly help or impede its work. And in the same way only can its habits serve the will.

5. Second, it must be said that habit does not effect all acts of that power in which it is, but only acts similar to those from which it was generated, or which are virtually contained in those. The first part is certain, because in one power there are several habits, as we suppose, which are therefore distinguished because they are ordered to diverse acts. The second is from Aristotle, Ethics II, chapter 1, and is common, which Almain treats extensively in tract I of Morals, chapter 21. But the matter is easy from what was said, because habit has its being from act; therefore also its inclination and virtue of acting; therefore from that alone it can have force for effecting similar acts. And it is confirmed contrariwise, for an act can only effect a habit proportioned to itself; therefore also conversely. But the third part needs greater explanation, which we shall give below when treating of the unity of habit.

6. Now I briefly note that sometimes one act virtually contains another, as intention of an end contains choice of means; then therefore (if nothing else prevents) it is probable that habit, acquired by the prior act, can effect the posterior act contained virtually in the prior. But how this should be understood, or extended, or limited, we shall say below; and thence it will also be established whether habit can extend to specifically distinct acts, and to which ones. And simultaneously it will be understood how great and what kind is the unity of habit.

Response to Arguments Left from the Preceding Section

7. To the first argument of the first opinion it has been explained what of those things that are enumerated there habit effects in an act, namely, its substance, and intensity proportioned to the

habit, and by acting these to confer facility. And what is objected to the contrary has also been solved, for that the power alone has sufficient virtue for the substance or intensity of an act does not prevent virtue from being added for better being or for easier operating. Whence when it is said that acquired habits are not posited because of the substance of an act, the sense is that they are not posited as necessary so that acts can be elicited simply; nevertheless it is true that these habits serve as useful for effecting the very substance of an act according to... [text appears cut off]

8. To the second, the assumption is denied; for habit by formally affecting the power inclines it to its act; for just as the power itself, because it is a natural virtue effective of its acts, has natural inclination to them, so habit by augmenting that force augments the inclination. Which experience also sufficiently teaches, although frequent memory of those things to which we are accustomed also much helps that inclination, and sometimes also bodily disposition arising from such custom. But when it is inquired what that inclination of habit is, it is responded that, properly speaking, it is not something beyond the information of habit, as Capreolus correctly responds in I Sentences, distinction 17, question 1, article 3, to the argument of Aureolus against the first conclusion, for this inclination is not by elicited appetite, but by natural weight, which each principle of acting has toward its act. Whence such inclination is really not felt by us in second act, except when by reason of it we think about the object of such inclination, or apprehend it as more fitting, or when in the work itself we experience some facility. Just as the gravity of a stone formally inclines per se without efficiency; but a man sustaining a stone does not feel the weight except insofar as by reason of it he labors and grows weary sustaining the stone.

9. The third argument demands the following disputation.

SECTION VIII
WHETHER ACTS ARE PER SE THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF HABITS

1. The reason for doubting is established from the preceding section; for if habit effects an act, how can an act in turn effect habit? To this is added that if habit is effectively from acts, as many as there will have been acts of diverse natures, so many will generate habits, and thus innumerable habits will be multiplied.

2. Infused habits are not made by acts. Species are not made by acts. In this matter I suppose there is no discussion of infused habits, concerning which there is special consideration belonging to theologians. I also suppose there is no discussion of intelligible species or phantasms, but of proper habits, as I said above, for species from their kind are not made by acts, but precede acts, because they are simply necessary for the very acts to be effected. Therefore they are made per se primarily by objects, or by agent intellect; but whether by prior acts some species are sometimes made for subsequent acts is to be disputed in the matter concerning the soul.

3. I suppose next what is sufficiently known from experience, that these habits are acquired by use and custom of acts. For they are not from nature, as Plato thought, especially concerning virtues of intellect, as Aristotle hints in the beginning of the first book of the Posterior Analytics; which experience itself teaches to be false, from which we know the acquisition of these habits, because, namely, by exercise of acts we are rendered more facile for effecting similar ones. But we can know by no experiment a habit given by nature and distinct from power, nor do we find it useful for any effect, because facility in operating is not from nature; but faculty is sufficiently given by power alone. Indeed, if sometimes facility is also natural, it is never by habit added to power, but by the intrinsic condition of such power,

as is evident in faculties operating merely naturally as much as they can. Since therefore those habits are not from nature, they cannot be generated except from the custom of acts, as Aristotle also correctly taught in Metaphysics IX, chapter 5, Ethics I, chapter 1, and book III, chapter 5. Therefore act has some kind of causality in habit, since it is generated at its presence and not otherwise.

The Point of Difficulty & Various Opinions

4. First opinion. But the difficulty is what might be that kind of causality. For some think that it is not effective causality, but dispositive, because, namely, when an act is posited in power, habit naturally flows from the very power, which nevertheless would not flow unless the power were disposed. So Durandus thinks in III Sentences, distinction 33, question 2, who is not moved by the reason for doubting posited above, since he elsewhere also denies that habit effects an act; but he is moved by the fact that there cannot be per se motion or change to habit, as Aristotle proves in Physics VII, chapter 3. From which principle he thus concludes: if act effects habit, either mediately or immediately; not mediately, both because such a medium cannot be feigned or understood, and also because the same difficulty remains about it. Not immediately, because otherwise act would effect habit by proper action, and thus there would be per se action to habit, contrary to Aristotle.

5. Second opinion. The second opinion is that act does not properly cause habit, but is the way to habit, so that the principle effecting habit is the power itself; but the action by which it effects habit is the act itself. So holds Buridan in Ethics II, question 3. He proves because an effecting principle does not effect something except through action distinct from the principle itself acting; but act does not make habit through action distinct from the act itself, because the act itself is a certain action, and from action there is no action; therefore habit is only made by act as by action. And it is confirmed,

because of things that are in the same subject, one is not properly the efficient cause of another; but habit and act are in the same power; therefore.

True Resolution of the Question

6. Nevertheless it must be said that act is the cause of habit in the genus of efficient cause, as the proximate principle of it. This is the more common opinion of theologians in II Sentences, distinctions 32 and 33. Which St. Thomas also indicates in I-II, question 51, article 2, and question 63, article 2. It is proved because when acts are posited habit is generated, and not otherwise; but no sufficient reason can be given for this effect except from effective causality, which can be attributed to act without any inconvenience; therefore. The minor must be proved, partly by disproving the cited opinions, partly by responding to the principal difficulty posited at the beginning.

7. I therefore argue against Durandus that that dispositive causality is not sufficient, indeed perhaps it is none, speaking physically. For physical dispositive cause is either per se and positively necessary because of the union of form with subject; and such disposition is not only necessary so that form be introduced into the subject, but also so that it be conserved in it, as is established by induction in all physical dispositions. And the reason is that there is not another union that is made in the first instant from that which perseveres afterward; therefore if disposition is per se necessary because of union, it will be necessary as long as union lasts; nor is there greater reason concerning the first instant than concerning the others. But it is established that act is not necessary disposition so that habit be conserved in power; therefore it is not physical disposition per se necessary because of the union of habit with power.

8. You will say: sometimes an efficient cause is per se necessary so that an effect be made, although it is not necessary for conservation of the effect, but only for becoming, as in univocal

causes; therefore the same can happen in some dispositive cause. It is responded that it is not similar, both because efficient cause is more extrinsic; but disposition, especially when it is per se required, is intrinsic in its way, insofar as from natural and intrinsic conjunction with form it is necessary. And also because when a univocal efficient cause is not required for conservation of an effect, some superior and equivocal cause always intervenes that conserves the effect, which does not have place in natural and intrinsic disposition. Whenever therefore some disposition preparing the subject for form is necessary for introduction of form and not for conservation, it is not per se necessary because of the union of form with subject alone, but because of removing some impediment or disposition repugnant to introduction of form. But neither in this way is act necessary for introduction of habit, because often power begins to acquire habit when it has in itself no contrary disposition; therefore if power from itself had total effective virtue of habit, no sufficient reason could be given why act is necessary disposition for effecting habit.

9. Evasion. I see that it can be said that power from itself is indifferent to receiving this habit or the opposite, and has sufficient active force for either; but by act it is determined positively and materially so that it is properly capable of this habit rather than another, and therefore also the power, as effective of habit, is determined rather to effecting this one than another, which from itself it could not because of indifference. Because for this effection of habit power is not determined as free cause, but as naturally acting, and as universal cause, which is often determined from disposition of the patient; but in this determining disposition (so to speak) it often happens that disposition is necessary for introduction of form and not for conservation.

10. It is disproved. This evasion is apparent, but does not satisfy. First, because in all natural effects disposition determining universal and indifferent cause is always either per se and intrinsically requisite for union of form with matter, or removing another

disposition repugnant; or if it has neither of these, it is in some way actively cooperating with the universal cause, because otherwise it is not understood what kind that determination might be, nor in what way material causality has place there. Second, because if power is from itself equally indifferent to acting and receiving habit, it is said entirely gratuitously to be determined passively by act and not also actively, since act is a perfect quality and can be an accommodated principle for that action. Third, because some habits do not have others repugnant or contrary in power, as is the habit of principles, or also the habit of science; therefore to these power is from itself sufficiently determined, both passively and actively; therefore it will effect them in itself, with no act awaited. Similarly among repugnant habits power by its nature has much greater propensity to one than to another, as will to virtue than to vice; therefore this would suffice for determining its efficiency, if such determination were only materially necessary.

11. Finally, Durandus's argument is of no weight. First, because it proceeds equally or more forcefully against his own position, for if a power alone effects a habit when materially disposed by an act, then it effects that habit through its own action distinct from that by which it effects the act; therefore much more is there given in this way a per se action toward the habit than if it were done by means of the act. Second, because Aristotle, in the aforementioned passage, does not deny that there is a per se action for the production of a habit, but rather denies alteration, which properly signifies sensible and successive change; neither of these, however, is required per se for the acquisition of a habit, because it occurs through an internal perfective action that is momentary in itself, just as the act itself also occurs. See St. Thomas, question 1 On the Virtues, articles 9 and 20. But if the name of alteration is extended to any effecting and reception of quality, then it can also be said that a habit is not made per se primarily, because it always presupposes another action, from whose terminus it somehow results. See St. Thomas, I-II, question 52, article

1, ad 3; and Capreolus, in III, distinction 23, to Durandus's argument. There are also those who think that Aristotle there does not speak from his own opinion; this is what Scotus holds in Quodlibet XIII, because Aristotle there proves that there is no per se motion toward habits only because they are relations; therefore either he does not speak from his own opinion, or certainly he proves only about the relations of those habits, not about them as regards their substance. The truth therefore is that, although there is no sensible and successive alteration toward a habit, of which Aristotle speaks there, there is nevertheless in some way a per se action, as will be more evident from the following point.

12. Immanent actions are not the proper way by which a habit is made. Second, therefore, Buridan's opinion is disproved, for an action is not really distinguished from the terminus that is produced through it; but acts are really distinguished from the habits they produce; therefore an immanent act is not the proper action by which a habit is produced. The minor premise is admitted by all as certain, because both a habit can exist without an act, and an act without a habit, and each is a proper entity really distinct from the power. The major premise is also more frequently accepted, and will be proved at length below in disputation 50, because action and passion among themselves, neither from motion or change, nor change or way from terminus, can be really distinguished, nor dependence from the thing that depends. Furthermore, because an immanent act has per se and from itself its own intrinsic terminus, with respect to which the habit is something secondary and as it were accidental; but one action has only one intrinsic terminus; if anything further results or follows from this, it can only be insofar as it actively flows from the terminus of the prior action. The consequence is clear, because action as such is only the way to its intrinsic terminus, nor does it have per se any other activity. The antecedent is declared first in powers and immanent acts that do not produce a habit, for those actions cannot lack intrinsic termini, as we shall demonstrate below in disputation 50. Then in the

very acts that are made from habits in equal intensity, for there also true action and efficiency of habits intervenes, which is not terminated toward the habits themselves, but rather is from them as from active principles; therefore that efficiency and action has another intrinsic terminus; but that action as regards essentials is of the same nature as that which preceded in the immanent act by which the habit was acquired; therefore that also has its intrinsic terminus prior to the habit. The reason finally a priori is that action, as action, is per se primarily ordered to its terminus; but an immanent act is not ordered per se primarily to a habit, but per se is for the sake of its formal effect, which is to know, or to love, or something similar; the habit, however, is an effect resulting from this, not universally, but according to the power's need or capacity. Hence this can also be confirmed from supernatural acts as regards substance, which are not per se effective of habits.

The Efficiency of Act in Habit is Explained

13. It remains therefore that an act effectively concurs toward habits, since no other sufficient mode remains by which their causality and necessity can be explained. I only note that, since in an immanent act there are two things, namely, both the nature of action and the nature of quality, as was said partly in the preceding disputation and will be declared more broadly in disputation 50, this efficiency does not belong to the immanent act as it is action, but as it is quality, because action as such is not a principle of acting, but only a way to the terminus. Thus a power through its vital action produces a second act by which it loves or understands, and informed by that act, through it produces in itself a habit when it needs it and the act is proportionate. Hence what Aristotle says in Metaphysics IX, that nothing is made through immanent actions, is understood either of the action itself, as it is action, and of the terminus that remains after it; or if it refers to the act itself, it is understood per se and necessarily,

that is, that through such an act nothing is necessarily made, nor is it per se terminated toward this. Nevertheless, if otherwise the power needs a habit, the act will be able to have an effect of this kind in such a power, although it can effect nothing outside it, except by directing or commanding.

A Resolution to the Doubt Raised at the Beginning

14. Habits and acts are specifically distinct. It remains for us to respond to the difficulty posed at the beginning concerning the mutual efficiency between habit and act. In this I presuppose that habit and act are specifically distinct qualities, for if they were of the same species, the solution to that difficulty would be easy, since among things of the same species there is no inconvenience that one thing should effect another similar to that by which it was itself made, because between them there is univocal emanation. But habits and acts cannot be considered of the same species, because an act is a quality that by its nature depends on being made and conserved by the actual influx of the vital power; a habit, however, is a permanent quality without such dependence. Hence these qualities also have formally diverse effects that are specifically different; for an act constitutes the power in ultimate vital perfection and does not leave the power passive for a further act; a habit, however, only constitutes it in first act and leaves it in potency for a second and vital act. Hence Aristotle compares one who merely has a habit to one who sleeps, while one who exercises an act to one who is awake.

15. Objection. You might say: act and habit are concerned with the same object; therefore they are of the same species, for they take their species from their object. For this reason Cajetan, I-II, q. 49, a. 3, says that habit and act, indeed even power, according to a certain consideration are of the same species, although they differ specifically speaking simply. But we need not use distinctions that cannot be sufficiently explained. Therefore, the response is given by denying the

consequence; for although the object in itself is the same, the modes of tending toward it are so diverse in act and habit that from this their specific diversity can also be sufficiently gathered. For an act attains the object immediately and actually unites it to the power, either representatively by drawing the object to the power, or impulsively, that is effectively, by drawing the power to the object; a habit, however, attains the object mediately through an act, for which reason it is customary to say that habits are specified through acts, and acts through objects. Therefore habits and acts differ simply in species; hence they do not have among themselves essential agreement in some ultimate difference by reason of which they might be said to be of the same ultimate species, either simply or in some respect. Nevertheless, some peculiar agreement could be conceived between them in order to the same object, by reason of which they might be said to be of the same proximate genus or subalternate species. But if this alone is what Cajetan wished, we do not contend with him; yet this does not bear on the present difficulty; for it suffices that between habit and act there is simply an essential difference.

16. From this principle it follows, according to common doctrine, that one of these qualities is essentially more perfect, because two equally perfect species of things are not given, as was touched upon in Metaphysics VIII, chapter 3. Hence it is further necessary that, if there is mutual efficiency between these qualities specifically according to diverse individuals, that which is less perfect should not be the total principle, indeed not even the principal principle of the other, but at most partial and instrumental; conversely, however, that which is more perfect will be able to be the principal principle of the other, according to the principles laid down above in disputation XVIII, on the efficient cause. Now there remain two things to be explained: first, which of these qualities should be considered essentially more perfect; then how that mutual efficiency should be understood.

Habits and Acts are Compared in Essential Perfection

17. The opinion of some on this matter. Concerning the first point, I judge that neither part can be sufficiently demonstrated; hence serious authors are divided into contrary opinions. Some judge that habit is essentially more perfect. This is the opinion of Alexander of Hales, 2 p., quest. 96, otherwise 104, member 2; it is also attributed to Henry, Quodlib. XIII, quest. 12, although he says almost nothing there. And St. Thomas favors this opinion, I-II, q. 51, a. 2, ad 3, and quest. 63, a. 2, ad 3, joining the solutions with the arguments. For in arguing he had taken this principle, that habit is more perfect than act, so as to conclude from this that it cannot be made by an act, and in responding he does not deny the assumption, but seeks a nobler cause that might help the act to effect the habit. Indeed, indications of this greater perfection in habit can be that it is more permanent than act and does not depend continuously on the actual influx of power; hence it also seems to dispose the possessor better, because it constitutes him simply as studious or learned. Likewise, habit is more similar to power; but power is nobler than act; therefore so is habit. The major premise is clear, both from permanence and from universality, because one habit can be the principle of several acts.

18. The opinion of others. Others, however, judge that act is essentially more perfect than the habit acquired through it, which is St. Thomas's opinion, I-II, quest. 71, a. 3, where he says that act preeminently surpasses habit; and there Cajetan holds the same opinion, explaining the solution to the first objection. In which St. Thomas also declares that the excess of habit in permanence is only secundum quid. Because indeed in the solution to the third objection, he adds that act preeminently surpasses habit in goodness and malice, Cajetan says: "Nevertheless, do not think from this that it is denied that act is simply nobler than habit; for from the reason alleged in the body of the article, and explained in response to the first objection, it

is clear that act is simply nobler and better than habit; just as act is simply better than act mixed with potency, and the end than that which is toward the end." But whatever may be the case concerning the assertion itself, it is not correctly gathered either from that place of St. Thomas or from those reasons. First, because he expressly compares act with habit in moral goodness and malice, not in entitative perfection. Second, because he does not compare act with power and with habit in the same way, saying that act preeminently surpasses power in good and evil, indeed he also says that habit under the same consideration preeminently surpasses power, although it is inferior to act, because it is something intermediate between power and act; but no one would say that acquired habit is simply nobler than power in the genus of being; nor can this be said of act either. Third, if those reasons were efficacious, they would equally prove concerning infused habits that they are less noble than their acts. The opposite of this is more frequently held by theologians, because those habits are necessary per se for the substance of the act, and because for this reason acts cannot effectively produce or intensify those habits. Fourth, because the fact that act does not have that admixture of potency that power or habit has only proves that the state when a thing is in second act is simply more perfect than being in habit or in first act; it does not, however, prove that second act, precisely compared to habit or first act according to what it adds, is a simply more perfect being, but only secundum quid, and in the mode of acting.

19. And for the same reason I judge that nothing is sufficiently gathered for the present matter from those places of Aristotle in which he places beatitude in the ultimate act as in the most perfect, as is clear from Ethics I, chapters 8, 9, and 13, and book X, chapter 10; and the same can be gathered from Metaphysics IX, chapter 7, and book XII, chapters 4 and 6. Although Scotus also, in IV, dist. 49, quest. 1 and 2, especially in the solutions to arguments, thinks on account of these testimonies that act is simply nobler than habit.

From these, however, it is only proved that to be in act is simply more perfect than to be in potency; but not that, precisely comparing the entity of the ultimate act to the entity of habit or power, the former is simply more perfect.

20. In acquired habits, acts are more perfect. Nevertheless, I judge this position very probable, at least in acquired habits, because they only confer facility in operating to the power, as we have explained. Hence they seem to be only certain impulses left by acts from their own virtue. Likewise, intentional species seem to be less perfect in their genus than second acts, even if they are more necessary. Finally, this perfection of acquired habit seems to be a minimal complement of power. Therefore it is more probable that act is simply more perfect than acquired habit, even if it is exceeded secundum quid in permanence or durability, or independence from actual influx.

The Mutual Efficacy in Habit & Act is Explained

21. From this principle, to respond to the second part concerning mutual efficiency, an act by its own virtue and as a sufficient proximate principle of acting leaves in the power a habit proportioned to itself, not so that it might be the sufficient principle of similar acts, for indeed it is not, since nothing can effect anything without power, but so that it might in some way incline and help the power. But indeed if habit were simply more perfect than act, it would be necessary to say that act alone is not the sufficient proximate principle, but that power simultaneously influences the effecting of habit, which does not appear so likely. Because the effection of habit as such is not a vital action, and therefore there is no reason why the actual influx of the soul's power should be necessary for it. Indeed, these powers seem to be able to act nothing immediately except vital acts, hence they have no other force for acquiring habit than what they have for producing act; therefore habit is the proper and proportioned

effect of the act itself. And conversely, habit is like a seed (as Cajetan says) or a partial agent (as Scotus says), and therefore although it is less perfect, it can concur in the effection of act. St. Thomas explains otherwise, I-II, q. 51, a. 2, ad 3, and q. 63, a. 2, ad 3, the root from which an act of the soul has the power to produce habit, because that act always proceeds from a nobler principle. But that is the radical and remote cause; we, however, have treated of the proximate perfection required for acting.

SECTION IX

WHETHER A HABIT IS MADE BY ONE OR SEVERAL ACTS

1. The reason for doubt. This difficulty is annexed to the preceding one and is necessary for its completion. For a habit cannot be acquired through one act, but by custom, as experience teaches, and Aristotle, Ethics II. But if it is not acquired through one act, it also does not seem able to be acquired through several, because several do not concur simultaneously in acting, so that for that reason they might act more strongly than individuals, but they happen successively one after another; therefore if the first effected nothing, neither will the second be able to; for it is not stronger, nor more intense, as I suppose; and the same argument can be made concerning the third, and concerning all subsequent ones.

Various Opinions

2. The first. In this matter there is a first opinion which universally denies that habit is generated through one act, because since habit requires that it be permanent and difficult to move, and its formal effect is to give facility in operating, all these things do not seem able to be acquired through one act. Aristotle insinuates this

opinion, Ethics I, chapter 7, and more clearly book II, chapter 1, where he speaks of both intellectual and moral virtue, and says that the former is acquired by doctrine, experience, and time; the latter, however, by habituation.

3. The second. The second opinion, on the contrary, universally affirms that any habit is acquired by one act. Durandus holds this, in I, dist. 17, q. 8, ad 2; Scotus, q. 3; Henry, Quodlib. V, q. 16; Gabriel, with other Nominalists, in III, dist. 23, q. 1, doubt 4. We shall see the reasons for this opinion later.

4. The third. The third opinion uses a distinction, for in the intellect regarding evident habits of science, etc., it affirms that the generation of habit happens through the first act, because the evidence of principles is a most efficacious cause, and otherwise there is no repugnance on the part of the intellect. In other appetitive powers, however, and in the intellect itself regarding opinative habits, this opinion says that habit is not introduced except after many acts; because either the causes are weak, or even the subject is repugnant or indifferent, so that through one or another act it cannot immediately be inclined habitually. This seems to be St. Thomas's opinion, I-II, q. 51, art. 3.

5. The fourth. Others use another distinction, as if subdividing the second member of the preceding opinion, for either the appetite has contrary habits, and then one act cannot immediately induce habit, because it cannot overcome so great a repugnance of the subject; or the subject lacks a contrary or reigning habit, and then the first act will be able to induce habit, for the opposite reason.

First Assertion for the Resolution of the Question

6. The reason for the assertion. I say first: in order that habit be generated from several acts, it is necessary that the first act, and then all subsequent and proportioned acts, effect something in the power, remaining in it, and gradually leading it or disposing it for the

generation of habit. This is proved by the common reason which especially moved Henry and others; because if the first act effected nothing in the power, it would equally leave it indisposed to receive anything through the second act, and the same would be true of the second with respect to the third and of any subsequent one in any number; because if the subject is equally indisposed, and the active virtue is not stronger, the effect cannot follow more.

7. The first response assigned to our reason. Various responses are given to this reason. The first is that an act through itself formally leaves the power disposed, even if it effects nothing in it; the first act begins this disposition, and the second increases it also through itself alone, only because it follows after another, and then the third proportionally, and so on in order, until a certain number of acts prescribed by nature is reached, which being posited, habit is introduced. And the authors of this response use the example of drops hollowing out stone, for one after a certain number makes the whole effect, although the prior ones effected nothing. And the example of the remote dispositions of matter can also be added, which leave it disposed only because they immediately preceded.

8. But this response cannot be sustained, because formal disposition, if it effects nothing, cannot last longer in the subject than the form through which it is formally made lasts, because a formal effect requires an existing formal cause, if the effect itself ought to be real and existing. Therefore I ask whether for the power to remain disposed for habit is something real in the power after the act has passed, or not. The latter cannot be said, because otherwise for the power to be disposed would be nothing at all, and consequently could not contribute later to a real effect, namely to the reception of habit; nor would a real cause, namely the preceding act, have been necessary for it. Therefore for the power to remain disposed is something real, which lasts in it as long as it remains disposed; therefore it requires some equally permanent real form, because this is of the intrinsic nature of formal cause and effect. Nor does it matter if someone

objects that dispositive cause pertains rather to material cause, both because material cause also requires coexistence with its effect, and also because, although the disposing form is compared materially with respect to another form to which it disposes, nevertheless with respect to the subject which it disposes, it formally confers this.

9. And for this reason we rejected above what is adduced in the second example concerning dispositions of matter, for if they truly cease to be at the instant of corruption, they cannot leave matter positively disposed, but at most not repugnant. And the same is true of the other example of falling drops; for unless the prior ones disposed in some way, by moistening and gradually softening the hardness of stone, no subsequent drop could hollow it out. Therefore what is said about a certain number of acts prescribed by nature, so that habit might be introduced, is said gratuitously, unless it is explained what those acts contribute, and how, to the introduction of habit. Add that if four acts, for example, only because they are made by power in such an order, leave it disposed and more capable of habit, for the same reason power will be said to be enabled and rendered more prone to operating, only because several acts succeed in it without any generation of habit; for the reason is the same or proportional; because through posterior acts power will always remain more disposed, and this is to be more able for work.

10. Another response is that prior acts neither introduce positive disposition nor effect nothing at all, but remove impediments that resist the introduction of habit. But it is necessary first to explain what these impediments are; let there be, for example, an act of some moral virtue, which will effect habit, which can be resisted by the habit of contrary vice. And I argue in this way. An act of virtue cannot expel habitual vice except by introducing habitual virtue, because act does not expel habit formally, since they are not formally contrary; for they are affections and inclinations of different natures; therefore it is necessary that it expel effectively. But it cannot expel effectively by immediately corrupting, because no efficiency tends immediately to

corruption or to non-being, but to some being, from which the non-being of another follows; therefore an act of virtue cannot diminish contrary vice except by introducing something of its virtue. Therefore it is not more difficult to introduce something of virtue than to expel some vice; because the more vice is diminished, the less it resists the introduction of virtue. If therefore the first act is potent for diminishing vice, which seemed stronger for resisting, it will simultaneously be able to introduce something of virtue, as much as can be compossible with vice thus diminished. But if it is said that resistance to introducing something of virtue through the first act does not come from contrary vice, it will be necessary to explain whence it comes and what kind it is. For either it is merely natural, as for example, such a complexion, or natural propensity to some vice, and this is not diminished except by acquisition of virtue of soul, and some use and exercise of body, through which sometimes it happens that even the disposition of body is in some way changed. Or that difficulty comes from other extrinsic and accidental causes, and these are per accidens, nor do they fall under science, and if they consist in some positive thing, they are not diminished through an act of virtue, except through positive change or acquisition of some opposite thing. And finally, all those extrinsic impediments that are not in the very interior power eliciting the act cannot impede an act from effecting something in power, if it is otherwise naturally active; because all those are not dispositions that render power incapable, or in itself less apt to receive such an effect. Indeed, if anyone rightly considers, all this extrinsic repugnance first and per se creates difficulty in the very act being effected, whence through the act itself that repugnance is conquered and overcome; but with respect to the emanation of habit or disposition from act there is no repugnance, but that is merely natural, if otherwise there is in the act some material force of acting. That this is present there, we prove from the fact that by its nature the first act is as active as the fourth or fifth, since they are of the same nature and intension, as we suppose.

11. The third response is refuted. From this it is also easily refuted what others are accustomed to respond. Namely, that disposition which prior acts leave comes only from memory, for after prior acts such an object or similar act is more easily apprehended as fitting, and more reasons for so operating more easily offer themselves. But first of all, this very thing that remains in memory by way of habit must necessarily be gradually acquired through those acts, and in that we shall similarly conclude either that something is acquired through the first act, or that nothing is effected through posterior ones. Then it can be established by experiment that there is greater facility not only in the representation of the object, but also in propensity toward the represented object, other things being equal; otherwise all habits except species serving memory could be denied for the same reason. Finally, whatever may be the case concerning this extrinsic facility coming from elsewhere, here we inquire about the intrinsic disposition of power, on account of which the fifth act, for example, effects habit in it, and the first effects nothing; for to this the facility or difficulty of memory is irrelevant. For that neither impedes nor renders the capacity of power more apt; therefore if otherwise the act is equally active of itself, it will also act something upon such power; therefore, conversely, if the fifth act introduces habit, and not the prior ones, it is necessary that the prior ones disposed the power intrinsically, by effecting something in it that remains in it; and the same argument is made comparing the fourth act to the prior ones, and so up to the first.

Second Assertion, & How Habit is Generated Only Through Several Acts

12. I say second: this disposition for habit, which is begun through the first act and perfected through subsequent ones, is not essentially or really distinct from habit itself; nevertheless it does not have the status of habit until it is so rooted that it can be removed with

difficulty, and gives facility simply in operating. And in this sense it is true that habit in the being of habit is not generated except through several acts. To prove this conclusion, it should be noted that habit being introduced after some number of acts can be understood in two ways, even if prior acts leave something permanent in power. First, that what is previous is only a certain disposition really and essentially distinct from habit, which disposes power for habit, and when that arrives it is corrupted. The second way is what we have insinuated in the conclusion; which cannot be better proved than by excluding the prior way, because besides these no other can be devised, supposing the prior conclusion. Some therefore have embraced that prior way, which Burlaeus seems to hold, II Ethics, chapter 1; and some Thomists follow this, whom St. Thomas seems to favor, II-II, q. 23, a. 6, ad 2, where he says: "In the generation of acquired virtue, not any act completes the generation of virtue, but each operates toward it as disposing, and the last which is the more perfect agent in virtue of all the preceding reduces it to act. Just as also happens in many drops hollowing out stone." And he has almost similar words in the Disputed Question on Virtues, a. 9, ad 11. If anyone, however, attentively considers these, he will easily understand that they can very well be understood according to the sense of our conclusion. For first of all there he says: "The first act makes some disposition, which the second perfects." In this he sufficiently declares that this disposition is not made formally through the acts themselves, but effectively by them. And finally he adds: "The last act acting in virtue of all the preceding completes the generation of virtue." Therefore St. Thomas does not wish that through the last act the whole entity of virtue be introduced, but that it be consummated and constituted in the state of habit or virtue. And Boethius, Albert the Great and others favor this opinion of ours, who in the Predicaments, chapter on Quality, said that disposition and habit differ accidentally, because the same thing that in the beginning has the nature of disposition, while it is easily movable, is perfected through acts until it becomes habit; which

Aristotle signified there not obscurely, saying that disposition becomes habit through duration.

13. This is also proved by reason, first because there is no cause of essential diversity between the quality that prior acts effect and that which the last effects, since both are first acts inclining toward the same object and toward similar acts, and both are qualities permanent of themselves without actual influx of power. That one is more rooted than another pertains to accidental difference. Then there is no reason why, when the effect that the last act makes arrives, all that which the preceding ones made should perish, since they do not have contrariety or repugnance. Nor is form accustomed to expel disposition to itself except per accidens due to corruption of subject; but here the subject remains intact. But if someone responds that the prior disposition is lost because it is now superfluous, we rather say that a new quality is not introduced, because it would be superfluous; for if the first can remain and be perfected, why is it necessary to introduce a new one and expel the prior one, for the sake of avoiding superfluity alone? Especially since, if those qualities are of the same species, it is manifest that one is not expelled so that another might be introduced; but if they are of diverse species, they will confer perfections of different natures, and thus will not be superfluous, even if they are simultaneous. But to say that such distinct qualities remain simultaneously is improbable, since there is no necessity, nor effect from which it could be gathered; otherwise as many such qualities could be multiplied as there are acts, because a posterior always operates in more disposed power, and with the same proportion. From this finally an argument is taken, for the last act does not differ specifically from the preceding ones; therefore neither will it confer a specifically different effect; nor is the disposition made by preceding acts toward a specifically diverse form. Therefore the same disposition more rooted and perfect becomes habit.

Solutions to Contrary Reasons

14. From these it is easily responded both to the reason for doubt posed at the beginning and to the foundations of other opinions. For that reason correctly proves that through prior acts some disposition for habit is made, but not that it is immediately made from the beginning in the being of habit; but Aristotle says that habit is acquired by custom and frequency of acts, in the being and state of habit; he does not, however, deny that some disposition for habit is gradually acquired. Rather, Ethics VII, chapter 7, he so distinguishes the continent from the temperate that the former, although he operates studiously from some use, disposition and virtue, still nevertheless suffers difficulty; the latter, however, now operates from virtue and without struggle; but continence and temperance taken in the same matter are not distinguished specifically, but as imperfect disposition and habit now perfect. So also theologians and moral philosophers distinguish three states: of beginners, proficient, and perfect, of whom the first do not yet have habits in the being of habit, yet they have them by way of disposition. The second, however, already have some habits, yet it can happen that they do not yet have virtues in the being of virtue, that is, with the connection of all virtues, and other conditions that are considered necessary for the state of virtue simply, although they are not necessary for its essence. From these therefore all the opinions cited above can easily be reconciled, if their authors wish.

15. The difference between evident acts of intellect and any others, what kind it is. The difference assigned by St. Thomas between the habit of science and others is placed in this, that because evidence convinces the intellect and brings necessity to it, therefore through one act alone it completely determines it. And it removes all difficulty, and as far as concerns itself, adheres immovably, if otherwise the species required on the part of the object are sufficiently retained and ministered by memory. But indeed an act of opinion, or of moral virtue, does not so determine power, either due to weakness of cause or means, as in opinion, or due to formal freedom of the power itself,

or repugnance of opposite inclination, and therefore habit acquired through one act of science is said to have not only the essence but also the perfection of habit, at least as to determination of power; but opinion or virtue does not have the perfection of habit until through custom it is converted as if into nature. But when Aristotle said, Ethics II, chapter 1, that habit of science is acquired by doctrine, time and experience, either he speaks of science perfect in every way, or certainly he speaks of human doctrine, which is not always evident and convinces the intellect.

SECTION X
WHETHER HABIT IS PERFECTED THROUGH ACTS, AND HOW

1. Habits are perfected through acts. To proceed to the point where the difficulty lies, those things which will have appeared clearer must be briefly premised. And first I suppose that habit, just as it is made through acts, so is perfected through the same, not only because from the state of disposition it is led to the state of habit, according to what was said in the preceding section, but also because in the very state of habit it is more and more perfected, until it arrives at the complement of its perfection. And we now comprehend all this perfection under the effection of habit, nor do we rigidly distinguish between the name of habit or disposition, but we speak absolutely of that quality from when it begins to be made until it is consummated.

2. Second I suppose that two kinds of increase are customarily distinguished in these habits: one is through pure intension, the other through some mode of extension. The former is when habit in order to the very same object and the same acts concerning it is more and more perfected, namely by more inclining power and rendering it more facile for eliciting similar acts. The latter increase is said to be when habit acquired concerning one part of an

object is extended to others, as when science is increased in order to diverse conclusions. This happens in various ways, namely, either concerning diverse natural or specific subjects, as when in science about animal one property of horse is known, and another of lion; or concerning the same subject, knowing diverse properties about it, as when concerning man I know that he is capable of wonder, and then that he is capable of laughter; and in habits of appetite sometimes virtue is extended to effecting various acts in diverse matters, as temperance to abstaining in food and drink, and charity to loving not only God but also neighbor, and any virtue to intending the end and choosing or executing means; sometimes however virtue is extended to effecting various acts in some way concerning the same thing, as when religion is extended to adoring God and to sacrificing to him, and charity is extended not only to loving God but also to desiring him, or his glory, and rejoicing about his goods, etc., concerning which extensive increase, whether it is true, will be said in the following section.

3. Habit is perfected by similar acts. Third, concerning the first kind of increase it is certain that habit is not made or perfected except through acts completely similar in essential nature, and in the object about which they are concerned, and in the mode of tending toward it. This is proved, because such habit is not perfected except in order to similar acts by virtue of that increase; therefore it is not increased in this way except through similar acts. And all agree on this. Concerning this intensive increase, however, many things are customarily asked, which insofar as they are common to other qualities that receive intension, will be treated below, disputation XLVI.

Whether Habit is Intensified Only Through More Intense Acts

4. Here, however, it is customarily asked specially whether, in order that an act intensify habit, it ought to be more intense. For although it was defined above, disputation XVIII, that multitude of form per se does not contribute to intension of effect, except in some at least part of the agent there be so much intension, nevertheless this is true when the formal principle of acting is of the same nature as the form that is the formal terminus of action; but if the form is nobler in essence, by reason of that it will sometimes be able to confer greater intension to the effect in a lower order than it itself has in its higher order. Since therefore it has been said that acquired act is nobler than habit, it will be able to happen that through mere repetition of similar acts habit is intensified, even if posterior acts are not more intense.

5. And thus Scotus opines, in I, dist. 17, q. 3; and there Durandus, quest. 8; and Gabriel, in III, dist. 23, quest. 1, doubt 4. Although these authors do not base themselves on the reason insinuated by us, but on uniformity of degrees of intension; for they think intension happens through mere congregation of similar degrees in the same subject. Hence when similar acts are multiplied and have equal force of acting, they will introduce equal degrees into the subject, from whose congregation a more intense habit will be made. Indeed Scotus signifies that when the subject is more disposed through prior degrees of habit, even less perfect acts suffice for acting something whereby they intensify habit. This opinion can be confirmed by experience, for after several acts of virtue or vice, even if they are of the same mode and intension, we exercise similar acts more easily and promptly than after the first act; therefore it is a sign of the effect of such habit, and consequently that that habit is perfected through such acts, and not except intensively; therefore.

Habit is Intensified by More Intense Acts, Not by Equal Ones

6. But St. Thomas's opinion is that habit is not increased except through more intense acts. Two things are included in this. First, that a more intense act intensifies habit. And this, speaking absolutely, is manifest from what has been said; for if an act effects habit, a more perfect act will perfect it, for in a more intense active form the efficacious virtue is also more efficacious for a more intense effect. And this is confirmed first, because otherwise no way could acquired habit be increased; for by what acts could this be done, if it is not done by more intense ones? Therefore, by what experience it is established that habits are acquired, it is established that they are also increased. Hence it is also gathered that just as through any act habit is made as to its entity, so through any more intense act it is intensified. Nor does the opinion of those seem provable who say that habit is not intensified through one act of intension, but through several; for the same reasons can be made against this as were made concerning the generation of habits. And finally, because in one act there is active virtue of such intension, otherwise there would not be such virtue in the last act either, and otherwise the subject is capable and disposed through remiss habit; therefore any more intense act, speaking per se, can intensify habit. The greater difficulty could be whether one act immediately confers all the intension proportioned to it, whose resolution will be established from what will be said.

7. The second statement of this opinion, in which it disagrees with the preceding, is that an act that is not more intense than habit does not intensify it, whether it be more remiss or equally intense. Thus St. Thomas, I-II, q. 52, a. 3, where all Thomists agree, and II-II, q. 24, a. 5 and 6. Almain follows the same, In III, dist. 22, quest. 2; and Major, q. 6. The foundation of this part is that action does not follow except from a proportion of greater inequality; but in virtue that is not more intense than the effect, there is not the predicted proportion, just as in heat equally intense there is not proportion for intensifying another equal one; therefore. In which foundation there is still left the

difficulty touched upon in the beginning, which we have explained in the following discourse.

8. But St. Thomas adds two things that do not have completely easy explanation. One is that acts equal to habit dispose for intension of habit. Some explain this so that after some similar acts, some act, although equal in intension, intensifies habit in virtue of the prior ones and the disposition left by them. For St. Thomas, speaking indifferently of more intense acts and equally intense ones, concludes that with acts multiplied habit grows. The other statement of St. Thomas is that acts less intense than habit dispose for diminution of it; in that way, namely, by which cessation from act disposes for corruption of habit.

9. I hold this latter opinion absolutely true; nevertheless many things are included in it that are not equally certain, which it is fitting to distinguish and declare. Therefore habit becoming more intense can be understood in two ways. First, in order to effecting acts more intense than are all those from which the habit was generated or increased; so that such a habit, although it was only effected through acts of degree four, nevertheless itself by reason of its intension inclines and gives virtue for acts of degree five or six. Second, it can be understood that habit becomes more intense in order to acts equal in intension to those from which it was generated, and a fortiori also to less intense ones. For just as power, although of itself alone it has virtue for an act of degree four, nevertheless through addition of habit of degree four, becomes more prompt for exercising acts of degree four, but does not receive new virtue for eliciting more intense acts, so it can be understood that the same habit that was generated from an act of degree four, through a similar act of degree four receives greater force for eliciting other acts of degree four, even if it does not grow in virtue of effecting a more intense act. In this way also we said above that multitude of form of equal intension can contribute to acting more strongly and quickly a similar quality, but not to acting a more intense one.

10. In the former sense therefore I hold it certain that habit cannot be intensified through acts that are not more intense. This even experience seems to convince; for no one operating remissly becomes prompt for fervent acts. Hence what Aristotle said, that habit renders acts similar to those from which it was generated, is true not only of similarity in essence, but also in degree. And the reason seems manifest, because prior acts do not have whence they might confer virtue for effecting more intense acts, for although those are more in multitude, from all taken together there does not arise one more intense. Hence as to this that reason is sufficiently efficacious, that just as in those acts there is not proportioned intension, so neither proportioned virtue for effecting habit more intense in that way. Nor does it matter that these acts are essentially more perfect than habit, because no form, even if it is essentially more perfect, can give or effect virtue for effecting a form similar to itself in essence and more intense in degree; but habit is nothing but a certain effective virtue of acts, which virtue is made through the acts themselves; therefore it can never receive from them force for effecting more intense acts than are those from which it was both generated and perfected.

Whether Equal Acts Increase the Force of Habit in Order to Equal Acts

11. In the latter sense, however, it is probable that equal acts perfect habit in order to effecting similar acts, until they confer all the efficacy and facility that it can have in rendering similar and equal acts in degree. This seems to be probably persuaded, both from the declaration placed above, and also because here ceases the foundation declared in the proximate assertion. Nevertheless this very increase can be understood in two ways. First, because it is not necessary that the first intense act, for example of degree four, effect a habit equal to itself in intension, because neither is the subject disposed, and consequently neither is there so much efficacy in the act itself. Hence

all concede that through the first act at least very intense that quality which is habit is produced, yet no one says that habit is immediately made with all that intension. And experience teaches that a man does not immediately remain prompt and able for effecting equally intense acts; but the same is the proportion of individual acts with respect to habits equal to themselves in intension; therefore it is not necessary that the first act effect according to its whole latitude a habit equal to itself in degrees.

12. But if this is true (as it is indeed very probable), it is correctly understood that the second act, even if it is only equal to the first, can increase the habit produced by the first, and thus through subsequent equal acts it can be increased, until it arrives at equality in degree with the acts themselves. And in this way it is sufficiently understood that what we seem to experience happens, that through completely equal acts we are rendered more prompt for other similar ones. In this way also what St. Thomas adds is very well understood, namely that equal acts dispose for intension of habit, even in order to more intense acts, because that very increase in order to equal acts is a certain disposition, although remote, so that a man more easily proceeds to a more fervent act, through which he also obtains similar increase of habit. Likewise according to this manner of speaking it is easily expedited what was asked above concerning a more intense act. For although any act more intense than habit intensifies it, nevertheless it is not necessary that one act alone immediately confer to habit all the intension in which it exceeds it, but it will be able to be perfected gradually through multiplication of similar acts; for the proportion is the same. And this suffices for the truth of the assertion posited.

13. Nevertheless it can be objected, because those acts are equal; therefore if the first could not effect habit, for example, of degree four, neither will the second be able to. Hence we never find in natural agents that an equal form can intensify an effect that another produced and could not intensify, even if the producing form is

essentially more perfect than the produced. As one light will not be able to intensify heat made by another equal light, if that prior one made as much as it could, because such lights are also equal in activity. It is responded that all this is true if other things are equal on the part of the subject; but in the present case other things are not equal, because the first act acts upon a subject disposed in no way; but the second act now finds the subject disposed, and therefore even if it is equal in itself, it can effect more. But you will press, because where passive power is of itself capable of the whole effect, it does not need positive disposition, but it suffices that it not have a contrary one; therefore whenever power does not have some form repugnant to the activity of act, this will effect as much as it can; but act can of itself effect habit equal to itself according to the whole latitude of intension; therefore the first act will so effect, speaking per se. It is responded that the very indifference of power, and the inclination that it has to other acts or objects, sufficiently resists so that the first act cannot immediately effect according to its whole intension from the beginning. Just as stone is capable of impetus, so that it is carried upward, or to right or left; nevertheless, because through inclination to center it resists, therefore the agent does not impress impetus as much as it can, but as much as it overcomes; so the first act cannot immediately overcome completely from the beginning the other inclination of power; nevertheless it leaves it somewhat more prone to its object, and thus more disposed, so that through the second act, although otherwise equal, it can be more inclined, and so consequently, until it attains all the habitual inclination that those acts according to their latitude can attribute. And this seems most probable in habits of appetite and in habits of opinion, for concerning act of science it is probable that it immediately effects habit according to its whole latitude, because of natural determination of power. In this sense therefore the stated assertion is very probable.

Section X

Acts in No Way Increase Habit Already Equal to Themselves

14. But further one can proceed by asserting that even after habit arrives at equal degrees of intension with act (whether it is constituted in that state through one or through several acts), it can through similar and equal acts, if they are further multiplied, be more and more strengthened and increased, not so that it inclines to a more intense act, but so that it inclines to an equally intense act more strongly and vehemently. For all this perfection of habit seems, as far as concerns itself, possible without any repugnance, and from elsewhere does not seem to exceed the active force of such acts, because they never give virtue for a more perfect effect intensively, but strengthen and increase virtue for an equal effect; for which the nobility of agent and multitude of form, to which multiplication of acts is equivalent, seems to suffice. But nevertheless this kind of increase can neither be proved nor sufficiently understood, because intension, as I now suppose, is not aggregation of similar degrees, but supposes latitude of form with some per se order among the degrees themselves, from first to last, in whose attainment intension consists, as we shall see disputation XLVI. If therefore habit now arrives at the fourth degree, in which it is equaled to the acts through which it was made, and nevertheless similar acts multiplied add some increase to it, they can only add the fifth degree of intension, or part of it, and thus not only will habit become more prompt and facile for equal acts, but also potent for more intense ones.

15. For neither can there be understood in such habit a double mode of intension in order to the same acts, since neither is such double intension found in the acts themselves, nor can it be explained by what reason intension is added to habit of degree four, and that according to it it does not become potent for communicating similar intension to act. One can only respond that that increase is not

through addition of that fifth degree, which per se has order with the prior four and perfects them, but as if through a certain iteration of other four degrees similar, which are united to the prior ones, and although they do not render habit per se more intense in order to acts, nevertheless they render it stronger. But this is rather to say that habits distinct in number are multiplied in the same subject with respect to the same acts, than that habit is increased, because those degrees as if accidentally accumulated in the same subject (so to speak), just as by their nature they do not compose the latitude of one quality, so neither can they be united among themselves for constituting one quality per se, as will be more established from what we shall say about intension. But to multiply habits distinct in number in the same subject with respect to the same acts would be to proceed to infinity, and it is repugnant to what was said above concerning individuation of accidents in disputation V. And therefore it is truer that there is no such increase in habits, but similar and equal acts effect nothing further, when they now find habit equally intense.

Solutions to Contrary Objections

16. Nor is Durandus's reason of any moment against this, namely that every passive thing, while it suffers, receives some change; but every act elicited from habit acts something upon power, because through it power actually suffers; therefore such an act of whatever intension it may be impresses something upon power, whereby it increases habit. For it is responded by denying the minor, because immanent act does not always act upon power, but it itself is made in power, and is the impression that through immanent action is made in power by the intrinsic agent, which is power itself, either alone or with habit. Nor does the foundation of Gabriel and others hinder, because it supposes a false mode of intension.

17. Finally, the experience adduced above does not hinder, because that mode of increase through several equal acts explained by

us in the prior way suffices. For after habit by operating arrives at a certain state with sufficient moral facility, experience cannot establish that through completely equal acts that facility is increased. Especially since it cannot be sufficiently known by experiment whether acts are completely equal or not. It is also added that the very disposition of body, and of imagination and memory, can contribute something to this facility; for we cannot deny that these help, although they are not the total cause of it.

18. Finally, from what has been said in this first point it is established how habit thus effected and perfected through several similar acts is one; for it is one with unity of intension, which is per se unity in qualities, and is sometimes called simple unity, and is distinguished from imperfect unity, which is only through collection of several habits, or proportion of several qualities, such as is in health or beauty. In this sense many say that habit is a simple quality, concerning which we shall see immediately. In rigor, however, that is unity through composition, just as is unity of continuous quantity, because it is through union of several degrees, which are distinguished in the thing itself. In this the reason is the same for habits and other qualities that receive intension, concerning which matter we shall speak in disputation XLVI.

SECTION XI

WHAT KIND OF AUGMENTATION IS THE EXTENSIVE AUGMENTATION OF HABIT, AND WHAT UNITY OF HABIT CORRESPONDS TO IT

1. That this kind of augmentation exists in habits, we have supposed above from common doctrine, abstracting from the question whether it is proper augmentation or not; for we left this to

be investigated here, inquiring what kind it is, and whether it is truly augmentation, or rather the production of a new habit.

The Meaning and Point of the Question is Proposed

2. But so that the difficulty of the question may be opened up, I suppose first that a habit cannot receive this extensive augmentation except through the addition of something real that comes to be in it. For all authors seem to agree on this. And concerning those who think that even mere intension occurs through this kind of addition, the matter is manifest, and is evident from Scotus, in II, dist. 3, q. 10, and in III, d. 23; Gabriel there, quest. 2, and in Prolog. sentent., quest. 8; Ockham in the same place, quest. 1 and 9; Gregory, quest. 3. Among those, however, who deny that intension occurs through addition, some think the same should be said about this extension, whom I shall mention below. We nevertheless now suppose the opposite, and we take this from St. Thomas, I-II, quest. 52, a. 1, where he distinguishes this double augmentation, intensive and extensive, although under different terms; for he calls intensive augmentation "on the part of the subject," because intension occurs insofar as the subject participates more and more in the same form, or the same habit; but he calls extensive augmentation "on the part of the form itself as such"; for he says this augmentation is in habits according to the order they have toward objects. As (he says) there is greater or lesser knowledge, which extends to more or fewer things. And concerning this augmentation he adds, in a. 2, that it occurs through addition, although he seems to deny this of the former intensive augmentation, which we shall see later.

3. And it is proved by reason, because first the arguments that can prove that something is added in intension conclude much more strongly here. Then it can be convinced from the common nature of real augmentation; for in what way can real augmentation be mentally

conceived without real addition? Moreover, through this augmentation there comes to be in the power a new formal and real effect that was not there before, for it remains disposed toward a new object, for example, toward a new conclusion of knowledge, toward which it was not before; therefore it is necessary that that effect be made through a new form, or a new part of the form. The consequence is clear, because neither can a formal effect be made without form, nor can a preexisting form confer a new formal effect, for it was informing before as much as it could; for this form, of which we are treating, is an absolute form, and actually inhering according to its whole self, and consequently also actually informing, as much as it can; therefore, when the formal and real effect of this form increases, it is necessary that something in reality itself be added to the form itself. Although this argument seems to conclude generally about every real augmentation, it does so especially about this extensive one, for this belongs to the form itself by reason of itself and according to the order it can have to diverse objects, or diverse acts, and not only by reason of the subject. Whence it is confirmed. For a habit through this augmentation has a new transcendental relation to new acts and new objects; but a new transcendental relation cannot exist except in a new entity that is added, because such a relation does not come from the change of something extrinsic; therefore this augmentation necessarily requires this kind of addition. Finally, active power is added to that habit, not only as to the mode of acting, or the mode of effect, but also as to diverse effects, that is, as to various acts either specifically diverse, or at least very dissimilar in tendency toward the object; therefore that augmentation was made through real addition, for real power does not increase per se and in itself without real addition.

4. Extensive augmentation of habits occurs through acts of the same power concerning diverse objects. Second, I suppose that this kind of extensive augmentation of habit occurs through acts of the same power indeed, yet in some way dissimilar among themselves in

tendency toward the object, and not only in intension and remission. The first part is proved, for if the acts are of different powers, they will generate habits that are entirely distinct, because, as was said above, an act induces a habit in that power in which it itself is; therefore if acts are in diverse powers, each one will induce a habit in its own proper power; therefore they will make diverse habits, not augment the same one, because one habit cannot be in diverse subjects. The second part is proved, because if acts are entirely similar, and only differ in intension, they will indeed be able to intend the habit, but not extend it, because acts only effect in the habit a perfection proportionate to themselves.

The First Point of Difficulty Concerning the Extensive Augmentation of Habit, What Kind It Is

5. From these things, therefore, various difficulties arise. The first is what this extensive augmentation in habits can be. And the reason for doubt is that either what is added through such augmentation is united per se and properly to the preexisting habit, or only through something else, namely, because both are in the same proximate subject. The first cannot be understood; but the second does not suffice for true and proper augmentation of habit; therefore. The minor is proved as to the former part, because union per se between qualities of the same subject cannot be understood, except through the mode of intension; for it is necessary that those which are thus united be compared as partial entities with respect to that integral quality which coalesces from them, and consequently that they be compared among themselves as co-parts unitable among themselves. But we can understand two parts to be unitable among themselves in only two ways. First immediately through the mode of act and potency, as matter and form are united; second, by means of some indivisible term, in which those two parts are joined through the mode of continuation, as two parts of a line are united in a point. The

prior mode of union does not have place between parts of the same quality, because never are any two things united in that way, unless one is related as potency, the other as act; for this is the unique reason of this unity, arising in this way from many, as Aristotle often taught, VII and VIII Met. But truly the parts of the same quality are not compared among themselves as act and potency, because neither is received in the other as in a subject, nor does it actuate it, but each proximately affects the same subject, in which the whole quality is. Whence neither do such parts have per se order among themselves, but each one can per se alone inhere in its subject; therefore neither actuates the other; therefore they do not have that kind of union among themselves. Which is manifestly clear in the present matter, for even if one virtue of religion, for example, is extended to acts of praying, sacrificing and vowing, and in order to those is understood to have diverse partial entities, according to which such a habit is augmented, nevertheless one part is not compared to another, as potency to act, nor is one per se presupposed in the subject for another, but indifferently can that virtue be begun through acts of praying, for example, and augmented through acts of sacrificing, and conversely; therefore the prior mode of union does not have place in this augmentation, or between the partial entities of the same habit.

6. Neither does the other mode have place in quality, except by reason of intension, in which, as we shall see below, there is a certain latitude maintaining proportion to the extensive latitude of quantity, in this that it is infinitely divisible, and consequently in it are found parts of the same intensive latitude, and indivisible terms, by which those parts are united; for without these such a mode of union cannot have place. But truly in extensive augmentation this mode of union cannot be found for two reasons. First, because each of those parts of extension, which are said to be thus united, is not further divisible according to extension, but indivisible; as, for example, although knowledge is said to have extensive latitude according to various assents of diverse conclusions, nevertheless each assent is

extensively indivisible, because it terminates only to one indivisible truth. Whence also that partial entity or degree corresponding in the habit to each act is also extensively indivisible, because it is proportioned to the act through which it is made, and inclines indivisibly to that act and its object; therefore between parts of this kind of extension of habit, there cannot be union through the mode of continuation; for never are those things thus united which are indivisible.

7. The second reason is that in those things which are united through the mode of continuation, there is given an indivisible term common to each extreme of the union, as was said above about quantity, and will be said below about intension. But in the present case such a term cannot be given, in which the parts of extension of the same habit are united, both because of the preceding reason; for since those parts are indivisible in themselves, they do not need a further indivisible term, indeed they cannot even have it. And also because that indivisible term ought to be proportioned to the entity of the habit; therefore it ought according to its mode to incline to some act and object, because the whole entity of habit is essentially of this kind. Since therefore one part of that habit inclines to one act, and another to another, I ask concerning that indivisible term, in which such parts are united, to which act it inclines, because there is no greater reason for one than for the other; nor truly can it incline to both, since it is said to be indivisible, and in acts there is extensive latitude. Likewise, because in acts there is nothing really common, in which they are united; therefore neither can anything similar correspond in the habit. From this discourse, therefore, it seems to be concluded that there can be no real union between what is supposed already acquired in some habit, and what is added through this extensive augmentation. From which it happens that those two can only be united through something else, namely, because they are conjoined in the same proximate subject.

8. Not only are individual habits in individual powers. Now truly the other part posited above is proved, namely, that this union does not suffice for true augmentation of habit, because that is not augmentation, but acquisition of a new habit in the same power. For that mode of union is common to all habits of the same power; therefore whenever a habit is acquired in one power already having another, it will be extensive augmentation, which would be most improperly said, because what is augmented ought to be the same as what was generated before. Unless perhaps someone might say that there is only one habit of one power, which would be absurd in moral philosophy, in which it is most accepted that there are several moral virtues in the same appetite, and several intellectual virtues in the same intellect. And in Theology, at minimum, it is certain that charity and hope are distinct virtues and habits, even if they are in the same will.

The Second Point, Through Which Acts Habit Grows Extensively

9. The second difficulty is through which acts this extensive augmentation of habits occurs, whether through acts specifically diverse, or only numerically distinct. For although it has been said that it is acquired through acts in some way dissimilar, nevertheless it does not therefore follow that they ought to be specifically diverse; for among individuals of the same species, especially relative ones, some can be entirely similar, as, for example, visible species of Peter; and others in some way dissimilar individually, as visible species of Peter and Paul, as was touched upon above in disp. V. This individual dissimilarity therefore seems not only to suffice among acts augmenting the same habit extensively, but also to be unable to be greater. The first is clear, because in whatever way acts tend to diverse objects, one cannot generate inclination to another, nor conversely; therefore the habitual inclination acquired through one act will be

augmented extensively to a new object through another act, similar indeed in species, but dissimilar individually, on account of tendency toward a diverse quasi-material object. The second is clear, because if acts are specifically diverse, they will generate specifically diverse habits; therefore they cannot augment the same habit, even extensively. The consequence is clear from what has been said; and the antecedent is proved. Both because habits are specified through acts, and thus from specifically diverse acts habits will take diverse specific differences. And also because an act is the proximate cause of the habit, which it leaves behind as its seed for similar acts; therefore specifically diverse habits will leave (so to speak) specifically diverse seeds.

10. On the contrary, however, it is that mere individual dissimilarity of acts does not seem sufficient for this extensive augmentation. First, because otherwise through all numerically distinct acts, which are concerned with diverse material objects, the habit would be augmented extensively, as justice by restoring money to this person, grain to that one, and so on with others, which seems both superfluous and false. Second, because otherwise the same habit could never elicit specifically diverse acts, because it can only effect acts similar to those by which it was effected; therefore if it cannot be made and completed through specifically diverse acts, neither will it be able to effect them. But the consequent seems false; for the same habit of knowledge can elicit assents of several conclusions, and the same moral virtue elicits intention and choice, and similar acts, which plainly seem specifically diverse.

The Third Point, What Kind of Unity Habit Has

11. In these difficulties there is also touched that celebrated question, whether habit is a simple quality, or a collection of several, which, as I hinted above, can have two meanings. One is whether habit is so simple that it admits no composition in itself according to

extension; the other is, granted that habit is a quality composed in some way, whether it is a quality truly and per se one, or rather only has some artificial unity from a collection of several, and the decision of both meanings depends on the mode of explaining extensive augmentation, in which we are now engaged.

First Opinion, That Every Habit is a Simple Quality

12. There are therefore various opinions in this matter. The first is that habit is a quality not only per se one, but also simple and extensively indivisible; for thus we now speak, lest it be necessary always to warn of this. Thus thinks Cajetan, I-II, quest. 54, a. 4; and Capreolus, quest. 3 Prologi; Ferrara, 1 contra Gent., c. 56; Henry, Quodl. IX, quest. 9. And in the same way many of the more recent Thomists think, and they believe it to be the opinion of St. Thomas, in the said quest. 54, a. 4, in I-II. Who consequently philosophize in the same way about extensive augmentation as about intensive, as to this, that neither occurs through addition of entity, but through only a different mode of the same indivisible entity's being related to the subject; although the said authors do not declare this so openly. Whence when St. Thomas, in the place cited above, says that habit is augmented according to itself through addition, they can explain that he speaks only of intellectual habit, and of the addition of intelligible species. This explanation has foundation in his words; for in I-II, quest. 52, a. 1 and 2 he speaks particularly of knowledge, which he says is augmented through addition of several conclusions, which are not understood to be added, except by means of intelligible species.

13. The reason of this opinion can be that habit is most properly and per se a species of quality; therefore every habit, because it is one habit in its species, is also one quality per se; but it cannot be per se one, unless it is also simple; therefore. The minor is proved by the said authors, with an argument that is common to intension,

namely, because that composition from parts or degrees cannot be, unless those parts are distinguished numerically; but they cannot be thus distinguished, since they are received in the same subject. But how much force this argument has in intension, we shall see later; in the present case, however, it is certainly not efficacious, because it will be answered that the parts of that habit, if they are made through specifically diverse acts, do not differ only numerically, but also specifically partially, yet they are quasi-heterogeneous parts, which can be united to compose one habit; but if those acts differ only numerically with some dissimilarity in order to diverse objects, at least material ones, thus also it does not repugn that two accidents of the same species be simultaneously in the same subject, as I declared above, disp. V. More efficaciously therefore does that minor seem to be proved by the discourse made in the prior difficulty, about which we shall say more below.

14. Although truly the said authors think thus about the simplicity of habit, nevertheless they simultaneously teach that one and the same habit is the principle of very many acts, and is concerned with a very broad object, comprehending various things or matters in itself, and in order to those it is sometimes one habit in an imperfect inchoate state, but is perfected and consummated through various acts, even if nothing is intrinsically added to it. But if you ask how a habit of one simple essence can incline to so many things or matters, they respond that the reason is that all those matters agree in one formal reason of object, under which they are attained by such a habit. But what this formal unity of object is, is explained with the greatest difficulty, nor can it be declared by one simple or general rule, which comprehends all habits; but generally it can only be said that in each habit that which is related as its motive, or as the reason of attaining the things in which it is engaged, is the formal reason of the object, from which the habit takes its unity. But this reason is diverse in diverse habits, according to their diversity and proportion, which will have to be explained in individual matters. Again, if someone asks

whether those acts, by which such habits are consummated, are specifically distinct, or only numerically, some of the said authors simply deny that they differ specifically, because they agree in the formal object of the habit; but others distinguish, for in comparison to the habit they are of the same species, but according to their proper reasons they can differ specifically. Finally, if you ask how several and dissimilar acts can perfect the same indivisible habit, they respond nothing else than that that indivisible entity can have various modes of affecting the subject, according to which it can be variously perfected through various acts.

15. But the foundation of this part has been declared thus, because a habit inclining to various acts under some latitude of object is truly one; but it cannot be truly one unless it is simple, as the argument made above proves; therefore. The major is proved, first by induction; for by one faith we believe various things, and by one charity we love God and neighbor, and so with the rest. Otherwise as many justices or temperances would have to be multiplied as there are offices of these virtues, and thus also in individual sciences, innumerable sciences would have to be multiplied. Then it is proved by reason, because habit is intermediate between power and act; but since power is a simple entity, it extends itself to several acts, and to several things, insofar as they agree in some reason of object; therefore also habit in its order will be able, existing as the same indivisible, to embrace many things in itself, under some reason of object. But I say, in its order, because it is not necessary that habit extend as much as the power which it perfects, because it is intermediate between that and acts, and therefore participates in something from each extreme in its own way, so that it is neither such a limited entity as an act, nor extends as broadly as power.

Second Opinion Distinguishing Between
Habits of Intellect and Will

16. The second opinion makes a distinction between habits of intellect and appetite, and denies that the former are simple qualities, but affirms this of the latter. This opinion can be attributed to Soncinas, VI Metaph., q. 9, where when he expressly teaches that knowledge is not a simple quality, he seems to think the same about all habits of intellect. But in the solution to the third, he expressly concedes that habits of will are simple qualities. Whence as to this second part he thinks the same and for the same reason as other Thomists; but as to the former he is founded on this, that he does not admit in the intellect other habits besides intelligible species, whose ordered collection he says is the habit of knowledge. Whence speaking rigorously of the judicative habit of intellect, about which we now dispute, he posits it as neither simple nor composite, because he rather removes it from the middle, although there can be some ambiguity and equivocation in terms in this. For Soncinas distinguishes two kinds of intelligible species: some, which are made by the agent intellect and precede the assent of knowledge, which he says only represent incomplex things; but others are intelligible species, which are made in the intellect from the force of scientific assent, which he says represent the complexes themselves, and enable the intellect for similar assents, and this species produced through the assent of knowledge he says is the proper habitual effect of demonstration. Finally, he concludes that one science is composed of many species of the latter kind, and is not a simple quality.

17. In which opinion it is sufficiently obscure what this author understands by complex species produced through assent of a conclusion. For if he understands them to be true species representing the object, and serving for apprehension of it, they do not seem necessary with respect to those objects, of whose species are impressed through the agent intellect. For those suffice, not only for simple apprehension, but also for composition. Because the first composition was made through those alone by means of simple concepts, formed by the power of the same species. Nor after the first

assent, even one had through demonstration, can composition or similar assent again be made without use of the same species, because without concurrence of the object cognition cannot be made; but the object concurs through species. Nor can it be sufficiently understood that species, which take the place of object, represent it except incomplexly, for complexion is only in the composition of mind, either apprehensive, or also judicative, to omit now words and writings. Whence, although it sometimes happens that through an act of imagination or possible intellect there is made a phantasm or intelligible species of some object, which could not be represented through the action alone of external senses, or of agent intellect, nevertheless even that species simply and incomplexly represents its object. Those species therefore representing complexly are neither necessary, nor sufficiently intelligible, if the discussion is about proper species. But if by the name of species Soncinas understands some quality left in the intellect from the efficacy of scientific assent, inclining and determining the intellect to similar assent of complex truth, thus it is true that such a quality is given in the intellect; but we call that a judicative habit. Nor does that quality take the place of object, but rather holds itself on the part of the power, whose light or virtue it augments for judging, and for use of species; wherefore it is not properly called intelligible species. And thus in this sense this opinion does not differ in this part from the following opinion.

Third Opinion Denying Universally That Habit is a Simple Quality, or Per Se One

18. There is therefore a third opinion, which universally denies that habits are simple qualities, whether in intellect, or in will, and consequently also denies that habit is a quality per se one, physically, and speaking rigorously, but only through some collection or coordination of several qualities. This opinion was held by Aureolus in the Prologue of the Sentences, where Scotus holds the same, q. 3,

dub. 2; and Gregory, quest. also 3, a. 1; and others in the same place, especially Ockham, quest. 1 and 9; and Gabriel, q. 9, and in III, dist. 2, q. 2. The foundation of this opinion consists in two principles, which seem to be sufficiently proved by us in what precedes. One is that real augmentation of habits, and especially extensive, cannot occur without real addition; the other is that what is added, when habit is augmented extensively, cannot have proper and per se union with that part of habit which is presupposed. For from these principles it is evidently inferred that a perfect and consummated habit (for this is what we are discussing) is not a simple quality, because it is consummated through extensive augmentation. It follows then that such a habit cannot be a quality per se one, because in these qualities there is no composition or union, from which an entity per se one could result. And since the whole force of this opinion consists in these principles, and their examination, I omit other arguments which are brought forward by the said authors. That, however, further follows from the aforesaid opinion, namely that this augmentation of habit through extension is not proper, but is (so to speak) through juxtaposition, and artificial composition, just as a house is augmented when it is built. But what kind this artificial composition is in habits, and when in one and the same power it suffices for unity of habit with distinction from other habits of the same power, has great difficulty, and is not sufficiently explained by the said authors.

Fourth Opinion Denying Simplicity to Habits, but not Per Se Unity

19. The fourth opinion, and quasi-intermediate between those mentioned, is that habit is a quality per se one, yet not simple or indivisible according to extension to diverse acts, and partial objects, but is composed of partial entities truly and properly united among themselves, because without addition there cannot be true augmentation, and without union there cannot be true unity of habit.

This opinion pleases some of the modern Doctors; for none of the more ancient sufficiently declares this way of thinking. But Cajetan seems somewhat to favor it, I-II, quest. 54, a. 4, ad 3 of Gregory, insofar as he compares the intension and extension of habit to the intension and extension of heat, saying: Just as in material forms heat and its latitudes intensive, and extensive, are not three entities, but one having two conditions, so in habit. But truly (omitting for now intensive latitude) it cannot be doubted that heat according to extensive latitude has parts really distinct, although united among themselves. And therefore, although heat and extensive latitude are not said to be two entities, because extensive latitude includes those parts with their union, and the whole is not distinguished from the parts taken simultaneously and united, nevertheless in that latitude are included entities partially distinct among themselves; therefore the same will be in habit, if there is similar extensive latitude in it. And according to this opinion extensive augmentation of habit is saved most properly, because what is added through such augmentation is united to what preexists, and from both is made one thing greater and more perfect. And consequently those acts will pertain to one habit, which although they seem diverse among themselves, either numerically, or even specifically, are apt to effect partial capabilities in the power, apt to be united among themselves. But when those capabilities are partial, and having the said aptitude, or when they are total without union among them, is no less difficult to explain than is the true unity of habit in every opinion. But recourse must be had to the formal object, and judgment can be taken from the affinity and proportion of acts among themselves.

First Assertion for Resolution of the Question

20. No true extensive composition in habits. The resolution of this question is without doubt difficult, because the root and mode of unity of habit is very hidden from us, and it is difficult to find a

middle between extremes, so that we neither assert that there is only one habit, or only one virtue in one power, nor multiply as many as there are acts, and recede from the common way of thinking and speaking. Nevertheless in a difficult matter I shall say briefly what seems more probable. And first I judge that no true and real extensive composition is found in habits. This the discourse made above proves to me efficaciously, which is neither dissolved, nor touched, nor is it explained what kind of proximate union between those habitual entities can be found by authors of the contrary opinion. There is added moreover that in acts of intellect and will similar extension with real distinction of partial entities and true union of them cannot be found on the part of objects only. Which I add, because in some acts of the soul latitude, and extensive composition can be found on the part of the subject; as corporeal vision insofar as it is in an extended and continuous subject can have extension and continuation of parts; yet neither does that extension have place in intellect and will, nor is it even to the purpose, because even if it has place in sensitive or cogitative appetite, nevertheless through any act whatsoever there will be generated a habit having the same mode of extension, because it is generated adequately in the same subject, because there is no greater reason of one part of the subject than of another, and because such a power through itself as a whole concurs to the act, and similarly according to itself as a whole acquires the habit or facility of operating. This extension therefore on the part of the subject is irrelevant to augmentation of habit, or to explaining its unity.

21. But that from the part of objects the aforesaid extension and composition cannot be in acts is clear, because either the power simultaneously tends to several objects through the mode of one and under one and the same reason, or through the mode of several. When it tends in the prior way, there is not in the act formal extension and composition, but there is indivisible entity, which embraces that whole object, as the adequate term of one transcendental relation. Otherwise it would have to be said that when by one act I will to give

alms to ten men, in that act there are ten particles, by which I tend to individual men, which appears incredible per se. And thence follow difficulties about infinite augmentation, especially in the intellect and will of an Angel, or of Christ's soul, which distinctly sees infinite things in the Word. And moreover the discourse made above also has place, that that union of parts can neither be through the mode of continuation, nor through the mode of act and potency. Which is especially true in those which are second and ultimate acts. Besides those two modes of union there is no other, which is real and physical. But if the power simultaneously tends to several objects through the mode of several, those acts will indeed be distinct; but concerning those it is more evidently true that they do not have union among themselves, by reason of which they could be said to compose one act that is truly one, because (besides the reasons made) in the object there is no unity in which the unity of act could be founded.

22. Finally, that from acts a sufficient argument is made to habits, is clear from the general reason, because an act is naturally fitted to effect a habit similar or proportioned to itself. It can indeed be answered that a power cannot always simultaneously in one act express what it contains in one habit, because an act requires greater attention, and consequently greater efficacy. But although this is true in general, nevertheless, if that mode of composition had place in habits, no sufficient reason could be given why it could not have place in some acts, at least when they have some subordination among themselves, and the power seems to extend from one to another, as from assent of premises to assent of conclusion, and from intention of end to choice of means; for then that reason about attention and efficacy of power ceases, because it now simultaneously attends to all those things. The general reason therefore is that this mode of composition and unity has place neither in acts, nor in habits. Indeed, if anyone considers, he will understand that in no forms or acts, insofar as they are such, is such a mode of unity found, unless through the mode of intension, or continuous extension; otherwise it is

necessary that one form be compared to another through the mode of passive potency, and the other, conversely, through the mode of act, so that they can be united. There is added finally that this opinion augments and does not explain difficulties; for in reality it multiplies as many entities as that which posits collection; but besides it adds union of them among themselves, which it cannot explain. And then it remains equally difficult to explain in this opinion whence the unity of habit is to be taken, as we touched above.

Second Assertion Concerning Habits, Which are Simple Qualities

23. Some simple habits must necessarily be asserted. I say second: it is necessary that there be some indivisible habits in the soul, and which are simple qualities. It is proved, because in habits there is no unity through extensive composition; therefore either it is through collection of several qualities, or through simple entity. If this latter is said, that is what we intend. But if the former is said, it is necessary that that collection consist of many simple things, because every composite is necessarily reduced to simples, and every number to unities. And it is clear from the terms themselves: for if one habit is a collection of several qualities, again I ask whether each of those qualities is also a collection of others, or is simple. If the first is said, I shall inquire further about them, until we stop at simple qualities, because it cannot proceed to infinity. Again when we shall have arrived at simple qualities, the argument proceeds concerning them, because each of them is a true and integral quality in its species, because it is not a true and physical part of any quality; for to be part of a number or collection, does not take away the nature of an integral being in its genus. But qualities of this kind are only in the species of habit, as is established from what has been said; therefore it is necessary to say that there are habits which are simple qualities.

24. An objection is answered. You will say: sometimes one quality consists of many, between which there is no true and real union, but only some tempering and proportion, as health, beauty and similar things, and in these genera or species of qualities none is given simple, even if it consists of simples; therefore the same can be said of habits. It is answered, whatever may be the case about that unity through proportion alone of several, whether it is true unity, and whether it has place in habits (which we shall see below), whenever any quality is composed of many, and is called one under some concept and name, it is composed of many, which although perhaps under that name are not considered complete, nevertheless under another essential nature are complete and simple qualities. As although heat is not complete health, it is nevertheless complete heat, or passible quality, and in that genus is a simple complete and perfect quality; whence if we granted that health also is a passible quality, and under this general nature discussion were about them, it would necessarily have to be said that some passible qualities are simple qualities, even if some are composite.

25. Similarly therefore in the present case, if we supposed knowledge to be an ordered collection of intelligible species, and the name knowledge to signify nothing else, it would indeed be true that no human knowledge is a simple quality; nevertheless each intelligible species, in the nature of such species, would be a simple and complete quality. Whence if we treat of them under the reason common to both, under that there will be both simple and composite qualities. But such is the nature of habit in which we are engaged; for it is general to all qualities, which through the mode of first act give to powers facility and promptitude for exercising second acts; whence under this general nature it does not require composition or proportion of several qualities; indeed the more simple the habit will be, the more perfect, other things being equal. Although therefore we concede that some habits are constructed from many, which is uncertain, nevertheless that will always be under some determinate nature either

of knowledge, or of such knowledge, or of such virtue. But the nature of habit as such does not require that composition. And thus it is concluded that there are habits which are simple qualities, and those very ones, from which others are said to be composed, are true habits and simple qualities.

26. But now two things remain to be explained. First, how great can be the latitude of a simple habit, both in the things in which it is engaged, and in the acts which it can make, or be made or consummated by them. Second, whether from simple habits others are composed, and what kind or how great that composition can be.

Third Assertion, Concerning the Extension of Simple Habit

27. A simple habit can be extended to several objects, and in what way. I say therefore third: one and the same simple habit can through its simple entity be virtually extended to various partial objects, and effect several acts, if either they are entirely similar in the formal reason of object, although they differ in the material, or they are so connected among themselves, that one is virtually contained in another. This assertion is shown first by induction: for at least in infused habits no one, as I think, will deny that there are simple habits having this kind of virtual extension. For faith is only one and simple, even if through it innumerable things are believed. Nor can anyone probably say that that unity consists in collection or composition of several entities, both because that faith is so indivisible that no one can believe one thing, if he disbelieves another article of faith; and especially because it per se primarily inclines to the reason of assenting, which is both equal and the same in all. The same is proportionally true of charity and hope, and in penance it is most clearly established; for the same uniformly detests all sins, especially mortal ones, which indivisibly belongs to such virtue, according to its formal reason.

28. Someone will say there is a special reason in infused virtues, either because they are of a higher order, and what are divided in lower things are usually united in higher ones. Or because they are not made by their acts, so that for that reason they ought to be entirely commensurated to them, and distinguished according to them. Or because they are not merely habits, but in some way participate in the nature of power; but in powers there is no doubt that one simple entity can have that virtual extension. It is answered that it is indeed true that more causes of unity and simplicity are found in infused habits than in acquired ones. Nevertheless a proportional argument of no little weight can be taken from them as to that in which they agree with acquired habits, namely, in the unity and connection of their acts in some formal reason of object in some way indivisible; for this suffices, or rather requires unity or simplicity of habit, even if other causes do not demand such a mode of entity, provided they do not impede it.

29. The assertion is shown in acquired habits. Thus therefore we can correctly argue from infused habits to acquired ones. As, for example, if infused penance is one and simple, because it indivisibly detests divine offense as such, and as averting from the supernatural end, so natural or acquired penance (whatever it may be) detests all things, insofar as they avert from the natural end, proportion being maintained. The same proportion can be made between divine and human faith, this difference being maintained, that divine faith has only one God, on whose authority it relies; but human faith can be founded on testimonies of diverse men, and therefore it is not necessary that the same indivisible habit, which inclines to believing the sayings of one man, also give faith to others; nevertheless with respect to the same person, and proportion being maintained, the argument is excellent. Again in acquired moral virtues the same argument can be accommodated; for if the virtue of justice inclines to preserving equality to another in his goods, where this reason is equally found, that habit will equally and indivisibly incline.

30. And from these things it will be easy to confirm by reason the assertion posited. But so that we may declare it through individual parts of the conclusion, it must be noted that in every habit there is given on the part of the object some reason of tending toward it, which we can call the motive of operating; for habits of intellect, about which we treat, are judicative habits; but judgment always relies on some reason of assenting; but habits of will tend to pursuing some good; but every pursuit of good is from some motive, or from some reason of goodness, which attracts the will. This motive therefore or reason of tending is without doubt what gives to the act its specific reason, which will be the same, if it is equally or in the same way attained through acts, because always what is formal is what gives species; but the material is quasi-accidental, or individual with respect to such an act. But I say, if it tends equally or in the same way toward such a reason, for it happens that one and the same reason of tending is not equally applied to diverse matters, and therefore is not attained in the same way through acts. As is, for example, divine goodness, insofar as it is in God, and renders Him lovable, or insofar as through a certain respect it is applied to neighbor, so as to render him also lovable. For although that goodness is one in itself, nevertheless it does not equally belong to those things, and therefore the mode of tending toward it is not the same. And the same is universally true of goodness of end with respect to the end itself, and with respect to means, and of similar things, in which the reason of tending is applied to one intrinsically, but to others extrinsically.

31. Then truly, although there is some diversity among them, (not disputing now how great it is), there is nevertheless some necessary connection. Because the act, which is concerned with the object having that reason intrinsically and per se, is the root of others, and virtually containing them, as love of God contains love of neighbor; and similarly that object, which is properly and per se such, is considered primary, and others secondary, not only in order of dignity (for that would not be sufficient for indivisible unity of habit),

but also of some connection and causality, insofar as by reason of that one the rest are attained. Finally, even among acts, which are concerned with the same thing, there is usually some distinction indeed from the mode of attaining such a thing, either because the very reason of tending toward it is considered in a diverse way, or because something peculiar in it is attained through such an act. But the connection is because one act supposes another, and is born from it in some way. Thus are compared in the will love, desire, and joy about some good, and hatred, flight, and sadness about the contrary evil; for all these acts (however they may be distinct) are rooted in love; for from love of good, if it is absent, follows desire, or even hope, if it is arduous; but if it is already possessed, joy follows; and from the same love is born hatred and detestation of contrary evil, and the rest consequently. But in the intellect there is no similar connection of acts except by reason of discourse, insofar as assent of conclusion follows from assent of premises; and therefore although such acts are concerned with the same subject, about which one property is demonstrated through another, or through definition, nevertheless always some distinct truth is as it were the adequate object of each act, and something new is known about such a subject through one act, which is not formally known through another.

32. From this declaration therefore the probability of the conclusion posited immediately appears per se, for if the reason of attaining things materially diverse is entirely the same, and equally as it were informing them, not only habits, but also acts are entirely of one species; therefore they will effect one and the same indivisible habit. And it is confirmed; for the inclination of power, as it is under such a habit, is not per se to this or that thing by reason of matter, but by reason of form, or because of such a motive, which is found in it; therefore if this reason is entirely the same, although it is applied to diverse matters, the inclination of power is indivisibly perfected in order to that, in whatever matter it may be found. By this reason therefore the same indivisible habit can have quasi-material extension

on the part of object, and of acts which are concerned with it. Again, when among partial objects there is some diversity in the mode of participating the formal reason, yet with connection and relation to one, then also there is sufficient reason for indivisible unity of habit, because where there is one for the sake of another, there is only one. And because the inclination of power, which is perfected through such a habit, is wholly primarily and indivisibly toward that one, but toward the rest only quasi-concomitantly, or by reason of another, in almost the way that motion tending to some ultimate term attains intermediate ones. Finally when the acts themselves are per se connected, and quasi-rooted in some first one, then also they can have similar connection at least virtual, in the habit itself; therefore as much as is from this source, if nothing else stands in the way, the same indivisible habit will be able to be the principle of acts of this kind. But all these things will be declared and confirmed more by the following inferences.

Corollaries Concerning the Extensive Augmentation of Simple Habit

33. First. From what has been said it follows therefore first, that a habit of this kind, simple within its own reason, and (so to speak) within its own scope, cannot properly be augmented by extensive augmentation on the part of itself, but at most on the part of species or memory. It is proved from that principle, which sufficiently, as I think, was demonstrated above, namely, that real augmentation cannot occur without real addition. Nor is this sufficiently explained through addition of real mode, as I shall show more broadly below, treating of intension, and in extension the matter is more evident, because in a thing otherwise indivisible extension in its formal effect cannot be understood, unless perhaps information grows on the part of the subject. As although the rational soul is indivisible, through augmentation of man it grows as to mode, and consequently as to

formal effect, because it is extended to a new part of the subject; whence information grows, because truly information is divisible. But truly in the present case, the habit or its formal effect is not augmented on the part of the subject; for it is the same indivisibly, and its information is always the same; therefore if the very entity of habit cannot be augmented in itself, in that it is indivisible, in no way will it be able to be augmented extensively, and in its latitude. Which I add to remove equivocation, if someone should contend that another habit inclining to new acts and objects can be adjoined to that habit, and from both one can coalesce; for now we are not treating of this, for that habit coalescing from two (whatever may be the case about the possibility of such conjunction) would be other, and of another nature from that indivisible one, and would have another latitude of object and acts. But now we only consider the indivisible habit within its proper nature and perfection, or the augmentation which it can have in that. Thus therefore it is manifest that it cannot be augmented extensively in itself, or from the fact that it is indivisible. But what we add about augmentation on the part of species and memory, is sufficiently manifest per se.

34. Second corollary. Whence consequently it is inferred second, that such a habit, as soon as it is generated in the beginning in any degree, and through any act, and concerning any partial matter of its object, has from itself power for any act within its degree of intension, and concerning the whole matter of its object, or any part of it. It is proved, because that habit in that degree of intension is capable of that extension on the part of object and acts, and does not receive it through its formal extension (so to speak), that is, through addition of parts of its entity; therefore it has it in itself quasi-eminently and unitedly, from the force of its indivisible entity; therefore as soon as it has that indivisible entity, it also has that whole power, because that power is no more partible than the entity. Whence, however great the intension of entity may be, so great also will be the intension of power; but the extension will always be the same.

35. And it is confirmed and declared in all modes of connection or unity explained above. For in divine faith, for example, minimal faith from itself equally inclines to all things believable from divine testimony, although it can happen that not all are equally applied through species, or doctrine, and therefore from this part faith can be augmented; nevertheless in itself it is not augmented, nor does it receive addition, except when it becomes more intense. Just as the power of heat, for example, or of fire, taken indivisibly in itself, extends to whatever combustible proportioned to it, which is applied to it, because according to the same reason or proportion it acts on it. So also faith from itself equally inclines to whatever matter, because according to the same reason it operates concerning it. And the same is true wherever similar objective reason intervenes, whether the virtue is infused or acquired; for truly in that degree of intension in which someone has become accustomed to eating meat temperately, he will feel himself disposed to maintaining the same moderation, if fish or other similar food is offered. It is true nevertheless that in one matter there can sometimes be greater difficulty than in another; but that per se does not require proper extension of habit, but intension suffices to overcome that difficulty, as I shall say immediately. Likewise, when partial objects are connected and subordinated, a habit can never incline to the secondary, without either simultaneously in reality, or even prior by reason or nature inclining to the primary, because that depends on this. For how will someone be disposed toward means, if he is not disposed toward the end? and so with similar things. Conversely also if such a habit inclines to the primary, it also inclines by power to the secondary object, because one follows from the other; as if someone is inclined to the end, he will also be disposed to means, and so with others. Finally the same argument will be made about acts connected among themselves; for no one can be prompt and easy for acts rooted in some prior one, unless he also has similar promptitude for that one. For no one desires unless he loves, and so with others. And similarly conversely, he who is

prompt and easy in exercising the primary act, also has relation to the rest; for in some way he contains the rest, and when that is formally present, it provides facility for the rest; therefore also the power left by it. Thus therefore it is established in what way these habits, existing indivisible in themselves, are extended to some latitude of objects or acts.

36. Third corollary. Third it is inferred that whenever a habit of this kind is augmented through intension, it is augmented according to its whole extension, that is, in order to all acts which it can elicit, and concerning the whole matter in which it can be engaged. This can easily be shown, applying with proportion the whole discourse made; and the reason is clear, because that habit, although it has latitude of intension, nevertheless in extension it is indivisible; therefore whenever it is intended, it is intended according to its whole propensity. You will say: even power, existing indivisibly the same, is the principle of several acts, and is engaged concerning various objects, and nevertheless is not perfected through any habit according to its whole adequate inclination. It is answered that it is not similar; for power is not perfected through habit after the mode of intension, so that the very entity of power is consummated in its intrinsic entity, but it is perfected as passive power through a superadded act, which is not always adequate to the capacity of power. But habit, while it is perfected intensively, is consummated intimately in its entity, and the second degree, for example, is adequate to the first (so to speak), and the third to the second, and so with the rest. Both because this is demanded by the nature of its perfection and latitude according to intension; and also because the same reason applies to any degree, because both acts and partial objects have the same connection with respect to that, which will be explained more in the following point.

37. Fourth corollary. Fourth therefore it is inferred that one and the same habit from these simple ones, about which we now treat, cannot be intense and remiss, or more and less intense with respect to diverse acts or objects. As, for example, if the same simple temperance

inclines to eating and drinking moderately, its inclination to one act cannot be more intense than to another. It is clear from what has been said, because the inclination of such a habit is always wholly adequately intended, because indivisibly; therefore as much as it is intended toward one act, so much it is intended toward another; therefore it can never be unequally intense with respect to diverse things. And moreover it is declared in this way: for if the same habit can be unequally intense in that way, let it be, for example, as four with respect to one act, and as three with respect to another; it follows therefore that that fourth degree is active of one act, and not of the other, and inclines to one, and not to the other; for if it inclined to both as principle of its acts, there would be no inequality as to intension. I ask therefore further, whether the third degree of that habit is one and the same with respect to both acts, or they are diverse. If the first is said, therefore the same must be said of the fourth degree, because they regard the same formal object, and therefore the same reason applies to both. But if the second is said, the argument will proceed further to the second degree, and from the second we shall proceed to the first; and thus finally it will happen that either the whole latitude of degrees is diverse with respect to such acts, and thus the habit is not extensively indivisible, as was said; or the whole latitude of degrees indivisibly inclines to all acts, and thus such a habit cannot be unequally intense with respect to them.

38. And it is confirmed, for if that habit is as four with respect to one act, and as three with respect to another, let us suppose it grows and becomes as four, in order to that act toward which it previously inclined more remissly; therefore there will be in that habit two degrees as four, which do not intend it as five, and consequently one does not perfect the other, nor conversely; therefore those degrees are not united among themselves through the mode of intension, but only through some extension, which we have shown cannot occur. But it can be said that those two fourth degrees are not united among themselves immediately, but in another, namely, in the third degree,

just as two branches are united in a trunk, and consequently it will be said that that habit in its foundation (so to speak) is extensively indivisible; but afterwards in augmentation it has extension according to diversity of degrees, which are united in the foundation, and thus augment that, but not among themselves; just as lines are united in a center, but not among themselves, and therefore easily one can be longer than another from the part of the other extreme. Nevertheless this mode of intension, besides being unheard of, can easily be attacked from what has been said about acquisition of this habit as to that degree or those degrees, which are considered as its foundation, in which it is said to be indivisible; for it is intended through the same acts through which it is acquired; but when it is first acquired, it is always indivisibly acquired with relation to its whole object, and all its acts, even if it is acquired through only one act, whatever that may be, and concerning whatever matter, provided it pertains to that habit; therefore if it is intended through a similar more intense act, it is also adequately intended. The consequence is clear, because in the act itself that diversity of intension cannot be feigned, because the whole act according to all its degrees is engaged in the same matter, and under the same formal reason; therefore that act is equally efficacious for intending, as a similar more remiss one was for generating; therefore it is impossible to understand in habit that mode of composition and intension mixed with extension. And the reason of all is that in object and acts there is the same unity, or connection with respect to any degrees of intension.

Objections are Proposed, & They are Met

39. But concerning these things, especially concerning the last two corollaries, difficulties occur. The first is that the same charity inclines more intensely to loving God than neighbor, since from charity God is to be loved more than neighbor. And by the same reason any habit inclines more intensely to the end than to means; for

"that on account of which each thing is such, is that thing more so." Second, experience seems to teach that the same man maintains temperance in food with greater facility than in drink, or in this kind of food than in another, and you will find a man who most easily restores honor, but money with the greatest difficulty, another conversely. And in the same virtue of religion one is more disposed to praying than to vowing, or something similar. There is therefore in these habits intensive inequality with respect to diverse acts, or partial objects. Third, it seems incredible that love of God grows equally through love of neighbor, as through love of God itself, or even that love of neighbor grows equally toward all through love of one. And the same is proportionally true of other virtues, both in indivisible and equal augmentation, and in acquisition. Fourth, it seems more difficult in habit of intellect, for through assent of one conclusion the intellect is in no way rendered easy for assent of another distinct truth.

40. The first difficulty is met. What it is to love something more appreciatively. To the first difficulty it is answered that there is equivocation in that particle, "more," for it does not always signify inequality of intension, but sometimes of perfection, or activity, or inclination, according to the requirement of the thing about which there is discussion. I deny therefore that the habit of charity is more intense with respect to God than neighbor, because charity according to itself as a whole, and according to all its degrees inclines to God and to neighbor. And the same is proportionally true of any virtue with respect to end and means, and therefore he who loves God more, that is more intensely, or the end, as much as is from the force of habit, will also love neighbor, or means more intensely. But when it is objected that God from charity is to be loved more, it is not understood more intensively, but appreciatively, as Theologians say. But that greater appreciation consists (as I think) in a higher reason and nobler mode of loving, by reason of which the will adheres more through one act to one object, than to another through another act, even if otherwise they are equal in intension. Just as heat as eight is more active than

coldness as eight, even if they are equal in intension. And when Aristotle said: "That on account of which each thing is such, is that thing more so," he was not speaking of greater intension, but of greater nobility either in certitude, or in evidence, or other similar property. In which way also through intention we adhere more to the end than through choice to means, even if otherwise the acts are equally intense.

41. The objection is satisfied. You will say, this inequality can somehow be understood in diverse acts, yet not in the same indivisible habit compared to them or to their objects. It is answered by denying the assumption, for the same indivisible power can incline more to one act or effect than to another, indeed and be more powerful and more active for one effect than for another, as the same will by its nature is more disposed to honest good than to pleasant good, even if it is indivisible in itself, and the light of the sun can be said to be more efficacious in power for illuminating than for heating. For this inequality is not through the mode of real respect in the same thing, and between its parts, or degrees; but it is conceived by us through the mode of respect in order to diverse things, because, namely, superior power contains them in a more eminent way, and has greater proportion and agreement with one than with another.

42. The second difficulty is addressed. To the second difficulty it is answered that such inequality does not always arise from unequal intensity of habit, but from other causes, especially two. The first is the better disposition of the intellect itself, or of other powers and organs that serve virtue. For when a man has become accustomed to exercise acts of some virtue in some certain matter, the intelligible species more easily propose and represent the fittingness or honesty that is in it. Memory also of past experience or custom helps not a little, so that such an object is immediately proposed as connatural and as something to be desired; and in the same way the imagination contributes much, which similarly cooperates in this proposal of the object. Finally, the very disposition of the body can by custom and use

be more accommodated and disposed toward some matter than toward another. Thus, although someone may be inclined toward penance, he will more easily exercise it through fasting than through scourging, if he is accustomed to the former and not to the latter; and this comes not from a division of the habit of penance itself, but from the very disposition of body and imagination. Although concerning habits that are generated in the sensitive appetite and imagination, it can more easily be believed that they are divided into several regarding diverse matters, even of the same virtue, because those habits are material, and those powers do not per se attain the formal nature of virtue. The other cause is the difficulty of the object itself; for, other things being equal on the part of all powers and organs, and on the part of the habit and its intensity, one act of virtue, even if it be of the same species, can be more difficult than another from the resistance of the matter or object, so to speak. Just as in natural things the same heat more easily heats dry wood than moist, not because it operates with lesser intensity of heat in one than in the other, but because one patient resists more than the other. So in moral matters, the same fortitude, although it be equally intense in itself with respect to all its matter, more easily sustains wounds than death, on account of the greater resistance and difficulty of the object. Whence it happens that when virtue is increased through acts that are more difficult on the part of the object, if those acts are more intense than the habit (as they often are, as it were through antiperistasis), then they increase the habit only by way of intensity; but if they are not more intense, but are performed remissly, they do not increase the habit in itself, although the very use and experience of such matter can help somewhat toward similar acts, in other ways declared in the prior cause.

43. The third difficulty is solved. To the third difficulty it is answered that those things which are inferred there are not incredible, if they are understood and explained in the proper way. For regarding the love of God and neighbor, either the discourse concerns supernatural and infused love, or natural love. Concerning the former,

I suppose that such love is not increased effectively by acts, but meritoriously; therefore, since love of neighbor, other things being equal and from its own kind, is not as meritorious as love of God, it does not follow that charity is equally increased by both loves; nevertheless, as much as the intensity of charity is increased with respect to God through love of God, so much is it increased with respect to neighbor; and conversely, as much as the same charity is increased with respect to neighbor through love of neighbor, so much is it increased with respect to God, because charity itself cannot be increased otherwise, nor is the merit concerning the increase of charity under one or another respect, but simply concerning the whole charity according to its adequate nature. But if the discourse concerns natural love, it is not necessary that there be the same habit by which God is loved and neighbor; concerning which elsewhere. And perhaps the same is true of natural love of neighbors among themselves, speaking generally of love, because it can be under diverse titles and reasons, which sometimes are personal and individual, sometimes are common to some but not to all. But when love is founded in a common reason, and according to a species equally participated by all, as is, for example, love of neighbor, especially because he is neighbor and of rational nature, thus it is true that, the habit being acquired regarding one, it is acquired toward all, and being increased with respect to one, it is equally increased toward all of itself, although on the part of apprehension and other circumstances there may not be equal facility, as has been declared.

44. And in this manner one must respond concerning the other virtues, when their acts are as it were equal, and differ only in material objects. But when they are in some way unequal and subordinated, as is the intention of the end and choice of means, then there seems to be somewhat greater difficulty; nevertheless it must be resolved in a proportional way, as we said concerning infused charity. For if we consider the natural activity that an act has for intending an acquired habit, perhaps it is greater in the act of intention than in the

act of choice, other things being equal, because it is more perfect and the source of the other; nevertheless each of them equally increases the habit with respect to both acts; for as much as the habit is increased through intention, so much greater promptitude is acquired for choosing more easily, and if through choice itself the habit is somewhat intended (which is uncertain), even according to that intensity the habit more inclines toward the end itself, because the whole nature of choice as such is the end, whence there is a virtual tendency toward it. And one must philosophize in this manner concerning all similar acts.

How Habits of the Intellect are Simple or Composite

45. The fourth difficulty is somewhat more obscure, and (as I think) proves what it intends, as much as concerns those particular habits about which it proceeds. First therefore one must distinguish between habits of the will and of the intellect; for up to this point we have spoken chiefly of habits of the will, and that difficulty is not proposed concerning them, and there is in them a certain peculiar nature, which I shall explain below. Again, among habits of the intellect one must distinguish between evident habits, which are its natural virtues, and non-evident habits, which are not virtues; for we are treating of acquired ones. Among which there is this difference, that evident habits show the truth of the thing in itself, either from the terms themselves or through some medium; but non-evident habits do not show truth in itself, but through extrinsic means they induce the intellect to assent, even if it does not perceive the truth, which is common also to infused faith and to theology, which is founded in it, even if they are considered virtues on account of infallible certainty.

46. A non-evident habit can more easily incline toward various matters than an evident one. From this difference I gather that one indivisible non-evident habit can more easily incline toward

various matters and acts than an evident habit. The reason is that an extrinsic ground of assenting can easily be applied uniformly to diverse matters. This can be seen especially in faith, both infused and human. But truly when the ground of assenting is intrinsic, as it is in evident habits, the same ground cannot be applied to diverse propositions. For if the truth to which we assent is known per se, the ground of assenting is the very intrinsic connection of terms; but in diverse truths there is always a diverse connection, because the terms also must be in some way diverse, and therefore there is always a diverse ground of assenting. But if the truth be mediate, just as there is diverse truth, so it has a distinct intrinsic medium by which it is shown. But if it happens that two diverse conclusions are immediately shown by the same medium, for example, if from one passion two others immediately arise, then also the intrinsic truth of each conclusion is diverse, and that medium is not in any way the ground of assenting to such truth, but as it is the root of such passion, and as it is the bond (so to speak) of such connection. Whence the formal object of such assent is not the medium in any way, but is the truth of such conclusion, as manifested and connected with such medium.

47. Why there is a proper habit of principles in the intellect, not in the will. From this (that we may note this in passing) arises a certain difference between habits of intellect and will. For although Aristotle said that ends in moral matters are related as principles in speculative matters, nevertheless in the intellect the habit of principles known per se is distinct from that of conclusions; but in the will there is the same habit toward end and means. But the reason for the difference is none other than that in the assent of a conclusion the ground of assenting is not the truth of principles alone, but the very truth of the conclusion, insofar as it is shown in itself from the connection of extremes with such medium; but truly in the will the whole ground of loving the means is the end, as was declared above in Disputation XXIII.

48. Hence therefore it seems to be inferred that through no evident assent can an indivisible habit be acquired that of itself equally inclines toward other truths, because in them there is always a diverse ground of assenting, whence they cannot have the connection that could suffice for such indivisible unity of habit. I declare both points thus: for if truths are immediately and in themselves diverse, and have diverse union of terms, and one does not have connection with another, because neither arises from the other, nor is known through the other, nor does assent to the other follow from assent to one, they seem to agree only in the mode by which the intellect assents to them, namely, without discourse from immediate connection of terms; but this is not enough for indivisibility of habit because habit does not give facility toward that mode, but toward the assent itself, and toward easily penetrating the reasons of terms, and toward the proper use of intelligible species by which those can be represented; and therefore it cannot be understood that the same indivisible habit, acquired through only one assent of a truth known per se, of itself immediately inclines toward other truths that are indeed immediate but diverse, and consequently it is necessary that through assent to another principle a real increase be made through extensive addition of new entity, which since it cannot be really united to the preexisting one, as was shown above, will be a new indivisible habit.

49. Whether one simple habit can incline toward knowing two properties of the same thing. Someone will say: granted this be true when those principles known per se are entirely diverse in both extremes, but when they concern the same subject, then the habit can have indivisible unity from attribution to such subject. As if, for example, two distinct passions immediately belong to man, the same indivisible habit will suffice for assent to two immediate principles by which such properties are predicated of man. But although there appears here some greater reason of unity, it is nevertheless not sufficient for an indivisible habit. For I suppose that knowledge of man is not so simple that in the very essence of the thing he perceives its

passions; for this pertains to angelic perfection; but after one passion and essence is known, man needs new attention and composition, and consequently also new assent, through which he judges concerning another, even if it be immediate. Hence therefore it clearly appears that from the force of an indivisible habit acquired through prior assent, the intellect cannot remain easy and prompt for judging concerning another passion, and comparing it with such subject, even if the subject be the same, because the connection and the other extreme are diverse, and those two truths are not only distinct but also one is in no way contained in the other; therefore identity of subject does not suffice.

50. And it is confirmed, for if two passions belong to the same subject, one through the mediation of another, the habit by which the first immediate passion is known concerning such subject is not enough that the same indivisible one should incline toward another assent concerning the mediate passion of such subject, as is clear from everyone's opinion, for the prior habit pertains to the intellect of principles, and the posterior to science; because such second passion is demonstrated through the first, which St. Thomas taught, I-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2. Therefore, although both passion and truth be immediate, much less can the same indivisible habit suffice for both. The consequence is clear, because although these two truths seem to have greater agreement in immediateness and in the mode by which they are known, yet on the other hand they do not have connection among themselves, nor is there virtual containment of one in another, as there is in others; which nevertheless seems especially to contribute and be necessary for indivisible unity of habit.

51. An indivisible habit of science does not suffice for assent to several conclusions. From this, proceeding further to habits of science, it does not seem possible that the same indivisible habit should suffice for assents to diverse conclusions, not only when they concern things diverse in species or essence, but even when they are demonstrated concerning the same essence. The first part seems

manifest from what has been said. First, because those conclusions do not differ among themselves less than the principles from which they are inferred differ among themselves; but such principles cannot pertain to the same indivisible habit, as has been proven; therefore neither can conclusions. Second, because Aristotle, in I Posterior Analytics, text 7, says that those are diverse sciences whose principles are not from the same sources; but as often as passions are demonstrated concerning diverse essences or species of things, the principles through which they are demonstrated consist of entirely diverse terms; therefore they cannot generate the same indivisible habit concerning conclusions. Finally, all the things we have said about habit concerning principles prove a fortiori concerning habit concerning conclusions. But the other part is also proven by proportional reason, because assent to the first immediate principle, namely, in which the first passion is affirmed of the subject, does not generate an indivisible habit that per se inclines toward the proximate truth in which the second passion is said of the same subject; therefore by parity of reason assent to the second proposition, in which the second passion is said of the subject, cannot generate an indivisible habit that per se inclines toward another truth in which the third passion is said of the subject. The consequence is clear, because there is the same distance or proportion; for that the first proportion be immediate and others mediate indeed indicates some greater similarity in the mode of assenting; yet that does not suffice for indivisible unity of habit, as has often been said; otherwise all sciences would be one, because they agree in the mode of assenting through discourse.

52. And it is confirmed, because when a new conclusion is inferred, although the subject be the same, nevertheless the truth and connection of the new demonstrated passion is formally diverse; therefore an indivisible habit, previously acquired, cannot per se and without real addition be sufficient to render the intellect prompt for assent to that distinct truth. And these reasons more evidently prove

the same thing when conclusions demonstrated concerning the same subject are not only diverse, but also one is not demonstrated through another, whether it is demonstrated through diverse media, which is clearer, or through one and the same. Because those truths do not have connection among themselves, or virtual containment of one in another, nor does their connection in one principle suffice, because an indivisible habit that is terminated toward the principle itself per se does not suffice to be extended to any of those conclusions, as has been shown; but that which is added with respect to one has nothing in common with respect to the other, nor conversely; therefore in no indivisible habit can those two conclusions be immediately united, so to speak.

53. What is the mode of extension in evident habits. I conclude therefore that a judicative and evident habit of the human intellect is not extended to new truths to be judged, nor does it give facility for assenting to them, except through addition and real increase; for this (as I think) the discourse made sufficiently proves, by which it was shown that an indivisible habit does not suffice. Whence it is also concluded that intensive increase is not enough, but extensive is necessary. First indeed, because intensive increase is (so to speak) uniform and concerning the same thing, or with respect to the same; therefore, if the first habit, acquired through assent to one principle or conclusion, in no way inclines toward another truth, from the force of intensity alone it will never incline. Second, because if concerning the same conclusion more intense acts are repeated up to the highest degree and effort that the intellect can apply in such assent, the habit will become intense even to the highest degree concerning such truth, but will not incline toward another; therefore, that the intellect may be inclined toward new conclusions through new assents, a new kind of increase is necessary, which is nothing but extensive. Third, because hence it happens that the acquired propensity toward diverse truths, even among those that are considered to pertain to one science, is unequal in the intellect, that is, intense with respect to one and remiss

with respect to another. For that inequality does not arise from some subordination of such truths among themselves; for I suppose them not to be connected, nor one demonstrated through another; therefore it arises only from greater frequency or intensity of acts concerning one than concerning another; therefore it is a sign that there is inequality of intensity in the habitually acquired inclination; therefore it cannot be one and the same in indivisibility; therefore there is real extensive increase there. But since it has been shown that what is added in this increase of qualities cannot per se be united to the preexisting one, it is concluded that this increase is truly through addition of a new quality.

54. The distinction between speculative and practical habits regarding extension. But finally concerning this point one must observe the difference between virtues of intellect and will, which, proportion being maintained, also exists between speculative and practical virtues of the intellect; for appetitive virtues chiefly engage in their acts concerning singulars, and therefore most easily can one and the same indivisible habit of such virtue engage concerning several acts and concerning several matters, because, although otherwise in natural being those matters may seem very diverse, nevertheless in the honesty that virtue regards, they differ as it were only in number. And the same is true in its own way of prudence and art, which descend to singulars, indeed chiefly engage in them. But speculative science stops in knowledge of universals, and therefore, as much as is from itself, does not apply the same formal truth (so to speak) to several things materially diverse, but always extends through addition of new truth, which in its universality is formally diverse from another and therefore requires both formally diverse assent and real increase or extension of the habit inclining toward it. Whence if a man applies a scientific conclusion demonstrated in universal to particulars contained under it, in this way the same indivisible habit of science (as I think) will equally and sufficiently incline toward all those particular truths contained in the universal; as if, the science of this conclusion being

acquired, "Man is risible," he expositively infers, "Peter is man, therefore Peter is risible," and so concerning others, the same indivisible habit will suffice for all assents of those particular conclusions, because those truths differ materially rather than formally, and because all those particular propositions are contained confusedly in the universal, and therefore it is only necessary to add species, or their application to singulars.

How Unity of Habit is Given in Sciences Through Composition or Collection of Simple Qualities

55. From all these things therefore I infer and say fourth, that besides the indivisible unity that some habits have through simple qualities, there is given in some habits composite unity through collection and subordination of several qualities, which with respect to that integral habit are considered partial habits. This assertion is chiefly posited to save the common mode of speaking about the unity of sciences; for all consider geometry, for example, to be one science, not only generically but also specifically; and we said the same above concerning metaphysics; but this unity cannot be understood through the mode of simple quality; therefore it is necessary that it be understood through some composition or coordination of several qualities; for it has already been shown that those qualities cannot have another mode of real union or composition. It is also declared from that common principle, that things that are several in one genus, or under one aspect, under another are one, or compose one. Which is clearly true also in the genus of quality in habits or dispositions of the body; for health or beauty is considered one quality in the common mode of speaking and philosophizing, and yet they are not simple qualities, but resulting from proportion of several; therefore the same can be understood in qualities of the soul. Especially in habits of sciences, in which neither can so great unity be found with respect to several conclusions or principles as there is in simple quality; nor can

all unity be denied to it, on account of the connection or agreement of things that are treated in one science, as we shall immediately explain.

56. And this opinion in the matter is held by all those cited in the third opinion, and Soncinas also does not disagree, although in mode of speaking he does not call those partial habits "habits" but "species"; and Capreolus, question 3 of the Prologue, is doubtful in this matter, even concerning the mind of St. Thomas; and Soto, question 3 Prooemial of Logic, although he holds the opposite, nevertheless concedes that science can have unity, although it not be a simple quality. And he considers it probable that it is not a simple quality. But Toletus there, question 3, simply follows this opinion; and Fonseca, book V of Metaphysics, chapter 7, question 5, section 2. Finally St. Thomas favors this, I-II, question 54, article 4, ad 2, where he says that through demonstration of one conclusion an imperfect habit of science is acquired; but when demonstration is extended to another conclusion, a new habit is not generated, but the prior one is made more perfect, insofar as it is extended to more things. In which words St. Thomas admits that real perfection is added to the habit of science through extension to a new conclusion, which cannot be understood to happen through addition of species alone; for through this alone the prior habit is not made more perfect, nor on account of species alone will the habit immediately incline toward a new conclusion, if its entity is not perfected and extended in itself. As to this part therefore this is without doubt the opinion of St. Thomas; I confess nevertheless, if that solution is joined with the body of the article, that St. Thomas holds that such habit thus increased and perfected always remains a simple quality; which I would willingly admit, if I understood either that such extension could happen through purely intensive increase, or that in extensive increase there could intervene real and per se union between partial qualities. But since neither of these can be understood, as I have proven, therefore I assert that such science is one, but nevertheless not a simple habit. Nor does the reason that St. Thomas adds prove more, namely, that

the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are ordered, and one is derived from another. For at most it is concluded from this that there is subordination of those qualities and some unity of the whole science, but not perfect simplicity or per se composition. Soncinas expounds that passage otherwise, namely, that the habit acquired through the first conclusion is perfected through assent to the second conclusion, not only extensively but intensively concerning the first conclusion. But neither is this always necessary, nor does St. Thomas truly say this; for he says thus: "The habit that was there before is made more perfect, inasmuch as it extends to more things"; for that particle "inasmuch" sufficiently declares in what St. Thomas constitutes that increase of perfection; nor does the reason that St. Thomas adds admit another sense.

Objections Against the Preceding Assertion are Solved

57. How one science is one habit and one quality. Against this assertion many arguments are made, which, as I think, are not difficult. Such is that one, that if there is one science, there is one habit; if one habit, one quality. For the same argument will be made concerning beauty or health. It must therefore be said that all things are true, speaking proportionally, concerning unity of the same mode. In the common mode of speaking nevertheless that is simply admitted under the name of virtue or science, rather than habit, to remove equivocation. Just as also speaking in a moral way, exterior and interior acts are said to be one act, yet they are not said to be one thing. Indeed one virtue of liberality is said to be constituted from habit of will and of sensitive appetite, or one virtue of faith from habit of intellect and habit of pious affection of will; and yet under the name of habit simply it is not said to be one in both powers. And so the specific name often more admits and signifies that composition than the generic.

58. Why a simple power suffices for several acts, but not a simple habit. Another argument is commonly made, that a unique and simple power suffices for several acts and objects partially; therefore also a habit will suffice, since it is a perfection proportioned to the power. But this argument at most concludes that such proportion should be maintained insofar as possible; for it is certain that there is not equality in this between power and habit; otherwise just as one simple power suffices for all its acts, so one simple habit would suffice for all those. In science therefore that proportion should not be entirely saved regarding simplicity of quality, because power is not acquired through acts, as science is. Whence power is a principle of superior nature and as it were a universal cause; but science is gradually made through acts, and each accomplishes something proportioned and commensurate to itself; and therefore through them there cannot be made one principle, or (so to speak) one instrument entirely simple and universal for all those.

59. What order partial habits should maintain that they may be said to compose one science. The opinion of Antonio Mirandola. The greater difficulty seems to be in explaining that coordination or accidental union on account of which one science is said to be composed from similar qualities; because if they do not have peculiar union among themselves, since they are otherwise in an indivisible subject, it does not appear what composition or ordering they can have. From this also arises the difficulty of explaining what is the latitude of one science according to species or according to genus; or why one science is composed from so great a number of these simple qualities rather than from a greater or lesser number. Whence perhaps for this cause, as I related above, Disputation I, section 2, Antonio Mirandola said there is only one science, although it is distinguished by us by way of several, for the convenience of learning and teaching sciences. And he could have been moved by this, that all sciences seem so connected among themselves that none can be perfectly taught without others. And thus consequently he could say that not only all

sciences, but all intellectual virtues also are one on account of connection; for this is greater between the habit of principles and sciences than between sciences among themselves. Whence there is no doubt that the proper principles of some science and its conclusions are taught by way of one science; and so it is customarily called. Again practical sciences depend much on speculative ones, and moral on physical; and artificial things on natural and mathematical. Thus therefore from all will be composed one virtue adequate to the intellect. But consequently it must also be said that there is only one virtue in the will, because there is no less connection between moral or appetitive virtues than between intellectual ones, indeed greater, as is clear from moral doctrine. Whence all virtues are also customarily called by the name of one universal justice. And many theologians of this time speak thus, that they say, although infused virtues and gifts are distinct among themselves, from all is constituted one adequate justice by which man is interiorly sanctified and formally made just. In this manner therefore it is said, according to this opinion, that there is only one science adequate to the intellect.

60. The opinion of the Nominalists. But truly the Nominalists, as Soto and others attribute to them, to avoid this extreme, decline into another, saying there are as many sciences as there are simple habits, or as there are conclusions known; because they think there is no middle ground in this matter that can be founded on reason, as was touched in the proposed difficulty. And thus they admit several dialectics, philosophies, theologies, and all these in great number. But neither Soto nor others report where the Nominalists speak in this way, nor could I find it. For rather in the prologue of the Sentences, treating of theology, although they deny it is a simple quality, they hold it to be one science, as is clear from Ockham, question 3 of Prologue, doubt 8; Marsilius, question 1, article 4; Gregory, question 3, especially article 3; and Scotus holds the same, question 3, doubt 2, nor does Gabriel dissent, question 8, although they do not speak so clearly about the unity of science.

61. Several sciences must be asserted in the human intellect. In this matter therefore extreme statements must be avoided, and those especially abhorrent to the common and received opinions of philosophers, and especially in a matter that depends much on the mode of conceiving and speaking. It is therefore not to be denied that several sciences are given in the human intellect, just as it cannot be denied that in the will there are several virtues, speaking absolutely, as was said in the cited place of the first disputation, and will be more evident from the divisions of habits, which we shall briefly touch in the last section of this disputation. Nor is it to be denied that one science can be extended to several conclusions and several partial or material objects; for thus all philosophers speak, saying there is one geometry, one arithmetic, etc.; and theologians, saying there is one theology. But the reason for this manner of speaking will be better explained by responding to the difficulty touched upon.

The Connection Between Simple Habits Composing One Science is Explained

62. When therefore it is inquired what is the connection or coordination between those simple qualities, that they may be said to compose one habit or one science, I assert first that, even if it is difficult to declare this connection or coordination of things or qualities in our mind, nevertheless there is no doubt that it is great. As is clear first from memory itself or reminiscence, in which species of things are so placed that sometimes one excites another, but sometimes they are entirely disparate. This also declares the inability to reason in order, arising from disorder of phantasms in frenzy or insanity.

63. Then I add that this coordination between these simple habits composing one science can be understood in two ways, and both can simultaneously concur for the unity of science. The first is effective subordination, such as exists between partial habits inclining

toward subordinated conclusions, one of which is derived from another. This mode of subordination St. Thomas touched upon, I-II, question 54, article 4, ad 3. And according to this mode it is said in moral matters that one act is constituted from internal and external, and one virtue from habits existing in diverse powers, one of which is subject to another regarding the use of such act, as faith to the will. The second cause of this connection is attribution or relation to the same total object; as, for example, in the science concerning man, some conclusions can be demonstrated concerning man that are connected among themselves, one of which is derived from another. And again several conclusions can be demonstrated that are indeed derived from the same total essence, even if among themselves one is not demonstrated from another, but they constitute as it were diverse lines or series of conclusions. We say therefore that not only those that are inferred under one series as if by continued discourse, but also those that do not have this order among themselves, if they are rooted in the same essence of the same subject and are ordered toward knowing it exactly, constitute one science, which will be said to have unity through attribution or relation to the same subject. As, for example, although in physics some demonstrations are made concerning matter, and others concerning form, and others concerning motion, quantity, etc., many of which do not have subordination among themselves, nevertheless one science is made from all those, because those tend toward exact knowledge of natural being. For just as parts or properties are not for themselves but for the whole, so all demonstrations that engage concerning parts and properties, insofar as they are such, tend toward constituting perfect science of the composite itself or subject, and thus it is commonly said that science has unity from its object, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, II De Anima, text 33.

Concerning the Power of the Object of One Science

64. But how great the unity of that object should be, which is sought in the second part of the difficulty, is also difficult to explain. For many say that specific unity of object is required, not material but formal, nor in the being of the thing but in the being of the knowable, as Cajetan explains at length with St. Thomas, I, question 1, article 3. But equivocation must be avoided in that word or denomination "knowable." For in rigor "knowable" is said through extrinsic denomination from science, or through a relation of reason founded in that denomination; but in this way science cannot have unity from a knowable object under the being of knowable, because rather it gives unity to it; for just as an object is knowable because science is terminated toward it, so it is one knowable because one science is terminated toward it; therefore science cannot take unity from a knowable object, insofar as that denomination is explained by that word. Therefore if unity of science is taken from unity of object, such unity of object is presupposed by order of nature to unity of science, indeed to the very being of science and to every denomination taken from science. When therefore there is discourse concerning a knowable object, as such, giving unity to science, it does not signify that "being knowable" is a denomination from science, but a proximate aptitude that it can fall under one science; which aptitude indeed is supposed on its part. Just as when it is said that the object of sight is color and light, as they agree in the nature of visible, that "being visible" is not to be taken through extrinsic denomination from sight; otherwise nothing would be explained, but rather the principle would be begged, declaring unity of object from unity of power; it is therefore necessary that through that word some reason be signified on the part of the things themselves, on account of which they are considered to have as it were proximate aptitude that they can per se be objected to the same visual power. For because things differing even according to species in their real being fall under the same visual power, we seek in them some agreement that is supposed on the part of the things themselves, by reason of which they can constitute one as

it were specific object, such as is, for example, the same mode of changing sight, or something similar; and this is called the proximate reason of visible, on the part of the object. In this manner therefore must be understood what is said concerning the knowable object.

65. But then it is equally obscure and difficult to explain what is this reason that is supposed on the part of things pertaining to the same science, by reason of which they are said to agree in the same nature of knowable. In this many think that from the specific unity of the thing itself, which is per se primarily objected to science, unity of object is taken, even in the being of knowable, so that the object that is per se primarily attended to in science be per se one in the being of the thing, but all other things fall under science by reason of that. Because that unity of object is formal in science, which in some way connects and virtually contains all things that are treated in science; but this is the essential nature of the object itself, and therefore it is necessary that it be one, specific, and indivisible. For if there are several essential and substantial differences, neither, per se speaking, contains the other as its principle, nor is ordered toward the other. Nor does it suffice that both be contained in potency in the generic nature, because that containment does not suffice for the medium of demonstration, and consequently neither for the connection and unity that science requires. Whence, according to this opinion, species of knowable objects will be multiplied according to species of things that are per se primarily known as the object which, as are, regularly speaking, species of substance. But by the name of species must be understood not only the ultimate species, but also subaltern species, or any formal reason abstracted, taken precisely according to its actuality; for thus it is taken as a certain in divisible species, and concerning it as such are demonstrated only those things that precisely from the force of such formal reason belong to it, as in physics is the grade of natural being or the grade of animal.

66. But I said "regularly" for two reasons: First, on account of mathematical sciences, which do not have for their object some

substantial species, but accidental, namely quantity; and in them it is commonly considered that there is one science specifically that treats of the whole genus of continuous or discrete quantity. This is perhaps because the species of continuous quantity, although they are distinct, are so per se ordered that in one, namely in body, the rest are in some way contained. But the species of numbers are neither so properly species, nor do they differ except through addition of unity, in which they maintain the same proportion. Another reason also can be given, that those sciences do not treat of quantity under its essential nature, but in order to certain proportions, with respect to which there is almost the same reason in those species. Then I posited that limitation on account of certain imperfect substantial species, which are as it were partial, as is blood or other humors in man, of which there is no science per se, but only that which concerns man or animal.

67. And this opinion thus expounded is indeed probable, and would especially have place if man could attain proper science of individual substantial species according to their ultimate differences, and from those perfectly and a priori demonstrate the properties of each. Nevertheless human science is rarely or never so perfect; and therefore, speaking of human science as it can in fact be acquired, that mode of unity of object contributes little to explaining its unity. And then it is of itself difficult to believe that there are individual sciences of individual elements, and that of individual genera or superior and inferior reasons there are also given individual sciences, namely, one science of being as such, another of substance, another of body, and so through individual grades, which according to our mode of abstracting can be varied in very many ways.

68. The common opinion concerning unity of science through abstraction from matter. Wherefore there is a very common opinion that this unity of object in sciences should be taken from the grade of abstraction; and thus threefold science is customarily distinguished from threefold abstraction from matter, either individual only and not entirely from sensible matter, or from sensible matter and

not from intelligible, or from all. This division is ancient; but modern writers treat it copiously in the beginning of Physics and Metaphysics. But first that mode of assigning object is not common to all sciences, for moral or rational sciences are not comprehended in it, nor other practical ones. Perhaps however they will say something proportional must be thought concerning objects of other sciences. Then it is not established whether those reasons suffice for specific unity of science, or only for generic, in which there is great diversity of opinions, which would be troublesome to treat in this place. Finally abstraction, if it is taken on our part, cannot constitute the formal object, for this abstraction with respect to things is only extrinsic denomination; but we have already shown that the formal object must be presupposed on the part of the knowable things themselves. But if it is taken fundamentally on the part of the things themselves, thus nothing else is signified through this abstraction except the order or grade of each essence more or less immaterial; and thus almost the same difficulty remains, namely, whether unity in such grade suffices for specific unity of object, since under the same grade several essential differences are contained, which do not have connection among themselves nor derivation of one from another.

Resolution Concerning Unity of Object of Science

69. Wherefore (to confess the truth) I could find nothing in this matter that satisfied me in every respect, to prescribe some certain and general rule by which this unity of object could be defined. And therefore what I said concerning connection and subordination of all those things that are treated in the same science, I also consider should be applied to declaring the specific unity of object. For when some formal reason of knowable object, which is customarily called the reason which, is such that in it are connected all things that are treated or demonstrated in that science, because through it or in order to it the rest are inquired into, then that reason constitutes all those things

under one reason of knowable, whether that be a specific reason in the being of the thing or not. Because it does not provide unity on account of the essential unity alone that it has, but on account of the unity that it causes among all things that are treated in science, insofar as it connects all those things in itself in some way. And thus, although that reason sometimes is in itself of some genus in the being of the thing, it can nevertheless happen that its species are not considered by science except insofar as they are connected in that reason; not only because they are known according to generic difference only, but also because, although they are known according to proper differences, nevertheless this is through a certain proportion or comparison to the common reason, and collation of the species themselves among each other. As the science concerning elements so treats of the common reason of element and of individuals, that they cannot be separated. And almost in this manner we explained above the unity of metaphysics. And thus I consider one must philosophize concerning the rest. This will appear less difficult to one considering that this unity of science is not exact and perfect, but as it were artificial, as we explained. This kind of unity probably intervenes not only in sciences, but also in prudence and art. And it can be extended to some virtues of appetite also; but concerning all these in particular it is not of the present undertaking to speak.

Corollaries Concerning Extensive Increase of Composite Habits

70. Whence finally it is understood that in that habit which has unity only from coordination of several simple qualities, extensive increase can indeed be given, yet this happens through addition of a new quality, which, although it be partial with respect to the whole, nevertheless considered absolutely from itself, is a certain integral species of quality. Whence also there is no inconvenience that this kind of increase happens from qualities differing in species, because

according to that imperfect kind of coordination or unity, qualities differing in species can well be joined into one. By which it also happens that such habit can rightly be gradually perfected through acts differing in species, to which those partial habits are proportioned. Nor is it necessary to use that distinction, that acts in order to habits are of the same species, and in order to objects of diverse species, because an act does not have diverse species according to these respects. Indeed an act has no specification from relation to habit, but rather conversely habit is specified from relation to act; for although an act, as it is a certain action, expresses relation to habit as to a principle, nevertheless it does not have its ultimate specification from this, but from the term or object. Nor are those two specifications, but only one, as we shall show below when treating of action. But those acts can be said to differ only in partial species in comparison to habit, almost in the way we said concerning habits generated from them.

The Specification of Habit Through Acts is Explained in Passing

71. And from this it also happens that when habit is said to be specified through acts, this must be understood with proportion. For a threefold mode of habit can be gathered from what has been said: one is simple quality (so to speak), both in being and in acting, because namely it is active only of one simple act, as for example assent to one principle or one conclusion; and in this the specification and proportion is clear. Another mode of habit is one that in being is also simple quality, but virtually or in acting is multiple, because it is capable of several acts so connected among themselves that in order to the same and indivisible formal object they have necessary connection among themselves and are in some way rooted in some primary act, and therefore such habit can be said to be specified either from such series of acts or from that primary act in which others are rooted, as

the habit, for example, of charity, from love of God. The third mode of unity of habit is from collection and subordination of several simple qualities; which kind of unity is less perfect, and thus can be taken from collection of several acts expressing order or attribution to an object in some way one, as we left explained a little before.

SECTION XII

WHETHER AND HOW HABITS ARE DIMINISHED AND CORRUPTED

1. This question is to be understood concerning acquired habits. This question, like almost all things we have said, is to be understood concerning acquired habits, for infused ones have a peculiar condition in this, that although they are gradually increased and perfected, nevertheless they are not remitted, even if they can be lost; but how this happens, namely whether demeritoriously, dispositively, or also effectively, cannot be explained without theological principles.

From Various Causes Habits can Be Remitted & Corrupted

2. Concerning acquired habits therefore, speaking in general, it is certain that they can both be diminished or remitted and lost; for experience itself seems to teach this. But the same is shown by reason through explaining the causes of such remission or corruption. For there can be a twofold cause of remission or corruption of some form: one we can call privative, which through absence alone, or lack of influx, causes remission or corruption of the form. For since corruption and remission is only a certain privation in becoming, a privative cause can suffice for it. The other is positive cause, which can be further distinguished into effective, formal, or dispositive. For it

happens that an efficient cause corrupts some form through positive action; yet it never accomplishes this except by introducing another, which either formally or at least dispositively repugns the other; because it is necessary that positive action be directly and per se terminated toward positive form or effect; but corruption or remission results from this from repugnance of the introduced form with the preexisting one, which repugnance cannot be except either formal or dispositive.

Habits are Not Diminished Through Absence Alone of the Conserving Cause

3. What therefore pertains to the prior mode of corruption or diminution (for the reason of both is the same, and therefore we shall speak of them indifferently), it seems manifest that they do not depend in being conserved on some proximate cause, through whose absence or cessation from influx they could be lost; for I omit the necessary conservation of the first cause, because this is not taken away, naturally speaking, except with some proximate cause of corruption intervening. I prove the assumption, because only a twofold cause can intervene here, namely material and efficient; for the formal cause is the habit itself, and does not have dependence on another in that genus. Nor does it depend on final cause according to its existence, as is per se evident. Hence also there is no place for dependence that is customary from an existing term, which being removed, another is removed; for habit is not a predicamental relation or some mode of union in which that mode of dependence is customarily found, but is a true absolute and permanent form, which although it has transcendental relation to its acts or objects, nevertheless can endure and exist even if those do not actually exist. There remains therefore only material cause or efficient. But the material cause of habit is the intellect, for example, or will, which are perpetual; therefore on the part of such subject habit cannot be

corrupted. Nor does habit require in such power some disposition on which it depends in the genus of material cause; for if there were any, it would be especially act; for habit requires no other disposition, per se speaking, in the power; but it is evident that habit does not depend on such actual disposition, otherwise it would endure only as long as the act endures. And this reason also proves concerning efficient cause, because habit has no other proximate efficient cause besides acts; but it is evident that it does not depend on them in being conserved.

Whether Habit is Diminished Through Cessation of Act Alone

4. But two difficulties remain concerning this part. The first is that habits are sometimes diminished and finally corrupted through cessation from act alone; but this is not a positive cause, but only privative; therefore. The major seems to be taken from Aristotle, Ethics II, chapter 3, and Ethics III, chapter 5; and from St. Thomas, I-II, question 53, article 1. And question 53, article 3, therefore says that through acts more remiss than the habit, man is disposed toward diminution of the same habit. This also seems to be established by experiment, especially in habits of memory and in intelligible species, which are no less permanent than other habits; for through cessation of acts alone, things that were held in memory are given over to oblivion, which is a sign that the species themselves are also lost. We also experience this in arts, and much more in moral virtues.

5. On account of these things Gabriel, in III distinction 23, question 1, article 3, doubt 6, and Almain, tract I Moral chapter 18, consider that habit is diminished and corrupted per se through cessation from act alone, just as light is corrupted through absence of the sun. And so they teach that habit depends on act not only in becoming but also in being conserved. But they add that this dependence in being conserved is not equal in all things; for some things so depend that, the cause being removed, they immediately

perish entirely, as light from the sun and all creatures from God; but others so depend that, the cause being removed, they immediately begin to be diminished, but do not entirely perish until some time; finally others are such that they do not even immediately begin to be diminished, but after some time of absence of cause and lack of its influx has passed. And in this third kind they place habits with respect to acts. But if you insist that, if for a brief time habit can be conserved without any causality of act, it already has for that time sufficient conserving cause without act, and consequently through that it will be able to be conserved for any time, although act ceases, because length of time contributes nothing to this, since another cause can endure for that whole time, they respond nothing else except that this is the nature of such things, that they require to be conserved in that way.

6. The opposite opinion is proven. Nevertheless St. Thomas, in the place cited, whom his disciples and almost all other theologians follow, in III distinction 23, and Henry, Quodlibet 5, question 38, teaches that cessation from act is not the per se cause of corruption of habit, but only per accidens, that is, it is an occasion that other causes arise, or acts are exercised, by which habits are either corrupted or entirely overwhelmed. The philosophical and proper reason of the prior part has already been touched, that from the nature of habit it is evident that it is a permanent quality without actual influx and efficiency of act. Whence it happens that it depends in being conserved only on influx of the first cause, because there is no other proximate cause on which it depends, act being removed; but influx of the first cause is of itself perpetual, unless a new second cause intervenes that demands removal of such influx. But in the present case cessation from act alone, because it is more lasting, is not a new cause, per se speaking. But to say that things of this kind by their nature demand to be conserved for so much time without act and not for longer is said gratuitously, both because, if there is discourse concerning extrinsic time, accompaniment of that is accidental; but if concerning intrinsic duration, since that is permanent, it is always the

same; and also because there is no sign or effect from which such condition or nature of these things can be gathered, as will be evident from proof of the posterior part of St. Thomas's opinion; and finally because every thing, as much as is from itself, demands to be conserved perpetually, unless another occurs that demands its destruction, or unless a proximate cause, per se necessary for conservation, is removed.

7. Nor will there be found in nature an example of any thing that demands to be conserved otherwise. Only what we treated above concerning impressed impetus and the mode of its corruption can introduce some difficulty here. But besides the fact that it is very uncertain whether impetus is a special quality, in that there is a singular reason, because it is not a quality permanently by its nature in the same state, but is always either in continuous increase or diminution. Whence it is only an instrumental virtue as it were actually flowing; and besides it is not corrupted without some resistance or motion of contrary virtue. But truly habit is a quality permanent by its nature, as experience teaches, for it remains integral and in a quiet state (so to speak) even after act has ceased. Whence also that argument is excellent, that if cessation from act alone per se sufficed for corruption, it would also per se suffice for remission; therefore as soon as act was suspended, habit would begin to be diminished, and, other things being equal, would be uniformly and continuously diminished, which is against experience. But what is said, that remission does not begin except after a certain delay, no new cause being applied besides cessation, is entirely arbitrary and beyond all philosophical reason.

8. And besides I shall inquire, after that delay, whether remission happens continuously, or also through discrete little delays; for the former also seems to be against experience; but the latter is much more arbitrary. Indeed, if after some time of cessation of act habit begins to be diminished, there is no reason why it should be successively diminished and not immediately perish entirely, since its

cause, which is said to be necessary for conservation, is entirely absent. Finally I confirm, because if act is per se necessary for conservation, this is understood either of an equal act or also of a more intense one. If the latter is said, it follows that habit cannot be conserved unless it is also sometimes increased, which is clearly false and against experience. Nor can the former be said, because an equal act has no action or efficiency in an equal habit; therefore it contributes nothing per se to its conservation; therefore neither conversely can its lack per se diminish or corrupt the habit.

9. The other part of St. Thomas's position was established on account of the experiences adduced, by which it is manifestly established that through non-use the promptness that habit confers is lost. Since this does not happen per se, it is necessary that it follow at least per accidens. As Aristotle also said in his book On Length and Shortness of Life, chapter 2, that knowledge is corrupted by forgetfulness, which cannot be understood per se, but per accidens; because while a man through non-use forgets the demonstrative middle term, he sometimes falls into error, which expels knowledge. On this point see Cajetan, I, q. 79, a. 5. This position of St. Thomas is therefore more philosophical and consonant with reason. It is only necessary to explain more fully concerning this part how this per accidens causality suffices to preserve the experiences; for what happens only per accidens neither always nor frequently occurs. But that the promptness of habit is diminished and lost through non-use is so regular that it seems to follow per se. Furthermore, if this follows per accidens, it is because through the cessation of an act, occasion is provided for positive contrary causes to intervene and effect corruption. Therefore, where such causes are not present or do not intervene, diminution will never be felt from cessation alone. Therefore, knowledge will never be given over to oblivion through cessation of an act, if on that occasion a man does not fall into contrary error; and the same will be true of art, which nevertheless seems to be against experience.

10. Some respond that since our powers do not cease entirely from operating, if any of them completely ceases from the use of some habit, it necessarily follows from the nature of the thing that it is exercised in other acts. But those acts can be compared to the habit lacking an act in two ways: first, by direct opposition and repugnance, and this is neither always nor necessarily the case, as the argument proves. Second, as acts that are entirely disparate, and these are also considered sufficient for the corruption of habit, because by their multitude and variety they overwhelm it. For a power is of finite capacity, and therefore cannot simultaneously tend promptly to disparate acts. Hence through excessive use concerning entirely disparate acts, the facility and thus the habit is lost concerning acts whose use has ceased. This way of speaking seems to have foundation in Aristotle, in the place cited above, saying that knowledge is lost by forgetfulness; for this forgetfulness does not seem to arise except from a multitude of dissimilar acts or thoughts. Nevertheless, the reason taken from the limitation of a power is of little weight, because even if a power cannot simultaneously tend to several acts perfectly and promptly, it can nevertheless simultaneously have most intense habits toward several acts however disparate, provided they are not repugnant. Because a power does not concur actively in the conservation of habits; therefore, however limited it may be in acting, it will be able to have disparate habits simultaneously, because in receiving it is quasi-infinite, provided there is no repugnance between the forms themselves. Therefore, through acts only of different nature, if they are not repugnant, one habit cannot be diminished, because those can only generate other habits, dissimilar indeed, yet compatible with the other habit. And I confirm this with a similar example concerning intelligible species, which can exist simultaneously in whatever multitude, although their acts cannot be simultaneous, and therefore one intelligible species is not corrupted through the acquisition of others however dissimilar or disparate. Therefore similarly, etc.

11. How through cessation, habit is diminished. I say therefore that habit in itself and properly is not diminished on account of cessation of acts, unless on that occasion acts are exercised that are in some way repugnant to the habit. St. Thomas sufficiently indicated this in the cited place, saying that from cessation of an act arise various imaginations, which sometimes dispose toward the contrary, and thus the habit is diminished or corrupted. Therefore, unless some contrariety or repugnance intervenes, a multitude of other acts is not sufficient. And the reason given proves this sufficiently. Therefore, concerning the experience of diminution of habit through non-use, it must be said that sometimes there is proper diminution in the habit itself, but sometimes only an impediment is superadded, by reason of which, even if the habit itself remains intact in itself, it nevertheless does not operate with equal facility. And therefore in the above I spoke disjunctively, saying that through non-use and through other acts that are exercised on that occasion, the habit is either diminished or overwhelmed, because through supervening habits, or memories, or imaginations it is impeded from operating with so much facility. The first therefore, that is, diminution of habit, never happens except through acts in some way contrary and repugnant, whether they are repugnant directly through proper contrariety according to specific natures, as intemperance is opposed to temperance, or through any repugnance or incompossibility of forms, from whatever source it may arise.

12. Habits can be impeded from easily breaking forth into acts, and in what way. The second, that is, impediment of habit without diminution, can happen through disparate and entirely dissimilar acts, especially if they are excessively multiplied. Such impediment can be either on the part of the body, because it is the instrument by which habit exercises its actions, and is often badly disposed through disparate actions, as is clearly evident in the works of arts and in some acts of moral virtues, which depend considerably on bodily disposition. Sometimes this impediment is on the part of

memory or imagination, because those things in which a man is exercised adhere more to memory and occur more easily to imagination. And this impediment is general, both regarding the use of habits of appetite and in the use of arts or sciences; for all these depend much on memory, and memory on use. Because although intelligible species once acquired are not lost, as I shall say immediately, they are nevertheless overwhelmed and as it were put to sleep by the multitude and greater actuality of supervening species. Besides which, phantasms necessary for the use of memory can be lost from bodily disposition, as we shall see immediately. Finally, this impediment can sometimes arise on the part of affection, especially in moral virtues; as if someone, omitting the use of the virtue of justice, for example, is exercised in the gain of money and love of it, even if he does not lose the virtue of justice nor directly diminish it, he will exercise its acts with more difficulty, and thus, although indirectly, he will gradually be disposed toward its loss or diminution. And thus it is sufficiently clear in what way through non-use of habit, it is diminished or impeded per accidens, and in what way this happens more frequently, because a man cannot so cease from certain acts without being exercised in others.

Whether Habit is Lost from Defect of Material Cause

13. The second difficulty concerning this mode of corruption of habit through mere absence or defect of the conserving cause arises from the material cause; for although habit does not have an efficient cause on which it depends in being conserved, it nevertheless has a material cause on which it depends in being conserved, and from the defect of which it can be corrupted. For thus habits that are in the body are lost when the body is lost or changed. It is answered first that this change on the part of the subject never happens without some positive cause changing the disposition of the subject, and therefore

this mode of corruption is comprehended by us under the posterior member placed above. Then, so that this mode of corruption may be more explained, it is necessary to distinguish between material habits, which are found in the body, and spiritual habits, which are in the intellect and will. Under the first member we comprehend not only bodily habits improperly so called, such as health or beauty (for we have already excluded these from the present disputation, although it is manifest that they depend on a corruptible subject and can be diminished or corrupted through its transmutation), but we principally comprehend habits properly so called existing in the material and corporeal powers of the soul, such as the sensitive appetite and phantasy or cogitative power, in which we can consider both habits that hold on the part of the power and, speaking broadly, can be called judicative, and phantasms or sensible species, which are conserved in the sensitive memory in the manner of habit. All these habits therefore are in a subject that is simply corruptible, and therefore can be corrupted upon its corruption. This is most true and more evidently established when the subject itself is entirely corrupted and perishes, as happens in the death of a man; for then, since the sensitive powers themselves cease to be, the habits existing in them must necessarily be corrupted.

14. The habit of phantasy is changed when its organ is changed. As long as these powers are not corrupted, habits do not seem to be corrupted on their part; nevertheless, because these powers have corporeal organs that require a certain disposition and temperament of primary qualities, they can be altered in them and greatly changed, and from this part some habits of these powers can be lost or diminished upon change of the subject. This appears to be especially true of apprehensive habits, or phantasms, or sensible species, concerning which experience sufficiently establishes that they depend much on the disposition of the organ; for humidity or dryness of the brain contributes to the conservation of these species, and affections arising from diverse humors, sanguine for example or

melancholic, contribute much to conceiving or forming diverse phantasms. And thus there is no doubt that on the part of phantasms a change is made in these habits on account of alteration of the subject or organ.

15. The habit of sensitive appetite is not changed while it remains. Concerning the proper habits that hold on the part of the powers and are acquired through their immanent acts, such as virtues or vices of the sensitive appetite, concerning these (I say) the matter is more doubtful, whether they are changed through mere change of the organ. And it seems surely more probable that they are not changed in themselves, even if they can be impeded in some way regarding active use. Because it is not likely that the proper habits of moral vices and virtues, even as they are in the sensitive appetite, are lost through mere natural alteration of the body without contrary acts of it. Likewise, because just as the powers themselves in their entity are not changed on account of alteration of the organ, unless it is so great as to corrupt them entirely, so it is likely that habits that hold on the part of the power imitate its condition in this regard, especially since they are made through proper immanent acts, which are of a superior nature. This part is therefore probable, although uncertain.

16. Nor from defect of serving phantasy. Concerning habits of intellect and will, it must be said generally that they are never corrupted or diminished in themselves from defect of subject, as St. Thomas rightly taught, I-II, q. 53, aa. 1 and 2. And the reason is that they have an incorruptible subject, and in it they do not require a peculiar disposition through whose alteration or loss they themselves could be lost. Nevertheless, there are some who establish some difference in this matter between intelligible species and proper habits of intellect. For concerning intelligible species they consider the assertion posited to be absolutely and without limitation true; concerning the habit of knowledge, for example, or opinion, they say it can be lost per accidens on account of change of the secondary subject, namely the corporeal organ; for although such a habit is not

properly in that as in a subject, it nevertheless depends on it regarding use, and therefore it seems also to depend in its being. Some attribute this opinion to St. Thomas, and Almain and other Nominalists indicate it. But it seems false to me. First indeed, because there is no reason for the difference, since intelligible species also depend in use on the phantasm and corporeal organ, as long as the soul is in the body; for without phantasms there could be no use at all of such species. And nevertheless they do not depend in their being on phantasms; for even if in death all phantasms are corrupted, the species remain in the intellect. The same is true of the habit of knowledge or opinion, speaking per se, or insofar as it is on the part of the subject, as is certain and established from the doctrine concerning the soul. Then, that dependence in use is only according to a certain concomitance, or as from an inferior and posterior instrument, and therefore dependence in being cannot be inferred from it; otherwise a similar dependence could be inferred even concerning the soul itself. It remains therefore that proper spiritual habits are never corrupted in this way on the part of the subject, because bodily disposition is in no way a conserving cause of proper habits existing in the spiritual powers of the soul. When therefore St. Thomas signifies that these habits depend on the disposition of the corporeal organ, he must be understood, first indeed and per se, as to use; secondarily and per accidens, as to being, insofar as the operation or disposition of phantasy can be an occasion for acts to be made in the superior part of the soul that corrupt such habits. In the way we said that knowledge can be lost by forgetfulness.

Whether Habit is Corrupted Immediately by Acts, or by Contrary Habits

17. Reasons for doubting. It remains to speak of another mode of corruption through positive action, which is called corruption per se by St. Thomas and others, not because such action

per se tends toward such corruption, but to distinguish it from corruption that happens through destruction of the subject, which is usually called corruption per accidens, because it supposes another corruption with which it happens concomitantly. Here however no other corruption is supposed, but only positive action and a term. Concerning this corruption therefore it is certain that it happens through contrary acts, or acts pertaining to a contrary habit. The difficulty is whether such corruption happens immediately through the acts themselves, or only by means of the opposite habit that they introduce. And the reason for doubting is that if an act per se immediately expels a contrary habit, then it does not expel effectively but formally; for we showed above, in Disputation XVIII, that one form cannot effectively expel another through itself immediately, because all positive efficiency must be terminated toward some form or positive effect, from which follows the corruption of another. But no form can effect itself, and therefore if it effectively corrupts another, it cannot immediately expel that through itself. Therefore in the present case, because an act does not effectively produce itself, it cannot effectively expel a habit per se and immediately, but only formally; but the power itself, or whatever is the effective principle of the act itself, will expel effectively. But the consequent is false, because a form only expels formally another that is contrary and repugnant to it; but an act is not formally contrary to a habit, for they are of diverse genera and natures, since they are compared as first and second act, and as it were potency and act. Hence, just as it is not repugnant to be in potency to one act or motion and to act or receive the contrary, so it is not repugnant to have a habit and to operate an act of a contrary habit. These two therefore do not include formal repugnance, nor does an act formally and through itself expel a habit.

18. Reasons for the opposite. On the contrary, if an act only expels a habit by effecting and introducing a contrary habit in the power, it follows that a habit once acquired is never lost until a contrary habit is acquired in an intense and perfect degree. The

consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is declared and proved, for in other contraries having latitude of degrees and formally expelling each other, it happens thus that a remiss degree of one contrary cannot be expelled by a contrary form unless in an intense degree, as cold as one is not expelled unless by heat as eight, nor does it begin to be remitted unless when heat begins to exceed the degree as seven. And the reason is that the subject is capable of the whole latitude of such forms, and therefore until that latitude begins to be exceeded, one contrary does not begin to expel another, as we shall say more broadly in the following disputation. But this reason proceeds in the same way concerning contrary habits, for a power is capable of such latitude of degrees of habit. Therefore, if a habit is not expelled formally except by a contrary habit, a remiss habit will never be expelled except by a habit exceeding in intension, with proportion. And consequently a habit acquired through remiss acts could never be lost except through more intense acts, because a more intense contrary habit cannot be acquired except through more intense acts. But the consequent is false, both because it seems to be against experience, for a habit acquired through remiss acts is usually lost through contrary acts, even remiss and equal ones, and also because it follows that through contrary and remiss acts, contrary habits are acquired remaining simultaneously in the power in a remiss state, because one does not expel another until it exceeds in latitude of intension. But this also seems false, because error and knowledge, and virtue and vice, cannot be simultaneously in any degree.

19. Gabriel's opinion. Gregory's opposite position. On account of these reasons there are diverse opinions concerning this corruption of habits, for Gabriel, in III, d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, doubt 6, says an act only corrupts a habit by means of its own habit that it induces; but Gregory, in I, d. 17, q. 3, a. 2, ad 10, holds that a habit is immediately corrupted or remitted by opposite acts. Some moderns defend this opinion, asserting nevertheless that acts themselves per se and immediately effectively expel a habit. In this they speak neither

correctly nor consistently, because either they think immanent acts are pure actions without intrinsic terms, or are true qualities that are made through proper actions. In the first way it is impossible for such action to effectively expel a habit through itself immediately, because positive efficiency, as I was saying, necessarily tends immediately toward a positive term; but an immanent action according to that opinion has no positive term. Therefore if it also induces no habit, no efficiency remains through which it could expel a habit. If however an immanent action as action has an intrinsic term, which is a quality, the same argument will be made concerning the immanent act itself, as such a quality, that namely it cannot through itself immediately effect remission or corruption of a habit, because it has no other positive term of that efficiency. But truly concerning the action as such, it can be said according to this opinion to effectively expel a contrary habit, just as it can be said to effectively introduce its intrinsic term, which is the immanent act itself in the being of quality, which would be said quite improperly, because action is not properly the efficient cause of its term but the causality itself; but there is no reason to delay over the manner of speaking.

20. Consequently however it would have to be said in that opinion that the immanent act itself formally only expels the opposite habit as a form contrary and incompossible to it, because no other mode of expulsion or corruption remains. And Gregory also holds this, who nevertheless does not speak consistently; for he, in the cited place, contends that contraries cannot be simultaneously in the same subject even in remiss degrees, and yet in the same place says an act can be simultaneously with an opposite habit; indeed he says an act can be so remiss that it does not diminish the opposite habit. Therefore either his opinion about contrary forms is not universally true, or it is necessary that he confess that act and habit are not contrary forms. This indeed seems absolutely more probable, speaking of formal contrariety. For they can be called virtually opposite, since one has a power repugnant to another; formally however they do not

seem to have immediate opposition, as the reasons for doubting proposed seem to show, because they have a very diverse mode of affecting the subject.

Resolution, That an Act Expels a Habit by Means of a Contrary Habit

21. Therefore Gabriel's opinion correctly understood seems more probable to me. For it is necessary to distinguish formal and effective conclusion. In the genus of efficient cause therefore it must be said that an act immediately expels a contrary habit, not because it is the proximate form from which it is formally expelled, but because it is the proximate efficient principle of such corruption; and in this way Aristotle said, in Ethics II, c. 3, that habit is corrupted through acts. Hence stopping in this genus of what corrupts effectively, a habit cannot be said to expel a contrary habit immediately, as the arguments made prove a fortiori. But truly, speaking of formal expulsion, thus a habit is truly said immediately to expel a contrary habit, because it is a form immediately incompossible with it. And thus with respect to that, and changing (as I may say) the genus of causality, an act can be said to expel a habit mediately, namely by means of the opposite habit that it introduces.

22. Someone could however further add that an act also through itself expels a contrary habit not formally nor effectively, but dispositively. In this way many think that through an act of knowledge the habit of opinion is immediately expelled, not only concerning an opposite conclusion, but also concerning the same one, because through such an act the power is rendered indisposed for the use of such a habit. The same therefore a fortiori must be said of an act of vice with respect to opposite virtue, and so of others. But this also is not proved to me. Because, although an act insofar as it disposes toward the generation or increase of one habit, consequently disposes toward the corruption of the opposite, nevertheless unless it really

introduces an opposite habit in an incompossible degree, it is not per se and immediately an incompossible disposition to the habit. For although it so disposes the power that, while that act remains, it cannot operate through another habit, nevertheless it neither absolutely renders it inept for retaining such a habit, nor for operating afterward through it, when ceasing from the prior act. No reason therefore can be given for such dispositive expulsion per se and immediately. I add this because per accidens and remotely an act can dispose toward remission or corruption of a habit, insofar as it disposes toward a repugnant habit, or also insofar as it provides occasion for making other acts repugnant to such a habit or its perfection. In this way a remiss act is said to dispose toward remission of its own habit, not per se and directly, for in this way it rather conserves its own habit, as much as lies in it, but per accidens, insofar as it does not entirely prevent contrary acts from sometimes being exercised, as was touched on above, and Cajetan treats more broadly, II-II, q. 24, a. 6.

23. The posterior reason for doubting is solved. In the reason for doubting placed to the contrary, two difficulties are sought. The first is whether contrary habits can be simultaneously in remiss degrees; the second is whether habit is remitted only through admixture of a contrary in an incompossible degree. These difficulties concerning all contrary qualities must be treated in the following disputation, and therefore there we shall more conveniently see what should be thought in this matter concerning habits and acts, and whether they have anything peculiar in this. Now, speaking generally, I consider it no inconvenience to concede that contrary habits can be simultaneously in a power in remiss degrees, and consequently that one is not entirely corrupted until another is perfectly intensified.

SECTION XIII
HOW MANY GENERA AND SPECIES OF HABITS THERE ARE, AND ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE DISTINCTION OF HABIT I NTO PRACTICAL AND SPECULATIVE

1. It is not in my mind to pursue and dispute exactly all those things that can be comprehended under this title; for it would be an almost infinite matter, for the treatment of which it would be necessary to bring many things from natural and moral philosophy, indeed even from dialectic and theology into this place, beyond all reason and method. Therefore I only intend to give some general knowledge of all habits, explaining terms more than the things themselves, and certain general principles that must be used in particular sciences. But because Aristotle, in books I and VI of the Metaphysics, and with him almost all writers of this doctrine, dispute ex professo concerning practical and speculative habit, therefore in the last part of this section I shall dwell somewhat in explaining these members, as much as the present undertaking permits.

Threefold Distinction of Habits: Numerical, Specific, Generic

2. It must first be supposed that there is numerical, specific, and generic diversity in habits. Concerning numerical distinction nothing needs to be added here, because in this there is nothing peculiar to habits; concerning specific distinction, those things that can be said generally in the present have been done in Section XI. Generic distinction is called in the present not in that rigor in which only those things are said to differ in genus that are of diverse predicaments; for in this sense all habits are of the same genus, indeed

of one subaltern species contained under the genus of quality, which species we declare in this disputation. Therefore those habits are said to differ in genus that differ by certain very common and general differences, constituting diverse series and quasi lines of habits. And these general divisions are especially to be explained by us in this place.

3. Various distinctive principles of habits. In this it must be further considered, from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 54, that there are various principles by which habits can be distinguished. For habit can be considered either according to itself or according to its causes, and thus it can also be distinguished by us; because however we do not know habits in themselves, therefore we distinguish them principally from causes; under which we also comprehend effects, because habit, besides its formal effect, has no other effects beyond its acts, through which we also distinguish habits, not however as through effects, but as through the final cause, for the sake of which the habit exists.

4. Finally it must be noted that these divisions of habits cannot be so coordinated that one is properly contained under another, so that one is a subdivision of another, but very many divisions are adequate and mutually dividing each other, because the principles from which they are taken are very general, as will be established from what follows.

First Division of Habit into Acquired & Infused

5. First therefore habit is divided into infused and acquired, which division formally considered is taken from diverse efficient causes; nevertheless, if it is understood per se, it indicates essential diversity in the habits themselves. For acquired habit is that which is effected through the proper acts of a man operating. If the name of habit is extended to intelligible or sensible species, acquired habit will generally be called every one that can be obtained through the efficiency of some proximate and particular created cause. But infused

habit is called that which is obtained through the influence of God alone. Because however God can by himself alone effect every form that can be made through secondary causes, therefore every acquired habit can be infused by God alone, and thus be infused. Therefore if the name of infused habit is taken in that amplitude, either the division will not be suitable, because it is not given through entirely opposite differences, or at least it will not be essential, and will only indicate diverse modes of production of habit, which can be accidental to it.

6. Habit is usually infused by God in two ways. Therefore it must be added that habit can be infused by God in two ways: in one way, because from its nature it is not otherwise producible, neither through acts nor through any other created cause; in another way from the will and power of God alone. Thus theologians distinguish a twofold infused habit: the former they call infused per se, because per se and by its nature it postulates to be made thus and not otherwise. The latter they call infused per accidens, not because when it is infused by God, it is not made per se and properly through infusion, as through an action per se terminated toward it, but because such a habit per se does not postulate that mode of production, and it happens to it from the will and power of an extrinsic cause that it be made thus. Therefore the given division must be understood concerning habit infused per se. And in this way, although it is given through order to efficient cause, or through diverse modes of production, it nevertheless indicates essential diversity of such habits. For forms that by their nature postulate so diverse a mode of production and causes of diverse orders have diverse natures and essences, by reason of which they require such diversity in causes and productions.

Whether any Habit is Congenital with Nature

7. Only a third member concerning natural habits can be desired in that division, that is, those given by nature itself, which therefore are neither acquired, since they are not effected through acts, nor are they properly infused, since they accompany nature itself. Nevertheless, speaking as we speak of human habits, we do not think this member is necessary; for we believe no proper habit is given by nature itself in man. I speak however of proper habit, for health or beauty and similar dispositions, which are sometimes called habits, can be connatural; but we excluded these above from the proper genus of habit, and consequently from the whole treatment of habits. For these are properly only operative habits, which are superadded to powers to perfect them in the virtue of acting, and in this way no habit is given by nature itself in man. Because every natural propensity and inclination of a power toward an act is through the very nature and entity of the power, and not through a distinct habit given to it by nature; for such distinction and addition would be superfluous, nor can there be any indication of it in nature, which was also touched on above, and also above in the first disputation, where we said something about the habit of principles.

8. The same question is treated concerning angels. But if we extend our discourse to angelic habits, certain connatural habits will be found in them, for from the beginning they have sciences and innate species of all natural things. Hence, if we wish to comprehend these habits in that division, they should rightly be numbered under infused habits; because, as the truer opinion holds, they are not made by any created cause, nor do they properly emanate from the nature of angels, but are infused by the author of nature, although according to connatural capacity and the perfection due to nature. And according to this, infused habit can be subdivided into that which is commensurate to nature and that which is above the order and what is due to nature. And the former is usually called indite or innate, because these words seem to signify commensuration to nature; the latter however, by antonomasia, retains the name infused. If however

someone notices what we say at the beginning of this disputation, where we excluded intelligible species from this treatment, he will understand that that moderation or subdivision would not be necessary, because in angels there are no connatural habits or habits given by nature besides intelligible species, which they require on account of the conjunction of objects; in which perfection they surpass the human intellect, which at the beginning is like a blank tablet on which nothing is painted. But truly on the part of powers, angels need connatural habits much less than men. Whether they can have acquired ones is a matter for other consideration.

9. Therefore according to this interpretation that division is sufficient and adequate, and coincides with that by which habit can be divided into supernatural and natural, for every infused one is supernatural; for this is the cause on account of which it can be had through infusion alone. But acquired is natural, not insofar as natural is said of what is congenital with nature, but what is proportioned to natural capacity, or what can be obtained through natural forces or causes. And concerning this latter member are principally understood the things we have said about habits up to now; consideration of the other member is higher and proper to theologians.

Second Division of Habit into That of Knowing or Appetitive Power

10. Second, habit can be divided into intellectual and moral, or of the will, or more generally, into cognitive and appetitive. This division is taken from the proximate material cause, or proximate subject of habits, which is cognitive or appetitive power, or intellect or will. Hence there is no doubt that the division is essential, both because the powers themselves differ essentially, and also because the distinction of formal objects is implicitly contained there, for the objects of habits are proportioned to the objects of powers and formally contained under them. Just as therefore those powers have

formally diverse objects, so also do their habits. Hence, although according to moral consideration one virtue is sometimes said to be composed of habits of diverse powers, nevertheless metaphysically considering the proper essences of things, it cannot happen that habits of diverse powers are of the same essence or nature. That division is therefore essential and quasi-generic, in the sense declared above, because it is given through very common differences and comprehending diverse series of habits, and because things that differ in matter or object are usually said to differ in genus. That division is also adequate, because, as was seen above, only those powers that have proper immanent acts are capable of habits properly so called; but such powers are only either cognitive or appetitive. Therefore this division is also adequate to the preceding, so that each member of that can be divided through this, and conversely; for not only acquired habits, but also infused ones can be cognitive and appetitive; and conversely, both cognitive and appetitive habit can be distinguished into natural and supernatural. This is most certain at least concerning habits of intellect and will; for concerning habits of sensitive appetite or cogitative power it is more controversial whether they can be infused per se and properly supernatural as to substance; which disputation, as I said, is properly theological and cannot be understood without proper principles of theology.

11. He divides habit into intellectual and moral. Moral is said of something in multiple ways. Under this division is comprehended and easily understood another, by which habit is divided into intellectual and moral, for according to diverse significations of that word "moral," this division can either be the same as the preceding or convertible with it, although it differs somewhat. For moral, since it is derived from "mores" (customs), insofar as it is assigned as a difference of habit, can signify either that habit which is proximately and per se elicitive of a moral act, or more generally any habit that is per se a principle or rule of such an act. In the first sense indeed, moral habit is the same as habit of the will, for a moral act properly and formally is

an act of the will, because that alone is formally free; customs consist only in free acts. Therefore habits elicitive per se of moral acts are properly acts of the will, and through a certain participation and subordination habits of sensitive appetite are also so named. But intellectual habits are generally called all those that are in the intellect. But if moral habit is also called that which is the proximate rule of moral acts, thus also some intellectual habits are usually called moral, as prudence is called a moral virtue. And in this sense, although this division is adequate to the preceding, it is nevertheless not so essential, nor is it given through such opposite differences, since one and the same virtue can be called intellectual and moral under diverse considerations and respects. For it is called intellectual from its subject, but moral from its object or matter about which it is concerned.

12. That also is worthy of note in this division: although all habits of the will, according to the general consideration mentioned, are truly and properly called moral, theologians nevertheless distinguish by special reason certain habits or virtues in the will as moral from theological ones; not because the latter are also not moral, as they are in the will, but because they have a certain excellence, in that they tend toward God himself proximately and immediately. Hence that difference of theological habit or virtue, since it is taken from the matter about which it is concerned, is common not only to certain moral habits, but also to intellectual ones, insofar as the intellect also can tend proximately and immediately toward God himself. Therefore also that difference of theological habit can belong not only to some infused habits, but also to acquired ones, insofar as God can also be naturally known and loved, although by antonomasia or a certain excellence that difference is usually attributed peculiarly to certain infused virtues alone.

Third Division of Habit into Virtue & Non-Virtue

13. How many things and what the name virtue signifies. Third, habit is principally divided into virtue and non-virtue. Virtue is a habit disposing a power toward perfect operation consonant with its nature. For thus philosophers more frequently use the name of virtue; for this word is sometimes taken for any faculty of operating, as when we say the virtue of moving, of heating; indeed it is also usually extended to signify any perfection of a thing, in which signification it seems to be taken by Aristotle, Physics VII, chapter 3, when he says that virtue is a certain perfection; hence he calls beauty, health, and strength virtues of the body, and universally the best disposition of a thing, which constitutes it in a perfect state. Sometimes however the name of virtue is taken for the object or effect of such a faculty, in which way the virtue of a thing is usually called the most perfect object or most perfect effect it can attain. In this way Aristotle said, De Caelo I, text 116, that virtue is the ultimate of potency, as St. Thomas expounds, I-II, q. 55, a. 1, ad 1, although Aristotle there does not expressly use the name of virtue, but simply says that a potency is denominated from what is maximum in it. From this therefore the name of virtue was imposed to signify that disposition of a power by which it is perfected and rendered prompt for eliciting good and right acts consonant with its nature. For this reason Aristotle says, Ethics II, chapters 5 and 8, that virtue is a habit that makes the one having it conduct himself well and renders his work good. Where "good," so that the definition may be general, is not to be taken for moral goodness, but absolutely for goodness or perfection consonant with the power. And thus also St. Augustine, in book 83 Questions, question 31, says that virtue is a good habit in due measure and reason, consonant with nature. Hence since habit properly so called is only in a power rational in some way, as I said above, virtue also, which is essentially habit, can be found only in such a power, first indeed and principally in intellect and will, but through a certain participation in the inferior portion of man, insofar as it participates reason in some way and is subject to its motion.

14. Therefore all virtues, either formally or radically, are reduced to virtues of intellect or will. The perfection of intellect consists in attaining truth, but the perfection of will in attaining honesty, and therefore virtue in common and simply is called a habit infallibly attaining the good simply of a rational power, and is subdivided into intellectual virtue and affective or virtue of the will. Intellectual virtue is that which inclines infallibly toward knowing truth. Affective or appetitive virtue is that which inclines toward operating rightly and honestly without defect; concerning which is principally understood the description of St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II, chapters 18 and 19: "Virtue is a good quality of mind by which one lives rightly, and which no one uses badly." Concerning which last clause theologians write much; it is sufficient for us that virtue of the will is such a habit that it elicits no act except good and honest, as such; whether however malice can be joined to such an act from elsewhere extrinsically or accidentally, is irrelevant now for declaring the essence of habit or virtue.

15. What vice properly signifies. But habit that is not virtue is sometimes called vice. For thus Aristotle, Physics VII, chapter 3, touching on this division, says: "Of habits, some are virtues, others are vices." But we have more willingly used a more universal name explained through negation, because vice properly signifies a bad habit contrary to virtue and inclined from itself toward an act contrary to the perfection of the power in which it is. As in the intellect errors and habits inclining toward the false will be called vices; in the will however vices are habits inclining toward base and dishonest customs. But the name of vice taken thus does not divide habit adequately against virtue, because there are some habits that, although they do not attain the perfection of virtue, are nevertheless not vices. Such is true opinion in the intellect, which although it is not virtue, in that, as much as is from its nature, it can incline toward the false, as St. Thomas rightly noted, I-II, q. 55, a. 4, is nevertheless not simply a bad habit, because it does not incline toward evil of such a power, but

toward good, although in an imperfect way. And therefore there will be proportionally in the will, if there are some habits indifferent from their object, concerning which elsewhere. For this reason therefore we distinguish against virtue a habit that is not virtue, which can be further divided into a vicious or bad habit, and an indifferent habit or imperfect in its order, although it is not absolutely bad.

16. And from the declaration of this division it is established that it is adequate to the preceding ones, although not in the same way. For the second and third division are so compared that each member can be divided through the members of the other; for both intellectual and appetitive virtue can be divided through virtue and non-virtue, or vice; and conversely, virtue can be divided into intellectual and appetitive, and vice similarly. But the first and third division do not relate thus, for although acquired habit is divided through virtue and vice, infused habit is not; and conversely, although virtue is divided into infused and acquired, vice is not.

17. No vice can be infused by God. Nevertheless there are some theologians, especially Nominalists, who say it is not repugnant for vice to be infused by God. But they are deceived not only concerning habit infused per se, which seems manifest, but also concerning habit infused per accidens, because it is repugnant to divine goodness and truth that God should per se be the author of evil and incline toward evil or the false. This reason proves excellently concerning vice properly taken, for if an indifferent habit is granted, nothing is repugnant to its being infused by God; it will nevertheless be at most infused per accidens, for among habits supernatural as to substance I do not think there can be given either an opinative habit in the intellect or an indifferent habit in the will, as must be demonstrated more broadly in theology. Therefore those divisions relate thus, that under one member of one division is contained both the whole of one member of another division and a great part of another member, and conversely, so that under virtue is comprehended infused habit and a great part of acquired habit, and so

of others. It is true that St. Augustine, in the mentioned De Libero Arbitrio II, places in the definition of virtue that it is a quality that God works in us without us; but he spoke of virtue more theologically and christianly than purely philosophically.

18. Hence here also occurred a question concerning this division of habit into virtue and non-virtue, whether it is into essentially divided members. For it is thought by many to be only in accidental subjection, in that the same habit can have the nature of virtue in one state and not in another, as conjoined with charity or with perfect prudence, or separated from them. Scotus seems to have held this, Quodlibet, q. 18, a. 1, and in I, d. 17, q. 2, where he signifies that virtue is distinguished from vice only through a certain relation. But there can be equivocation in the use of that name "virtue"; for sometimes it signifies not only the nature of habit, but also the state, and thus not only expresses essence but connotes or requires certain accidents, such as sufficient intension and extension and connection with other virtues. Sometimes however it signifies the nature of habit alone. And in this way it is taken in the present, and thus there is no doubt that the division is essential, as is easily clear from what has been said, and Cajetan treats more broadly, I-II, q. 55, a. 1. But those two members are further subdivided into various virtues and vices, as can be understood from what was said in the preceding division and from those things also that we treated concerning the distinction of habits from objects in the preceding section, and in the following division we shall also touch on some things, as much as the present undertaking permits.

Fourth Division of Habit into Practical & Speculative

19. Fourth, habit is principally divided into practical and speculative. This division in one sense can also be universal and adequate to habit in common; in another more usual and received sense it is usually given of habits of intellect, and can be applied both

to habits that are not virtues and to virtues. We however, for the sake of example and clarity, shall explain it in virtues and sciences, for from there it will be easy to apply the same doctrine to the remaining habits through the same proportion. Since however practical habit, in the opinion of all, is that which is concerned with praxis per se and by its nature and in a peculiar certain way, therefore, so that the mentioned division may be understood, two things must be declared by us. First, what praxis is and how manifold; second, how habit ought to be concerned with praxis so that it may be practical, and from this it will also be established what speculative habit is.

What Praxis Is

20. Praxis therefore is thus defined by Scotus, Prologue, q. 4, at the beginning: "Praxis is an act of another power than intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, apt to be elicited conformably to right reason so that it may be right." For that praxis signifies an act or action is undoubted from the signification of the Greek word itself; for πρᾶξις in Greek signifies action or act, from πράττω, which is "I act" or "I do." Although among Aristotle, as I shall note below, the name praxis is usually taken more strictly for action, which he distinguishes from making; nevertheless, from the rigorous signification of the word and from use both common and also necessary for explaining the division posited, the name praxis is taken more generally as it signifies operation.

21. That however that operation which is called praxis ought to be an act of another power than intellect, Scotus proves from a certain common saying, that intellect becomes practical by extension; which is believed to be taken from Aristotle, De Anima III, chapter 10, text 50, where he distinguishes practical from contemplative intellect by the end, because practical (he says) reasons for the sake of something and is a principle of acting. This seems necessarily to be understood of action that is outside intellect itself; for within intellect

itself the speculative intellect is also a principle of acting. And St. Thomas favors this opinion, I-II, q. 57, a. 1, where he says: "Practical or operative, which is divided against speculative, is taken from external work, toward which speculative habit has no order, but only toward the internal work of intellect, which is to speculate on truth." Where also St. Thomas, when he speaks of external work, does not understand only transient actions, but all acts of another power than intellect. For he treats of internal and external work in comparison with intellect itself. Hence II-II, q. 179, a. 2, explaining the division of active and contemplative life through order to active and contemplative intellect, he says the active is called such from being ordered toward external action, where he seems to take external action in the same way, for action outside intellect.

22. Soto follows this opinion, in the fourth prooemial question of Logic. He confirms it with this reason: every operation of intellect is speculation; but praxis is an operation distinct from speculation; therefore. But this reason does not seem efficacious, because not every act of intellect seems to be speculation, otherwise every habit of intellect would be speculative, because speculative habit is that whose act is speculation. And this presses especially in the opinion of Thomists, who posit an act of command elicited by intellect, which is in no way cognitive of truth but impulsive toward work; that therefore cannot be called speculation. But concerning the force of this reason, more below.

23. Capreolus seems to prove the same opinion, Prologue, q. 2, conclusion 4, with a certain limitation joined, which perhaps Scotus would not deny. For first he correctly proves that external action, which is called praxis, ought not to be understood of transient action alone, but also of immanent, provided it is outside intellect, in the will for example or appetite; for prudence is a practical virtue that is concerned with praxis, and per se primarily is concerned with affections of the will, which it directs or commands; and St. Thomas teaches both, I-II, q. 47, aa. 2 and 5. And q. 16 De Malo, a. 8, he says

that cognition by which something is judged to be chosen or desired is practical or affective, holding that choice itself or affection is praxis. From this however Capreolus adds that even the act of intellect itself, insofar as it is free at least as to exercise, is praxis, because as it is, it falls under choice of the will and direction of prudence, as St. Thomas also notes, II-II, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2. Therefore if choice of the will itself is praxis, also every work, insofar as it falls under such choice, will be praxis, however much otherwise according to itself it may be speculation. And this can be confirmed, for under this consideration that act is not judged true or false, but good or bad. Hence just as an act of intellect according to itself is not formally good or morally bad, but insofar as it is intrinsically denominated by a good or bad act of the will, so it will not be called praxis according to itself and intrinsically, but as it were through extrinsic denomination, under which notion it is compared to the mode of a certain external act. And therefore I said it is likely that Scotus would not have denied this mode of praxis in acts of intellect. Hence the same Capreolus, in the same q. 2, ad 1 of Gregory, says that work of intellect is not praxis except by means of choice, and ad 2 infers that this is not truly praxis, but rather that choice which is immediately regulated by practical reason.

24. From this however we can argue further, as Scotus also objects to himself, that for intellect to be practical, it is not necessary that it extend to an act of another power than intellect itself, but it suffices if through one of its acts it extends to regulating another act elicited by itself also, and consequently praxis is not always an act of another power than intellect, but can be an act of intellect itself, insofar as it is directed and regulated through another act of the same intellect. The first part is proved, because if an act of intellect directing work of the will so that it may be done rightly in its order is practical, why not also one act of intellect directing another so that it may be done rightly in its genus? For that one is an act of intellect, another of will, is not a sufficient reason, but rather begs the question, unless

another reason is applied. And it is confirmed, for such an act is not entirely speculative, because it is neither for itself alone, but for directing other acts of intellect; nor is it for the sake of cognition of truth alone, but for direction of some power in operating. From this therefore the other part is proved, for some act of intellect as directed and regulated through another act of the same intellect is truly praxis; therefore it is not of the nature of praxis that it be an act of another power than intellect. The antecedent is clear, because one act of intellect regulating and directing another is compared practically to it; therefore, conversely, the act regulated and directed is compared as praxis to another.

25. On account of these things therefore many think it is not of the nature of praxis that it be an act of another power than intellect, as Gregory, Prologue, q. 5, a. 1; and Aureolus, q. 3; Ockham also, q. 4, a. 1, and Gabriel, q. 10, say some act of intellect is praxis; but they speak in the same sense as Capreolus, namely as to use, and that by means of an act of will an act of intellect can be called praxis; and Fonseca holds the same, Metaphysics II, chapter 3, q. 2.

26. I think however that the dissension is more about the signification of names than about the thing, because in the thing it is established that an act of intellect can be subject to direction and rules of art, and can be done voluntarily thus rather than otherwise, which conditions suffice in acts of other powers for them to be praxis. Therefore whether an act of intellect should be so called or not can only pertain to the use or signification of the word. Up to now however no sufficient reason has been given why it cannot be called praxis, which will be more established within by declaring the nature of practical habit. I add however lastly concerning this part that not every act of another power than intellect is praxis; for Aristotle, when in De Anima III, chapter 10, he distinguishes intellect into practical and contemplative, under the name of intellect also comprehends imagination or phantasy, as is established from the beginning of the chapter. Hence also in phantasy he distinguishes twofold acts, some

practical that move toward work, others merely speculative that consist in representation or cognition of object alone. In these however praxis or speculation is not said to be except through a certain participation of reason, and therefore they can be comprehended under intellect.

27. Some parts of the definition of praxis given by Scotus are disapproved. What rectitude belongs to praxis. The other clauses of the definition of praxis posited by Scotus are either not all necessary, or must be interpreted according to what we have said up to now. For what he says, that praxis ought to be an act naturally posterior to intellection, is simply true of every praxis that is outside intellect, for it is of the nature of praxis that it be an act regulable through practical intellect, and therefore praxis as such by its nature supposes that intellection which is its rule. But if some act of intellect is praxis, it is not necessary that it be posterior to any intellection or under any consideration whatsoever, but with proportion, namely that insofar as it is an act done artificially, it is posterior to that intellection through which the rule of such artifice is applied. In the way that dialectic, as it is a mode of knowing, is by its nature prior to other sciences, according to that in Metaphysics II, text 15: "It is absurd to seek simultaneously science and the mode of knowing." Finally, what Scotus says in the last place, that praxis ought to be an act conformable to right reason, first does not simply belong to every praxis, but to that which is done rightly, and therefore Scotus himself also adds that clause, "so that it may be right"; this was not however necessary in the common definition. Then it must be noted that a twofold rectitude can be found in praxis, one moral, which is usually called rectitude in use, another we can call by the general name artificial, which is also usually called regarding the faculty of operating. These two rectitudes can be found in praxis both separately and conjointly; for if someone paints excellently, but not with right intention, the praxis will be right artificially, not morally; and conversely, if with good intention and prudently he paints, but not according to the rules of art, the praxis

will be morally right, not however artificially; if however he has both, it will be right in both ways. Praxis therefore abstracts from both rectitudes. And moreover if we speak generally, it also abstracts from rectitude; for vicious praxis is also given in a twofold way opposite to the mentioned twofold rectitude.

28. In what praxis is formally situated. Therefore it seems to be of the nature of praxis only that it be human or rational action, insofar as it is directed, or is directable or regulable through human reason (for now we speak only of human praxis). This description is sufficiently established from what has been said, from the common opinion of all who speak of praxis, and will be more declared from what is to be said below. Since however we say praxis is voluntary action, it must finally be noted that the name of action among Aristotle is sometimes equivocal. For sometimes action generally signifies every true action, whether it be interior or exterior, whether remaining or immanent or transient. Sometimes however Aristotle distinguishes action from making, as is clear from Metaphysics IX, chapter 9, and accommodates the name praxis to action, but calls making ποιητικήν. But it is ambiguous among him in what he distinguishes action from making. For a threefold exposition of that division seems to be found among him.

29. What is the distinction between action and making. For first he distinguishes them as we distinguished twofold rectitude, namely moral and artificial, so that an act as regulable in moral use is called action, but as regulable artificially is called making. Aristotle indicates this sense in Metaphysics VI, chapter 1, where, distinguishing practical science into active and factive, he says that the same thing is agible as choosable. And according to this interpretation the same act can be making under one consideration and action under another; among habits however, art will be factive, but prudence active. The second exposition is that through action Aristotle understands immanent acts, through making however transient ones. And he signifies this in Metaphysics IX, chapter 9, which St. Thomas

there and in another place, Metaphysics VI, approves, and I-II, q. 57, a. 4. The third exposition is that action is called that which is not for the sake of some work to be effected that remains and perseveres after the action; but making is that which leaves some work made and permanent. Thus Aristotle indicates in book I of the Magna Moralia, last chapter, where he says thus: "Of makers and doers the makeable and doable are not the same, for of makeables besides the making, another end remains, as of house-building, besides the building, there is the house; but in those things that fall under action, besides the action there is no other end, as besides the modulated cithara there is no other end, but that is the end, the exercise and action." From these examples it is established that even in transient actions Aristotle distinguishes action from making. Hence according to this third exposition, under action are comprehended all immanent acts regulable through reason, and moreover some transient ones, because every immanent action leaves nothing worked from itself; but not every transient one but some. It is true that Aristotle, Ethics VI, chapter 5, signifies that action, as it is distinguished from making, sometimes leaves something acted; for thus he writes: "The end of effection is something other than itself, but of action not always"; where when he indefinitely says "not always," he signifies that sometimes the opposite happens even in action. But either that clause "not always" is not to be taken in that rigor but in the force of absolute negation, or (as St. Thomas indicates in exposition) he says "not always" because, although action can be for itself as an end, sometimes it can also be ordered toward another extrinsic end, although such an end is not some intrinsic term made and permanent from the force of such action, but something else intended by the operator. And thus it happens to action, as such, to be for another end; but to making it is intrinsic and per se, because it is intrinsic to it to have a term made through itself and remaining after itself, for the sake of which it is principally intended.

30. And this third exposition seems most intended by Aristotle, although, because among actions the principal ones are immanent, and in these moral rectitude has its chief place, therefore he sometimes uses the term "action" and "actionable" in reference to immanent actions, and in relation to prudence, and goodness and badness, as can be seen in the cited passages. But whatever may be the case concerning this distinction between action and making, as far as the present matter is concerned, both are comprehended under the name "praxis," because both are human action, voluntary, and regulable by reason. And so much for the first point.

How a Practical Habit is Concerned with Praxis

31. Regarding the second part proposed, namely, how a practical habit is concerned with praxis, it should be noted that a habit or power can be concerned with praxis in various ways. First, by eliciting the act itself, which is praxis, just as temperance elicits good choice, which truly is praxis. Second, by commanding, regulating, or directing praxis; in this way prudence relates to the said choice, and the art of painting to the movement of the hand. And these two modes are per se and proper; another can be conceived that is less proper, and not so per se, nor from the direct intention or causality of the habit or power, which we shall discuss below, because that does not suffice for the nature of a practical habit.

32. Therefore, according to those two modes, the division of habit into practical and speculative can be explained. For if it is taken in all that generality which can be comprehended under those two modes, it will be an adequate division for habit taken in common. For every habit is in a power either appetitive or cognitive in some rational way, and insofar as it is such, as I said above; therefore every habit is a principle of cognition or appetition in some rational way. But every appetition that is rational in some way has the nature of praxis, because it is the work of a power other than the intellect, regulable by

reason; therefore every habit existing in the appetite is a practical habit. And thus Capreolus taught above, at the end of the fourth conclusion, though he speaks especially of the act of the will. But the same reasoning applies to the act of the sensitive appetite, insofar as it is in some way a human act, and subordinated to reason and will; under this aspect, however, our appetite is capable of habit. But rational cognition either rests only in the cognition of truth, or is ordered to work. The prior cognition is speculation; the latter cognition is practical; hence Aristotle, in Metaphysics II, chapter 2, speaking of science, says: "The end of speculative science is truth; of practical science, however, work." Nor can any middle be found between these two members, because it is necessary that every cognition of the mind be ordered to truth in some way. Either it rests in this, and this is contemplation or speculation; or it proceeds further tending to another end; but this end cannot be anything except some operation, whether immanent or transient. Therefore every habit of the intellect is also either speculative or practical; therefore that partition adequately divides habit, although it comprehends under one member all appetitive habits and some intellectual ones; under the other, however, the remaining part of intellectual virtues or habits.

33. But since neither does the nature of speculative habit have a place in the appetite, nor does the nature of practical habit have any difficulty in it, therefore that division is peculiarly given concerning habits of the intellect. And in this way especially theologians treat of it in the Prologue to the Sentences, and in I, distinction 35, and on the First Part, question 1, article 4 and question 14, article 16; and philosophers, both in the prooemial questions of dialectic and philosophy, and in books I, II and VI of the Metaphysics. For the explanation of which they further inquire, first, whence the distinction between those two members should be taken; second, how great the distinction of habits is through those differences, that is, whether it is essential or only accidental; third, whether it is a real distinction or only of reason between those members; fourth, whether it is

sufficient; in which two things are included, namely, whether there is any intellectual habit that participates in both those natures, and whether there is a habit that has neither. About which many things are said by others; they can be expedited briefly, however, if we remove contention about words and equivocation, and attend to the thing itself.

Whence the Difference into Speculative & Practical Habit is Taken

34. Algazel's opinion is disproved. The second opinion. Concerning the first point, therefore, some distinguish these habits from their material object, because a speculative habit concerns a thing not operable by us, while a practical one concerns what is operable. Thus Algazel signifies in book I of Philosophy, chapter 1. But this is not sufficient, because there can be speculation about a thing operable by us, such as about vision, love, etc., although conversely practical science as such cannot be about a thing not operable by us, because this is repugnant to its end, which is work. Others therefore distinguish these from the same objects taken more formally; for practical science is about an operable thing, as it is operable, that is, teaching how to operate it, and consequently regulating and directing its operation; but speculative science is concerned with a thing not as operable, but precisely as intelligible, or speculable. This distinction finally coincides with that which Aristotle assigned from the end; for the end of a speculative habit rests in the cognition of truth; of a practical one, however, is some work, namely, beyond the cognition of truth. For a practical intellectual habit must necessarily be immediately ordered to some cognition of truth; for a habit of the intellect cannot not be a principle of understanding and knowing something under the aspect of the true. This therefore is common to a practical habit with a speculative one; it differs, however, in that the speculative ultimately rests of itself in the cognition of truth, while the

practical tends beyond this to operation. And thus those two habits are distinguished, both from their formal objects and also from their end; for these two are nearly the same, if we speak of the objective end, or that which is obtained through the habits. And in these matters nearly all agree.

35. They doubt further, however, whether this should be understood of the end of the habit itself according to itself, or of the end of the learner or one having such a habit. For some think that both ends are necessary for the nature of a practical habit. According to their opinion, if someone learns the science of building a house, not with the intention of exercising or directing such work, but of knowing how such work can and should be exercised, the science will not be practical. St. Thomas seems to teach this opinion in nearly these words in I, question 14, article 16, who consequently says that the science which God has of creatures, if he does not have the will to operate them, is speculative; if he does have it, however, it is practical. Hence this opinion is frequent among Thomists, as is clear from Cajetan there; Ferrariensis, 3 Contra Gentiles, chapter 20; Soncinas, V Metaphysics, question 4; Javellus, question 5.

36. The third opinion. But the contrary is taught in the Prologue to the Sentences by Ockham, question 4, article 2, otherwise question 11; Gabriel, question 11; Gregory, question 5; because otherwise being practical or speculative would be in some habit only an extrinsic denomination from the intention of the knower. Hence by a mere change of intention the same habit would become speculative from practical, and conversely.

37. The author's opinion. But I think that, regarding this part, the question is about the mode of speaking. For there is no doubt that science, as applied to work through the intention of the operator, has a peculiar ordering to work, by reason of which it can receive the peculiar denomination of praxis or practical. Nevertheless it is also certain that science, if from itself and its own nature it is so concerned with an operable thing as operable, that insofar as it is from itself it

provides facility in operating, is properly and intrinsically practical, and not only speculative. Hence St. Thomas, above, did not say that from the end of the operator science is simply speculative or practical, but according to a certain aspect or denomination, which we can say according to the state it has in such a subject. But it should be noted that the end of the operator can be twofold. One merely extrinsic and accidental to the science itself. And this does not suffice to constitute practical science; for although someone might learn natural philosophy or metaphysics with the intention of gaining money or taking pleasure, the science would not therefore be practical. The other is an end intrinsic and connatural to the science itself, and this can pertain to the perfect state of practical science; but this end always supposes that the opinion itself is ordered to work from itself, or is regulative of work. And thus besides that intention of the operator, there is supposed in such a habit an intrinsic difference by which it tends to work, through which without doubt it differs from a purely contemplative habit; hence by reason of that it can deservedly be called practical.

38. How the intellect is distinguished into practical and speculative. To explain this further, I note two things. The first is that Aristotle, in On the Soul III, chapter 10, and Ethics VI, chapters 1 and 5, also divides the intellect into practical and speculative from the end, because the former rests in the contemplation of truth, the latter extends to operation. But this distinction in the intellect itself does not depend on the intention of the will, but belongs to the intellect from itself as it precedes the will and distinguishes the faculties or functions of that power. Hence it also happens that the intellect not only does not become practical absolutely from the intention of the will, but also insofar as it is practical, it moves and affects the will, although afterwards it can be more applied to work through the will and, as it were, become more practical regarding use. Therefore an intellectual habit will be best divided into practical and speculative from its subject, namely so that speculative is that which perfects the intellect

as it is speculative, practical that which perfects it as it is practical. Hence there will also arise a distinction from the order to acts by which habits are best distinguished, for the speculative intellect as such exercises only speculation, the practical truly practical cognition. But each intellect can exercise its acts, and as they are elicited from it, they are practical or speculative, and not only from the intention of the will. The same therefore is true of habit, regarding its substance and intrinsic nature, whatever may be the case concerning perfection or accidental denomination on the part of the operator.

39. Various genera of practical habits. Second, it should be observed that some practical habits of the intellect are concerned proximately with the appetite, directing or moving it to work; others truly are concerned with other human actions, which two genera of habits Aristotle often comprehends under the names of prudence and art. And the division touched on above of practical habit into active and factive can be accommodated to them, according to the various expositions given above. And therefore also the former habits, which are concerned with the work of the will or appetite, are called practical regarding use, because it belongs to the will to move and impel the other powers to exercise and use; hence active use is a certain peculiar act of the will; but the function of the said habits is to direct and move the will in its acts and their use. But the others are called practical regarding the faculty of actions, since from themselves they do not excite the appetite to such actions, but are only certain principles for exercising them artificially, and therefore such habits are often called powers by Aristotle. Therefore the former habits cannot always suppose an intention of operating on the part of the knower, because they themselves induce such intention. Hence, just as the operation of the intellect simply precedes the operation of the will, so also the practical act, and consequently also the habit, is by its genus prior to the intention of the operator.

40. Nor does it matter if someone says that prudence supposes the intention of the end, both because, although this is true

of prudence regarding the preceptive act of choice, it is not however regarding the act of judgment about such a particular end to be intended here and now, which act is also practical, and it is very probable that it pertains to prudence. And also because at least for the intention of the end there is supposed the judgment of synderesis, which is a practical habit, for its judgment is practical, since by its nature it is ordered to the work of the will, and is a rule of it.

41. But other habits, which only give the faculty of operating, seem less to depend on the intention of operating of the will, as to their being, even if they depend regarding the use and exercise of their actions, which is something posterior to the being of the habit itself. Such a habit therefore is not practical because it is actually applied to operating, but rather, because it is practical, therefore by its nature it is apt to be applied to directing or exercising praxis; therefore, if such a habit is compared in this way, that it truly provides from itself the faculty or facility of operating, with whatever intention it is acquired or obtained on the part of the learner, it will be intrinsically and according to its substance practical, even if it lacks (so to speak) the practical state.

42. Whence arises the formal difference between practical and speculative habit. From these things therefore we conclude that practical and speculative habit differ first and per se from their intrinsic end, because the speculative rests in the contemplation of truth which it intends for its own sake, but the practical transmits cognition of truth as a rule and principle of some human work that has the nature of praxis. Hence consequently they also differ from their genus in the matter about which they are concerned, because practical science must necessarily be concerned with a thing operable by the knower, because it must proximately direct or regulate its operation; but the operation of someone cannot be concerned except with a thing operable by him; but speculative science from itself is concerned with a thing not operable by the knower. But if it is sometimes concerned with an operable thing, it differs at least from practical

science in mode, because the latter (as is commonly said) is concerned with an operable thing in an operable mode, which mode extends to the formal object, and therefore practical science is said to be about an operable thing as it is operable; but speculative about a thing as it is speculable, that is, insofar as it has in itself cognizable truth, whether this consists in something operable or not. Hence that operable mode does not exclude that a practical habit can proceed by defining and demonstrating; for these are common to every science; but it only adds that the mode of proceeding is such that through it cognition is compared which from itself is a sufficient rule, and in its order a sufficient principle of praxis. But if it does not arrive at this, it rests in speculation alone, although the truth in which it is concerned is in an operable thing, all of which will be more clear from the responses to the other proposed points, which can be expedited more briefly.

Whether Practical & Speculative Habit Differ Essentially in the Same Power

43. Theology is a science both practical and speculative at once. Concerning the second point therefore, whether these differences are essential to intellectual habits or not, I suppose that there is now no discussion of that denomination which can be taken from the intention of the operator; for that is manifestly extrinsic and accidental. With this supposed, and omitting opinions, I respond that when these differences are adequate to habits, they are essential, but sometimes it can happen that neither of them is adequate to some habit, and then in comparison with it practical and speculative are not such essential differences as to cause essential diversity in it, although that habit essentially differs from an adequately speculative habit or an adequately practical one. This resolution is first clear from examples, for metaphysics, which is adequately or purely speculative, essentially differs from another purely practical science; but in theology, which according to the truer opinion is at once both practical and speculative

formally, those differences are not essential, although theology itself has some difference by which it essentially differs from a purely practical or speculative science. But the reason a priori is that these differences are taken from the order to the end and the formal object of science.

44. How one habit can be both practical and speculative. But many doubt in what way differences that in some things cause essential diversity can be formally joined in something. But this will be easily understood by noting that these differences can be under a certain consideration subaltern, and under another ultimate, according to the various agreements and differences that are found in things. Therefore two sciences can agree in this, that each treats of an operable thing as such; but differ because one treats adequately of an operable thing, or only of it; the other however not adequately, but in a superior or more universal mode. Thus therefore practical can be taken either as it abstracts from the adequate and inadequate, and as such it is only a subaltern difference, or as it is defined and limited to an adequately practical habit, and thus it is an ultimate difference, and the same is proportionally true of speculative. Therefore those differences do not cause essential diversity except as they are ultimate, and as such they are never joined in the same habit; but as they are subaltern, they can be joined, because the same thing can have subaltern differences constituting genera that are not placed subalternately among themselves. Whether besides divine theology there is any natural science at once practical and speculative, I shall say a little below; now we only say that on the part of the subject it is not repugnant, for the same faculty of the intellect is at once practical and speculative. This example is also apt for declaring what we said about the differences, practical and speculative.

45. The habit of faith is at once practical and speculative. Whether the same is true of the light of glory and the beatific vision. But concerning this it should lastly be observed that this opinion should be explained differently if habit is a simple quality, or if it is a

collection of several subordinated qualities. For in the former way not only the same science or habit, but also the same simple quality, will be at once practical and speculative; just as the same intellect, although it is a simple quality, is practical and speculative, because it is the principle of practical and speculative knowledge. And in this way I judge that the habit of infused faith, even if it is a simple quality, is at once practical and speculative; for it is both the principle of contemplating divine truths, and the rule of principles or truths by which human operations are to be directed, so that they have a certain superior honesty. And perhaps the same is true of the light of glory; indeed many believe the same of the beatific vision itself, because in things of the supreme order not only the same principle, but also the same act can embrace both the nature of practical and speculative in imitation of divine science; but of this elsewhere. But if science is composed of several qualities according to the diversity of principles and conclusions, thus the same human science cannot be at once practical and speculative according to the same quality, but according to diverse ones, because one and the same conclusion is not at once practical and speculative; but those qualities are said to be multiplied according to the variety of conclusions. And thus also habits of principles are divided into synderesis and intellect, from the fact that they are concerned with practical and speculative principles. But one could easily say that such a habit is one by a certain collection, and thus at once practical and speculative, although according to diverse parts.

Whether Practical & Speculative Differ in Reality or in Reason

46. From the resolution of the preceding doubt the response to the third is easy, although Aristotle introduces some difficulty concerning it, who sometimes seems to separate speculative and practical intellect as really distinct powers, as is clear from On the Soul

III, chapter 10, where first he says, in text 50, that the intellect which is the principle of acting differs by its end from the speculative intellect; but afterwards, in text 53, he says thus: "It is also established that those who divide the parts of the soul, if they divide and separate powers, must concede that they are several: the principle of nourishing, sensing, understanding, deliberating, and desiring, for these differ more among themselves than the power of desiring and being angry." Where by the power of understanding and deliberating, he seems to understand speculative and practical intellect, and to establish openly a real distinction between them. And similarly in Ethics VI, chapter 1, he distinguishes two parts of the soul, which he says differ in genus, one by which we contemplate, the other by which we deliberate about things to be done.

47. The intellect is not distinguished in reality from the speculative intellect. Nevertheless it is certain that these faculties are not distinct in reality, as St. Thomas, Ia, question 79, article 11, and all teach, and it is per se evident, for the intellect is a universal power having being or truth as its object. Hence operable and non-operable truth with respect to the intellect are as it were material or inadequate differences. Likewise faculties cannot be distinguished in reality, both because the reason for composing and discoursing is the same in every matter, and equally requires a spiritual cognitive power; and also because the same faculty is that which by natural light assents to first principles, both speculative and practical; for it is the same mode of assenting in all those from the immediate connection of terms; but the diversity of terms alone does not require diversity of power, since the same intellective force suffices for apprehending such terms and penetrating their natures; therefore the same is also the intellective force or faculty that discourses from both kinds of principles. Add also that there is such great connection between practical and speculative truths, that often practical ones cannot be exactly known without the aid of others on which they depend, and therefore no science is so practical that it either does not have something of speculation, or at

least is not in some way subordinated to or subaltern to speculative science. And therefore speculative science from its genus is prior and more noble, as Aristotle said in the prooemium of this work. Therefore the principle of speculative and practical cognition must necessarily be the same regarding the power of understanding. And it is finally confirmed, because opinion and science seem to differ more than practical and speculative; but the faculty of knowing and opining is the same; therefore much more so practical and speculative intellect.

48. Whether Aristotle held practical intellect to be distinct in reality from speculative. Nor could Aristotle have held the opposite; rather St. Thomas, in the cited place, gathers this same opinion from that axiom, that the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension, which he also brings from Aristotle, On the Soul III. Also from the fact that practical cognition is distinguished from speculative only by its end, as Aristotle says in the same place in book III On the Soul. This difference is accidental with respect to the cognitive faculty. Hence also in phantasy, it is manifest according to Aristotle that it is the same faculty that is in its way speculative and operative. Since therefore Aristotle numbers the intellective and deliberative as diverse powers of the soul, one could understand by deliberative not the practical intellect, but the will; for he first numbers the sensitive and intellective power, and then numbers the deliberative and appetitive power; therefore by these words two appetites corresponding to sense and intellect can rightly be understood. But this is not pleasing, because to deliberate properly signifies to take counsel. Hence another translation there has "consultative" for deliberative. And therefore it is better said that there Aristotle does not distinguish these powers as distinct in reality regarding faculty, but regarding function. Nor is it necessary that in all things that are numbered there, there be equal or similar distinction. Just as also in Ethics VI, chapter 5, Aristotle distinguishes a double part of the soul, opinionative and scientific, which nevertheless it is established are not diverse faculties in reality. Add that from the cited place in On the Soul III, it is not so much

gathered that practical and speculative intellect are distinguished in reality, as that the irascible and concupiscible are not more distinguished in reality than practical and speculative intellect, which perhaps is true, about which elsewhere.

49. It is therefore established that on the part of the subject a real distinction between intellectual practical and speculative habit is not necessarily gathered; for it has been shown that the subject of both is the same in reality. Nor conversely from the unity of power is identity gathered between the habits themselves, because in the same power there can be really distinct habits, as was shown above. Therefore it must be inquired from elsewhere in what way such habits differ, namely from the principle posited in the superior point. For when practical and speculative are adequate differences of habits, it is a sign that those habits also differ really, because each of them has its own entity distinct from the power, and adequate to an entirely distinct object; therefore they are distinct entities among themselves. But when they are inadequate differences of habit, then practical and speculative habit do not differ in reality, but in reason through our inadequate concepts, in the manner in which practical and speculative intellect differ, or just as common sense, as it is concerned with colors and sounds inadequately, can at most be distinguished by reason, although the inferior senses, which adequately regard other objects, are really distinguished.

Whether the Said Division is Adequate

50. The resolution of the fourth doubt also, which is about the sufficiency of this division, is easy from what has been said. For no habit can be conceived that is not either practical or speculative; for in some way these habits include immediate contradiction. For every intellectual habit necessarily tends to cognition of the true, or under the aspect of the true. Therefore either it tends to cognition of the true for its own sake, and such a habit is speculative, or such cognition is

ordered to another end, and thus a practical habit is constituted. But between those two members, namely, cognition of the true for itself or for something else, no middle can be understood; therefore between practical and speculative no middle can be given through negation of both extremes. This can also be confirmed, both from the power in which such habits are, which is sufficiently divided into practical and speculative intellect; and from the acts and functions of that power, which is given to man because of the perfection and excellence that is in truth to be contemplated, and also so that it might be as it were a light directing and governing man in all his actions, insofar as they are subject to his power, whether they are ordered to moral life or to tutelage and conservation of natural and corporeal life. And thus also philosophers distinguished a double happiness of man, namely active and contemplative, as is clear from Aristotle, Ethics X. And similarly Christian philosophy distinguishes a double life, active and contemplative, to which Aristotle, Ethics I, chapter 5, added the voluptuous life, which is not counted among human ones, because it is rather bestial and is not ruled by reason. Therefore human or intellectual habits are sufficiently comprehended under that division.

51. Theology is more speculative than practical. But whether a middle can be given between those two members as it were through participation of both extremes, as far as the thing itself is concerned, the resolution is clear from what has been said. For if one calls middle a habit that is at once practical and speculative, it is indeed true that there is such a habit; but whether it should be called middle or not will be a question of name. Speaking simply, however, that division is sufficient, both because when intellectual habit is divided into practical and speculative, it is not necessary to take those differences as ultimate, but as subaltern, and thus that habit which is at once practical and speculative is comprehended under both those members for diverse reasons. And also because, as St. Thomas said in a similar case, IIaIIae, question 179, article 2, ad 2, a middle that consists of extremes virtually contains the extremes, but always in it one of the

extremes dominates, from which it takes its absolute denomination. Just as concerning supernatural theology, which is at once speculative and practical, the same St. Thomas said elsewhere that it is more speculative, because from its primary object it is speculative.

52. Scotus asserting the contrary is disproved. Although Scotus, in the Prologue, question 4, thinks conversely that a science that extends to praxis in any way should simply be called practical, because such science is simply not for its own sake, but for another. But he does not speak correctly, and seems deceived in two ways. First, because he thought that for the nature of a practical act it suffices that it excite the affection in any way, and therefore he also calls the contemplation of God in us a practical act. But not correctly, because for the nature of a practical act of the intellect, it is necessary that it be concerned with praxis as object or matter about which, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said, and Capreolus, Gregory, Gabriel, and others noted in the Prologue, in the cited place. Indeed St. Thomas also, whom Capreolus reports, teaches the same in III, distinction 23, question 2, article 3, question 2, and question 14 On Truth, article 4. And the reason is that from however speculative cognition follows delight, as is clear from Ethics X, chapters 7 and 8, not however by way of direction or practical rule, but by natural consequence; and similarly contemplation of God excites love from the force of the excellence and goodness of the object, not because that contemplation is per se and intrinsically referred to that end.

53. Then Scotus does not seem to have noticed that when the same habit at once has speculative and practical acts, although according to one aspect or relation it does not tend to cognition of truth for its own sake, nevertheless according to another it participates in this perfection, and therefore it is not repugnant that a habit which according to something is practical, according to something else is speculative, and also sometimes more, or simply speculative.

54. Whether medicine is speculative and practical. Whether logic is speculative and practical. And thus some judge that we should

philosophize, not only about divine theology, but also about many natural sciences. For although this belongs to theology in a more eminent and higher way because of the excellence of the light that rests on revelation, and because of the eminence of God according to himself, and as he is the first principle and ultimate end, nevertheless according to some inferior aspect something similar can be found in natural sciences. As St. Thomas holds about medicine, on Boethius On the Trinity, in the question on the division of sciences, article 1. For medicine is simply practical from its principal end, and from the greater part of it, and nevertheless it contemplates many things speculatively. And thus medicine is usually distinguished into speculative and practical, not as into entirely diverse sciences, but as into diverse parts or aspects of the same science. The same also many think about moral philosophy; for without doubt it considers many things speculatively, although absolutely it seems to be ordered to moral work, and therefore is judged more practical. And in the same way we can probably speak of logic, in the opposite mode; for it is simply speculative science, although in part it is also practical; for it directs operations of the intellect, so that they are done artificially in the way they can be done, hence it is also called a liberal art; nevertheless for this direction it contemplates many things, and for the greater part purely speculatively, and it performs that very direction more by speculating on the nature and natural properties of the acts of the intellect themselves, than by practically instructing the intellect how it ought to operate, as Hervaeus well noted, Quodlibet I, question 3. But concerning this matter and the divisions of habits, and even concerning the species of quality, let these things suffice.

DISPUTATION XLV

ON THE CONTRARIETY OF QUALITIES

Connection of this disputation with what precedes. Having explained the species of quality, it now remains to speak about its properties. Of these we proposed above to treat only two, contrariety and intensification, both because only these involve real difficulty—the others we dispatched briefly—and because knowledge of these is necessary for the completion of this work. For opposition and contrariety are commonly counted among the properties of being, and thus Aristotle discusses the former in Metaphysics X. Intensification, moreover, is found in both spiritual and material qualities, and treating it will contribute to a more perfect understanding of forms. In order, therefore, to speak about contrariety, we will first preface some remarks about opposition, of which contrariety is a species. Then we will clarify what contrariety itself is and in what things it obtains.

SECTION I

WHAT OPPOSITION IS AND HOW MANY KINDS THERE ARE

1. Various divisions of opposition. Opposition can be taken in two ways. First, in a general sense, for any diversity or repugnance

between things or extremes. In this way, opposition is the same as diversity and distinction. Second, opposition is taken more strictly and properly for a repugnance between certain definite extremes and for a peculiar relation found between them. In this way, things that are diverse, distinct, or repugnant can be divided into those that are properly opposed and those that are not properly opposed but are usually called disparate. In this latter way various substantial forms are mutually repugnant, as we shall say below. Similarly, two differences dividing a genus are opposed in this latter way; hence Aristotle sometimes calls them contraries on account of the positive repugnance they include. The former and proper sense of opposition is the one with which we are presently concerned; for if "opposition" is taken in the more general sense, it is the same as "diversity," of which we have spoken sufficiently in Disputation VII.

What Opposition in General is, & its Division into Positive & Negative Opposition

2. From these points one may gather that opposition as such adds neither a thing nor a real mode to the things said to be opposed, but can add only either a negation or a relation, whether real or of reason. To explain this, note that two kinds of opposition can be distinguished. One is between positive extremes; the other is between a positive and a negative extreme. A third member—opposition between negative extremes—cannot be given, both because real opposition (of which we are speaking) must have a real foundation in at least one of the extremes, and because one negation as such does not of itself repel another. For although one negation can fall upon another, or upon a privation, and in that respect they repel each other with respect to the same thing—as in "to be blind" and "not to be blind"—still that opposition is by reason of the affirmation included in one of the extremes; and thus one extreme is always positive either virtually or formally. Hence the said opposition is contradictory, and

by its very notion one extreme is positive. Thus, in the example given, when a man is called blind, one thing is affirmed virtually, namely, that he has the capacity for seeing, and another is denied, namely, that he has sight. Therefore, when the same man is said not to be blind, either it is denied that he has the capacity for seeing, or it is virtually affirmed that he has sight. Every opposition, then, is either between two positive extremes or between a positive and a negative.

3. Accordingly, the opposition that is between positive extremes adds nothing over and above those extremes except a negation—namely, that the one is not, or cannot be, the other or exist together with the other. Yet this negation is founded upon the particular nature and condition of such extremes, by reason of which opposition can also add a real relation of one to the other, unless the opposition itself otherwise consists in a relation, as I will say in a moment. That this opposition is nothing else is clear both because nothing else is necessary or even intelligible in such opposites, and because opposite or contrary forms are contrary through themselves and not by something added; therefore the opposition adds nothing to them except the negation or relation by which their nature is manifested. Thus, when we say that opposition adds nothing beyond positive extremes, we must be understood to speak of the forms or extremes taken formally. Finally, this opposition is a certain species of diversity or distinction, as Aristotle testifies in Metaphysics X; but diversity or distinction adds only a negation or relation beyond the distinct things themselves, as is clear from what was said above in Disputations IV and VII.

4. When, however, the opposition is such that one extreme is negative, then, if it is taken as signifying a relation between the opposites, it is more an opposition of reason than of reality, because when one extreme is nothing or a being of reason, the relation cannot be real but only of reason. Hence the negation that such opposition can add to the positive extreme is likewise more a negation of reason than a real one. For white is opposed to not-white because it is

necessarily distinct from and repugnant to it; thus white necessarily implies the negation "not-white." Now the negation of a negation is called a negation of reason rather than of reality, as we touched upon above in Disputation IV, section 1. Accordingly, those oppositions in which one extreme is negative place in reality only the foundation, in the positive extreme, of the opposed negation, which in reality is nothing, but has a kind of quasi-being only to destroy and remove the other positive extreme. From these considerations there is sufficient clarity about what opposition is, and in part about how many kinds it has.

Division of Negative Opposition into Privative & Contradictory

5. Each of those members must in turn be subdivided into two others so that there is constituted the fourfold division handed down by Aristotle both in the Categories and in Metaphysics X. Negative opposition is subdivided into contradictory and privative opposition, which differ as negation and privation differ. To understand this division and its members, note that we speak of contradiction in two senses: dialectically or "complexly," so to speak, and physically, really, or "incomplexly." In the former way, contradiction is the opposition between an affirmative and a negative proposition about the same thing, one of which is universal and the other particular, or both singular, along with the other logical conditions. Such contradiction, insofar as it is formally in the intellect among its judgments, is not the contradictory opposition contained in the said division, but is rather contrariety, for it is opposition between positive and absolute extremes—namely, between acts of assent of the intellect—which, when they tend to contradictory objects, are contrary to one another. If, however, we are not speaking of acts of assent but only of apprehensive propositions, these are called opposed not as things but as signs, because they signify or represent opposed

things; something similar obtains also in vocal and written propositions. The objects of such propositions, insofar as they are signified and conceived complexly, are indeed contradictorily opposed; nevertheless, since in reality they do not have that mode of complexity, but are objectively in the intellect and are denominated from its act, they have that opposition only in a proportional manner. Hence that contradictory opposition belongs more to beings of reason than to real beings.

6. To say this in passing, the same holds proportionally for complex contrariety, which is said to intervene between universal propositions, affirmative and negative; to this is added subcontrariety, which is a most improper kind of opposition, because, according to reality, the same is not being affirmed and denied of the same thing, but only according to a mode of conceiving or signifying. Dialecticians do not usually number privative opposition among propositional oppositions, because they attend to opposition in accordance with the quality of the copula, affirmative or negative. Yet were one to attend only to the predicates, these two propositions—"Peter is blind" and "Peter is sighted"—would be privatively opposed. Since they cannot both be true together, they must have some opposition; and it can be no other than the one just mentioned. However, because the copula is, as it were, the form of the proposition, and in it those propositions do not have formal opposition, therefore as such they are not said to be simply opposed, although they may be said to be opposed in a certain respect, namely on the side of the opposed extreme. The same can occur with extremes opposed contrarily, relatively, or even contradictorily. But let this suffice concerning dialectical oppositions.

7. Contradictory opposition as distinguished from privative opposition. Our present concern, therefore, is with incomplex contradiction, which intervenes between any form or nature and its negation, and which is distinguished from privative opposition in that privative opposition connotes a relation to a subject capable of such a form. Thus formally or respectively they have the same notion of

opposition, namely, that it is impossible for a form and the lack of the form to belong to the same thing, in the same respect, and at the same time. This principle and foundation is so self-evident as to require no proof or defense, although Aristotle discusses it at length in Metaphysics IV. Nor is it necessary at this point to add more about these two kinds of opposition, beyond what we shall say in the next section concerning their comparison with contraries. For the understanding of these oppositions is entirely based on an explanation of the natures of privation and negation and their differences, a matter we shall treat expressly in the final disputation of this work, section 4, because privation and negation are numbered among beings of reason (entia rationis).

Division of Positive Opposition into Relative & Contrary

8. What relative opposition is. What contrariety is. Finally, positive opposition is divided into relative and contrary. Relative opposition is the opposition between the extremes of relations, as between father and son, etc. We shall speak of this below in Disputation XLVII, section 16, at the end; for it presupposes many things that we shall treat there concerning the nature of relation. Contrary opposition is that which exists between positive and absolute extremes that directly repel one another in the same subject. We shall discuss its definition and properties at length in the next section. For now, one difference noted by St. Thomas (De Potentia, q. 7, a. 8, ad 4) between contraries and relatives must be observed: relatively opposed terms are not always unequal in perfection, at least as regards the opposed relations. This is manifest in created relations if they are mutual and of equiparance (aequiparantiae); in non-mutual relations no such comparison can be made, since in one extreme there is no real relation. In created relations of disparity (disquiparantiae), one is always less perfect, as is evident by induction in relations such

as father and son, greater and lesser, and the like; for the foundation of such relations is always in one of the extremes with some imperfection, or at least with lesser perfection. Only in uncreated relations, even if they are of disparity, is equality found, and for the opposite reason. In contraries, however, one is always less perfect than the other, either for the general reason that they differ in species under the same genus, and things that so differ are unequally perfect, or for the special nature of contraries, one of which is always more potent than the other.

9. This difference is even more evident between privatively or contradictorily opposed terms and relatives, for in those, since one extreme is negative, it is always less perfect than its opposite. Indeed, St. Thomas says in the place cited that for this very reason the same condition is found even in contraries, because one includes the negation of the other. This reason is difficult, because it seems common to both contraries that each includes the negation of the other, either fundamentally in itself or causally with respect to the subject—unless we understand that one of the contraries is always such as to be compared to the other by way of negation and defect. For this reason Aristotle sometimes calls one of the contraries a privation —e.g., blackness with respect to whiteness—though only equivocally with respect to "privation" as it constitutes privative opposition.

10. Sufficiency of the fourfold division of opposition. From the division just given, with its double subdivision, one can easily gather the sufficiency of the common fourfold division of oppositions. Between positive and negative opposition no middle can be conceived, any more than between negation and affirmation, as we have explained sufficiently. Again, negative opposition can be conceived only in two ways: either simply, or with a determination or connotation of a subject. Positive opposition, moreover, is either absolute or founded solely on some relation; between these too no middle can be found. Thus the said four kinds of opposition are all that arise.

What Sort of Division This Is

11. A doubt can be raised here whether all these kinds of opposition equally and univocally share the common notion of opposition. Simplicius, Boethius, and others on the Post-Predicamenta think so; others establish an analogy, as Albert the Great does there, and St. Thomas (Opusc. 48, tract. De Interpretatione, c. 8). The matter is of little moment, and therefore I omit the reasons that can readily be devised on either side. Considering formally the notion of opposition, however, there seems no doubt that the ratio of opposition belongs per se and primarily to contradiction or negative opposition. Hence contraries and relatives are opposed only insofar as each includes in some way the negation of the other; and so there appears to be an analogy according to a kind of attribution. Nor does it matter that contraries and relatives have greater reality on the side of the thing, because the formal notion of opposition is considered not so much from the entity as from the negation that opposition as such adds. Aristotle favors this opinion in Metaphysics X, c. 7, saying that contradictory opposition is the greatest of all. Comparing contradiction with privative opposition, however, there is no proper analogy between them, since there is no formal diversity in the notion of opposition, as we have said. Nevertheless, pure negation is said to constitute a greater opposition than privation, as it were extensively, because negation states that opposition absolutely with respect to anything whatsoever, whereas privation states it with respect to a determinate subject. And therefore Aristotle (Metaphysics X, c. 7) says that privation is a kind of contradiction. Comparing contraries and relatives among themselves, the former seem to be opposed simply, the latter in a qualified sense, because contraries are opposed absolutely, relatives only with respect to the same (i.e., by reference). Hence contraries also mutually conflict and, so far as depends on themselves, formally or effectively expel one

another; relatives, though requiring distinction, do not properly conflict, but rather the one requires the existence of the other, as St. Thomas notes in the place cited (De Potentia, q. 7, a. 8, ad 4). They are also said to be convertible with one another, which is proper to them among all opposites, as Aristotle notes in the Post-Predicaments in the chapter On Opposites.

12. An objection is answered. Someone might say: one contrary is more distant from another than a mere negation is; for white is more distant from black than from not-white; therefore there is greater opposition between the contraries. Hence contrariety entails contradiction, but not conversely. I reply that this is true only insofar as the negation of the one contrary is conjoined with the other; thus the comparison is made between two oppositions taken together and one taken alone, and therefore it is no wonder that the former appears greater—or rather multiple. Strictly and formally, however, the assumption is false. For a negation immediately, per se, and formally destroys the whole thing and has no agreement with it; they are as distant as being and non-being, and therefore they adequately divide being and no middle can be found between them. This is not so in the case of contrary forms, for each immediately posits something in the subject, in which it agrees with its contrary; and only then, causally and as it were mediately, does it expel the latter. Therefore, simply speaking, the former repugnance (i.e., the contradictory) is greater. A sign of this is that things contradictorily opposed cannot be conjoined in the same subject even by God's absolute power; contraries, however, can be, as we shall say below.

SECTION II

WHAT THE PROPER DEFINITION OF CONTRARIES IS AND HOW THEY DIFFER FROM OTHER OPPOSITES

Disputation XLV

1. Since the matters concerning the other three kinds of opposition that might have been desired here will find more convenient places below, as I said, here only those matters are to be treated that pertain to contrariety. This placement is also most fitting, because contrariety—numbered among the properties of quality—ought to be understood with every propriety and rigor.

Contraries Defined

2. Aristotle defines contrariety, or contraries themselves, thus in Metaphysics X, c. 6: "Contraries are those which, under the same genus, are most distant and from the same subject mutually expel one another." In this definition the term "which" takes the place of the genus, and under it we may understand "qualities," or something similar, if the definition refers to contraries themselves. It is, however, placed under a confused and transcendental notion, because perhaps outside quality there can be some true contrariety, as we shall discuss later; for a definition, as far as possible, ought to abstract from what is uncertain and doubtful. If the definition is given of contrariety itself as it were in the abstract, then the genus contained under that term will be the opposition or distance of those things which, under the same genus, are most distant, etc.; thus Aristotle appears to explain it in the place cited. The remaining three clauses are set down in place of differences and must be explained briefly one by one.

Are all Contraries Contained Under the Same Genus?

3. First a doubt can be raised as to why Aristotle definitively says that contraries must be contained under the same genus, since in the chapter On Opposites in the Dialectic he asserts with a distinction that they must be either contained under the same genus or be diverse genera. He gives the example of good and evil, which are contraries

and yet are not contained under the same genus, but are as if diverse genera of things; under these, moreover, virtue and vice could be assigned, as well as error and knowledge, which are contraries and are not contained under the same genus. Also, either the clause is understood of the same proximate genus, and then it is manifestly false, as the examples given show; or it is understood of a remote genus, and then, by the same token, contraries could be of diverse genera, since there is no greater reason why they should agree in one remote genus rather than another. Especially since contrariety seems to intervene between things of different categories: for instance, heating is contrary not only to cooling but also to cold, from which it differs by predicamental genus; likewise heat seems contrary to the substantial form of water, which it therefore expels.

4. Resolution. Nevertheless, one must say that this clause is very well assigned, by which contraries seem primarily to differ from privatively or contradictorily opposed terms; for these are primarily diverse because one extreme is negative, which cannot have real agreement with the positive, and therefore they cannot be contained under the same genus. From relatives contraries also differ in some way by this clause, although not in every respect. For if a relation is said to be relatively opposed to its terminus as such, this difference will also hold with respect to that opposition, because it is not necessary that relation and terminus be under the same genus; indeed they are more frequently under different genera, since the terminus is something absolute, as we shall show below. If, however, we consider the opposition between the relations of each extreme, then sometimes they may differ by more than a genus, because one may be a real relation and the other a relation of reason; sometimes, however, they may be contained not only under the same genus, but even under the same species, as in relations of similarity and others called equiparances (aequiparantiae). In this they also differ from contraries, because true contraries can never be of the same species, which is also implied by that clause. Sometimes, however, opposed relations can be

contained under the same genus, as paternity and filiation, and these are not excluded by this clause, but by the one that follows.

5. Aristotle derives the reason for this part from what follows: between contraries there is a certain order per se with respect to transmutation, for by the nature of the thing there is a passage from one to the other and conversely. This vicissitude of change is not found per se between things that differ by genus; for, speaking per se, there is no passage from place as such to quality, but from place to place, and conversely. Therefore contraries must be of the same genus. For the same reason they cannot be of the same species, otherwise they would not conflict in this way. Moreover, contraries must concern the same subject; hence, on the side of the subject, there is the same capacity for receiving contraries—not jointly, but severally; therefore contraries must have at least a generic agreement by reason of which the same subject can be capable of each. Here we may observe that "genus" is sometimes taken logically, sometimes physically for "matter." Although the definition seems properly to be understood of the logical genus, as the clause "under the same" indicates, we may add that contraries ought to be of the same physical genus; for if taken in the concrete, they must consist of the same matter; if in the abstract, they must be received in, or concern themselves with, the same matter. Further, since there is a twofold matter—"out of which" and "about which," that is, subjective and objective—whenever contraries have both (for not all require objective matter, but only those that have a transcendental relation to some object), then they must agree in both so that in this way too they may be said to be of the same physical genus in both matters; otherwise they will not have repugnant formal effects and inclinations unless they somehow concern the same thing. All this can easily be shown by induction both in wholly absolute physical qualities, such as whiteness and blackness, heat and cold, and in the habits or acts of the mind.

6. A difficult passage of Aristotle is explained. What Aristotle says in the chapter On Opposites—that contraries are sometimes of

diverse genera—is variously interpreted. Some think Aristotle was not speaking from his own opinion, but according to the Pythagoreans, who posited two primarily diverse principles, good and evil, and under them two orders of things entirely diverse and contrary, as Aristotle himself reports (Metaphysics I, c. 5). St. Thomas seems to approve this interpretation (Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 9); it was also that of Iamblichus and Simplicius, as Ferrarensis reports there, and Cajetan follows it in his commentary on the Categories. Others interpret good and evil as "contrary genera" not properly, taking "genus" strictly, but because they are general conditions of all contraries; for one contrary always has the notion of evil with respect to the other, either in itself—since one is always related to the other as privation and defect, as was said above—or with respect to the subject, for which one of the contraries is unsuitable. Thus think Theophrastus and Ammonius on the Categories. According to this interpretation, contraries, as to their entities, are contained under the same genus, but under the aspect of good and evil they are in a way as diverse genera or under diverse genera. It seems better, however, to say that Aristotle is speaking about moral good and evil, as St. Thomas also expounds in the place cited and proves more fully in I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 3. The Philosopher himself explains this by the examples of virtue and vice. In morals there is contrariety not formally by reason of malice (since malice consists in privation, as we declared above in Disputation XI), but by reason of the act or habit itself, which is as it were the subject of malice; and thus these contraries are of the same genus not only under the aspect of quality but even under that of habit or act. They are said, however, to be opposed in the aspect of good and evil in a peculiar way, which are as it were diverse genera, because only under that aspect do they have their maximal distance, as we shall declare in the next point.

7. Whether, according to Aristotle, good and evil are contraries. In confirmation it is answered that it is not necessary for contraries to agree in the proximate predicamental genus, as has been

rightly shown. It is necessary, however, above all that they agree in the category, if they are immediately and directly contraries; for an action is not immediately contrary except to an action; nor is it per se and directly opposed to the term of a contrary action, but to its own term. Likewise a disposition is not properly contrary to a substantial form, but to its contrary disposition; and thus it expels the substantial form not formally, but dispositively. Again, contraries are contained not only under the same highest genus of the category, but always under some subalternate genus, as is clear by induction in qualities (and the same is true of the other categories insofar as contrariety can be in them). Contrary qualities are both in the first species or in the third; for habit is contrary to habit, act to act, and passible quality to passible quality. The reason is none other than that otherwise they would not have the suitable proportion to expel one another, nor would there be a per se transmutation between them.

8. What and what kind of genus must be common to contraries. From this principle we must proceed further to judge how great the generic agreement between contraries must be. No single general rule can be assigned for all cases: one vice is contrary to another vice; yet one virtue cannot be contrary to another virtue, though the generic difference is the same or proportional in both cases. There must therefore be as much agreement as suffices for the proportion required between contraries and their effects, so that they can directly conflict with one another. For this reason we said above that a habit is not properly and directly contrary to an act, but a habit to a habit, and an act to an act. For the same reason error is more properly and directly contrary to true opinion than to knowledge, because error too is a kind of opinion; and so in other cases.

How all Contraries are Most Distant from One Another.

9. A second doubt concerns the other clause, which requires that there be the greatest distance between contraries. This does not seem to apply universally to all contraries. For a virtue is most properly contrary to a single vice, and yet it is not at the greatest distance from that vice; rather, one vice is at a greater distance from another vice that is extremely opposed—for example, avarice is more distant from prodigality than from liberality. Likewise, error is properly contrary to true opinion, from which it is not maximally distant; it is rather more distant from knowledge. Finally, in the range of colors, not only is the extreme contrary to the extreme, but also to the intermediates. A confirmation follows: if one contrary were opposed only to the other that is most distant, it would follow that one has only one contrary, since there can be only two extremes of a given distance. But the contrary seems false, as the examples show: one virtue is contrary to two extreme vices.

10. Nevertheless, one must say that those things which are simply and absolutely contraries, insofar as they are contained under the same genus, must be maximally distant under that genus. First, this must be understood of positive distance; for negative distance, as we have said, is greater between contradictories—if indeed it should be called "distance." Second, it is understood of distance under the same genus; for beyond that genus it is clear that one contrary may be more distant from other things than from its contrary. Finally, that the distance be "maximal" can be understood as a positive excess—as seems to be the case between whiteness and blackness under the genus of color—or only negatively, namely, that none is greater. This seems sufficient. It is probable that the four primary qualities—heat and cold, moisture and dryness—agree in the same proximate genus under passible quality, under which heat and cold are sufficiently distant for perfect contrariety, although they are not more distant from each other than dryness and moisture are from each other; it is therefore enough that they be maximally distant in the negative sense. The reason why so great a distance is required is that otherwise

contraries would not wholly expel one another, nor would the transmutation of the one terminate perfectly at the other, which belongs to the notion of perfect contraries, as will be clearer from the replies to the arguments.

11. Whether virtue and vice are maximally distant. Virtue and vice are not contained under the same proximate genus under the aspect of habit, and therefore they need not be simply at the greatest distance; in this way the argument rightly proves that vices which are extremely opposed are more distant from each other than from the virtue. But under the moral opposition or under the aspect of the honest and the base, virtue and vice—or a given virtue and the vice concerning the same matter—are at the greatest distance; and therefore, under that aspect, they are simply and most properly contraries. I say "at the greatest distance," at least negatively, because it can happen that two vices are equally distant from the same virtue, though under different and extreme aspects. For although absolutely the vice which is worse and more deficient from the right reason of the virtue may seem simply more distant from it, nevertheless, in a proportional sense, each can be said to have an extreme distance from that rectitude of the virtue which it destroys. The same must be said of true and false opinion, or error: they are maximally distant under their own genus—that of opinion—if they have a true contrariety on the side of the object. For if they differ only relatively, they are not contraries, since the same opinion can be successively true and false through a change in the object. Thus the fact that error is more distant from knowledge than from true opinion is not contrary to the notion of the other contrariety, because that is a distance in another genus, in which knowledge and opinion do not have a contrariety so proper. As to intermediate colors with respect to the extremes (and the same is true of any intermediate that exists by participation in each extreme), one must say that they are not simply and absolutely contrary to the extremes; rather, such a mean is opposed to one extreme by participation in the other, and conversely. Hence the extremes do not

altogether exclude the mean, but contain it in themselves either formally or virtually, as we shall explain below. When contraries are said to be "extremely distant," it must be understood of those contraries which are through themselves and entirely contrary and expel one another.

Is there only One Contrary to One Contrary?

12. In such contraries it is true that one has only one contrary, as Aristotle explains in Metaphysics X, c. 6, 8, and 9, where he says that this holds in extreme contraries, not in the intermediates. Therefore it does not conflict with this that evil is opposed both to good and to evil, as Aristotle says in the chapter On Opposites; for it is opposed to the one as an extreme, to the other as a mean. Or we may say that one contrary has only one contrary when the latter is adequate to it, that is, opposed to it according to its entire latitude. But when a virtue has two extreme vices contrary to it, neither is opposed adequately, that is, according to the entire latitude of its matter and acts. Liberality, for example, inclines both to giving and to withholding when and as right reason dictates; avarice, by itself, is opposed to it insofar as it inclines to withholding; prodigality, conversely, insofar as it inclines to giving. From these points the part of the definition of contraries that requires that they be, under the same genus, maximally distant, has been sufficiently explained.

Do Contraries Mutually Expel One Another?

13. Reason for doubting. Third, one can doubt how it is true that contraries must mutually expel one another in the same subject. There seem to be many contraries that do not have this power. Cold cannot expel heat from fire; dryness cannot expel moisture from water; nor can blackness expel whiteness from snow. In the intellect, error cannot expel knowledge, although knowledge easily expels error

—especially if we speak of acts, among which there is also a proper contrariety. In habits it can sometimes happen that error expels knowledge by the intervention of forgetfulness, which is, as it were, per accidens. The difficulty is confirmed: when one contrary is said to expel the other, this is either to be understood effectively—which is not so, since not all contraries have the power to act, as is evident of whiteness and blackness, pleasure and sadness, and the like—or it is to be understood formally, and even this is not universal; for formal expulsion obtains only between things that can be together in the same subject and formally conflict, for if the one is not in the subject when the other enters, there is no formal conflict. But this too is not common to all contraries, since at least two contrary vital acts can never conflict in that way.

14. Contraries ought to concern the same subject. Are two bodies contrary with respect to presence in the same place? In this clause three conditions of contraries are contained. First, that they concern a subject; for taken in themselves they cannot have repugnance to each other except with reference to some third thing, and that can only be a subject. Therefore two subsistent entities as such cannot be contraries, insofar as they are such, since as such they do not have reference to a subject in which they can exercise contrariety. You will say: one subsistent can act upon another to destroy it. I answer that it can act only by means of something inhering in it; for if it acts upon the whole subsistent thing as such, it will not act to destroy but rather to produce or conserve it. That, therefore, which inheres in one thing can be contrary—not to the thing in which it inheres, as such, speaking per se (for it is rather united to it and in its own way perfects it), but to another thing in which it can also inhere. You will say: one body is contrary to another with respect to presence and existence in the same place, and this contrariety is not taken with reference to the same subject but with reference to the same imaginary space, which cannot be filled simultaneously by two bodies. I answer that this is not proper contrariety but a kind of repugnance in a more

general sense, which does not arise from a proper opposition, since those quantities and presences are of the same species and nature, but arises from the particular limitation and condition of quantity, which by its nature is impenetrable by another quantity at the same time.

15. From this the second condition is clearly gathered, namely, that the subject of contraries as such must be one and the same—understanding by "subject" the physical genus of contraries—because, in order that they repel one another, they must concern the same thing. You will say that heat existing in fire repels cold existing in water. I reply that it repels it quasi mediately, because it can introduce into the water another heat expelling the cold; if it had no such power, it would not repel it. Immediately, therefore, contrariety is exercised between forms with respect to the same subject.

16. Contraries must concern absolutely the same subject. From this one may incidentally gather the answer to the question raised above concerning expulsion, whether it is effective or formal. It must be said that formal expulsion is per se and intrinsically required; for effective expulsion is not always necessary, as the argument showed; nor is it immediate, as I said; nor is it always effected by the contrary quality but by another prior or more eminent quality, as the same will can effect contrary acts. It is false, however, that formal expulsion requires the simultaneous existence of both forms in the same subject; indeed that is itself contrary to the notion of formal expulsion, which consists in the fact that the formal effect of one form is by the nature of the thing repugnant, in the same subject, to the formal effect of the opposite form. If, however, the forms exist together, then, as to that point, they do not have repugnant formal effects; hence, as to that point, they do not have proper contrariety, as we shall declare in section 4. Hence, if perchance while they thus exist together one form operates something toward the destruction of the other (which rarely or never happens, as we shall see later), then that is not formal but effective expulsion, because it occurs only by producing something else that is formally incompossible with the

preexisting form. Thus, if heat and cold as qualities exist together, heat cannot operate anything toward the destruction of cold except by operating toward an increase of itself, which is formally incompossible with so much cold.

17. Contraries must mutually expel each other from the same subject. The third condition contained in this clause is that this expulsion be mutual. The reason is easy from what has just been said; for this expulsion is not effective but formal, and therefore it is not measured by the power of acting but by the mode of informing. From this it necessarily follows that it is reciprocal; for if the formal effect of one quality is per se and directly repugnant to the formal effect of the opposite quality, it is necessary that conversely the formal effect of the other be repugnant to the first. Against this condition the objection above urged especially proceeds; to which one must briefly reply that this expulsion need be mutual only so far as concerns the force of the proper formal effects of such qualities. Nevertheless, on the side of the agents it can happen that in some subject one contrary cannot be expelled, either because it flows from the proper form in such an intrinsic way that it cannot be impeded by an extrinsic agent, or because it is a disposition so necessary that, if it were removed, the subject would at once be corrupted. And therefore Aristotle, in the chapter On Opposites, after saying that contraries expel one another in turn, added: "unless one of them is present by nature."

Corollaries from the Foregoing Doctrine

18. Difference between contraries and relatives. The reconciliation of two passages of Aristotle. From this explication of the definition of contraries, various differences between contraries and other opposites can easily be gathered—some already touched upon in the course of this and the preceding section, others taken from Aristotle in the chapter On Opposites. Of these three must here be briefly noted and explained. The first is properly between contraries

and relatives. In relatives, one of the opposites entails the existence of the other; not so in contraries. "For if the one exists," says Aristotle, "the other will not necessarily exist." This can also be said of privative or negative opposites; still, because in those the other extreme is nothing, the difference is applied especially to contraries. Yet Aristotle seems to contradict this doctrine when he says in De Caelo II, text 18: "If one of the contraries is in reality, the other must also be." The reply is that the proper sense of the difference is that one of the relatives, by its own and intrinsic nature, entails the existence of the other—since its being consists in reference to the other—whereas one of the contraries does not so entail the other from its particular nature, but rather, so far as depends on itself, destroys it. Nevertheless, what Aristotle intends elsewhere can be true, namely, that with a view to the perfection of the universe it was necessary that, if one of the contraries exist, the other also exist: both because of the variety of things from which the beauty of the universe arises, and because of the vicissitude of corruptions and generations by which the universe is conserved, and finally because the same potency of contraries seeks to be reduced to act, at least in different subjects.

Difference between Contraries & Contradictories

19. The second difference chiefly concerns contraries and contradictories, and can in its own way be extended also to privative opposites. Among contraries some are immediate, others have a mean; contradictories always lack a mean. Concerning this difference note that a threefold mean can be conceived between opposites. First, a "mean from the extremes," which is properly said to be "by participation" in the extremes, because it is constituted from them either virtually or formally (as we shall declare in section 4). Second, a mean "between the extremes," as virtue is between vices. This agrees with the former in that it is some positive form; it differs, however, in that it is not composed of the extremes, although materially it agrees

with each in some respect (as I explained on Metaphysics X, c. 10). Third, a mean "without the extremes," that is, by mere abstention from the extremes. Some contraries are immediate with respect to a positive mean, as love and hatred; others also lack a mean by abstention in respect of the adequate subject in which they can be found, as Aristotle teaches in the chapter On Opposites—though he adduces examples of certain things that are not properly contraries, such as even and odd, healthy and sick. Between contradictories, however, none of these means can have place, as is self-evident and as we shall discuss more at length below in Disputation LIV, section 5. Between privative opposites no positive mean can be given, as is evident, because nothing can be constituted from the affirmation and negation included in privation; nor can a positive form be conceived between a negation and the positive habit to which it is opposed. In this respect privative opposition differs from contrariety taken absolutely. A mean by abstention, however, can in some way be found between privative opposites, in which they differ from contradictories (as we shall explain more fully in the said Disputation LIV). They agree with contraries in this, though with some diversity: contraries can have such a mean even in a capable subject, for the will can lack both virtue and vice; privative opposites can have such a mean only in an extraneous and incapable subject. For if the subject is apt, it is necessary that it either have the form or lack it; and if it lack it, it will be deprived, since the aptitude is already supposed. The a priori reason is that, other things equal, the opposition of privatives (which consists in negation) is more immediate, more formal, and greater than that of contraries (which is positive). From this one may incidentally understand that although two forms be contrary, their privations have no opposition to one another; hence they can exist together in the same capable subject, as has been shown.

Difference Between Contraries & Privatives

20. A third difference is assigned between contraries and privative opposites: namely, that between contraries there is mutual transmutation and vicissitude with respect to the same recipient—so far as depends on their side, as was explained in the definition—whereas between privative opposites it is not so, for from negation there is no return to habit. This difference is also commonly assigned between privation and negation, and therefore it will be explained more fully by us in Disputation LIV.

SECTION III

WHETHER PROPER CONTRARIETY IS FOUND IN ALL AND ONLY QUALITIES

1. In this section it must be explained in what way this opposition is attributed to quality as its property, namely, in full rigor, as what is called a "proper" property—something that belongs to all, to only, and always. About the last condition there is no question at present. If a quality has a contrary, it has it by its very nature; and in this sense it will be said always to have it, whether the contrary actually exists or not—a point already treated in the previous section when we asked how its existence might or might not be necessary. The other two conditions must therefore be briefly clarified here.

Not Every Quality has a Contrary.

2. The habit of first principles does not have a contrary. First, it must be said that not every quality has a contrary. This is clear if we run through the four species of quality. Among habits, some do not have a contrary, such as the habit of first principles; for it is a kind of spiritual light so perfect that it cannot have a positive contrary that would expel it from its subject. I judge the same to be very probable of science (scientia) as well, for it too is a perfect light and belongs to a

certain higher order which an opposing habit is unable to reach in order to resist it. Hence error is more proportionately opposed to opinion—under which it falls within the same genus—than to science, even though, more loosely speaking, error is often said to be contrary to science. Intentional species (species intentionales) likewise have no contraries; the species of white and black can be present together without repugnance. Infused habits, in my opinion, properly have no contraries, because they are in a certain superior order within which there cannot be disordered habits opposed to the studious habits of that order. In a lower order, however, there can be habits, namely acquired ones, that can in some way clash with those superior habits, yet not through direct and proper contrariety; their proper contrariety is with other acquired habits of the same order. Among acts or passions of the appetitive power, St. Thomas (III, q. 23, a. 3) notes an act of anger that has no contrary passion. Immanent acts, as we said above, are placed in the predicament of quality and under the species of disposition.

3. A proper power lacks a contrary. Again, in the second species of quality it is clear that intellect, will, and similar powers have no contraries. Indeed, in this species, if "power" is taken properly—distinct in reality from passible quality—I scarcely think any will be found that has a contrary. I say "if taken properly," that is, as distinguished in reality from a passible quality; for if every passible quality that is active is placed, under that aspect, in the species of power, then many "powers" will have contraries. In the third species, by and large, we find qualities that have contraries; nevertheless, there may be some that lack them, like light, and perhaps others unknown to us. In the fourth species there is no proper contrariety at all; one figure is not contrary to another, though it be diverse. As for beauty and deformity, which are usually counted as contraries, they seem rather to be opposed privatively. If in some respect they include contrariety, it is only insofar as they require some passible quality for their constitution.

4. The reason for this variety among qualities can scarcely be rendered except by saying that this property does not follow "positively," so to speak, from the precise notion of quality as such, but from the determinate natures of diverse qualities, which, in accordance with their different natures and ends, participate in this property—a property not repugnant to the genus of quality as such. Other qualities, according to their proper differences and functions, do not have a nature apt for such opposition. This can arise from different grounds in different qualities: in figure, from the fact that it is merely a kind of terminus of quantity; in intellect and will, because they are faculties intrinsically consequent upon a spiritual substance; in light, because it is a most noble quality common to incorruptible bodies; and so on.

In What Way Contrariety is, or is Not, Proper to Qualities

5. Second, one must say that not only qualities have contraries, although in a certain respect this can be attributed to them in a singular way. Each part is briefly clarified. First, according to the common view of philosophers, contrariety is attributed to motions and actions, which are not qualities. That would suffice to prove the first point. It should be noted, however, that among changes or motions two kinds of opposition are found. One is between generation and corruption and all others that comport themselves in the mode of corruption and generation, such as intensification and remission. This opposition is not properly contrariety but privative opposition, because one of these changes—corruption—is not positive but privative. The other opposition is between positive actions or changes, as between heating and cooling; between these there can be proper contrariety, which springs, at root, from the contrariety of the termini, as is clear from Physics V. Thus, as the

contrariety is between the termini, such will it be between the changes themselves.

6. The termini of changes can be called contrary in two ways. First, merely because they are the two extremes of a latitude (range) that can be traversed successively by tending from one to the other or returning back. This contrariety is not always proper, but is so called by a kind of imitation. The two extreme points of a line are not really contraries, since they are of the same nature; yet if they are considered insofar as one can go from one to the other and conversely, then they are said to have contrariety under the ratio of termini, because they are positive termini and have a kind of repugnance with respect to such motions. In another way, the termini of changes can be contrary with the most proper contrariety defined above, as heat and cold are contrary termini with respect to opposite alterations. The first, more broadly taken, is common to other things or changes, as is evident; the second is found only among qualities, or among changes to qualities that are properly contrary, by reason of the qualities themselves.

7. The root of all contrariety is in qualities. In this sense it belongs in a special way to quality alone to have a contrary, namely, properly and perfectly, and as the root and foundation, by reason of which such contrariety is participated in actions and changes. Hence even in the changes of increase and decrease (if one consider the matter carefully) the opposition is more by reason of privation than of proper contrariety. Among local motions, the contrariety lies rather in a certain different relation with respect to the same termini than in the substance or entity of the motions themselves, which otherwise can be of the same kind, as between a motion from Athens to Thebes and a motion from Thebes to Athens.

Outside the Predicaments of Quality, Action, & Passion, Proper Contrariety is not Found

8. Why there is no contrariety in substantial forms. Substantial differences are not physically contrary. Setting aside motions and changes, or actions, there is no proper contrariety in things of the other predicaments outside quality. Aristotle expressly teaches this of substance in the chapter On Substance; and the point is well known of prime matter and of subsisting forms or substances as such, for they do not have reference to a subject in which they could have a contrary. It is harder to render the reason why there is no proper contrariety among substantial forms; for between the form of fire and of water, for example, they seem to be maximally distant under the genus of elemental form and to expel one another from the same subject. Some reply that those forms are not contraries because they do not expel one another from the same subject in such a way that the subject passes successively from one to the other through some mean participating in the extremes. But this is certainly not necessary for contrariety; love and hate are contraries between which there is no successive passage nor any positive mean constituted from the extremes. It seems better to say that among substantial forms there is no proper contrariety, because with respect to matter they do not have repugnance from some special condition but from the general notion of a substantial form that absolutely constitutes a thing's essence or species. For this reason too they are not opposed as proper extremes of one genus, which, by their proper natures, have among themselves that proper and peculiar repugnance in the sense intended by the definition of contraries. From this it follows, a fortiori, that there is no proper—especially no physical—contrariety among substantial differences, although in metaphysics they are commonly called "contrary." As for the other accidental predicaments, there is no difficulty, as is clear from what was said above concerning quantity; the rest will be evident from what follows.

SECTION IV
WHETHER CONTRARIES CAN IN ANY WAY BE TOGETHER IN THE SAME SUBJECT

1. Two questions are chiefly contained under this title. First, whether contraries can naturally be together at the same time, at least in diminished or remiss degrees; for if they are perfect, the question does not arise, as is clear from the very definition, which at least must be understood of the nature of the thing. From this there arises a second question: whether, at least by absolute power and supernaturally, contraries can be together, even in a perfect state of being.

Whether by the Nature of the Thing it is Repugnant for Contraries to be Together, Even in Remiss Degrees

2. The opinion of some. Concerning the first, some think that contrary qualities cannot be together in any degree, even a remiss one, as formally present in the same subject, but only virtually, as the extreme colors are in the intermediates. Thus Gregory (In I, dist. 15, q. 3) holds, followed by Soncinas (on Metaphysics X, q. ult.). Their foundation is that qualities are not contrary by virtue of intensity but by virtue of their specific essence, Aristotle saying in Metaphysics X (texts 13–14) that contrariety is an opposition according to form, and the form or essence is entire in any degree, however remiss; therefore contrariety remains and excludes coexistence. Second, the intermediate qualities between extremes are true qualities constituted in some species of quality; therefore they cannot consist formally of the extremes taken as such, since it is impossible to compose a third species out of species that are diverse and complete in their own genus. The antecedent is clear by induction in the intermediate colors;

it cannot be denied that they are properly and per se qualities. The same seems true of temperament relative to the form of the mixed body; for as that form is per se one, so too is the disposition to it. Therefore in that quality the extremes are not formally present but only virtually; and by parity the same must be said whenever a middle quality seems to be given between extremes. Third, Soncinas adduces certain testimonies of the Commentator and of St. Thomas, which we shall cite below.

Contraries in Remiss Degrees are Not Repugnant: Proof

3. Nevertheless, one must say that it can naturally happen that two qualities which cannot be together in a perfect and intense state can exist together in remiss degrees in the same subject. This is the common opinion of metaphysicians on Metaphysics X (see Iavellus, q. 13; Capreolus, In I, dist. 17, q. 2, ad arg. contra 2 concl.; Marsilius, II De Generatione, q. 6, and others to be cited below). It seems to be Aristotle's manifest view as well in Physics V, c. 2 and 4, where he says that something is "more or less such" as it has more or less of the admixture of its contrary; and in the last chapter (text 62) he admits that contraries are in some way together in the same thing. In Parts of Animals II, c. 1, he says that the first composition is from the four primary qualities. The same is gathered from De Anima II (texts 123–124) and from other places which we cited above in Disputation XV, section 10, nos. 41 and following.

4. Above all, this opinion is proved by experience, which seems so evident that to deny it without compelling reason would not be philosophical. When water is heated by fire, it is evident that it receives some formal heat, and yet it does not at once lose all coldness; therefore those two contraries remain together in remiss degrees. Otherwise it would follow, for example, that coldness is never intensified or remitted, but that as soon as the action of fire begins

upon the water, the whole quality of coldness ceases entirely and another new simple quality is introduced which virtually contains both heat and cold. The consequent is false. Therefore the antecedent is false. The sequence is proved thus: when the fire first acts upon the water it introduces into it some positive quality; therefore either that is formal heat in a remiss degree, and it remits coldness as well—which is precisely what we intend—or it is some quality that wholly expels formal coldness; in that case coldness could never be remitted. The minor is proved: if these primary qualities are not intensible and remissible, then none are—which is false, as we shall show in the next disputation.

5. The argument is further confirmed. If by the first action of fire upon water the whole coldness is expelled and a middle quality introduced, then as long as the action proceeds in such a way that this quality virtually contains more heat than cold, it is necessary that the whole of that quality perish and another be introduced. The consequent is false; therefore the antecedent is false. The sequence is clear, first by parity of reason: if coldness is not intensible and the whole of it perishes immediately by the action of fire, why not also that middle quality? Second, because it cannot be that one and the same simple quality is intensified by a simple action insofar as it virtually contains one extreme, and is remitted insofar as it virtually contains the other. If such a quality has degrees of intensity, all are proportionate to one another and of the same essential nature; therefore in all and each there is a proportional participation, that is, a virtual containment of the extremes. For example, if the color red virtually contains whiteness more than blackness, in each degree of that color the same mode of containment is found; hence whenever that color is intensified, that virtual participation of whiteness over blackness is likewise intensified; and so in other cases. Therefore, when by the action of heat a tepid state comes to have a greater participation of heat than of cold—whereas previously the converse held—this cannot occur by the mere intensification of the same

simple quality; otherwise that quality would at once be intensified and remitted, and those degrees would not be of the same essential nature nor proportionate to one another. It is therefore necessary that there always be a change of the entire middle, "mixed," quality into another composed from a different mixture. But the consequent is false, because then either that change would not be continuous—which is against truth and experience, as we shall say in the next disputation—or, in the succession of such change, infinitely many middle qualities would have to be changed, since at every instant the middle quality is differently disposed—and not by intensification or remission—therefore by the change of one quality into another. This last consequence is likewise impossible, as we shall show more fully in a similar case in the next disputation, section 1.

6. An a priori reason for the conclusion. The a priori reason is to be taken by destroying the foundation of the opposing opinion. It is not necessary that all contraries mutually expel each other by the force of their essential natures taken precisely; neither did Aristotle say this in Metaphysics X (the place cited), nor does experience or any probable reason show this to be the nature of contraries. Aristotle says only that contraries must be maximally distant under the same genus and expel one another from the same subject. From this it rightly follows that there is formal contrariety between certain essentially different forms; but it does not follow that they have formal repugnance by reason of their precise essential entities in whatever remiss degree they may exist. They can therefore be repugnant with respect to the excess of latitude or intensity—namely, in the higher degrees in which they exceed the latitude—although in lower degrees they are not repugnant. This can be made clear in physical qualities: contrary qualities regard the same subject according to the same capacity. Some (e.g., Iavellus, on Metaphysics X, q. 13) say that the subject is not receptive of contraries except according to a different capacity and disposition. This is not true, speaking per se and generally, of the subject's mere passive power to receive contraries as

such, as is clear of the will, a surface, and so on. This can also be seen from what was said above in Disputation XIV concerning the material cause of accidents. The subject's capacity therefore extends to a certain latitude of degrees, which can be filled either by a single quality if it is perfectly intense, or by the admixture of several in remiss degrees. Thus forms can have contrariety and repugnance in intense degrees—where they exceed the latitude—although in remiss degrees they can be together.

7. Hence it follows that contraries can sometimes be together in equal remiss degrees, sufficient to fill the latitude; sometimes in unequal degrees; and at times the one contrary may exceed, at times the other, provided there is a proportion that fills but does not exceed the latitude. From this an objection often made is easily resolved. If, for example, whiteness at degree four and blackness at degree four can be together in the same subject, then the colors red and green could be together in more degrees, or even in their highest degrees, since means are less opposed to each other than extremes. The consequence is denied. A subject is capable only of such a latitude of color as can be filled from whatever degrees. Although middle colors are less distant in nature, nonetheless, as regards coexistence in the subject, they are not less repugnant in their intense degrees.

Objections Against the Solution Given.

8. You will say: if contraries are together in this way, then they denominate the subject at the same time; therefore it will be at once hot and cold; but from contrary denominations contradictory propositions are inferred. And the point is confirmed: if such qualities can be together, then the motions that tend toward them can also be together up to those degrees, since there is no greater contrariety between motions than between their termini.

How Contrary Forms Denominate Simultaneously.

9. On the principal argument, Capreolus, Iavellus, and others labor to defend absolutely that neither contrary quality denominates the subject, because they think that contradictory propositions are necessarily inferred from contrary denominations. In this a twofold sense of "denomination" must be avoided to prevent a quarrel over words. It can be understood of verbal denomination (so to speak), which consists in the usage of our speech and in the imposition of names. In this sense it is true that we do not call something "simply such" except from the predominant form; and since both contrary forms cannot predominate, the denomination is always single. When the forms are equal, we do not take the denomination from the one or the other, but from the conjunction of both—so that, although the verbal denomination is simple, in reality it is quasi-collective. Thus, when we say that water is tepid, this is tantamount to saying that it is affected by cold and heat with a certain equality. We measure this equality or excess not from the thing itself but from our sense or from the power of acting. Hence we sometimes call water simply "hot," although perhaps in reality it has more of cold than of heat, because the heat acts more and is felt. Denomination can also be understood as real, that is, as that which exists in the thing itself by the adhesion of the form to the subject and could be signified by a proper concept and name. In this sense it is true that two contrary forms, to the extent that they are together, give two denominations, because they have two formal effects that could be signified by proper names; although in fact there are no incomplex names imposed to signify them, we can nevertheless express it complexly by saying that the same thing is hot at six and cold at two, or something similar. These denominations, however, do not infer contradictories, because they are not really contrary; although they are said to be taken from contrary forms, as it were materially, they are not taken formally as the forms are contrary and repugnant.

When Motions Toward Contrary Qualities can be Together.

10. To the confirmation, Iavellus replies that contrary acquisitive motions cannot be together; but if one is an acquisition and the other a loss, they can be together. This reply is not satisfactory. If acquisition and loss are of the same quality and according to the same respect or the same part of the subject, they cannot be together, because they are privatively opposed, as intensification and remission of heat. If, however, they are the acquisition and loss of contrary qualities—such as the intensification of cold and the remission of heat, of which he speaks—then those are not contrary motions but rather quasi-partial changes composing one entire transmutation by withdrawal from one terminus and approach to the other. The argument does not concern these, but concerns acquisitive motions toward contrary termini. Of these, too, if we speak proportionately, it cannot be absolutely denied that, in the way that the termini can be together, the acquisitive motions toward them can also be together, up to the remiss degrees.

11. A subject of such changes can be disposed in two ways. First, it can be fully affected with the whole latitude of degrees of the contrary qualities—for example, having six degrees of heat and two of cold, or some similar proportion. Then it is impossible for the acquisitive motions of those qualities to be together; for at once the subject would exceed the latitude and would begin to have the qualities beyond remiss degrees. Second, the subject can be understood as not having that full latitude: as when it wholly lacks both cold and heat, or has some heat and no cold, or conversely. Then nothing repugnant follows if such a subject is moved at the same time toward each of those forms up to the attainment of the full latitude of degrees arising from the remiss degrees of each form. The argument

cited compels this conclusion, since there is no greater contrariety between the changes than is taken from the termini.

12. Nor is it true, as Iavellus objects, that the opposition between these changes toward contrary termini in remiss being is as great as that between motion and rest with respect to the same terminus; for motion and rest are privatively opposed, whereas those changes are not in strictness opposed, because contrary termini, as such in remiss being, are not truly and formally contrary. Hence, when Aristotle denies in Physics V that contrary motions can be together, he speaks properly and formally of contraries insofar as they have a true opposition—just as he generally denies that contraries can be together, which must be understood of the state in which they are truly contraries.

13. From this we gather that when the termini of changes are such as cannot be together in any degree, then contrary changes toward them likewise cannot in any degree be together in the same subject. We can take an example from local motion. Because the same body cannot be at once in two places, neither as a whole nor according to the same part, therefore it cannot be moved at once by contrary motions according to the whole or according to the same part. A rational soul, however, which informs diverse parts, can at once be moved with them by motions in some way contrary, because it can at once be whole in diverse partial places. For a similar reason I judge that the vital and immanent acts of the soul that are contrary cannot be together even in remiss degrees, because vital acts in this respect have a greater repugnance than other physical qualities or even than habits themselves, on account of their intrinsic and actual mode of affecting, and because one act actually destroys the object of the other. It does not matter that a man can sometimes be sad and take delight, for—as Alexander noted (Natural Questions I, 12), followed by Zimara (Tabula, s.v. Contraria) and by St. Thomas (III, q. 84, a. 9, ad 2)—these vital acts are not contrary unless they concern the same object. No one is at once sad and glad about the same object, formally

speaking, but about different ones—a point I noted and explained at greater length in Part III, vol. I, Disputation XXXVIII, section 3.

The Foundations of the Opposing View are Satisfied.

14. Are middle qualities composite or simple? The principal foundation of the opposing opinion has already been dissolved. To the second argument, concerning middle qualities between extreme contraries, the reply is that sometimes a middle quality is truly and per se one, in which the contraries are not formally present in remiss being but only virtually. It is probable that such are the middle colors—red, green, and so on—for they are truly proper species of color. Perhaps the Commentator speaks of these in Metaphysics IV (text 27), where he says that contraries that have a mean are in the mean in potency, not in act—that is, virtually and not formally; he at once adduces the example of whiteness and blackness as they are in a middle color. He declares this expressly in Metaphysics X (text 7), saying: "One must not say that colors are composed of two, namely, of white and black"—that is, formally. In the same way St. Thomas can be understood (In III, dist. 14, a. 2, q. 3, ad 1) when he says: "In the less-white there is no blackness, but a less intense whiteness," although there he seems rather to speak formally of the "less-white" as such, which of itself requires neither a middle color nor blackness, but a remitted whiteness. Thus we do not deny that sometimes the mean between contraries can be truly one and contain the extremes only virtually and not formally, even in remiss being—not because it is repugnant that all contraries should thus be together, but because in some middle qualities there is a perfect mixture by the transmutation of the extremes into one mean that virtually contains them. Such mixture cannot always be made in all contraries, but only imperfectly by the formal conjunction of each contrary in remiss being, as has been shown of tepidness composed from cold and heat. The same is

manifest in the habits of the soul: one simple habit does not coalesce from the opposing vice and virtue in remiss being. Whether temperament—the other example touched upon—should be placed among the simple means that contain the extremes only virtually matters little for our purpose; whatever it be, it does not follow that contrary qualities can never be together in remiss being. For my part, it is more probable that temperament is not one simple quality but an imperfect mixture or collection of the primary qualities in remiss being with a certain proportion, as is the more common opinion of philosophers (De Generatione I, c. 10; Meteorology IV, c. 1). In these places Aristotle favors this view; and St. Thomas clearly does so as well (I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; Quodlibet I, a. 6, ad 3). From these testimonies our position above is also confirmed.

By God's Absolute Power, which Contraries Are able to be Together?

15. Finally, it remains to say whether by God's absolute power contraries can be together in an intense state. Iavellus and others seem implicitly to deny this when they say that a contradiction would necessarily be inferred from such contraries. In truth no contradiction is inferred, even if such a miracle were admitted by absolute power. As I said above, the one contrary does not have an immediate and formal negative opposition with the other; rather, it entails such opposition mediately, insofar as the formal effect of the one is naturally incompossible with the formal effect of the other. God can impede that incompossibility and conjoin both positive effects in the same subject, so that in reality the same thing is hot at eight and cold at eight. Then, with respect to divine power, the affirmation of the one does not entail the negation of the other.

16. The question would then only concern verbal denomination: whether the subject should be called hot, or cold, or neither. One could impose a name that included the collection of

both. Speaking generally, I find no contradiction here from the precise notion of contrariety. Although such contrary qualities by their nature are apt to expel each other, it is not against their essence that God should prevent that aptitude from being reduced to act. Just as it is naturally repugnant for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time, and yet God overcomes that repugnance and places them there together, so He can do the same with contrary qualities, even with respect to repugnant degrees. Paludanus (In III, dist. 15, q. 2) holds thus, and says the same even of contrary vital acts. I, however, always except the latter, because of the contradiction they include on the part of their objects—one act destroying the formal object of the other—which I have explained at greater length in the place cited (Part III, vol. I, Disputation XXXVIII, section 3). Nothing need be added here, nor is it necessary to repeat what was said there.

DISPUTATION XLVI

ON THE INTENSIFICATION OF QUALITIES

This is the second property of quality that I proposed to explain here, because by its nature it abstracts from matter and can be found in spiritual realities. Concerning the word intensification (intensio), it should be noted that it can be taken in two ways. First, and most commonly, it names that change by which the same quality becomes more and more perfect in the same subject according to the same part or the same entity of the subject. I say "the same quality" to exclude increase by the addition of a new quality wholly distinct in kind, for this has been discussed sufficiently in the disputation on habits. I also add "according to the same part," to distinguish intensification from extension, which occurs by adding parts of the quality in diverse parts of the subject and is of the same kind as augmentation in quantity; hence extension is not proper to qualities but is common to other material or quantitative forms. In a second sense, intensification can be taken for the latitude or mode of entity of a form that is intensible and remissible, by reason of which it is capable of the change that is also called intensification. Here I am chiefly concerned with intensification in this latter sense; for the whole difficulty of this matter lies in explaining this latitude or mode of such a form, by reason of which it can confer upon its subject a greater or lesser formal effect. This point must therefore be our focus; once it is

explained, the remaining issues touching the mode of the production or change itself will be easily resolved, and finally I shall explain in what way this condition is proper to quality.

SECTION I

WHETHER A QUALITY THAT IS INTENSIBLE AND REMISSIBLE IS IN ITSELF INDIVISIBLE OR COMPOSED OF DEGREES OF ENTITY

1. I presuppose what experience makes known, namely, that there are some qualities capable of the increase we call intensification. All philosophers agree with Aristotle on this, and it is evident: the same water or hand gradually becomes hotter, not by the extension of heat to different parts of the subject, but with respect to the same part, or even with respect to the whole—as our senses, especially touch and sight, plainly teach. In spiritual qualities and subjects, in which there is no extension of parts, this is even clearer, because there too the quality receives increase, as in love or delight with respect to the same object. From the principles of faith this truth is also certain, since grace, charity, and faith can be increased and perfected in the same indivisible subject, even without any extension on the part of the object; the increase in question is therefore intensive. The general reason why this mode of entity or of informing the subject belongs to qualities is simply that such is the nature of these forms. Particular reasons can be assigned in diverse qualities, as will be seen below and in section four.

2. Those who seem to hold the contrary. Against this view one can adduce the opinion of those who say that, when a form seems to be intensified, it is not the same form that is perfected, but one imperfect form is changed into another more perfect. This was the view of Godfrey (Quodlibet XI, q. 3), followed by Durandus (In I,

dist. 17, q. 7, n. 25); Avicenna, Gilbert of Poitiers, Albert of Nifo (on Metaphysics VIII, disp. XI, c. 3), and Burley (treatise on the Intension of Forms) are also cited in the same vein. From this opinion it plainly follows that one and the same form is not intensible and remissible; rather, among qualities of the same species, one is exchanged for another individually more perfect, and thus one speaks of a form's being intensified or of one form's being more intense than another. How false this opinion is will be seen shortly.

First Position: Although Qualities Receive Intensification, They are Indivisible

3. Granted, then, that there is intensification, the difficulty is this: in what does the intensive latitude of a quality consist, and how can one and the same form or quality confer upon the same subject a greater or lesser formal effect? On this point I find two opinions that differ to the extreme. The first holds that a quality capable of intensification and remission is in itself indivisible in its entity, without any intensive composition of partial qualities in relation to the same indivisible subject; its intensification and remission consist only in this, that the same indivisible form affects the same subject more or less perfectly. This opinion is common among the disciples of St. Thomas, who think it drawn from his doctrine (I–II, q. 52, a. 1–2; II–II, q. 24, a. 5). Cajetan teaches the same in those places and in I–II, q. 54, a. 4; so do Capreolus (In I, dist. 27, q. 2), Hervaeus (ibid., q. 5; Quodlibet VI, q. 11), Soncinas (on Metaphysics VIII, q. 21), and Iavellus (q. 6). Henry of Ghent (Quodl. V, q. 5; Quodl. IX, q. 13) holds likewise. This view is also attributed to Aristotle (Physics VIII, text 84), who says that from hot there comes to be hotter, with no new hot thing being produced in the matter.

4. The foundation of this view seems to be that, in one and the same accidental form informing the same subject as such, diverse entities or parts of the same entity, really distinct and conjoined,

cannot be distinguished; therefore such a quality must be simple. The antecedent is proved thus. Either those entities are of the same species, or of different species. If of different species, they could not properly compose one quality, save perhaps accidentally by a certain collection or subordination; and then they could not make a more intense quality, since an intense quality, precisely as such, is one and of one and the same kind. If the entities are of the same species, they cannot at once exist and be distinguished in the same subject. Furthermore, from such a composition it would follow that the intensification of a quality is entirely of the same nature as extension, differing only in that, in extension, the parts of a quality are in different parts of the subject, whereas in intensification they are in the same part of the subject or in the same indivisible subject. Many absurdities follow: for example, just as extensive multiplication of a quality is as it were accidental to the perfection of the quality, so too would intensive multiplication be accidental. Again, just as that extensive increase can go on to infinity, so far as depends on itself, if there are parts in the subject, so too could the intensive process proceed to infinity, so far as depends on itself, by the piling up of more and more similar parts of the same quality in the same part of the subject; for if the aggregation of some number of parts of the quality in the same part of the subject is not repugnant, neither will a greater and greater number be repugnant ad infinitum. Other similar absurdities could be easily inferred, and we shall touch on them below.

A First Way of Explaining this Position, & its Rejection

5. Because it is hard to explain how the same indivisible quality can have diverse modes of informing a subject more or less perfectly, the authors of this view labor not a little in explaining it, and they are divided among themselves. Some say that the same indivisible quality, with respect to the entity of its essence, can have different

"existences," one more perfect than another; and in this lies the difference between an intense and a remiss form—namely, that the former has a more perfect existence, not a more perfect essential entity. Thus Aegidius (Quodl. II, q. 14) says that a quality is not intensible according to essence, but only according to being (esse) in the subject. Astudillo (I De Generatione, q. 8) says the same, and cites Capreolus (In I, dist. 17, q. 1, a. 2), who does not speak clearly and sometimes suggests the opposite, especially in his fourth conclusion. In responding to Gregory's arguments against the fifth and sixth conclusions, Capreolus hints at this opinion, though he seems at times to speak of existence, at times of inherence, which are distinct.

6. Understood of existence, this opinion seems to me incredible and untenable. First, it is truer that in reality existence and actual essence are not distinct; therefore it is impossible for one to vary and not the other. Second, even if they were distinct in reality, they are naturally inseparable, because existence is the intrinsic act of an actual essence. Third, an agent can induce as much existence as it induces essence in a form; therefore, if it simultaneously induces the whole entity of the essence, it simultaneously induces the whole entity of existence. You will say there can be an impediment from the resistance of the subject. But against this: if there is in the subject a repugnance that prevents the whole existence from being produced, it will also prevent the whole essence from being produced. The consequence is clear both because an essence is not produced by the agent except insofar as existence is given to it—indeed, strictly speaking, only an existing thing is produced—and because existence intrinsically accompanies essence, and conversely essence is actualized by existence; therefore the subject equally impedes or does not impede the action of the agent with respect to both. Fourth, either existence itself is indivisible in entity, or it has parts of which it is composed and which come to be little by little. If the latter, the same difficulty arises for existence as was proposed for essence; nor is there any reason why that mode of composition should be admitted more in

existence than in essence. If the former, an indivisible existence will no more be able to be more or less perfect than an indivisible essence.

7. Perhaps someone will reply—Capreolus suggests as much—that when a form is intensified, it loses one existence and acquires a more perfect one, the imperfect ceasing and the perfect arriving. But this is as incredible as what we reported above from Godfrey, namely, that in every intensification the whole preceding form is lost and a new one acquired. The reasons commonly urged against that opinion tell equally against this. First: an intensive action is not destructive of the form that is intensified; nothing is corrupted by its like. By the same reason such an action is not destructive of the existence of a like form, both for the same cause and because, so far as sense-experience can judge, it is almost evident that the sun destroys nothing of the air's light when it perfects it; nor is there any reason compelling us to assert such destruction either in the essence or in the existence of a form, contrary to all sense.

8. Second: if in intensification such a change occurred, a similar change would occur in remission. Therefore when water, for example, returns to its former coldness and remits heat, it expels the whole of the more perfect heat and acquires another, less perfect. From what agent, then, is that less perfect heat introduced at the very instant in which the more perfect is expelled? I suppose the contrary agent to be entirely absent and consequently unable to produce it, nor can it flow from the very form of water, as is obvious; therefore remission cannot occur in that way; rather the total cessation of the contrary quality would occur instantaneously. The same argument applies equally to existence: if once the whole existence of heat is expelled from the water, there is no agent by which another, albeit less perfect, existence of heat can be introduced. You will say that it flows intrinsically from the essence of heat, which always remains the same. But against this: it is repugnant that existence should actively flow from essence, as we have treated at length above. Also, if the whole existence is removed, then inherence is removed as well, for it

presupposes existence in the order of nature. How, then, can a form not be corrupted which naturally depends on the subject through such inherence and existence?

9. Third: if the whole form were changed in intensification, it would be impossible for the alteration to be continuous—a point we shall prove below to be false. The sequence is plain. Suppose there is in a subject heat "at one," and that it is intensified up to the fourth degree. If, when the heat becomes "at two," the former heat "at one" is entirely lost and another heat "at two" wholly introduced, and again, that in order for the heat "at two" to become "at three," it must itself be expelled and another, more perfect, introduced—then I ask: how long does the heat "at two" endure in the subject? If for some time, then during all that time the alteration has ceased and has not proceeded further; thus the intensification is not continuous. If it endures only for an instant, the same argument advances to the third degree. It is impossible for the heat "at three" to endure only for an instant, because two successive instants are not given; therefore it must endure for some time between the two instants of inception and cessation, during which time the intensification does not proceed; for if it did proceed, it would, on the given hypothesis, destroy the heat "at three." Therefore it is impossible for intensification to be continuous if in it there is a change of the whole form.

10. The point is confirmed and clarified. If heat "at one" is an indivisible quality, and likewise heat "at two" is also an indivisible quality distinct from the former and more perfect than it, expelling it from the subject—and the same for the other degrees—then I ask again whether there is another mean quality between heat "at one" and heat "at two," one more perfect than the former and less perfect than the latter; and the same must be asked for each pair of successive degrees. If no other mean is given, but passage is made immediately from the first quality, which is called "at one," to the second "at two," and from this to a third, and so on, then it is evident that the alteration is not continuous, but proceeds, as it were, by as many indivisible

leaps or instantaneous changes as there are said to be degrees of the quality. Since all those qualities are indivisible, they are produced, of their very nature, indivisibly in the same subject, and therefore cannot be produced except by intrinsically indivisible changes; out of these a continuous succession cannot be composed. If, however, a mean quality is given between the first and second degrees, I ask again whether another mean is given between heat "at one" and that mean; if not, the previous argument returns: by adding one mean or another, the number of instantaneous changes is increased, but continuous succession is not thereby achieved. If, on the other hand, beyond that mean another is given, and so on to infinity, it follows that, in the course of a continuous intensification, infinitely many total, indivisible, and really distinct qualities are acquired and lost—a manifestly unintelligible result. Continuity cannot be understood in change if it does not exist in its termini; but those termini, being indivisible, cannot be continuous; consequently it is impossible to traverse in finite time such an infinite, discrete multitude, as the argument from duration shows. This whole line of reasoning applies equally to the supposed succession of indivisible "existences," as is easily seen by applying the same arguments, for they do not rest on any special condition of the form as regards the entity of its essence, but proceed absolutely of any succession of indivisible entities.

11. Fourth and finally, there is a special argument against the foregoing explanation. In intensification not only is the form perfected as to being (esse) but also as to the very entity of its essence—even according to those who distinguish these in reality—as is clear from Capreolus (loc. cit., concl. 4), who adduces St. Thomas (II–II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 3) saying that those do not understand the proper force of the words who say that, when a quality is intensified, it is not increased according to its essence but only according to its rooting in being. Since it is an accident, its being is to be in a subject. Hence nothing else is its increase according to essence than that it is more in the subject; that is, that it is more rooted in the subject. St. Thomas says

similar things (q. 1 De Virtutibus, a. 11; In I Sent., dist. 17, q. 2, a. 1). From these places the same point can be confirmed: by intensification the form grows in power to act; therefore it grows in the very entity of the form, even as entity of actual essence, because that is truly the formal principle of acting, whether or not it have a distinct esse. Therefore the power to act does not grow from an increase of existence alone (if existence is distinct), but the essence itself must be increased.

12. Reply to an objection. You will say (with Aegidius): essence consists in an indivisible; species are like numbers (Metaphysics VIII); therefore essence itself cannot be increased. I reply that there is an equivocation in these terms, as Nifo notes (Metaphysics VIII, disp. XI, c. 4). Essence can be said to increase in two ways. In one way, with respect to essential parts as essential—explicable by genus and difference. In this way it is true that essence cannot be increased but consists in an indivisible; and in this way heat "at one" is as truly heat and as essentially perfect as heat "at eight." In another way, essence can be said to increase with respect to the entity of the essence itself and, as it were, its integrity. Thus, for example, when a two-foot line becomes three feet, the essence of line is not increased metaphysically or essentially; yet the very entity of the essence of line is increased and becomes greater, as it were integrally; and the same, proportionally, in water or fire. In this latter way we say that intensification perfects the essence of the form itself—not that it becomes essentially more perfect, but that, entitatively, modally, integrally (or by whatever other name one chooses), the very entity of the essence of the form is perfected. It is this perfection we are inquiring into: in what does it consist, if the form itself and the entity of its essence are indivisible—since it has been shown that it cannot consist in a variation of either forms or existences?

A Second Way of Explaining the Same Position, & Its Rejection

13. There is, then, a second way to explain the first opinion: namely, that the same indivisible form is made more and more perfect through intensification because it is more and more educated from the potency of the subject; by this eduction it is more and more rooted in the subject. Capreolus speaks in this way (loc. cit., concl. 5); Cajetan too (I–II, q. 52, a. 2, at the end). But since to be educated from the potency of the subject is nothing other than that what was only in potency comes to be in act, depending on the subject both in coming to be and in being, it remains for these authors to explain how that form is more and more educated if its entity is indivisible. When such a form first began actually to be in a subject, it was educated from potency to act; therefore, if it is indivisible, when it was first educated, it was wholly educated in itself and as a whole; for in an indivisible reality one cannot understand that, according to something, it is educated, while according to something it remains in potency—this would be to divide what is indivisible, or to attribute contradictories to the same indivisible thing, namely, to be in act and to remain in potency. How, then, can the same indivisible form be more and more educated? What is it that is newly educated, if previously the whole form was educated?

14. An evasion of the foregoing argument. To this one can reply, following the authors cited, that for an intensible form to be more and more educated is the same as for it to be more and more united to the subject. In such an accidental form there are two things: one is the entity of the form—in which I include the actual essence together with existence, whether these are distinct or not, for that does not matter here, as is clear from what was said against the previous opinion. The other is the union of such an entity to the subject, which has often been shown to be, of its nature, something distinct from the entity of the form itself, especially in Disputation XV. Apart from these two, nothing else can be imagined in such a form—especially nothing that could contribute to intensification. Since the foregoing argument plainly shows that, if the form is indivisible and

always remains the same, it cannot be more and more educated according to its entity but is educated as a whole at once, it remains that this greater eduction can consist only in union. Both are accomplished by eduction; and therefore, for a form to be said to be more educated, it is enough that it be more united—whence it aptly is said to be more rooted. Cajetan seems finally to explain the view thus (loc. cit.), saying that by intensification the simple essence of the form is perfected in this very respect, that the subject formally subjects itself to it more. What "formally subjecting itself more to it" is, he does not explain. St. Thomas seems to teach it (II–II, q. 24, a. 5, ad 3): "In a change according to more and less, it is not necessary that something be present that was not present before, but that what was present before be present more." But inherence and union are the same thing. Hence the whole increase or perfection of intensification lies in union, or in reason of union. And this appears to be the exposition more commonly received in the Thomist school.

15. Refutation. Against it, all the reasons urged against the previous explanation seem to apply with equal proportion and force. This greater perfection in the union of the intensified form can be understood in two ways. First, the union itself might be indivisible, and consequently occur as a whole at once, and so be perfected only insofar as a certain imperfect union is removed and another, more perfect, arrives through the intensive action. Second, there might be in the union itself a kind of latitude, by reason of which it can be produced and increase little by little, after the manner in which the union of a rational soul to the body grows as the body grows—saving the difference that there the increase is extensive, here intensive. If this opinion understands union to be produced and perfected in the first way, the arguments brought against the previous explanation clearly apply. First: by intensification nothing positive is removed from the form that is intensified; a like agent does not dissolve the union of a like form; nor is such a claim consistent with reason or sense. Second: otherwise, even in remission the whole union would be dissolved at

once from the beginning, nor would there be an agent by which the form could be united again; thus there would not be remission but total corruption of the form.

16. Third: alteration could not be continuous; for if each union is indivisible in itself, it must be brought about whole at once by an indivisible change; consequently the intensification will be a succession of indivisible changes that cannot be continuous—both because indivisibles cannot be continuous, and because, given their coexistence with our time, it cannot be that all those changes endure for a mere instant if one follows immediately upon another without interruption of the action. After an instant there immediately follows time; therefore, if one change endures for only an instant, the next, which follows immediately, necessarily endures for a time, because it begins by coexisting with time; and that time of its duration will necessarily be determined in such a way as to be enclosed between two instants, one being the last non-being of such change with respect to our time, the other the instant of its cessation. During that time the intensification will not proceed, but remain in the same state; thus it is not continuous. If those changes do not immediately follow one another, but some time intervenes between them, the action will be discrete and not continuous.

17. Fourth: in this way the form that is intensified would not be perfected in the entity of its essence or of its existence, but only as to union or inherence—contrary to St. Thomas and the reasons given above. Hence Cajetan (loc. cit.) says that the essence of the form is perfected "in that the subject formally subjects itself more to it." And later he adds: "Whenever it is more intense, it becomes more perfect according to essence, being, and being-in the subject." Capreolus and others think likewise. Nevertheless the consequence stands. First, by a parallel: when the rational soul is united to a larger or better disposed body, it is not perfected in the entity of its essence, because only the union is perfected; therefore, if when a form is intensified only the union is perfected, the form itself is not perfected according to the

entity of its essence or of its existence. Next: if we suppose two heats, one intense and one remiss, to be separated from the subject and preserved—then, according to the opinion under discussion, those two qualities would be equally perfect; this is a sign that the more intense heat was not made more perfect in the entity of its essence or of its existence. Finally: union is something, of its nature, distinct from the entity of the form, and it alone is perfected; therefore the entity of the form itself is not perfected in itself. One might say that it is true that the entity of the form is not perfected by a perfection distinct from union, but it is perfected by union, because inherence is the natural mode and thus the perfection of such a form. In that way, to be sure, one could say that the soul is perfected when it is united to the body; yet one does not truly and properly say that it is perfected in the entity of its essence. And whatever be the manner of speaking, this does not suffice for the matter at hand, as the a posteriori argument drawn from the power to act shows: that power grows through intensification. But the form does not act formally by inherence, but by its very entity; therefore, since the internal power to act grows, it is a sign that the entity itself grows and is perfected in itself. Nor is it enough to say that inherence is a condition required for acting, and that from the perfection of a required condition, facility or power to act is wont to increase, at least in mode, or because impediments are removed. This does not suffice. Inherence is necessary to an accident's acting only insofar as it is necessary to its being; if the entire entity and existence of a quality are equally well preserved in being, considered in themselves, with imperfect inherence as with perfect—even if it does not communicate itself formally to the subject in the same way—it will have equal power to act upon another and will be equally able to exercise that power, especially when the subject contributes nothing to the action except as sustaining the quality.

18. Beyond these reasons, we can add another that shows in a special way that such a change of inherence or union is not naturally possible in a form, especially one that does not subsist but depends for

its coming to be and its being upon the subject through such union. This can be made clear first thus: since such a form is in itself wholly uniform and indivisible, it does not seem capable of diverse indivisible unions with respect to the same subject. Whence could such unions have their diversity?

19. Second, it is harder to understand when one of those unions is more perfect than another, if they are altogether distinguished as indivisible modes of which one is not included in the other. I ask whether those modes, in their own order, are of different "essences" or as it were of the same species. If the former, how can they be connatural to the same simple quality in species? If the latter, whence have those modes distinction in the same quality with respect to the same subject? Or if such a distinction is possible in them, why not also among the partial degrees of the form? Again, how is one more perfect than another if they are of the same species and altogether simple? Or if this is admitted in them, why not in the degrees? Finally, how does one expel the other, since they are of the same kind? It is in itself exceedingly difficult to conceive that a form dependent on a subject should lose union with it in order to be more rooted in it and more perfectly united to it.

20. Third: if the form is capable of diverse unions, why is it not united to the subject from the beginning as much as it can be united? For just as a natural quality acts naturally as much as it can, so too it naturally informs as much as it can; therefore, if the whole quality is in the subject, it is necessarily united in the most perfect way it can be—at least by the natural propensity it has to inform the subject, according to which it causes by a necessity of nature. One will say this is true unless there is an impediment or indisposition on the part of the subject. But against this: sometimes a form is remiss even if there is no indisposition on the part of the subject, as we shall show below. It will be replied that at least on the part of the agent there is always some impediment, by which it cannot unite the form so perfectly. But against this again: if the agent's power is sufficient to

produce the whole entity of the form with the whole entitative perfection of it, and we suppose further that, on the part of the subject in itself, there is no indisposition or impediment—what reason can be given why the same power and efficiency should not suffice to unite such a form to the subject in the most perfect way it can be united? The extremes are now most present to one another, and there is no repugnance between them, but rather a natural propensity to perfect union. Indeed Henry and others, as I said above (Disp. XV), probably affirm that even apart from the activity of an extrinsic agent, a form naturally unites itself to its proximate recipient if they are intimately present to each other and there is no other impediment.

21. Cajetan's position. It remains to speak of the other horn of the first dilemma. One can say that the union of an intensible form with the subject is not indivisible nor perfected by the change of one less perfect union into another more perfect, but that it has a latitude and is perfected by an increase of a pre-existing union. This mode seems to be indicated more by Thomists, especially by Cajetan (loc. cit.), when he says that in intensification a quality is perfected according to essence, being, and being-in, and adds: "No corruption intervenes there, but only the increase of all the aforesaid." Yet even this part seems to be impugned by very forceful reasons. First, the fourth reason brought against the previous member applies here also —namely, that in this way the quality is not perfected with respect to the entity of its essence, but only with respect to union, as is easily seen by applying what was said there. Second, almost the whole last line of argument in the preceding member applies against this part. For it is indeed very hard to conceive that an entity indivisible as to intensive perfection, which does not subsist but is by its nature necessarily united to and dependent on a subject, should be capable of a divisible union and of one that has intensive latitude. Nor can one readily conceive wherein that greater and greater union consists, since the whole form, as a whole, is united to the subject. I confirm this: if the whole form is united to the subject, then it confers the whole

effect it can confer; therefore it cannot be understood either that it is more united or that it confers a greater formal effect. The first consequence is clear: just as a form cannot be united to a subject without conferring a formal effect, so too it cannot be united as a whole without being wholly united to confer the formal effect as far as it can.

22. An objection answered. It is pressed, first, by the example of a substantial form, especially that which informs an organic body, which does not equally inform each part of the matter, even if it is wholly united to them; and also by quantity, which, although wholly united to its subject, does not always extend itself equally, since sometimes it occupies a larger place, sometimes a smaller. The first example can be turned against the objector. A substantial form, insofar as it is indivisible or similar, cannot have a diverse and unequal union to matter; but as it wholly informs matter, so it informs and unites to it as much as it can. Therefore, similarly, a quality, insofar as it is indivisible and regards the same subject, always informs it as much as it can. Next, in substantial forms informing heterogeneous bodies (except for the rational soul), just as in parts diversely disposed there are reckoned to be partial unions of the form unequally perfect, so it is more likely that the parts of the form themselves are somehow dissimilar or unequal in their partial entities; for it is more probable that all those forms are divisible and consist of parts informing the parts of the matter. Nor does it seem likely that those parts of the form, which require in the matter very dissimilar dispositions, should be wholly similar among themselves in their entities. Wherefore, if a proportional comparison is made, such a form always unites to and informs the matter as much as it can—comparing, namely, the whole form with the whole matter, and the several parts of the form with the several parts of the matter proportionate to them.

23. As to the rational soul: although it is constant that in diverse organic parts it has diverse accidental and secondary effects, yet it is not as certain that the substantial union itself is of a different

kind with different parts of the matter; for that diversity in secondary effects can arise from a diversity of accidents and not from a diversity of union. Let us grant, however—which is very probable—that the total union of the rational soul to a heterogeneous body is in itself in some way heterogeneous. Since the dispositions of matter greatly contribute to union, it is likely that partial unions to parts of the matter diversely disposed are in themselves somehow dissimilar and of unequal perfection. From this, however, no argument can be drawn for the point at issue, both because this is singular in the rational soul on account of its eminent perfection and because it subsists; hence it can inform whole to whole and whole to each part, and can inform whole to a greater and a lesser body extensively without any addition being made to itself, save as to union—none of which belongs to any other form. Moreover, even if this soul unequally informs diverse parts, it nevertheless informs each as much as it can, according to their disposition, and with respect to them its union cannot be more or less perfect. If a proportional argument is made from this, it rather confirms the point I intend.

24. The other example, drawn from quantity, is far less to the point. The same quantity, if no addition or diminution is made in its entity, cannot either have a different union to the matter or confer upon it a greater or lesser formal effect; it always equally extends the parts of matter in relation to itself. Extension with respect to place is not the formal effect of quantity, but of local presence, given such rarity or density; and each of these forms or affections always has in the subject the whole formal effect it can have by reason of its entity. Finally, the earlier line of reasoning can be confirmed here: even if we were to grant that in the union of the same indivisible quality there is a latitude, nevertheless the quality would always be united to the subject in the most perfect way and as much as it could be—especially if on the part of the subject there were no indisposition or repugnance. But it is clear that this is not what happens. Therefore it is a sign that intensification does not consist solely in the latitude of union.

25. Third, and above all, we can argue ad hominem against this exposition. If the union of the intensified form has in itself an intensive latitude, either that latitude consists in this, that the union is composed of parts really distinct, one of which is added to the pre-existing one when intensification occurs, both together yielding a greater union from which the form is denominated more rooted and intense—or else there is in the union no such distinction or real addition of parts. The latter cannot be maintained. First, this is to assert that the union is indivisible, because it does not consist of parts really distinct; and it plainly follows that such a union must be produced as a whole at once, since what is indivisible cannot come to be little by little—for that is to come to be by parts, which repugns an indivisible. Third, if neither in the entity of the form—either essence or existence—is any addition made, nor in the union itself, then no increase occurs in any reality or real mode of such a form; for a real increase without addition in some reality or real mode cannot even be conceived. In such a form there is only so much entity and union. If, therefore, to neither is anything added, then to no reality or real mode is anything added; therefore no real increase occurs. And the point is confirmed. According to this opinion, the form was said not to be increased in itself and by reason of itself, but by reason of union, because the entity of the form is indivisible and as such has nothing added to it. If, then, union also is indivisible and as such has nothing added to it, the form could not be perfected by reason of itself but only by reason of something else. What is that "something else"? It is plainly inexplicable; and however it is explained or imagined, I will ask again whether it is something indivisible, or something with latitude that receives addition. Whatever is asserted will be refuted by a similar proportion and the same dilemma. This second alternative is therefore manifestly impossible if one proceeds consistently within that opinion.

26. But if the union itself has a latitude and an addition is made of parts of union, then all the arguments return with which the

authors of the first opinion prove that no latitude and addition of parts can be given in the form itself; so that one must say either that those arguments are ineffective, or that this opinion—so far as it admits an increase of union—is false. The antecedent is clear. I ask similarly whether the parts of union are of the same kind or diverse. If diverse, how do they compose one union? If of the same kind, how can they at once be in the same subject? Whatever answer is made, it can be easily applied to similar questions about the degrees of the form. The same method can be used with the other arguments or reasons. It is enough to have shown this in that dilemma, which is as it were the basis and foundation of the opinion. And finally it is confirmed thus: if in union itself one understands a latitude and an addition of parts, why should such a thing seem impossible in the entity of the form?

A Third Way of Explaining the Foregoing Position, & Its Rejection

27. A third and final exposition of that opinion is that a quality is intensified only per accidens, by the removal of the contrary or of other dispositions repugnant to the quality. Aegidius suggests this view (Quodl. II, q. 14; I De Generatione, q. 18 and 15). This opinion can be taken in two senses. First, the removal of the contrary quality or of an impedient disposition is a necessary condition for the form that is intensified to actuate and inform the subject more, even though in itself it does not become more perfect. This seems to be Aegidius's intention; yet it contains nothing different from the previous view. For that removal of an impediment, which is sometimes present in the subject, is without doubt necessary to the intensification of the form and in the order of material cause is prior in reason; nevertheless it follows upon the intensification of the form itself in the order of formal cause. It is therefore clear that, according to this opinion, the intensification of the form does not formally and per se consist in the removal of the contrary; it remains to explain

wherein the greater actuation of the subject consists—whether it is increased by an addition in the union itself. All the arguments urged against the preceding expositions return—especially because it is not universally true that in the intensification of a form the contrary or a repugnant disposition is cast out of the subject, as I shall now say.

28. A second sense is that intensification formally and precisely consists in the removal of the contrary or of impediments. It follows that, according to this view, there is no true and real increase either of the form or of its formal effect, but only an accidental one—either as to the removal of an impediment, or according to appearance and for us—because, impediments having been removed, the thing acts or moves more perfectly, and so we judge it more perfect. This is the first absurdity that follows. The sequence is plain: nothing positive is added to the form or to its union; therefore it does not grow positively; therefore what remains is only the removal of impediments or a certain appearance. The falsity of the consequent is certain by the principles of faith and very clear in philosophy. The first part is evident: it is erroneous to say that faith, charity, and grace are not increased in us truly and really, or that such increase consists solely in the removal of the contrary. Grace and charity have properly no contrary save sin, nor faith save unbelief; the contraries are wholly removed by even the least grace or faith, respectively speaking, and afterward these qualities can be increased and perfected of themselves. Among the blessed, the lights of glory and the visions are unequal, though among the blessed there is no proper and formal inequality as to the removal of contraries. The second part is clear: it seems plainly contrary to sense to deny that light is of itself and directly perfected in the air when it is more illuminated; the same holds for the acts of our soul when with greater effort we love or intend. Hence the argument: greater or lesser intensity arises not only from the material disposition of the recipient, but also on the part of the agent—if it is natural, because it is stronger or weaker, or because it is nearer or farther; if it is free, because it voluntarily exerts its power more or less.

29. From this it further follows clearly in various ways that intensification does not consist in the removal of contrary or repugnant dispositions. First, in a subject wholly without repugnance or equally disposed, a form can be more or less intense by reason of the agent—as experience and reason show. Second, the expulsion of the contrary or of a repugnant disposition is effected by the very action by which the form is intensified; fire does not remit cold except by intensifying heat, and so in other cases. Therefore, besides the removal of the contrary, that action has a prior positive terminus; for, as often said, a positive action does not per se first tend to a non-being. That terminus can only be the positive perfection of the form that is intensified; in this the intensification itself, formally and per se, consists. What other terminus can be imagined here? If one says there is some other positive disposition of the subject by reason of which the other form actuates the subject more, that is plainly false: another disposition is not always required for the quality that is intensified; otherwise one would proceed to infinity. And even then the difficulty would not be explained: for about that very disposition it remains to be declared how it is increased, since it too can be greater and lesser; and concerning the other quality to which it disposes, it remains to be explained how it actuates more if it is indivisible. One would necessarily have to fall back upon one of the modes already impugned. Third, we showed above that contraries in a remiss state can be together in the same subject. Therefore, if a remiss form is in itself as perfect as an intense one with respect to entity and union, then when two contraries are together each has its whole positive perfection; therefore both will be at once in the highest degree, and one cannot be remitted by the introduction of the other, nor the other intensified by the removal of the first. There is here a plainly impossible circle: if the form is not intensified in itself, it is not remitted in itself; therefore, as long as the contrary remains, nothing of it is cast out; therefore the other contrary is not intensified; and conversely the same argument can be made about the remission of a form.

Second Opinion: The Intensive Latitude of a Quality

30. Since no probable way seems to remain by which an indivisible quality could really be increased in the same subject, there is a second principal opinion, which affirms that an intensible quality is divisible and composed of diverse parts of the form itself, which inform the same part of the subject or the same indivisible subject. Those who hold this view think that the intensive latitude of a form consists in this composition. They add that these parts of the form are entirely of the same kind, and do not differ among themselves in their partial entities any more than two parts of the same form existing in two parts of the subject differ. The whole difference lies in union to the subject: when they are in diverse parts of the subject, they increase the quality extensively; when they are in the same subject, they increase it intensively. Nor do they consider it incongruous that two numerically distinct parts of a quality, yet united among themselves, should inhere in the same part of the subject. For they do not take individuation formally from the subject; rather they take it from their entities, which have relations to such a subject—relations that can be numerically different even if their terminus is the same. From the fact that these parts are not divided but united, composing one perfect quality, they can be together in the same part of the subject; and this is not superfluous, but pertains to a greater perfection both of the subject and of the quality itself. Finally, this opinion calls these parts of a quality its degrees; and thus it is commonly said, in this view, that intensification occurs by the addition of degree to degree. So explained, this opinion is held by many theologians (In I, dist. 17), by Albert (a. 10), Bonaventure (in II, dist., a. 1, q. 1, ad 2), Richard (a. 2, q. 2), Scotus (q. 3), Ockham (q. 6), Gabriel, Gregory, and others there; by Marsilius (In II, q. 1, a. 1, supposit. 8); by Nifo (on Metaphysics VIII, from disp. V to the end, especially VI and XI); by Antonius Andreas (on Metaphysics VIII, q. 6); and by Toledo (I De

Generatione, c. 3, q. 4). The foundation of this opinion, set forth in refuting the previous one and explaining this, is that in this kind of composition there is no repugnance, and otherwise such composition is necessary to save true intensification and the inequality of perfection that is found in the same form as intense or remiss.

The Difficulty in the Second Opinion

31. In this view one thing is difficult for me, namely, that it posits the latitude of an intensible quality to be wholly uniform and to consist of parts of the same kind as the parts involved in extension, as explained. From this it follows that if two heats "at one," existing in two subjects, are placed together in the same subject and in the same part, there arises from them one more intense heat, namely "at two"—which the authors will readily concede. Many inconveniences seem to follow. First, that such intensive augmentation would be just as accidental to the form as extensive augmentation; for it is accidental to a quality whether its parts are received in the same or in different parts of a subject; therefore the quality is not made more perfect by intensification than by extension.

32. Second, it follows that such augmentation can proceed to infinity just as extensive augmentation can; but the consequent seems contrary to the nature of things, so far as one can gather from experience of physical qualities. The sequence is clear, for the composition and union of two degrees of heat are of the same kind whether in different parts of a subject or in the same; therefore the diversity of the subject does not hinder the composition and union of degrees from proceeding to infinity in the same part of the subject just as in different parts. Indeed, it can be done more easily in the same part, because then there is no need to multiply the subject. The point is confirmed and made clearer: it is no more repugnant for the fourth degree to be united to the fifth than for the third to the fourth, and the same holds for any degree with respect to a further one. One will say

perhaps that this argument rightly proves that on the part of the quality there is no repugnance, but there can be repugnance on account of the limited capacity of the subject, which extends to so many degrees and no more. But surely, if those degrees are entirely of the same kind, and on their part there is no repugnance to being together in any number, there is no reason why there should be repugnance on the part of the subject, which is in itself indifferent and capable of receiving each and many together, and which those degrees do not "occupy" (so to speak), nor do they have effects repugnant to one another. Why then should that capacity be called limited, and not rather—in itself—negatively and potentially infinite in a passive way?

33. Third, it follows that heat "at one," just as it can produce many heats "at one" in different subjects, can do so in one and the same subject; consequently it can produce not only an equal heat but even a heat more intense than itself. The sequence is plain: those heats are entirely of the same kind, and the diversity of subjects is accidental to the agent, provided there is capacity in one and the same subject. You will say capacity does not suffice without privation and dissimilarity of the patient to the agent. But after a hot thing "at one" has produced one degree of heat in the patient, then the patient is similar to the agent and lacks the privation of such heat; therefore it cannot be acted upon by that agent. This does not satisfy. The patient has the privation of another degree; otherwise it could receive that degree from no agent. Therefore on this side the action is not impeded. Dissimilarity between agent and patient is necessary only because, if the patient already has the whole form similar to the agent's form, it cannot receive another altogether similar. If it could, there would be no reason or foundation why that condition should be necessary. Therefore in the present case, if the same subject is capable of several wholly similar degrees of heat, even if it has one and is already similar to the agent in respect of it, there is no reason why that similarity should impede further action; for, insofar as it lacks another like degree, it is sufficiently dissimilar to receive it. Thus heat "at one"

could produce heat "at two," and consequently "at eight," if there is no greater resistance in the patient. It follows also that two heats "at one" could mutually increase each other in heat even up to ignition, which follows upon heat "at eight." Indeed, it follows that the same heat "at one" could, by the power of heat alone, intensify itself up to "two" and "three" and any degrees—by applying the argument made. That the subject or a part of it should act upon itself will not be an impediment, if it is otherwise presupposed (as the opinion indeed presupposes) that the same subject, according to the same respect, can at once be formally in act with respect to one degree and in formal potency with respect to another entirely similar degree.

34. Fourth, it follows from that opinion that in the remission of a quality no degree can be designated which by the nature of the thing is first cast out by the introduction of the first degree of a contrary quality. But the consequent is absurd; therefore so is the antecedent. The sequence is proved thus: all the degrees of that quality are entirely similar among themselves and equally united among themselves; therefore no natural reason can be assigned why one degree should be cast out before another. Perhaps it will be said that, by the nature of the thing, that degree is expelled first which was acquired last, because the order of resolution is contrary to the order of generation. But this does not satisfy, both because that is per accidens when from the order of generation there does not arise in the thing a special order of parts that requires the opposite order in resolution, and because it is not always necessary that an intense form be made in that order—for sometimes intense light comes to be in an instant. The falsity of the consequent is proved: otherwise, the remission of a form could never begin, because there is no reason why one degree should be expelled rather than another; hence either none would be excluded, or all at once. It can be said that in such cases it is determined by the First Cause what should rather be produced or expelled. But this answer does not prevent it from being true that, by the nature of the degrees of the form, no account can be given why

one should be expelled before another; nor should one have recourse to a determination by the First Cause unless evident necessity or a defect of causes compels—which is not the case here. Add that, if intensification is only the collection and union of entirely similar degrees, then each and all of them will have the same formal opposition with any degree of the contrary quality; therefore, if in a subject that was cold "at eight" one degree of heat is introduced, either all the degrees of cold will be expelled or none. For, since all the degrees of cold are entirely similar, if one degree of heat is formally repugnant to some degree of cold, it will have the same repugnance to any degree; or, if it is compatible with one, it will be compatible with all—since the collection of all does not introduce a special repugnance or incapacity in the subject. Especially since it has been shown to follow from that opinion that such capacity is not limited of itself to a certain number of degrees if the degrees are entirely similar and are heaped up as it were per accidens. Therefore, according to this opinion, the intensive latitude of a quality is not sufficiently explained.

The True View & Resolution of the Question

35. An intensible quality is not indivisible in its entity. Between these opinions I judge that a certain middle way must be taken. First, one must say that an intensible quality is not indivisible in its entity, but has a certain latitude of parts by reason of which it can sometimes be in its subject as a whole, sometimes according to a greater or lesser part; and because such a quality is not in reality unless it is also in a subject, therefore such is also its entity, that sometimes it can exist wholly in reality, and sometimes according to a part. Hence it comes to be that it can be more intense and more remiss, and that it can affect its subject more and less. This assertion seems to me to be compelled and demonstrated by all that was urged against the first opinion; without such a latitude and divisibility it cannot be understood how the same indivisible inhering form can affect the

subject more or less. For one cannot intelligibly say that the form itself has a greater or lesser entity in itself, nor that it has a greater or lesser union to the subject; and besides these two nothing else positive and real is found in such a form by reason of which it could terminate a new real action or confer upon the subject a greater or lesser formal effect. All this has been sufficiently declared and proved in the arguments above.

36. From this conclusion it follows that the intense and the remiss forms differ not only in their mode of actually affecting the subject but also in the entity by which they are apt to affect the subject. Indeed, it is because they can have a greater or lesser perfection or integrity in their entity that they can have a more or less perfect mode of affecting. For as much entity as they have, so much aptitude they have to affect the subject; and as much aptitude, so much (speaking naturally) actual affection of the subject; for such a form is present only as much as it is and as much as it can be present. Wherefore, if two heats—one "at one," the other "at eight"—were by divine power separated and preserved outside any subject, they would not be equal in entity and perfection, because one would have the whole entity due to it, the other far less; and one of them is always such that, if it is united to a subject again, it necessarily renders it hot "at eight," whereas the other, however it be united, can never cause that effect, but only "at one."

37. Whether separated heat could be intensified. You will say: therefore heat "at one," separated from the subject, could be intensified and become heat "at eight," which seems impossible because intensification cannot be understood without an order to a subject. Hence St. Thomas sometimes says that, if a form is separated, it necessarily has the whole perfection of the species (I, q. 54, a. 1–2, and often elsewhere). I reply by distinguishing the sequel according to the action of a natural agent or by the power of God. In the former mode, a separated accident cannot be intensified by a natural agent, because nothing can be added to it that is educated from the potency of the

subject, since the accident is supposed to be outside a subject; a natural agent can act only by eduction from the potency of a subject. But by divine power that entity can be increased and perfected in the entity of itself, according to its intensive latitude; and in this sense the action can be called intensification—not insofar as this word signifies a change from a subject, but insofar as it signifies the effecting of certain degrees of an intensible quality. This perfection can be brought about in the mode of creation; therefore God can bring it about. The antecedent is clear: just as God can preserve in act an accident without a subject, so He can produce it; and such production is from nothing and so is, in a way, creation. Likewise, just as He can produce outside a subject a whole accident at once, so He can produce it by parts if it is divisible; thus He could successively augment, according to extension, a separated line or surface; therefore, by the same reason, He could augment intensively a separated heat. Those, then, who say that intensification cannot occur outside a subject must be understood—if they wish to speak truly—of natural intensification, which occurs by natural change. Similarly, when it is said that in a form separated from a subject no latitude of intensification can exist, this must be understood of a form that is by nature separate and so not only outside a subject but lacking aptitude and order to a subject; such a form will no longer be an accident but a substance, which is not intensible, as I shall say in the following section.

38. Whether one heat is "more heat" than another. You will urge further: it follows that not only is one hot thing hotter than another, but one heat is more "heat" than another; for not only is the subject more affected, but the heat itself has more of the entity of heat. But this is against Aristotle (Categories, ch. On Quality), who indicates that concretes admit of "more and less," not abstracts. I answer: as to the thing, it is true that the form of heat itself can be more and less perfect and integral in its entity. If this alone is signified by those words, I concede the sequel; nor could Aristotle have taught the contrary. As to form of speech, the locution is admitted more in

concretes than in abstracts, either because of what we said above—namely, that a separated form cannot naturally be increased, and because in the abstract it is signified as standing per se, and as such is not said to receive "more and less," whereas the concrete is said to receive "more and less" because it participates the form more or less—or certainly the locution is denied in abstracts because it seems to signify "more and less" in the very constitutive difference of heat, and thus in the essential notion of heat, in which there is no latitude; the latitude is in the integrity of heat, as said above. Therefore no one is said to be "more heat" than another, but "greater" and "more perfect" heat—just as a line is not said to be "more line," but "greater." A hot thing, however, is said to be "hotter," because only an excess is signified in the participation of the form that constitutes "hot," and thus only an accidental, not an essential, excess is indicated.

39. Second, one must say that the entitative latitude of an intensible quality is not a mere heaping together of many degrees of the same quality wholly similar, but a per se composition of such parts or degrees, one of which by its nature presupposes another. By reason of this subordination one is called first, another second, a third third, and so on; so that the first and the second are distinguished not only as two first degrees existing in different parts of the subject, but also because they are by nature first and second—and so with the rest. The negative part of this assertion is sufficiently proved by the reasons we drew up against the second opinion. Although some of those reasons can in some fashion be evaded, they cannot be adequately solved; taken together, they show that this mode of intensification by mere aggregation is not sufficient to save all that we experience of these qualities and of their efficiency and power. Next, the foundation of the first opinion—about the numerical distinction of entirely similar degrees in the same part of the subject—gives no small confirmation to this part. For, as we discussed at length above (Disp. V), accidents that are only numerically distinct and altogether similar in their individual effect cannot be multiplied in the same subject. The reasons

given there prove the point equally whether the accidents are total or partial. And indeed, if such accidents could be gathered in the same subject, they could be multiplied to any number, nor could any limit of such aggregation be firmly defined by reason.

40. The affirmative part of this assertion follows from the foregoing. First, by an enumeration of the possibilities. Other modes being excluded, no other seems thinkable by which the nature of such an entity and such a latitude can be explained. Second, because in this way divisibility is saved, and a real addition, and a possible increase in such an entity; likewise unity is saved along with a per se composition in such a quality; and no repugnance appears from elsewhere in such a mode of entity and unity. Therefore one ought to think thus concerning this latitude. The antecedent is known from what has been said as to the first two points; as to the last, it is clear, because in this way the difficulties touched upon in both opinions are most easily solved. For we concede that such a form is not indivisible in its entity and union, but in both receives a real addition and increase—since the difficulties urged against the first opinion compel this.

Objections Answered

41. We easily resolve the foundation of the second opinion so far as it tells against this part. Those partial degrees, although they are of the same essential kind in their individual and partial entity, are not altogether similar, at least in this, that they regard the subject with a certain order among themselves; the first is by its nature presupposed to the second, and the second is by its nature not apt to inhere in a subject except as already affected and disposed by the first degree. This diversity suffices for them to be conversant about the same subject even if, in their partial way, they are distinguished only numerically. As for the other reasons confirming that opinion, we readily admit them, for they do not prove that such a form is indivisible; rather they prove that it is per se one and requires a latitude and composition that is

more per se than a mere gathering of wholly similar degrees. The same is more confirmed by the arguments objected against the second opinion. The arguments by which the second opinion relies prove only that an intensible quality is not indivisible. From this the authors of that opinion seem to have inferred immediately a composition by mere aggregation, as if in a quality no other, more per se mode of composition were possible—which they have not proved. Nor does any reason occur to me that even apparently shows impossible a latitude of quality with a certain per se order, defined by nature, among its parts. Just as in an animal or plant there is a per se order among heterogeneous parts of its form—though in that form the composition is extensive, while in the quality under discussion it is intensive; for examples need not be altogether alike. If someone perhaps judges that the view I have proposed does not contradict the previous ones but is a certain concord and legitimate interpretation of them, I not only do not contradict, but I desire that very thing. At least I think it is not foreign to the mind of some of the authors cited for those opinions, and especially to that of St. Thomas, about whose mind I shall say more in section three.

SECTION II
WHETHER ONLY QUALITIES ARE CAPABLE OF INTENSIFICATION, AND WHY THIS DOES NOT BELONG TO ALL

1. The first root of intensification is found in quality alone. Since the capacity to receive "more and less" is assigned as a property of quality, we must explain in what way it is proper, which depends on the two points proposed in the question: namely, whether it belongs to quality alone, and whether it belongs to every quality.

How Only Quality is Capable of Intensification

2. Whether the speed of motion is an intensification. First, then, I say that the primary, so to speak, root of intensification is found in quality alone. I frame the claim in this way because Aristotle, in the Categories, also says that action and passion receive more and less. Yet this belongs to action and passion only by reason of their terminus, inasmuch as that terminus has an intensive latitude. Hence neither in substantial generation nor in augmentation, insofar as it is terminated at quantity, is there the mode of receiving more and less, but only according to extensive addition. Proportionally the same holds for local motion, which is called greater or lesser on account of extension to a larger or smaller space, or through more or fewer parts of the subject, and not properly according to intensification. You will say: one local motion can be swifter than another, and this seems to be a kind of intensification. I reply: the speed of motion is not properly intensification, but is rather a condensation of the parts of the motion within a shorter time. Hence that condition can be found in extensive motion as well as in intensive increase, and even in remission. Therefore, with respect to action or passion, that is, motion, intensification has place only by reason of the intensible quality toward which the motion tends. For this reason intensive latitude is said to be primarily and per se, as it were in its root, in quality.

3. Thus the conclusion, so explained, is proved because this latitude belongs to quality in such a way that it belongs to it by reason of itself and not by reason of something else; to another category it does not belong in that way. Therefore it is a property of quality alone. The major is evident by induction in heat, light, love, and the like, which possess such a latitude and not by reason of something else, for nothing can be assigned by reason of which it should belong to them. Someone will say that it belongs by reason of an agent unequally applied, or by reason of a subject unequally disposed, following Durandus (In I, dist. 17, q. 6, n. 6). But this does not hinder our conclusion, because, as the same Durandus adds (n. 7), both causes, the efficient and the material, presuppose in an intensible form such a

nature as has latitude in its entity and requires such a composition for its integrity. In this way we say that quality of itself has such a nature, and not by reason of something else, although as to existence it is brought into act more or less perfectly by an agent that is unequal either in power, or in proximity, or in will if it be free. The disposition of the subject, too, can sometimes concur, although it is not always necessary.

4. That relation receives more and less. The minor is proved because things of the other categories are either not intensible at all or only by reason of quality. This is clear by induction, for substance and quantity do not receive more and less. Relation, indeed, is said in some way to receive more and less, but not by reason of itself; rather by reason of its foundation, and not properly according to intensification but according to variation, as we shall declare in the following disputation, in the last section. As to action and passion, we have already spoken. Concerning the remaining four categories, the matter is evident either because they are reckoned to be extrinsic denominations (as is clear of habit, and many think the same of the others), or because, if they are intrinsic modes, they are accommodated to the things themselves. Thus duration can indeed be greater and lesser extensively, or even in essential perfection, but not properly intensively, unless perhaps insofar as the thing that exists has intensification in itself and in its existence— from which duration is not distinguished by nature, as we shall say below. In "where" (ubi) and "position" (situs), since they are either not "in" something, or are conceived only after the manner of quantity, extension can indeed be understood, but not intensification.

Why the Substantial Form is Not Capable of Intensification

5. Whether the highest genera receive intensification. The difficulty lies in giving the reason why substance and quantity are not

capable of this latitude; in the remaining lower categories there is no difficulty, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said. As to substance, a reason can be given: it is not in a subject, whereas intensive latitude cannot be understood except in relation to a subject, as we said above. If it is outside the subject, there will be extensive latitude, not intensive. This reason is indeed excellent for prime matter and for any subsistent thing as such. Yet for material substantial forms —which in their own way are in matter and are educed from its potentiality—the reason does not hold; for in the way in which they are in matter, they could also be more rooted in it, or more drawn forth from it. Hence some have not been lacking who say that the substantial forms of the elements are intensible and remissible, as we touched upon above (disp. XV, sect. 10, n. 41 and following), drawing on the Commentator and others.

6. Nevertheless the truth is that such forms cannot be intensified and remitted; otherwise their effects, or the composites themselves, would also receive more and less. For just as a thing is "more hot" that has a more intense heat, so there would be "more fire" which had a more intense form of fire. To render a reason for this a priori is difficult. Hence Durandus proves it only a posteriori from the mode of production of these forms: an intensible form can be acquired by successive motion, whereas a substantial form is never acquired in this way, but indivisibly in the same part of the subject. Yet in this reasoning the subsumed claim seems equally difficult to prove, namely, that a substantial form is always acquired indivisibly in the same part of the subject; for we do not experience the introduction of a substantial form in itself, but only in its accidents. Thus from experience alone it is not clear whether, for example, the form of fire is introduced partibly along with heat itself, or indivisibly and whole at once at the culmination of heat. Nonetheless, from what was said above (disp. XV, sect. 1) this can be made sufficiently probable: in heating water, for instance, even if many degrees of heat have been introduced, if the form of water has not been lost, then once the

external agent is removed, the heat is expelled with the greatest ease and the water returns to its former degree. Therefore this is a sign that neither the substantial form of water had been remitted nor the substantial form of fire introduced for some degrees. Otherwise the former could not again intensify itself; and the latter would often overpower it, both by itself and as it were from within, if such an action between them were possible— for we often seem to observe many degrees of heat being introduced.

7. From this experiment one can take a kind of a priori reason from the final cause: the substantial form is given to the supposit as the foundation of its complete being and of all its properties, and therefore it must be fixed and invariable as long as the essence of the thing remains, so that by virtue of it the thing may preserve itself and return to its natural state if it has suffered any disadvantage. To this St. Thomas seems to tend (ST I, q. 66, a. 4, ad 4; I–II, q. 52, a. 1): the substantial form cannot be intensified or remitted, because it is that which first constitutes the essence of the thing, which ought to be fixed and invariable. We have said more on this reason and on the whole matter in disp. XV, sect. 10, n. 45, etc.

Why Quantity is Not Intensified

8. Whether rarefaction and condensation are intensification and remission. From these points it is easy to render the reason why intensive latitude has no place in quantity. For proper quantity, which is continuous, is a natural property conjoined to matter and most closely allied to it; and therefore, just as matter does not have this latitude, neither does its property. Indeed, the same happens in every intrinsic property connatural to the substantial essence, as I shall immediately say. A plausible reason can also be taken from the formal effect of quantity and its mode: the formal effect of quantity is the extension of matter or corporeal substance. But intensive latitude is not proportioned to this effect; its ratio is that the same subject

participates more in the formal effect of a form. Since the formal effect of quantity is extension, to participate more or less in such an effect is simply to participate a greater or lesser extension, for as "simply to more," so "more to more." Therefore in quantity there is place for extensive increase, not intensive. You will say: when the same quantity is condensed or rarefied, it seems to be intensified or remitted, as St. Thomas also holds (II–II, q. 24, a. 1 ad 1). I reply first: that variation is not in the proper and formal effect of quantity but in a certain mode of it. Next, it is not properly a greater intensification, but a greater or lesser extension with respect to place—although, with respect to that quality which is density, rarity has the mode of intensification. And because with respect to place there seems to be an increase of quantity without a new quantity, therefore by a certain proportion it is sometimes called intensification; and in this way St. Thomas spoke, as Soncinas notes (In Metaph. VIII, q. 27, ad 1). That way of speaking has a foundation in Aristotle (Phys. IV, text 84). But it belongs to the physicist properly to dispute about rarity and density, because those qualities and the changes according to them are wholly physical and material.

9. As for discrete quantity, the reason it cannot be intensified is that each species of it is constituted by an indivisible limit; when that limit is changed by addition or subtraction, the species of that quantity is changed. Proportionally, St. Thomas explains the same for the species of continuous quantity: its "species," such as two cubits and three cubits, are changed by any addition or subtraction. Yet, as I said above, these are not proper species, but are conceived or named after the manner of species; therefore by them it is conveniently explained that these quantities do not receive more and less according to intensification.

Which Species of Quality Admit Intensification, & Why

10. Figure does not receive intensification, and why. Second, we must say that this property or intensive latitude does not belong to all qualities, but only to some. This assertion is also certain and is established by induction. The species of quality seem in this property to be divided: the first and third species of quality enjoy this property, but not the second and fourth, except insofar as they participate in something from the other species. This is to be understood as a general rule and to the extent that by probable reasoning we can form a conjecture about these qualities. Thus, regarding the fourth species, namely figure, St. Thomas already noted this, giving the reason that such a quality is formally constituted and, as it were, completed in its species by a certain indivisibility—e.g., that it is enclosed by such-and-such boundaries or lines. Also, because figure is a kind of terminus of quantity, and since quantity does not receive intensification, neither will figure receive it, especially since a terminus as such calls for indivisibility. You will say: in this species not only figure is placed but also form, such as beauty, which can be intensified and remitted. I answer first that we have already said above that this is not a proper species except by reason of figure. Next, in the way in which it is a species, it can be intensified only insofar as it consists in some passible quality, such as whiteness, or some similar quality.

11. Whether in the second species some qualities receive intensification. As for power, the same is evident by induction in intellect, will, senses, and the like. The reason seems to be that these qualities flow intrinsically from the substantial essence, in such a way that they cannot be otherwise produced; therefore they participate in an indivisible entity proportioned to essence. If this reason is sound, it proves the same for all powers that are per se primarily ordered to acting and have no other mode of production per se except by emanation from substance. Yet it is uncertain whether this is universally true of all natural powers of herbs, stones, and the like, which are not principles of vital acts but of material alterations. For these are truly powers and qualities of the second species;

nevertheless experience seems to show that they are sometimes diminished, because they depend on temperament and dispositions that are intensified and remitted. This experience, however, does not sufficiently prove that the powers themselves are remitted in themselves, but only that their actions are; for in them perhaps they are helped in some way by the temperament of the primary qualities, and when that is weakened and changed, the action also becomes weaker.

12. Nor can it be rightly inferred, from the fact that such powers require a certain temperament or dispositions for their connatural state, that the powers are remitted when the dispositions are remitted. For much more does the substantial form demand the same dispositions, and yet in itself it is not diminished even if the dispositions are remitted. Within a certain range, a minimal disposition is sufficient for the form to be conserved in matter, which is intensively indivisible. These powers or natural faculties flow immediately from the form and do not depend on dispositions more than the form does; therefore it is no more necessary that they be diminished in themselves than the form is. Thus the power of sight, for example, requires in its organ a certain temperament, yet the power itself is not intensified or remitted by a change of temperament; rather, either it perishes entirely when the dissolution of the temperament reaches a certain limit, or it is conserved whole, although with greater or lesser aptitude for acting on the part of the temperament. In like manner it is probable—though uncertain—that the same happens in proper connatural powers that are neither passible qualities nor able per se to be produced by their own proper action, but only by natural emanation from the substantial form. If perhaps some of these faculties can be intensified and remitted, they have that capacity insofar as they have only such dependence on the temperament of passible qualities that they are intensified or remitted along with it. Finally, I have always limited this part to natural powers, because instrumental powers, which can come from without and pertain to the

second species of quality (such as impetus and the like), can be intensified and remitted. And thus I said this must be understood as a general rule.

13. The first and third species of quality are capable of intensification. From this it is clear enough how the negative part of the conclusion holds in the second and fourth species of quality. That the affirmative part is true in the first and third species is sufficiently evident by induction in habits and acts of the soul and in the primary qualities of the elements, such as colors and other such things. A reason can be given: in these qualities one finds all that suffices for this intensive latitude. For all of them come to be by proper actions without natural emanation; or, if some of them flow naturally from certain forms (as heat from the form of fire, cold from the form of water), nevertheless they have a contrary by which they can be impeded and diminished, and they can also per se, that is, by their own proper action, come to be. Again, by force of their essential notions these qualities do not include an indivisibility repugnant to this intensive latitude; and moreover they have their own accidental entities, in which they can be capable of this latitude. This line of reasoning proves very well that, if in any genus there are intensible qualities—as indeed there are—then especially in these genera they are given. It also proves that we do not know of any qualities in these genera that are incapable of this latitude. And this suffices for us to affirm that all the qualities of these two species are intensible. Nevertheless we cannot demonstrate it; for perhaps there is, or can be, some quality of these species which cannot be intensified, because in this we have not shown a positive repugnance. Conversely, perhaps there is some natural power that can be intensified and remitted—many judge gravity or levity to be such; of this elsewhere. In this way the objections that can be made here are easily set aside.

14. One further difficulty is usually added to this question: namely, whether in forms of the same species that are not intensible there can be inequality in individual perfection. But I have already

referred this question above to the books On the Soul, because although it is general, its difficulty concerns souls, and especially the rational soul. It is most foreign to the present place, since it contributes nothing to explaining the intensification of quality.

SECTION III
OF THE KIND OF ACTION OR CHANGE BY WHICH THE INTENSIVE LATITUDE OF A QUALITY IS ACQUIRED

1. Thus far we have treated intensification in the latter sense posited above, namely, of the latitude signified in the terminus itself, that is, in the quality. It remains to speak of the other sense, namely, of the acquisition of such latitude; this contributes much to a fuller explanation of the property. And although the question seems physical, it is broader, and contains a proper metaphysical difficulty, as we shall see. To better understand the usual doubts, certain points that appear certain must be premised.

Some Presuppositions

2. First, the acquisition of this intensive perfection is a true and real action and passion, that is, a change. This is established by experience; indeed, there is no alteration more familiar to us, for by it all things are changed for the better or for the worse. Second, this acquisition is often a different action from the first acquisition or production of the quality itself. Experience shows this as well, both in the habits of the soul and in sensible qualities; one action temporally precedes another. Third, the intensive latitude is not always acquired all at once or by one indivisible action, but with the passage of time, even after the first acquisition of the form. This is also manifest by experience, and it will be made clearer by what follows.

Section III

Whether Intensification Is Greater Rooting & Eduction of the Same Form

3. With these points laid down, many doubts arise that are contained under the proposed title. The first is the common one, whether acquisition or intensification is a real addition of the form, or a greater rooting or eduction. But on this we have no question left, given what was said in Section I. It remains only to add that all three—being intensified by addition, by greater rooting, or by eduction—are not mutually repugnant, but all are true if rightly explained. The first cannot be denied: in this acquisition there is a real addition, since the pre-existing form is really perfected by a new real action. But what is added cannot fail to be something of the entity of the form; this has been amply proved above. Again, it is clear that what is added by this action did not previously exist in act before that action—otherwise no addition would be made later—neither in the same subject (for then nothing would be added), nor in another subject (for either the accident would migrate from one subject to another, which is impossible, or it would be added not only as accident to accident but as subject to subject; and thus the change would be extension, not intensification). This is what Aristotle said (Phys. IV, c. 9): from hot there comes to be hotter, nothing hot being made in the matter— that is, without the addition of a newly hot part of the subject, as the Commentator expressly declares. Therefore the addition per se necessary to intensification must be of a part or degree of the form in the same subject in which the remiss form previously existed. Thus what is added by intensification did not pre-exist, but is newly made.

4. Hence it is finally concluded that what is added in intensification is educed from the potentiality of the subject, because it is not made by creation, but is made in the subject, depending on it in its coming-to-be and its being. Nor must the intensification of infused qualities be excepted in this respect (as Cajetan thought, I–II,

q. 52, a. 2), for those qualities too are brought about by eduction, as I proved above in disp. XVI; therefore they are increased in a similar way, for the reason is the same in both. Thus the intensification of a form is a certain greater eduction of it from the potentiality of the subject; this is called addition when we compare the terminus of this change to the thing previously existing, and it is called eduction when we compare it to the subject in which and from which such a change is made. And the same eduction is called a greater rooting of the form in the same subject, because a quality that already has more degrees actually educed from the potentiality of the subject gains more dominion in it and has its entity more rooted in it. In this way the expression denotes that the addition made by intensification is not a mere aggregation of different qualities in the same part of the subject, but is the eduction of one and the same form according to its diverse degrees or parts, from which the form is per se one and out of which it is composed; the more complete it becomes, the more it is said to be rooted in the subject.

5. In this sense many recent authors think the view of St. Thomas on the intensification of forms by greater rooting in the same subject can be explained. For only in this sense, and in no other, can that opinion be true; and the words of St. Thomas do not seem to contradict this meaning. For in I–II, q. 52, a. 2, he says: "This kind of increase of habits and of other forms does not take place by the addition of form to form, but by the subject's participating more or less in one and the same form." But the subject cannot participate more or less in one and the same form unless that form is more or less educed from its potentiality, and consequently unless it has more or less of the entity of the actual form—which cannot be understood without some addition. St. Thomas does not seem to deny addition universally, but denies the addition of "form to form," that is, the mere aggregation of several wholly similar qualities or degrees, according to the sense impugned above under the second opinion treated in Section 1. In this interpretation and in these words one can explain St.

Thomas wherever he seems to deny addition elsewhere, although, to speak the truth, at times he seems to speak with greater difficulty.

Whether Intensification Takes Place by Continuous Succession

6. The opinion of some. Second, it can be doubted, regarding this intensification or eduction of quality, since it is not made all at once, whether it takes place by continuous or by discrete succession. Some think it cannot be done continuously, but only by instantaneous and discrete changes. Thus Soncinas holds (In Metaph. VIII, q. 21), and some Thomists follow him, attributing it to St. Thomas (Phys. VIII, lect. 5), where he says it is not possible for something to be increased or diminished continuously. The Commentator is also cited (Phys. VIII, com. 6), signifying that intensification is not one continuous motion but many alterations. Aristotle too is cited (Phys. VIII, text 23), saying it is impossible for something always to be increasing or diminishing, but there is a mean between them. The reason for this position is that when a quality is first made, it is made by an indivisible change and in an instant in some degree of itself; therefore later it is increased by similar changes; therefore it cannot be increased continuously. The first antecedent is proved because a permanent thing begins by its first instant of being, according to Aristotle (Phys. VIII, text 69). It is also proved because in these qualities there is a minimum in intension, which must be made from the beginning indivisibly, and thus by an indivisible and momentary change. The first consequence is proved because the second degree, which is added to the first by intensification, is proportional and equally indivisible; likewise because the agent can act in each following instant as much as in the first, or even more, since in itself it is equally powerful and the patient is more disposed. Therefore just as in the first instant it produced a certain degree of heat by a sudden action, so afterwards it increases it by a similar or proportional action.

The second consequence is proved because indivisible changes cannot be continuous. Otherwise, at the end of the action the quality would be infinitely intense; for in every instant an equal degree would be added, and in continuous succession there are infinitely many instants. Thus, according to this opinion, the intensive latitude of a quality is composed only of indivisible degrees in some definite number—eight, for instance, or ten— and by as many indivisible changes that whole latitude is completed, and after the first production it is increased and intensified by each of these.

7. This opinion is rejected. This opinion is false and contrary to the common sentence of the philosophers. Therefore note that the question here is not whether the intensification of a quality from a minimum degree to a maximum necessarily occurs by one continuous change. It is clear that this is not necessary; intensification can at times be interrupted and later proceed again, as experience shows. In this sense Aristotle and the Commentator speak of the discontinuation of alteration or augmentation in the cited places. The question is whether alteration can be made by continuous succession and, consequently, whether, all the requisites concurring on the part of the natural agent and the patient, it does so in fact, or whether on the part of the quality itself this is always repugnant.

8. That the intensification of a quality can occur successively and continuously. In this sense it must be said that, as far as it depends on itself, the intensive latitude of a quality can be acquired by continuous succession and that it is frequently so acquired in physical alterations. This assertion is consonant with Aristotle in Physics V and VI, where he numbers alteration among physical motions, which are divisible according to time and require continuity; and the Commentator says in Physics III, text 6, that continuity belongs to the notion of motion—namely, of a motion that is per se and properly one. Aristotle required this condition in Physics VI for the unity of motion. For if the changes are discontinuous, no motion that is truly and properly one can be composed from them, but at most something

analogous to number or discrete quantity. St. Thomas holds the same in the same places; and nearly all authors who posit a latitude of degrees in these qualities follow this view, such as Aegidius (In De Generatione I, q. 26) and Iandunus (Phys. VIII, q. 8). Yet without cause they say that the extension of a quality is necessarily discrete, although its intensification is continuous; the former will also be shown false below.

9. The conclusion is proved first by experience. We see that a hand brought near fire becomes more and more heated and actually feels the heat. Some will say that discontinuation occurs by imperceptible pauses. But since this is asserted gratuitously and without experience or effective reason, it is easily set aside. Next, I ask why in those pauses the agent ceases from its action and why it returns to it. The agent is not voluntary, to cease at its pleasure and then act again; nor can a reason be given on the part of the agent, for I suppose it to have always the same power and an equal or greater proximity to the patient. I likewise suppose that there is no reason on the part of the medium, which is the same. Nor can a reason be given on the part of the patient, which is the same and equally or more disposed to receive the action of the agent. Some respond that the reason is to be taken from the disposition of the patient, which is not equal at the point where the agent repeats the intensive action; by then the patient is more disposed than it was earlier. If you ask whence the patient became more disposed, they say that the agent itself produced that greater disposition. Hence, according to this opinion, although the agent that intensifies the form ceases in some brief pauses from its proper action of intensifying that form, nevertheless it does not simply cease from acting, since it is always disposing the patient to be more apt for receiving another degree of intensification.

10. Those who respond thus do not speak consistently. That disposition made in the subject must necessarily be made continuously in the individual parts of time that intervene between one intensive action and another. For if it is not made continuously, I

shall again ask why that action is interrupted and why the agent returns to it; either one must fall back on another prior disposition (about which the same question will return, and so on to infinity), or seek another reason for such interruption. If that disposition is made in a continuous action, why should not the same be said of the intensive action itself, without superfluously multiplying such actions —especially since, if that action which tends to such a disposition cannot be other than some alteration (and I suppose it is not a local motion of the patient), its continuity can only be an intensification, not an extension, since we are speaking of an action around the same subject according to the same part. Therefore that opinion already admits continuity in the intensive action of some disposition. Add that a disposition prior to the intensification of another quality, say heat, is plainly fictitious. What could that disposition be except another quality? Therefore we must necessarily stop at some first quality, for which no prior disposition is required; the intensification of that first quality, then, cannot be interrupted by a defect of disposition nor occur again because of a greater disposition of the subject. Among physical qualities of this sort, heat and the other primary qualities are the chief cases; for although rarity, for example, seems to be a disposition for heat, nevertheless strictly speaking it is not a prior but a consequent disposition: when heat is produced per se, it is not produced by the intermediate of rarefaction; rather rarefaction follows upon the production of heat. The argument is manifest in light: in pure air it requires no disposition beyond the diaphaneity connatural to air.

11. From this, moreover, an evident argument is drawn. When the sun rises and ascends, for example, into our hemisphere and becomes more and more proximate to this air, it illuminates it more and more continuously. No interruption can intervene on the part of the disposition of the patient, both because no new disposition is per se required in the patient and because, if there happen to be vapors or something similar in the air that impede perfect illumination, that very

thing is not dissipated by the sun except by the action of illuminating. Therefore this action and the intensification of light take place continuously. Soncinas replies that then the interruption of the action does not arise from the disposition of the patient but from the nature of the quality itself, which cannot be produced continuously because it is composed of indivisible degrees. But on the contrary: if this were so, no natural reason could be given why intensification occurs through those short pauses and not through longer ones, or rather why all those changes are not made at once in the same instant. I explain: suppose that in this instant the sun has produced a second degree of light and then, for some subsequent time, ceases, and later in another instant produces a third degree. Since a definite time lies between those two instants, which can be divided into two parts that are continuous at some instant midway between the two extremes, I ask why the sun did not produce the third degree of light at that middle instant. On the part of the form, this is not repugnant, since an interruption of action is posited for some segment of time and those indivisible degrees are posited to be produced by two discrete, instantaneous actions, to which it is irrelevant whether the time between them is longer or shorter. The same argument can be made for any assigned instant; between any two instants lies a time in which earlier instants can be designated, and so on to infinity. No reason for such action can be given from natural causes; one would have to resort to the First Cause to determine the individual instants in which the changes effecting intensification are to be repeated—which is hardly philosophical, especially when no reason or experience compels. Hence it further follows that, in that opinion, all those degrees are produced simultaneously in the same instant; for, as I shall say below, on the part of the form there is no repugnance to being produced thus, just as there is no repugnance to existing simultaneously. Nor will there be repugnance on the part of the agent or the patient, since after some time has passed, without any other change being made in the patient or the agent, the degrees are produced. Therefore there was

sufficient active power on the part of the agent and capacity in the patient; consequently the succession and temporal interruption are irrelevant.

12. Thus by experience and a posteriori it is sufficiently proved that the intensification of a quality can be made by continuous succession. The a priori reason must be sought from a principle contrary to the foundation of the first opinion. The intensive latitude of a quality is not composed of a certain number of indivisible degrees, but is divisible to infinity in the same proportion as a line or other continuous quantity. For just as there are infinitely many proportional parts in a line, so too there are in the intensive latitude of heat, though they are not disjoined in place as the parts of a line are, but only by entitative composition and latitude. That the intensive latitude is of this sort is made manifest to us by the motion and acquisition of such a form. Nor can any other a priori reason be given for that composition than those adduced above concerning the intensive latitude of forms; this is the nature of these qualities—to have this mode of entity and composition, in which no repugnance can be shown, any more than in the composition of a line from its parts divisible to infinity. Therefore, given such a composition of the parts of a quality according to intension, it is not difficult to understand that intensification can be made continuously according to those parts. For when any part of that quality is designated, another smaller part can be designated, since it is divisible ad infinitum; therefore each smaller part can be acquired in a shorter time and a larger part in a longer time; thus the whole intensification can be made by continuous succession.

13. Hence, although in such qualities we are accustomed to divide in thought eight or ten degrees so that we may have a way to speak about them, nevertheless each single degree is not indivisible, but is like an equal part, as when in a line we divide by palms or in time by hours, which are nevertheless divisible to infinity. And so, when heat is intensified to "two" successively, it does not immediately

become "three," but first becomes "two and a half," and first acquires a fourth part of the third degree, and so on without end.

14. Objection. You will say that although this sufficiently explains that continuous succession is not repugnant to intensification on the part of the latitude of the form, nevertheless a sufficient reason has not yet been given why that very latitude of the form is produced successively. For although those parts of the form are distinct in reality and divisible in that way, nonetheless all can be made at once, just as the parts of a line are also distinct and divisible to infinity and yet can be produced simultaneously; or, as with heat, the parts it has on a surface according to extension are distinct and divisible to infinity, just like the parts of the surface, and yet all can be produced simultaneously— for indeed the whole surface can be heated at once. The point is strengthened and clarified by a reason: all those degrees of intension remain simultaneously in the same subject; and if they depend on the agent for their conservation, then the whole action by which they are produced also endures simultaneously in each instant, notwithstanding the distinction and divisibility of that latitude. Therefore, on the same ground, they can be produced simultaneously without any succession. The consequence is clear both because there is no greater difficulty in conservation than in first production and because the parts of the action or change are no more repugnant to being produced simultaneously than the parts of the terminus are to existing simultaneously; for the repugnance of actions must be taken from their termini. Therefore all the parts of that action can be produced simultaneously without any succession; therefore from that consideration alone a sufficient reason for continuous succession is not given.

15. I reply first that this difficulty proceeds equally against discrete succession as against continuous, for the argument aims to prove that all degrees are made at once without any succession. Next we say that the argument rightly concludes that, on the part of the intensive latitude of the quality alone, there is no repugnance to the

intensible quality's being produced either according to its whole latitude or according to some of its degrees simultaneously. Experience confirms this: light suddenly comes to be according to some degrees of intensity; and our will can suddenly break forth into a fervent and intense act of love. This is not contrary to what was said, for we only said that the intensification of a quality can be made continuously; both propositions can be true, since each is indefinite. If you ask which mode of production is more natural to the quality or to its intensification, I answer: according to the diverse conditions of the things that concur in such an action, either mode is more connatural. If, on the part of the intensible quality, you consider its permanence and the fact that all its degrees can exist simultaneously in the same subject, which has sufficient capacity to receive and sustain them all at once—in this respect it is more connatural for such a quality to be produced all at once according to its whole intensity, provided that on the part of the agent there is sufficient power and nothing impedes. And the proposed difficulty sufficiently proves this. But if we consider either the limited power of the agent or the repugnance or indisposition of the patient, then it is more connatural that such intensification be made by continuous succession in the way we have described.

16. Three reasons why intensification is made successively. The first. From this we can gather three causes for which this change is made successively, supposing the latitude or capacity on the part of the terminus. Two are more certain; the other is more doubtful. The first cause is the distance between agent and patient, which is diminished by continuous motion as the agent and patient draw nearer. We experience this cause in the illumination of the sun. The reason is that a limited agent does not act equally on what is distant as on what is close; therefore in the distant part of the patient it does not act at first as much as it absolutely can, but only as much as it can at that distance. Since that distance is diminished successively and continuously, therefore the effect increases successively and

continuously in the same parts of the patient; this increase is intensive. This, then, is the first cause of this continuous succession with respect to natural agents. A proportional cause corresponds among free agents: insofar as they are such, they do not act as much as they can, but as much as they will; and so, if there is no impediment from elsewhere, they can intensify a quality by continuous succession by applying their power more and more. Thus the will can, for some time, love continuously and intensify love.

17. The second cause of succession in intensification. The second cause is the resistance of the subject—either by a contrary quality or by some other disposition repugnant to the introduction of another quality. From this root most often comes the succession we experience in physical and material alteration. Thus wood, even when perfectly applied to a very great fire, is not perfectly heated at once but successively; this arises only from resistance. Since the agent has finite power, it cannot suddenly overcome the resistance of the patient; hence the smaller the resistance, the more rapidly the intensification occurs. The name "alteration," when taken simply among the philosophers, is usually taken for physical, material, and sensible alteration, which takes place between contraries and is a path to generations and corruptions. In this way it is said in De Generatione I that whatever is alterable is corruptible; therefore such alteration is simply called a successive motion. For just as it is natural for these qualities to have a contrary, so it is natural for them to be intensified and perfected successively. Here, however, a special difficulty occurs concerning the intensification of habits, which I shall take up immediately.

18. The third cause of succession in intensification. The third cause of this succession can be the mere limitation or imperfection of the agent's power. From this it can follow that the agent cannot produce the whole effect at once; thus it produces it little by little and by parts. This cause differs from the preceding because, setting aside the resistance of the patient and removing all distance between agent

and patient, precisely because the agent has imperfect power, it is determined to such a mode of acting that it cannot produce all the degrees of the form's latitude at once, but one after another. A varying disposition of the subject also concurs in this: when in the beginning it is not disposed to such a quality, the agent can introduce into it only a minimal degree; by this degree it is disposed to a further degree; and thus, by each degree to the next more perfect degree. For this reason the intensification is made successively. An example can be given in the intensification of habits. An act that produces a habit does not at once bestow all the intensity that it can, even when there is no contrary act in potency. As we said above, the first act produces the habit; it is not likely that it produces at once a habit equal to itself with respect to all degrees of intensity. Indeed, many think that the first act produces nothing and that the fourth or fifth produces something in virtue of the preceding acts. We, however, think it necessary that each act effect something—otherwise a later act could not be helped by the preceding. We add that it is probable that a habit produced by a first or second act cannot be so perfect or intense as that which can be produced by many similar acts. Hence it seems to be concluded that the first act, from the imperfection of the active power alone, cannot at once produce a habit adequate to itself in intensity.

A Special Difficulty Concerning the Intensification of Habits

19. You will say: at least in the intensification of habits it is true that it is not made by continuous succession but by discrete changes. One act suddenly seems to produce some degree of intensity, and afterwards another act adds another portion of intensity, and so with the rest. I reply: even if this be conceded, there is no inconvenience; for we have not said that every intensification of a quality is made by continuous succession. Here there intervenes a special cause on account of which it is not made continuously: as

many acts as are varied, so many agents concur in intensification; and each acts suddenly as much as it can.

20. To explain both responses, note that the power of each act to produce or intensify a habit can be understood in two ways. First, that no single act by itself suffices to produce a habit equal to itself in intensity, but only to produce some degree of habit in a certain proportion—e.g., that an act of degree "four" can introduce the first degree of habit into a bare potency; and in a potency already having the first degree, it can introduce the second, and so on. Since these acts by their nature have a perfective and not a corruptive action, it can further be added that it is probable that each act suddenly produces as much as it can according to the disposition and capacity of the power; so that if the latter is more or less disposed, or even affected by a contrary quality, the act can also produce more or less—yet always suddenly—producing at once all that here and now it can with respect to a subject so disposed. If these things are true, it follows rightly that the intensification of a habit is made by discrete little changes; and the first mode of responding holds.

21. Second, the activity of acts can be understood thus: the active power of each act is not limited to only one degree of a habit unequal to itself, but can, as far as depends on itself, produce a habit equal to itself in intensity—yet not able to produce the effect adequate to itself suddenly, but proceeding little by little from the imperfect to the perfect. This is likely, first, because since the act is more perfect than the habit acquired through it, there is no reason why it should not be of itself effective of the habit according to its whole intensity, since the active power is proportioned to the entity of the form and increases through each of its degrees. Second, because, supposing that the first act does not produce a habit equal to itself in intensity, it is probable that the second act increases that habit equally; and both points become very probable from experience, as I have shown above. Therefore the same persevering act in a power will also more and more intensify the habit produced by itself in the first instant. The

consequence is clear: that persevering act is not, physically speaking, less efficacious than another equal act; and from the fact that it produced something in the first instant, its power is not diminished so as not to be able to produce afterwards as long as it exists, if the subject is capable. Therefore the same persevering act can intensify the habit it has produced. Experience also seems to show this: other things being equal, one acquires a firmer habit by a prolonged act in which one has persevered for a long time than by a brief transient act; this is a sign that the same act is active—at least when the habit has not yet reached a perfection equal to it. Thus it follows that an act, as far as depends on itself, has power to produce a habit equal to itself, although it cannot exercise all that efficacy at once, but only little by little, because of the limitation and determination of such power, as we said in the third cause. To this can be added that there is not lacking some resistance on the part of the subject receptive of the habit, on account of its indetermination and indifference, as we asserted above (disp. XLIV). For if the agent has sufficient power, it is difficult to understand why it is determined to that mode of acting if neither the subject resists in any way nor is instantaneous production repugnant to the form. Thus that third cause seems to be limited and almost to coincide with the second; the only difference will lie in the mode of the repugnance or resistance on the part of the subject.

22. A habit can be intensified by continuous succession, and how. With this principle laid down, it clearly follows that the intensification of a habit can also be made by continuous succession. For if the same persevering act in a power can intensify the habit it produced at the beginning, then necessarily it will intensify it successively and continuously as long as the same agent remains equally applied and has the same power and reason for acting during the whole time. The arguments made above concerning other agents apply here as well. This can be especially confirmed if the same act in a power is itself continuously increased, as we said it can be; for then, by reason of the greater continuous intension, it will also continuously

increase the habit more and more. Finally, this seems most necessary when the power is affected by a contrary habit at a degree incompatible with the other; then even by the habit the power resists the intensification of the other habit, and therefore the action cannot be instantaneous but successive. It will be difficult to establish a difference here between contrary habits and other opposed qualities; and this was the difficulty referred above to this place.

23. The foundations of the opposite opinion are overturned. As to the foundations of the contrary opinion, insofar as they consist of authorities, an answer has been given: the Doctors do not deny that a motion of alteration or augmentation can be continuous; they deny that it always occurs continuously, that is, without interruption or through a whole life or for a long time— and this does not arise from the intrinsic nature of such a motion or its terminus, but from the manifold variation of things and causes in the universe. Philosophers treat this more broadly when speaking of the augmentation of bodies. The reasoning for that opinion will be more conveniently resolved in the following section.

SECTIO IV

WHETHER THE INTENSIVE LATITUDE OF QUALITIES HAS DEFINITE TERMINI OF INTENSIFICATION AND REMISSION

1. Philosophers are accustomed to treat this question in Physics I, where they dispute in general about maximal and minimal termini of all things that can receive increase or decrease. Yet for our purpose this discussion is necessary here, both to refute the foundation of the contrary opinion proposed in the preceding section and because, although extensive increase (which follows upon matter and quantity) and its termini belong to physical consideration,

nevertheless intensive increase abstracted from matter and quantity belongs per se to the metaphysician to treat, as do its termini.

The Sense of the Question

2. The sense of the question is whether a quality having intensive latitude determines for itself some definite degree or portion of its entity which, as a minimum, it requires in order to be able to exist—so that it cannot be produced or conserved in a more remiss degree. This is for the quality to be terminated at a minimum. To be terminated at a maximum is for there to be some terminus of that entity beyond which its intensification cannot proceed. Although philosophers are accustomed to distinguish two kinds of termini of greatness and smallness, namely intrinsic and extrinsic—calling, in smallness, the minimum "which is so" and the maximum "which is not," and in greatness, the maximum "which is so" and the minimum "which is not"—we do not need that distinction here. For if these qualities have termini, it is certain that they are extrinsic and not intrinsic, as will be clear from what follows.

The First Opinion, Teaching That There is a Minimum in Intension

3. Many think that these qualities are terminated at a minimum with respect to smallness. So holds Soncinas (In Metaph. VIII, q. 13); the same seems to follow in Iandunus (Phys. VI, q. 15), in Aegidius (De Generatione I, q. 25), and in Toledo there (q. 7). There is, however, a difference among these authors. Soncinas thinks that minimum to be something simply indivisible in its entity, both as regards composition of parts (which it lacks) and as regards the mode of affecting the subject more or less; for, according to the account that explains intensification in this way, that minimal degree is posited as incapable of intensification, since in its mode of affecting it receives no

variation but has indivisibility. But this sense presupposes the false opinion impugned above—namely, that the whole intensive latitude is composed of indivisible degrees—and therefore I set it aside. In another way the opinion is understood: that in the intensive latitude of a quality no part can be designated which is not composed of parts, and therefore in the total entity no part can be designated so small that a smaller one cannot be designated. Nevertheless some part can be designated so small or so remiss that a smaller or more remiss one cannot be conserved or exist as it were separated from the other parts. In other words, there is no minimal degree of remission existing "in" the whole quality, but there is a minimal degree capable of separate existence, because the quality cannot be produced or conserved under a lesser intension.

4. This opinion so explained can be recommended, first, because every permanent thing begins by its first instant of being; therefore every intensible quality does so. Therefore it determines for itself a certain degree in which, as a minimum, it must be produced in an instant, by its first instant of being; otherwise, if a lesser and lesser were always producible, it would not have a determined beginning but would begin in successive time. Indeed, it is scarcely intelligible that fire begins to introduce heat into water and does not first produce some determined portion of heat that is like a foundation of the rest. Second, because every form determines for itself a certain definite mode of being; therefore, just as a substantial form determines for itself certain dispositions in a definite degree, and a potency a determinate act, so an intensible quality determines a certain mode or degree of remission. The point is confirmed in vital acts: the will cannot love nor the intellect attend except with some definite intension. For this reason, too, these qualities are said to be terminated at a maximum, namely because the essence of such a form is limited and therefore determines for itself a definite mode of being; the same reason, then, holds for the terminus of remission as for the terminus of intensification.

The Contrary Opinion is Set Forth

5. Nevertheless others think that these qualities are not terminated in themselves at a minimal remission, but that, no matter what part be designated, they can, as far as depends on themselves, be produced or conserved under a lesser degree, separately from any further intension. Thus Soto thinks (In Phys. I, q. 4, a. 3, concl. 5), as do the Conimbricenses (In Phys. I, c. 4, q. 1). Aristotle favors this opinion (Phys. VI, c. 6, texts 53–54), where he proves that in every motion from contrary to contrary there is, before anything changed, some motion, and before any part of motion another smaller part; thus the division proceeds to infinity, or one can arrive at the least part of motion. This doctrine is general to all true motion and includes alteration, as all explain. The same reason applies to the terminus of motion as to motion itself, especially in the motion of intensive alteration; for the space of its divisibility is nothing other than its intensive latitude; therefore a minimum according to intension cannot be given in the terminus of such a change. The point is also proved by reason: in these qualities there is no minimal degree "inexisting" according to intension; therefore neither is there a minimal degree per se existing or separable from further intension. The antecedent is proved because the intensive latitude of a quality is after the manner of the continuous and is therefore divisible to infinity; thus, by designating something in the whole quality, a minimal part in it existing cannot be designated.

6. The consequence can be proved in various ways. First, by proportion to continuous quantity: in it, just as there is no minimal non-existing part, so neither is there a minimal per se existing part, as far as regards the very quantitative nature. The same holds (according to the truer opinion) of the extension of a quality which it has on a surface or continuous quantity; and as in it there is no minimal extension of a part non-existing, so neither of a part per se separated.

The same proportion seems to hold for degrees of intension. Second, because the lower degree in intension does not per se depend on the higher— the first does not depend on the second, nor the second on the third— but rather conversely the higher depends on the lower as on something like matter, for it per se presupposes it. This reason holds for any lower part of such a degree with respect to a further degree; therefore any minimal part designable in an intense quality does not per se depend on all the remaining perfection of the total intension added to it. Therefore, speaking per se, it can be conserved without it; consequently any smaller and smaller part that can exist in the whole quality could also exist per se. This is the only reason why, according to extension, any part of a line, however small, can per se exist without the others: it does not depend on them; and the same is true of any minimal heat according to extension. Therefore the same is true according to intension. Third, otherwise, if a form were gradually remitted and in some instant reached a certain minimal intension below which it could not be conserved, such a form would cease by the last instant of its being. For in that instant it would exist, and immediately after it could not exist— otherwise it would already be less than the minimum, since immediately after that instant it would become more remiss. Other arguments are commonly made to confirm this opinion, taken from the succession of motion and from action uniformly difform through the sphere of activity; they are not so effective, and I omit them.

The Latter Opinion is Preferable

7. Neither of these opinions can be evidently demonstrated. Considering the nature of an intensive quality and the mode of composition of its entity which we have explained above, the second opinion seems more probable and more apt to understand the mode of continuous alteration by which intensification or remission is made, as well as the mode of inception and cessation of these qualities. It

must only be noted first that it is one thing to speak of these qualities in themselves, another to speak of them insofar as they are properties or dispositions of such forms. In the latter way, it is certain that they can be terminated at a minimal degree of intension, because the case is not the same in all forms but varies according to the variety of forms. For each substantial form, just as it has a determinate nature and intensive perfection, so it demands a determinate disposition both in species and in degree of intension; in this way we say that the quality can be terminated at a minimum either intrinsically in the way of generation (that is, in the connatural state of such a form) or at least extrinsically in a preternatural state (that is, in conservation, as they speak). Here, however, we are not considering a quality as a disposition to a substantial form, but in itself and according to its own entity, with extrinsic impediments or contrary agents set aside. In this sense we say that a quality is not terminated at a minimum. For if a quality is to be in its connatural and perfect state, it ought to have its intension in its integrity, which can be called minimal— or rather unique— for the perfect state of such a quality. When that is diminished, the quality begins to be in an imperfect state; and in that state it has no definite terminus of smallness, since it can always proceed from imperfect to more imperfect, and conversely it can successively acquire the whole latitude of its entity.

8. Second, it must be considered that it is one thing to speak of the parts of a quality, another to speak of its continuative or terminative indivisibles. I am of the opinion that here too the proportion between intensive and extensive latitude is preserved: just as there are parts divisible to infinity in them, so there are certain indivisibles that continue or terminate such parts. The reason is entirely the same; nor otherwise can the true union and continuity of such parts be conveniently understood, nor the continuity of the motion that is the intensification of such a quality. For in that motion there are parts and changed states, and in them something must be made which can be nothing but indivisible.

9. In divisible forms there are indivisibles that terminate and continue. Hence I gather that just as in heat "at eight" there is an indivisible of heat that continues the seventh degree with the eighth and the sixth with the seventh, and so for all the other degrees and divisible parts that are continued among themselves, so too there is some ultimate indivisible that terminates it. Likewise, because heat "at eight," as such, begins by its first instant of being— it begins at that instant in which the motion of intensification ends and is completed — at which instant it is true to say: "now there is no intensification, and immediately before this there was," and conversely: "now there is heat at eight, and immediately before this there was not." Therefore, in that instant, something has been added that consummates and, as it were, constitutes heat "at eight"; this can be nothing but the indivisible terminus of heat. For all the parts of heat had been acquired through all the parts of the motion during the entire preceding time.

10. From this we further conclude that, on the other extreme of such intensive latitude, there is given an ultimate or first indivisible terminus initiating and from that side terminating heat; for the proportion and reason are the same. Every finite continuum is enclosed by two termini; herein lies the difference between successive and permanent things: in successive being, the termini are extrinsic because they are not simultaneous with the whole, whereas in permanent being they are intrinsic because they actually remain with the whole and in their way compose it, as is clear in the two extreme points of a line. The same holds for any other permanent continuum. No reason can be given why the intensive latitude of a quality should have continuative indivisibles and one terminative on one extreme and not another on the other extreme. Therefore there is given an indivisible terminus on both sides of this latitude. When we say that there is no minimum in these qualities, it must be understood of the qualities with respect to some divisible part or latitude—which alone deserves the name of "quality"; for this indivisible is better called the beginning of the quality. Thus, speaking of it, it cannot be denied that

there is in a quality something minimal, even not existing "in" the quality, namely that indivisible in which (so to speak) the entire intensive latitude of the quality is as it were initiated and founded. If we conceive a line ascending from the center to some point, in that line we shall not be able to designate a minimal point "toward the center," but we can designate the point existing at the center, which is as it were the base of the whole line. In this way the intensive latitude of a quality must be conceived. Whether that first indivisible can not only be designated in the whole, but can sometimes for some time or instant exist by itself without the other parts of the quality, I shall presently say in answering the foundations of the contrary opinion.

The Foundations of the First Opinion Are Answered, & the Inception of Qualities Is Explained

11. The first reason of the contrary opinion is taken from the mode of beginning of such qualities. To this one could answer in a word that a permanent thing, as far as depends on itself, begins by its first instant of being if nothing else hinders—because, as we said above, even an intensible quality, as far as depends on itself, is made whole at once just as it is whole at once. But on account of the conditions of the agent or the patient, just as it is not repugnant for a permanent thing not to be made whole at once but part by part, so it is not repugnant for it to begin by its last non-being, so that before any part of it another smaller part is made; then it does not begin by an indivisible change nor at the ending of a successive motion, but at the inception of successive alteration or intensification.

12. To make this clearer, let us distinguish between potency, intension, and the proper production of the whole quality. Whenever only intensification is properly begun, the quality is already presupposed as produced and terminated up to a certain degree by the intrinsic indivisible terminus of that degree, and a further degree begins to be added to it. Then the matter is sufficiently clear: that

degree of the quality which is made by that intensification and is added to the pre-existing quality— although it is a permanent thing— does not begin by the first instant of its being but by the last instant of its non-being, because it does not begin in any determinate part of the quality; before any part a smaller part is produced. Nor does it begin according to some indivisible, because in the pre-existing quality the last indivisible terminus of the pre-existing degree was presupposed; that terminus is not corrupted by further intensification, since, as we have often said, by intensification nothing positive is taken away from the quality pre-existing in a remiss state. Nor is another indivisible terminus added immediately, because in a continuous latitude two indivisibles are not immediate. Therefore by intensification it happens that the indivisible which previously was terminative now begins to be continuative through the addition of parts of the same quality, among which there is no minimal part, nor another that is made whole at once. For this reason it is easy to understand that the degree of intension begins by the last instant of non-being. The same is evident in extension when, for instance, illumination, which in this instant reaches intrinsically up to this surface of the air, immediately goes beyond it in the next instant by the sun's approach. Whatever light is understood to be in the parts of the air that are beyond such a surface begins to be by the last instant of its non-being, because it does not begin simultaneously in some determinate part of the air, but before any part in a smaller part. Thus the action proceeds continuously as the sun itself approaches more and more; the same holds for intension, and in this there seems to be no difficulty.

13. A small doubt. But when a quality first begins in a subject, the difficulty is whether then something of the quality must be introduced at once and indivisibly which is the foundation of the whole quality, and in which the quality begins by its first instant of being. Authors of the contrary opinion deem this necessary and therefore posit a minimum in the quality. Others absolutely deny that this is necessary even in the first inception, and thus they easily meet

the argument. According to what we have said, there is a peculiar difficulty: in the quality there is given some initiatory indivisible, as we have said; therefore it seems at least that this must be made first in some instant indivisibly. Yet it does not seem able to be made alone as if separated from all parts, because such indivisibles cannot naturally exist so; therefore at least for this reason it is necessary that something of the quality be made simultaneously, which will be a minimum of intension in it.

14. Two ways to satisfy this doubt. We can proceed in two ways. First, by admitting that the introduction of a quality always begins by its first instant of being in some indivisible—either alone or together with some parts— not because of the necessity of a minimum but because of other natural causes. Second, one can readily defend that even in the first introduction qualities often begin by the last instant of non-being. To clarify both, I presuppose that these qualities are sometimes produced with the resistance of the patient, sometimes without it. I also presuppose that their efficient cause sometimes acts by necessity of nature, sometimes freely and voluntarily. When the agent acts naturally and without resistance, it acts all at once as much as it can—either absolutely, or according to the capacity and application of the patient. Because this power of acting is never determined to only one indivisible of the quality but either to the whole of it or to some definite degree, such a quality is always produced at once by such an agent—either according to some degree or part of it— not because the quality is terminated at a minimum, but because the agent is determined to act thus. Hence in the nearer part it acts more, and less and less in the more remote parts, until it reaches the terminus of its sphere of activity. If that terminus is intrinsic, as is probable, it will produce in it— that is, on the ultimate surface of its sphere of activity— the least quality that it can effect. From this, however, no minimum of the quality as such follows; for by another voluntary or weaker agent that quality could be made more remiss. If the sphere of activity is terminated extrinsically, as others

think, then that agent will do nothing on that terminus, that is, on the ultimate surface; but within it, throughout the whole space, it will act uniformly difform, always acting more remissly in the more distant part. Yet that whole action might lie above some designated definite or divisible degree. From this mode of acting, therefore, we can infer neither that there is a minimum in these qualities nor that there is not. If the agent is free, it can, by its liberty, apply its power to act more or less; thus, although we grant that it always produces at once some part of the quality, nevertheless not a determinate one, but at its choice it can produce a smaller and smaller one. From this mode of acting a minimum is not inferred but rather the opposite.

15. The same is to be said of our vital acts insofar as they depend on liberty and are made in an instant in us. It is more likely that it is not in our power to produce only some indivisible terminus of such a quality. It is also probable that, regularly and in the human way of speaking, we always apply our powers to produce these acts with an intension greater than any minimal one that can be conceived —not because such intension is simply necessary for the existence of such a quality, but because we do not apply our powers to act in that mathematical manner, but physically and, so to speak, confusedly, so as to produce something perceptible; thus we are determined to a greater intension than is strictly necessary for the being of the act. God, however, or another agent that could distinctly discern among the minimal parts of a quality, could produce such a quality in any minimal degree; and at least with respect to God there would be no repugnance in only a single indivisible being produced.

16. But when these qualities are produced with the resistance of the patient or by an agent of limited power, then succession and inception by the last instant of non-being seem more necessary. Some say that even then some degree or part of the quality is always introduced first in an instant, because, for the agent to act at all, there is a proportion of excess on the part of the patient; and according to that excess something is first produced at once, and afterwards

intensification is continued successively. But even if we grant this, it does not follow that there is a minimum in these qualities, because even within that proportion and excess there is no minimum; the quality can be less and less ad infinitum. Thus, even if we grant that something is always made at once in an instant, nevertheless with respect to diverse agents and diverse proportions it can be less and less intense. Moreover, that mode of acting does not seem necessary; otherwise, after the agent produced that part of the quality in the patient in an instant, it would overcome the resistance much more than before; therefore it would produce more in each instant than in that one— which conflicts with succession. Indeed, there would be no sufficient reason for succession; for in the same instant in which that degree is produced, the agent remains with the same or greater proportion; therefore immediately, without any succession, it could produce a more perfect effect.

17. Therefore, if in that case the agent first introduces something into the patient in an instant, that something is nothing but the first indivisible of the quality to be introduced; for to overcome the resistance with respect to that, an instantaneous pause suffices. Nor does it seem incongruous for that indivisible to be made in this way, because it is only, as it were, in becoming, and in that state it does not remain except for an instant; immediately afterwards something of the quality is joined to it; and for that moment alone it is in actual emanation from its agent. If this is not acceptable, one must say that whenever a quality begins with the resistance of the patient, it begins successively and by the last instant of non-being— more slowly or more rapidly according to the greater or lesser proportion between activity and resistance. Then that indivisible can also begin by the last instant of non-being, because it does not begin adequately and by itself alone, but together with other parts and after their manner—just as in extensive succession it must necessarily be said.

18. From these points the first reason and all the foundations left in the preceding section have been answered. The second reason,

with the induction made there, has also been dispatched: the intensification of a quality is not a disposition to it, but a kind of its integrity; therefore a determinate intension is required for its consummate perfection, but not simply for its being.

On the Maximal Terminus of Intension

19. Natural qualities claim a terminus with respect to greatness. From this it is easy to answer the third argument, in which the second principal part of this question is touched on, namely the maximal terminus of intension. It must be said that qualities of the natural order determine for themselves a certain degree of highest intension to which they can reach by nature. First, because each thing determines for itself a certain mode of intrinsic perfection, such as intension. Second, because these qualities are commensurate with the substantial forms of which they are properties, or with finite natural agents by which they can be produced. Therefore the case is not similar with respect to the terminus of smallness: a thing which in its natural state demands a certain integrity retains in a preternatural and imperfect state as much of its entity as it can, however small it be; and a finite agent, though it cannot exceed a certain perfection of effect, can within that limit produce a smaller and smaller effect. I have spoken of natural qualities, because supernatural and per se infused qualities have no definite terminus of their increase, for particular reasons which the theologians consider at length. I have also spoken of this intension by nature, because God by His power could intensify such qualities more and more, since no contradiction appears involved in this. This suffices to have said about qualities.

DISPUTATION XLVII

ON REAL RELATION IN GENERAL

After the two preceding genera of quantity and quality, Aristotle treats of "toward something" (ad aliquid) in Metaphysics V, chapter 15. He does not do so because, in its own entity, it is more perfect than all the last six categories—for the Commentator says in Metaphysics XII, commentary 19, that relation is of the least entity among all the genera; how true that is will become clear from what follows. Aristotle seems, then, to have observed not an order of perfection, but an order of teaching, both because the doctrine pertaining to this category is more universal, and also because it is in a certain way necessary for the knowledge of the other categories, which for the most part seem to consist in relation. Moreover, very many relations follow closely upon quantity and quality. We shall therefore first consider relation in general: whether it exists, what it is, how many kinds there are, and what properties or causes it has. Then we shall discuss more particularly the chief kinds of relations and their foundations and termini.

SECTION I

WHETHER RELATION IS A TRUE GENUS OF REAL BEING, DISTINCT FROM THE OTHERS

Section I

Various Reasons by Which the Whole Difficulty of This Category is Proposed

1. First. One may doubt because relation as relation posits nothing real in the thing said to be referred; therefore it cannot constitute a real genus of being. The consequence is evident, since a real genus is founded upon a real being which exists in the nature of things and posits something; but relation, as predicated of created things (for such is our present topic), cannot be anything real in the nature of things, if it posits nothing in the very thing related. It certainly posits nothing in the terminus, as is self-evident, even if perhaps it presupposes it (of which below), nor does it remain in itself, since it is not a substance; therefore, if it posits nothing in the related thing itself, it is absolutely nothing real. The antecedent is proved, first, because "toward," as "toward," does not name a real notion, both because it is univocally and in its whole propriety attributed to relations of reason, and also because "toward," as "toward," abstracts from "being in"; therefore, as such, it posits nothing real in anything. Otherwise, according to its proper and ultimate notion, it would include inherence, which is repugnant; therefore relation posits nothing real in the thing which it refers. The consequence is clear, because relation as relation says nothing other than "being toward," as Aristotle says when he defines relatives as those things whose whole being is to be ordered to another.

2. Second. A relative denomination, when newly accruing to something, does not alter it nor make it to be otherwise in reality than before, Aristotle saying in Physics V, text 10, that relation comes without a change in the thing; therefore relation posits nothing in such a thing. The consequence is clear, for it is impossible to understand that something real is newly added to a subject and that the subject is not in reality otherwise than before; for if something is added to it, it has something it previously did not have, and this is

precisely to be otherwise disposed. What some answer—that it does not have "something," but "toward something"—seems a play on words. I ask whether that "toward something" is something. If it is, then one who newly has a "toward something" also newly has something; therefore he is otherwise disposed and changed. If the "toward something" is not something, then it is nothing; and that is what we assert.

3. Third. This is further clarified: relation, as relation, is nothing besides absolutes; therefore it is simply nothing. The consequence is clear because, when we ask whether relation is anything real, we treat it as it is distinguished from or abstracted from absolute things; otherwise, how will it be a distinct genus of being? The antecedent is proved thus. If we posit, for example, two white things in the nature of things, then by the force of the absolute qualities they have, they are similar to each other. Therefore they have that relative denomination by the force of absolutes existing together, or taken together, without any other real addition; therefore relation adds nothing real to absolute things. Both consequences are manifest because, if relation is anything, it is only on account of that relative denomination which seems to intervene between those absolutes; if, then, this very denomination is taken from the absolutes alone, whatever else is adjoined is fictitious. The antecedent is further proved thus: if we posit two white things in the nature of things, and either by the mind separate from them every other real that could be added, or by God's absolute power suppose it to be separated or impeded, nevertheless those two will remain similar to each other; nor can the mind conceive otherwise, because they necessarily retain a formal unity, and to be similar is nothing other than to have qualities of the same kind. If someone replies that this is truly said of things similar fundamentally, not formally, he certainly begs the question. For this is precisely our intention: that there is no other denomination there except the one called fundamental; this is sufficient for those things to

be truly similar, and that other formal denomination is either nothing or, at most, a consideration of reason.

4. And this is confirmed, for in the same way many similar denominations are preserved without any addition that is intrinsically made in the denominated thing. Thus God is said to be Creator or Lord in time; thus a column is called right or left; thus a wall is said to be "seen," and so on. Therefore, by the same reasoning, every similar denomination can sufficiently be preserved without the addition of a relation that is something real. If someone says that in the examples proposed there is lacking a foundation on the part of the denominated things, we will answer that perhaps this is not universally true (as we shall treat below), and that it is not a satisfactory reply. For if a thing that has no foundation can be denominated relatively by the position of another, even though nothing real is added to it, then much more can a thing that has some foundation, by its force and by the coexistence of the other, be so denominated precisely without the addition of any respective reality. Therefore such respects are nothing real over and above the absolute.

5. Fourth. We can argue further (and this is another principal reason for doubting): even if we grant that relation is something real, nevertheless it cannot constitute a new genus of being different from the others. Proof: an order to another is intrinsically included in every real concept of created being. For, first, every created being, precisely as such—even substance itself—expresses a relation of essential dependence upon the uncreated being, and thus it is analogically a being or a substance in comparison to that. Likewise every accident expresses an essential relation to its subject, on account of which it is said to be the being of a being rather than a being. Again, in each genus of accidents distinct relations are found: quantity, precisely as continuous, expresses an essential relation to the termini by which it is continued, and conversely a point and other similar termini express an essential relation to the parts of which they are termini. Among qualities, power expresses an essential relation to its object; and of

science, and consequently of habit and disposition, Aristotle confesses in the chapter on Quality that they are "toward something."

6. He adds that being "toward something" according to generic notions belongs to science in general, but not according to specific ones; for, he says, science is toward the knowable, but grammar as such is not toward anything. But this is, first of all, false. For although perhaps the names are not imposed so clearly, nevertheless in reality, just as science in common says a relation to the knowable in common, so this science says a relation to this object. Next, this does not pertain to the present difficulty. For genus and species belong to the same category; therefore, if this science in species is a quality, then science in common is a genus of the category of quality; therefore, since it is also "toward something," it will be impossible that those things which are "toward something" be located in a special category. Much less satisfactory is what Aristotle immediately subjoins, that it is not absurd for the same thing to be placed under quality and under relation if both belong to it. For the same thing cannot be essentially constituted in diverse categories. But science, for example, is not only accidentally but essentially "toward something," both because its whole entity is intrinsically ordered to the knowable, as Aristotle confesses in the chapter on "toward something," and because otherwise, if science were related to the knowable only accidentally, science itself would not be constituted under the genus of relation, but that relation which comes to it accidentally; which is against Aristotle in the same chapter on Quality. The same difficulty presses regarding the last six categories, which, by everyone's admission, include some relation; and Aristotle expressly says this of position (situs) in the Categories, and we shall speak similarly of the others in their proper places. Therefore this notion of "toward something" is transcendental and included in every entity, especially in created entity; thus it does not constitute a special genus.

7. Two responses are usually given to this last difficulty. The first is that all the things we have enumerated in the other categories

are relative only according to being said (secundum dici), whereas those that constitute the special category are relative according to being (secundum esse). But this response is easily refuted if we ask what is signified by "relative according to being said." Either the things are so called about which we speak as if they were relatives, although they have no relation among themselves in reality; or they are called thus certain things which do have in reality some relation, yet of another sort than real relation. The first cannot be said, both because science not only in the mode of speaking but in reality has its being ordered to the knowable, and power to its object, and so with the rest; and also because, if these relative denominations or expressions are said to be in our mode of speaking and not in reality, the same will be said of every similar denomination; nor will any probable way be left for positing real relations of this sort, for they are chiefly gathered from such denominations. If the second member is chosen, one must explain what these "habitudes" are, or how they are distinguished from relations, or to what end relations of a different kind than such "habitudes" are necessary. And in this another response is indicated, together with its difficulty. It is said that in the aforementioned things of the other categories there are included transcendental respects, not proper predicamental relations, which constitute a special genus. But immediately, concerning such a partition, one must ask why it is necessary to multiply these diverse modes of respects. For if the transcendental respect is true and real, it suffices for all relative denominations that are not purely extrinsic denominating; therefore it is superfluous to feign other relations. Then one will have to explain what the difference is between such respects, or why one constitutes a special genus and another does not.

Various Opinions are Proposed

8. First. These seem to be the chief difficulties that occur concerning real relation in general. Others that could be offered

regarding the particular kinds of relations will be proposed below. Therefore, on account of these difficulties, there are two ways to speak. The first is that there are no true real relations, but that all the denominations which are explained after the mode of relations are taken from the absolutes themselves or from their coexistence. This opinion is reported by Averroes, Metaphysics XII, commentary 19, and by Avicenna, Metaphysics III, chapter 10; and Aureolus followed it, as Capreolus reports on I, distinction 30, question 1.

9. Second. Another opinion can be that there are indeed real relations in things, yet they do not constitute a special genus of being, but are a certain transcendental condition that can be included in all beings. Soto attributes this opinion to Zeno and the philosophers earlier than Plato, at the beginning of the category "toward something," following Albert and Alexander there.

10. Third. Now the received opinion, and as it were a philosophical and common axiom, is that in created things there are real relations which constitute their own proper special category. This was the opinion of Plato; Aristotle followed him; and all his interpreters—Averroes, Simplicius, and all the other Greeks and Latins—followed Aristotle; and the theologians imitated them: St. Thomas (I, q. 13, a. 7; q. 28, a. 1–2, and often elsewhere), Capreolus and others on I, d. 33; Gregory at length on d. 28, q. 1; Henry, Quodlibet III, q. 4, and Quodlibet IX, q. 3. This is held not only on philosophical reasons but also because that opinion is more apt for explaining the mystery of the Trinity, and seems to be greatly confirmed by it.

11. For the Catholic faith teaches that there are in God three real relations which constitute and distinguish the divine Persons; whence there arises an evident argument that the concept of relation as such, without adding "created" or "uncreated," is not fictitious; and that for something to be referred is not an extrinsic denomination arising only from the mind's comparison, but is something real, since in God it is something real. Hence, with great probability, it is further

gathered that even in created things there can be something real of this sort. For either it would be repugnant to created things on account of their perfection, or on account of their imperfection. The first cannot be said; for if relation is not repugnant to the supreme perfection of God, why should it be repugnant to the perfection of a creature? You will say: because that relation in God is substantial, whereas in a creature it must be accidental. But on the contrary: relation as such is no more repugnant to being accidental than to being substantial, for just as accident says "to be in another," so substance says "to be in itself." If, therefore, "being toward another" can be conjoined with the latter, much more with the former; and besides, a creature as such is not repugnant to a real accident; therefore neither will such a relation, which, although accidental, is something real, be repugnant to it. Nor indeed can it be repugnant on account of imperfection, because relation as relation does not express imperfection; and if any imperfection is joined to it from the fact that it is accidental, such imperfection is not beyond the latitude of a created thing. By this theological argument, therefore, it seems to be efficaciously proved that there can be, and in fact there are, real respects in created things.

12. From arguments drawn from natural reason alone this is usually proved chiefly from relative locutions and denominations that exist in the things themselves without any fiction of the intellect, and must therefore be founded in some real being. They are not founded in an absolute; therefore in a relative. Therefore in things there is a real relative being. The antecedent is evident in such denominations as "greater," "less," "equal," "similar," "near," "far," "father," "son," and the like. For all these plainly express a bearing toward another without which they can neither exist nor be understood, and they exist in the things themselves, as seems self-evident.

13. How much force these proofs have we shall see in what follows; for the latter natural argument depends in great part on the solutions to the objections, which we cannot give unless we first explain many things about the distinction and division of relations.

The theological argument does not seem to some sufficient to show predicamental relations, because the divine relations are outside every category; and if God were in the category of substance, those relations would pertain or be reduced to that same category, since they are the personalities of the divine nature—just as created personalities or substances pertain to that very category. Hence neither is the argument from the likeness of divine paternity to created paternity very efficacious, because divine paternity is not the result or consequent of generation, but rather constitutes the Person who is the principle of generation. And thus that uncreated paternity, just as it is substantial, can be considered as quasi-transcendental, that is, intimately included in the adequate concept of such a being, or of a personal substance. From those relations, therefore, predicamental relations do not seem to be derivable; at most real transcendental respects intimately included in certain beings.

14. Another proof of said relations is usually taken more specifically from the order of the universe, which is something accidental with respect to the absolute things of which the universe consists. For even if the elements and the heavens were constituted in another order, the absolute things themselves would be the same; therefore the order they now have is something accidental to them. And it is not something invented by reason, for it is manifest of itself to be in the things themselves and to belong greatly to the perfection of the universe, as Aristotle attests in Metaphysics XII, text 52; and it is nothing other than relation, which must belong of itself to its own category, because it is not of the intrinsic notion of any absolute thing, nor can it be designated as belonging to or being referred to any of the other categories. Nevertheless this proof suffers from the difficulties touched upon when arguing. For the order pertaining to the perfection of the universe amounts to this: that individual bodies are constituted in their natural places; this is absolute in individuals, and in all together it expresses their coexistence. That a special accident

follows upon this, namely a real relation, seems to contribute nothing to the perfection of the universe.

Resolution of the Question

15. Nonetheless, we presuppose as true and philosophically certain the third and common opinion, which we now confirm especially by authority. Its reason and proof must chiefly be taken from those relative denominations, adding two points. First, that they are of such a sort as to accrue to created absolute things, and can vary in some subject without the loss of the absolute form—which is sufficiently clear in almost all the examples adduced above. Second, that these are not merely extrinsic denominations; and here lies the difficulty, but it depends on what will be said below. For we must first declare the mode of entity of such relations and denominations.

SECTION II
WHETHER A REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATION IS DISTINGUISHED, REALLY OR MODALLY AND BY NATURE, FROM SUBSTANCE AND FROM ALL ABSOLUTE ACCIDENTS

1. This question is most necessary for explaining in what sense created relations are something real, what they are, and what sort of entity they have. On it there are various opinions.

The First Opinion Positing a Real Distinction is Rejected

2. The first teaches that a real relation is always a thing really distinct from its subject and foundation. This is the opinion of the

older Thomists: Capreolus on I, distinction 30, question 1; Cajetan, I, q. 28, a. 2; Ferrara, IV Contra Gentiles, chapter 14. They ground themselves on the words of St. Thomas in those same places, and in Quaestiones de Potentia, q. 8, a. 1, and I, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1. In these places he establishes a difference between a created relation and the uncreated: the former is not identified with substance but is another thing and makes up a composition with it; the case is otherwise with the uncreated relation. Yet this opinion, understood of a proper and rigorous real distinction such as exists between entities altogether distinct, has no foundation sufficiently probable. For the arguments brought by these authors concerning the separability of the relation from the foundation, or the diverse changes that can occur in them, prove at most a distinction by nature (ex natura rei), if they prove anything at all; and it is perhaps more probable that they do not even show that, as we shall see when treating the following opinions. From whose arguments also, and from the proofs of our own view, this opinion will be sufficiently refuted. Although, to reject it, what was proposed at the beginning of the preceding section would suffice; for those things, in my judgment, sufficiently demonstrate that relation is not a thing in itself having a proper entity really distinct from all absolute entities.

The Opinion of Scotus, Insofar as It Agrees With the Above, is Rejected

3. The same judgment must be made of the opinion of Scotus (II, d. 1, q. 3; III, d. 8, q. 1), insofar as it agrees with the preceding. He distinguishes certain relations which can in no way be separated from their foundations—such as the relation of the creature—from others which can be separated, for example the relation of similarity; and he says that these latter are really distinct from their foundations by reason of that very separability, whereas he denies that the former are distinct, because, since they are inseparable, no sign of a real

distinction remains, nor does any necessity for it appear otherwise. However, as regards the first part, it has already been shown above that that sign does not indicate a real distinction but at most a modal one —especially when the separation is not "convertible," so to speak, as happens here. For although the foundation can remain without the relation, the relation can by no means remain without the foundation. From this there can be taken no light argument against that part and against the whole opinion above. I add further that this sign is not sufficient here even to indicate a modal distinction that is actual and by the nature of the thing. For although the relative denomination is removed when the foundation remains but the terminus is taken away, nevertheless, with both remaining, it cannot be removed. And therefore from that sign it is not effectively concluded that relation is something distinct from the foundation which is taken away from it when that denomination ceases. For the denomination can include or connote the concomitance or coexistence of the other extreme, and thus cease not because something is removed from the foundation but because something is removed from the terminus. Hence, if some relations are inseparable from their foundations, this is because their termini cannot fail to exist; therefore, when the foundations are posited, it is necessary that the relative denominations arise. Thus, if by an impossibility a created essence could remain when God did not exist, the relation of the creature to Him would cease. That it cannot now be separated is not only on account of identity with the foundation but also on account of the intrinsic necessity of the terminus. Conversely, from the fact that other relations cease when the termini are removed, a distinction by nature is not rightly inferred unless it be shown otherwise that the destruction of the terminus alone does not suffice for that.

Durandus's View on This Point is Not Approved

4. Wherefore Durandus (I, d. 30, q. 2) uses another distinction: certain relations are true habitudes and real respects consequent upon their foundations, either per se or per accidens—for example, inherence follows per se upon the nature of an accident, and touching or being touched follows per accidens upon quantified bodies; others are merely relative denominations, such as being equal or similar. He says, therefore, that the latter are not distinct in reality from their foundations, nor add anything real beyond the existence and concomitance of both absolute extremes, from whose mutual coexistence, he says, those denominations are taken; yet he still says they pertain to the category of relation and suffice to constitute it. Of this part we shall see later. As to the first respects, he says that they are really distinct from their foundations, wherein he agrees with the preceding opinions and uses the same foundation, namely the sign of separability of the foundation from such a respect. About which sign it has already been said that it can show at most a modal distinction; nor does Durandus intend more, as is easily clear to a reader. He only differs in the use of the word, calling it "real" because it is found in the things themselves.

5. Now regarding this part of Durandus's opinion, a certain subdivision of the former member is to be noted—that of the real habitude—which he briefly touched upon, and his examples for both members are to be considered. For a certain respect (he says) follows per accidens upon its foundation, as touching follows upon quantity; another follows per se, as "being in" follows also upon quantity; and he says that both respects are distinct in reality from their foundations. But regarding the former member and example, Durandus does not seem to speak consistently. For by the same reasoning whereby he says that things are called similar or equal not by the addition of some respect distinct by nature in reality, but by the sole coexistence of the two extremes and the denomination arising therefrom, he should consequently say that two bodies touch each other by a denomination arising from the coexistence of both extremes in such a place, without

any other respect distinct by nature in reality. I suppose we are speaking of purely quantitative contact; for physical contact adds something else, although not merely relation but a physical action of one upon the other. Quantitative contact is nothing other than a certain proximity between two quantities and their termini, such that no other quantity is interposed. But this belongs to two bodies by the very fact that they exist in such places or spaces, without the addition of any other mode or respect distinct by nature in reality, at least according to Durandus's own doctrine. For the same arguments that can prove this of similarity prove it of contact and of any proximity or distance; namely, that positing two bodies in such places, and every other thing or real mode being set aside either by the intellect or by divine power, it is impossible that those bodies not be in contact. Therefore the same is the ratio of this denomination. And universally the same holds for every respect that is said to follow its foundation per accidens. It will be per accidens because it is such a denomination as requires the coexistence of the other extreme, which the foundation as such does not require—clearly seen in the example of contact. Therefore that denomination can always be taken from the coexistence of the extremes without any other respect in reality distinct from the extremes. Or, if it is not a mere denomination but an intrinsic habitude, the same will hold for all those which Durandus puts in the second member of his principal distinction.

6. As regards the other member concerning a respect that follows upon the foundation per se, and the example of inherence, by the name "respect" one can mean the very mode of inherence or union, or a predicamental relation arising from it. In the first sense, it is true that that respect is distinct by nature from the form or thing of which it is a mode—the thing called the foundation of such a respect —which we have often taught previously, and confirmed by the same argument. Although what Durandus says, namely that this respect makes no composition with its foundation, is false, as has often been said above when treating of the distinctions of things and of the

composition of nature and supposit, and in other places. This respect, however, is not predicamental but transcendental, because that mode of union or inherence is not something resulting from the foundation and the terminus, but an absolute mode which can be produced per se by some action, although it intimately and essentially includes a transcendental respect to things that can be united. This too was touched upon above and will be explicitly declared below, partly in this disputation, partly when disputing about action. The consideration of that respect in the sense just said is, therefore, irrelevant to the present question. But if the discussion be of a predicamental respect which is thought to result between the inhering form and its subject, and universally between things that are united, the same account must be given of such a respect as of contact, similarity, and all similar cases: namely, that it is no thing or real mode distinct by nature in reality from the extremes, but only a mutual denomination arising in the extremes from their coexistence under such a mode of existing. This can easily be shown by applying the reasoning made above. Therefore, properly speaking of a predicamental respect, this distinction of Durandus is not necessary; one must either say that every predicamental relation is something distinct, or that it is not.

The Fourth Opinion, of a Modal or Formal Distinction of Relation from Its Foundation, Is Expounded

7. There is, therefore, a fourth opinion which, in general, affirms that a real relation is actually distinguished from its subject and foundation, not, however, altogether really as a thing from a thing, but modally, as a real mode from the thing itself. This view seems to be held by Iavellus (Metaphysics V, q. 22) and Soto (on the category "toward something," q. 2). Yet they do not call this distinction "modal," but "formal," though they think it exists actually in things prior to any consideration of the intellect. But Fonseca (Metaphysics

V, c. 15, q. 2, sec. 5) affirms that a predicamental relation is distinguished from its foundation by a formal distinction, such that it has its own being of essence and existence distinct from the being of the foundation; nevertheless he denies that that distinction is real, or modal, or merely of reason, but a certain middle distinction, which he says is less than the real distinction and greater than the modal. He seems to constitute the difference thus: in a modal distinction the mode does not have its own being distinct from the being of the thing of which it is the mode; in this formal distinction, however, each extreme has its own being. Likewise, in this distinction each extreme is a proper entity; in a modal distinction the mode is not an entity. On this he chiefly grounds his opinion: that relation has its own being distinct from the being of the foundation; for the being of the foundation is absolute and in itself, whereas the being of relation consists in a habitude toward another, as appears from Aristotle's definition.

8. Yet I, first of all, do not perceive this middle distinction between the real and the modal, which is a true actual distinction in the thing and much greater than the distinction of reason, since it is also said to be greater than the modal. First, because in a modal distinction, just as a mode in the thing itself is distinguished from the thing of which it is the mode, so it has some proper being, equally and proportionally distinct from the being of the thing itself—as was declared when treating existence. Again, just as a mode is something existing in things, so it can be said to have some entity, insofar as by this word is signified whatever is not nothing; yet because that entity is of such a nature and condition that it cannot per se constitute a real being primarily and per se, but must necessarily be conjoined and identified to some being which it affects and modifies, for that reason it is called not a "thing" but a "mode of a thing."

9. Hence it is clear that between a real and a modal distinction, as distinctions by nature, there can be no middle, as was treated generally above in Disputation VII. In particular it is clear in

the case at hand. For relation, from the mere fact that it has its own being and is something in reality distinct from the foundation, does not thereby have that it is an entity rather than a real mode; that is common to both. Therefore, from that principle alone, neither a distinction greater than the modal nor another kind of entity beyond that which is found in real modes is sufficiently concluded. Next, either a real relation has such an entity as can be understood to be primarily, per se, and essentially constituted by the merely respective notion, so that from this title it is not repugnant that such an entity be alone without the entity of the foundation; or it has such a mode of entity that it intrinsically requires to be conjoined to the foundation and in its own way to affect it, so that by no power can it be otherwise. If the first be said, it is plainly concluded that it is a true and proper thing altogether really distinct from the foundation—something this opinion does not admit. If the second be said, there will be no distinction other than the modal, supposing that it actually exists in reality. Therefore, just as no middle can be conceived between those two [possibilities], so neither can a middle be devised between those two distinctions by nature. Either the extremes of the distinction can in reality be mutually separated and one preserved without the other and vice versa—and thus there is an altogether proper and rigorous real distinction; or only one extreme can be separated and remain without the other, not conversely, and this distinction we call modal; beyond these two modes there is none other. For if each extreme is inseparable in reality from the other, the distinction is of reason, not by nature. Since, then, here the foundation and the relation are not mutually separable, as is common knowledge to all—for a predicamental relation can in no way be understood without a foundation—no greater or other distinction, which is actually in reality, can intervene between relation and foundation than the modal. Although, therefore, the authors mentioned use other words, calling this distinction "formal," they must be speaking of the modal distinction, if indeed they understand their opinion as asserting an

actual distinction existing in the things themselves; some of them, however, do not sufficiently explain even this, as we shall say below.

The Said Opinion is Recommended

10. The principal foundation of this opinion, thus explained concerning the modal distinction, is that taken from the sign of separation. The foundation is so separable from the relation that it can remain in reality without it; therefore it is necessary that they be distinguished in reality, at least modally, according to principles established above in Disputation VII. Second, this is rather clearly confirmed by the reason that relation has its own being which intrinsically consists in a habitude toward another; therefore it must be distinguished in reality from an absolute being. Third, I further explain it thus. When, there existing only one white thing which was previously similar to none, another white thing comes to be, either the former acquires some real respective being which it did not have before, or it acquires nothing new. The latter cannot be said; otherwise relation is nothing real, for if before it was nothing, and afterwards receives no real being, it is never anything. Therefore that respective being which is added must necessarily be distinct from that to which it is added, at least by a modal distinction. For if one existed and the other did not yet exist, and afterwards the latter is added or arises, they cannot be one and the same in reality.

11. Fourth. When one thing is said to be similar to another, or one man the father of another, either these are merely extrinsic denominations or they are intrinsic. The first cannot be said; therefore the second must necessarily be said. Therefore some form intrinsically denominating is necessary; therefore that form must necessarily be distinct by nature, at least modally, from the denominated thing. The minor is proved, first, because if it were an extrinsic denomination, it would not as such be a relative denomination; for it would be rather like the application of an extrinsic form to the denominated subject

than the habitude of the subject itself to an extrinsic terminus. Second, for this reason the denomination of "clothed," or "surrounded by a place," or even of "agent," is not properly relative with a predicamental respect. Third—and this is more difficult—otherwise there would be no more a real relation of Creator to creature than of any created agent to its effect; for an extrinsic denomination can intervene equally in both. The second consequence is also clear, because an intrinsic denomination is said to be that which is taken from an intrinsic form. The last consequence rests on the oft-repeated foundation that this denomination can be lost and acquired anew while every absolute form is preserved; therefore the intrinsic and respective form from which it is taken is, in some way, in reality distinct from all absolute forms, at least by a modal distinction. And this opinion, thus explained and confirmed, is more probable than the others which posit some actual distinction in reality between relation and foundation. If it be once asserted in some relations, then, by consequent reason, it must be posited in all created and predicamental relations, because there is no sufficient reason to use one distinction rather than another, as can be understood from what has been said against Scotus and Durandus.

The Fifth Opinion, Denying an Actual Distinction in Reality of Relation from Its Foundation, is Set Forth

12. Nevertheless, there is another opinion, extremely opposed to these, which denies that relation is distinguished in reality by any actual distinction from its absolute foundation, but only by a distinction of reason having some foundation in the things. Many theologians teach this, especially the Nominalists on I, d. 30: Ockham, q. 1, and d. 31, q. 1; Gregory, d. 29, q. 2, a. 2. And Aegidius (I, d. 26, q. 4) is openly of the same mind, when he says that relation has nothing proper beyond the being of the foundation, nor any composition added to it—which cannot be true unless by reason of complete identity in the thing itself. Sylvester clearly holds the same in the

Conflatus, q. 28, dubium 1, where he says that relation is the same thing as its proximate foundation. And although he adds that it is distinguished formally, he immediately makes it clear that that distinction is only of reason, from the diversity of concepts, insofar as the same thing, taken by itself, is conceived absolutely, but, another being posited, it is conceived relatively—without anything at all being added or varied with respect to the thing itself. Hervaeus teaches and handles this opinion more expressly and better (I, d. 30, a. 1; Quodlibet VII, q. 15; Quodlibet X, q. 1); for he also declared that these relative denominations are taken from the consortium of several absolute things and not from peculiar entities or modes distinct by nature in reality which they add to the absolute things.

13. This opinion has a foundation in St. Thomas, Opusculum 48, chapter 2, On "Toward Something," where he says thus: "When I say that the likeness of Socrates has his whiteness as foundation, it must not be understood that the likeness of Socrates is some thing in Socrates other than the whiteness itself, but it is only the whiteness as it stands in relation to Plato's whiteness as its terminus." He immediately confirms this by the argument made above: otherwise, a likeness could not accrue to someone without a change in him—an argument which proves as much against a real mode distinct by nature as against a proper reality. Hence this opinion is also founded on Aristotle's saying in Physics V, text 10, that relation comes to a thing while the thing itself remains unchanged. And in a similar manner this opinion is gathered from Anselm in the Monologion, chapter 24 (a passage we shall cite at length below when treating of non-mutual relations), and there is a similar idea in St. Augustine (City of God V, chapter 16). Finally, the words of Damascene favor this opinion (Dialectica, chapter 52): "It is necessary that those things which are said 'to something' be first reduced to another category as considered separately, and then at length, as having a habitude and affection to another, be referred to those things which are 'to something.' For it is necessary that a thing first exist without habitude and relation, and

then a habitude be considered in it." Damascene's thought, I believe, is to be understood of relations that are not subsistent; the case is otherwise with subsistent relations.

14. The reasons for this opinion are chiefly those by which the other opinions that posit a distinction in reality are disapproved; with those removed, by an enumeration of the parts sufficient in itself, this opinion is concluded. Next, from the very thing: this distinction of reason and this mode of denomination suffices for everything that is said relatively of absolute things—as the reasons put first at the beginning of the preceding section seem also to prove. If this suffices, it is superfluous to add anything; for the distinction and multiplication of real things and modes are not to be feigned or asserted without necessity or a sufficient reason.

15. Third, we can retort the argument from separability. Positing, for example, two white things, it is impossible even by absolute power to make it that they are not similar; therefore this denomination is not taken from some thing or real mode distinct by nature in reality from both whites taken together. Otherwise, why would it be repugnant for God to take away that mode, if it is distinct in reality, or why could He not impede the resultant of such a mode? Some, convicted by the argument, concede this, as Mairon does (I, d. 29, q. 2). But then I ask whether those two whites remain similar or not. The latter cannot be conceived in the mind, since they retain the same unity in whiteness; if the former be said, it is proved that the distinct mode and the resultant now feigned are invented without foundation, since true similarity remains without them. It is therefore a sign that this denomination is taken only from these absolutes coexisting and being disposed in the same way. Hence, as I said above, that upon the removal of the terminus the denomination ceases is no argument that similarity is some real mode distinct by nature in reality from whiteness; it is only an argument that the terminus itself is in reality distinct from the foundation and in some way concurs or is necessary to complete such a denomination. This suffices for the

denomination, upon its removal, to cease, even if nothing real is taken away from the denominated thing. Therefore, from the inseparability of the relation once the foundation and terminus are posited, what is rather inferred is complete identity in reality—or, what is the same, that the relative denomination adds nothing real over and above all the absolute things.

16. How some deny that the foundation is changed by the acquisition of a relation. Fourth, that argument presses: a thing becomes similar or equal to another without any change in itself by the mere position of the other. For whether similarity is a thing altogether distinct or a real mode distinct by nature in reality, it cannot accrue anew to anyone without a change in him. Some reply that a respective mode does not suffice, by reason of itself alone, for a thing to be said to change, because it is not "something," but "toward something," and because the whole foundation from which that relation has its entity already preexists in the thing. This does not satisfy. For those words—namely, that relation is not "something," but "toward something"—either involve a repugnance or are very equivocal and quite irrelevant. If "not something" be taken absolutely and transcendently, it plainly follows that relation is nothing, and that to be "toward something" is nothing real, as I argued above. If it be taken more restrictively so that to be "something" is the same as to be an absolute thing or mode, the point is begged and the argument is not solved but evaded. For although relation is not an absolute "something," if nevertheless it is something real, new, and distinct by nature in reality from everything that was before, then by reason of that the thing is truly and properly, intrinsically otherwise disposed than it was; therefore it is truly changed. Nor is it sufficient, to avoid the change, to say that the whole foundation of the relation preexists, because we did not say the thing is changed on account of the foundation, but on account of that which is added to the foundation and is said to be something real and distinct by nature in reality from it. Hence, according to this opinion, one cannot consistently say that

relation has its own or modal entity formally from the foundation itself, but at most radically, insofar as the relation sprouts from the foundation when the terminus is posited. But this does not exclude a true change, since something new and distinct comes to be in the thing, even if it proceeds from what is intrinsic.

17. Some admit that the foundation is changed by the resultant of the relation, in order to explain Aristotle. Hence some finally admit that by the advent of a new relation or relative denomination a true real change takes place in the related thing itself, not indeed by a proper action, but by an intrinsic emanation; but that Aristotle was not speaking universally of any change taken most broadly, but of that which is effected by proper action and passion. Nevertheless, although this response proceeds consistently if the said opinion be supposed, and can be easily defended to escape Aristotle's testimony in Physics V, it asserts something which, considered in itself, is difficult to believe and not founded on any sufficient sign or experience—namely, that whenever someone anew becomes white or hot, something new and real truly and properly inhering sprouts in all other hot or white things in the world. As seems sufficiently proved above, for those denominations alone—similar, equal, and the like—there is no need of that resultant of a new real mode or entity; with that sign set aside, there is no other from which it can be gathered. It is therefore gratuitously and without probability feigned. Moreover, that change or acquisition of that new real mode or entity cannot be without an efficiency, at least by way of resultant; for every change, insofar as it is such, includes a proportionate action. I inquire, then, whether that efficiency is from the terminus itself upon the foundation, or from the foundation upon itself by a natural resultant. No one asserts the first; nor is it probable. How would the terminus act at once upon almost countless things, however distant? Again, if relation were thus produced, nothing would be lacking for it to be produced by a proper action and per se by an extrinsic agent. Finally, because relation intrinsically belongs to a thing when the foundation

and terminus are posited; therefore it does not depend upon the efficiency of an extrinsic agent. The second also can be disproved, because such an efficiency, even if it be from an intrinsic principle, will be by a proper action, and consequently by a proper change. For although such a resultant takes place only upon the terminus being posited, this will be only because the terminus is either a necessary condition for the relation to result, or as it were an object specifying it without which it cannot be; this does not prevent the resultant which comes from the foundation from being by a proper action which occurs in that subject without any other action intervening there at that time. Thus a descent downward naturally results from the stone's gravity when the impediment is removed, and nevertheless it takes place by a proper action and change. Finally, the oft-touched argument has force here: such a resultant and any efficiency cannot be without God's concurrence, which He can suspend. And even if we suppose that He suspends it and consequently no real resultant intervenes, we still understand the things to be similar or equal when the extremes are posited as such; therefore there is no sign that such a resultant or change intervenes.

An Opinion Distinguishing Between the Relation's "Being-In" & Its "Being-Toward" is Discussed

18. Wherefore, to reply to this difficulty, others employ a distinction which could be counted as a sixth opinion in the present question concerning the distinction of relation and foundation. They distinguish in relation an esse in ("being-in") and an esse ad ("being-toward"), and they say that relation, according to its esse in, does not properly result or sprout from the foundation, but results only according to its esse ad as such, and therefore the foundation is not changed by such a resultant, because a thing is not changed except by that which newly inheres in it, and thus according to its esse in. From this distinction it plainly follows that relation, according to its esse in,

is not distinguished by nature from its foundation, because it necessarily belongs to it even before the terminus exists or independently of the terminus; but its esse ad is distinguished by nature and can, therefore, result from the foundation when the terminus is posited.

19. How many inconveniences arise from the opinion proposed. First. This opinion involves many impossibilities and things that cannot be understood. First, it follows that in one and the same relation the esse in and the esse ad must be actually and by nature distinguished. For the esse in is said to be in reality the same as and indistinct from the foundation, whereas the esse ad is said to be actually distinct in reality from the foundation; therefore the esse in and the esse ad will be actually distinct from each other, for those things that stand to a third in such a way that one is the same with it and the other is not, cannot be the same with each other. The consequent is impossible, because the esse in and the esse ad are compared as superior and inferior, or as the common or transcendental and the mode determining or modifying it—which, as taught earlier, cannot be distinct in reality.

20. Second. A second inconvenience is that it follows that the esse ad of a created real relation as such is not an accident of anything, and consequently does not constitute a true real accident—which is against the notion of this category. The consequence is clear because that esse ad does not essentially include an esse in, since it is distinguished and abstracted from it by nature. Likewise, if that esse ad were the accident of something, it would affect it and accrue to it anew, and thus the difficulty we are treating returns—namely, that by the resultant of that esse ad the thing or foundation from which it results would be changed. But they say that the esse ad as such is not something real; hence it is not surprising that it is neither an accident nor inheres nor alters the relative which it denominates. But this is neither true nor consistent if we use the terms univocally, and especially according to the said opinion, which supposes that a real

relation is something in reality, that it exists in things, and that, according to something of itself, it is distinguished in reality from the foundation. For although, when speaking of the esse ad as attributed to relations of reason, it is not something real, nevertheless, as I shall show below, it is only equivocally, or at most according to a certain analogy of proportionality, called an esse ad; and of that we are not now speaking, but of the true esse ad which constitutes a real predicamental accident. But that cannot fail to be something real; otherwise, how could it constitute a true real accident? Or how could relation be an intrinsic form referring its subject to the terminus if it did not affect it according to its proper notion and consequently according also to its very esse ad?

21. And this is confirmed because almost the same account must be given of the very esse in. For it can be taken equivocally or analogically when it is attributed to beings of reason; thus blindness is said to be "in" the eye. Therefore, taken thus, the esse in does not signify anything real. Nevertheless, there is a true real esse in which constitutes a real accident. In a similar way one must philosophize about the true esse ad—namely that it is something real; hence it necessarily must be either intrinsically subsistent (which cannot be said of an accidental relation) or intrinsically inhering, which is what we maintain. Therefore, if the esse ad of a real relation is something distinct by nature in reality from the foundation of such a relation, then also the proper and intrinsic esse in of that relation will be distinct—or conversely, if no esse in of the relation is distinguished by nature in reality from the foundation, neither will the esse ad be distinguished. And finally I argue: it is impossible that relation, according to its esse ad, result from the foundation as something real distinct by nature in reality from it, without that very real something, whatever it be, inhering somewhere. For either it exists in itself and will be subsistent, or it is sustained by something and thus will inhere in it. Therefore, either it inheres in the terminus (which cannot be said, as is self-evident), or it inheres in its proper subject or

foundation; and thus such an esse ad will be distinguished from that foundation also according to its proper esse in, which it intrinsically includes. Therefore that distinction is vain for explaining the present matter, nor by it is the touched difficulty avoided—that by the resultant relation the related thing is changed in some way—if relation, according to its proper real being, is something actually distinct by nature in reality from its foundation.

The Fifth Opinion, Properly Interpreted, is Approved

22. Among these opinions, therefore, the one most pleasing to me is the fifth, which Hervaeus and some other Thomists taught, from whose sense the Nominalists scarcely differ, and to which Aristotle and St. Thomas greatly favor, as we have seen. This opinion must, however, be interpreted so that it not be understood to mean that the formal notion of relation is nothing, or that the relative denomination is merely extrinsic taken from some absolute form; for in that sense the real category "toward something" would be utterly overturned and abolished. It must be understood thus: relation indeed names some real form intrinsically denominating the proper relative which it constitutes; yet that form is not any thing or mode distinct by nature in reality from every absolute form, but is, in reality, some absolute form—not taken absolutely, but as bearing upon another, which the relative denomination includes or connotes. Thus, for example, similarity is some real form existing in the thing which is denominated similar; yet it is not in reality distinct from the whiteness, as to what it posits in the thing called similar, but only as to the terminus which it connotes. And thus similarity in reality is nothing other than the whiteness itself as bearing upon another whiteness as of the same or of a similar kind. And this distinction of reason suffices both for diverse forms of speaking and also for the distinction of categories. For, as we said above, the predicamental distinction is sometimes only a distinction of reason with some

foundation in reality—as we shall say below concerning action and passion and the other categories. This opinion will be further clarified both from the solutions to the arguments and from the following sections.

The Grounds of the Other Opinions are Satisfied

23. The grounds of the first, second, third, and sixth opinions were touched and answered among those proposed against them; nor does any other argument occur which could raise a difficulty in their favor that must be satisfied. It remains only to solve the arguments of the fourth opinion. The first, concerning the separability of relation from the foundation, has already been solved: we deny that relation is ever separated from the foundation according to anything real that is intrinsic to it. It only happens that the terminus is separated or wanting; when it is removed, the relative denomination also ceases—not because some reality or real mode is taken from the relative itself, but because the relative denomination in some way includes the terminus, without which it does not actually remain but only fundamentally, that is, in proximate aptness. To the second we reply that the being of relation in reality is not other than the being of the foundation, yet it is distinguished by reason, insofar as that very being is conceived as in some way including or connoting the terminus which it regards. To the third I reply that when a new white thing comes to be, nothing real is newly added to the other white thing, as has been explained and proved. Nor does it follow that the relation of similarity is nothing, but only that it is not something distinct from the whiteness which previously inhered in that white thing. When it is urged that previously there was no similarity in that white thing and afterwards there is similarity, and therefore either similarity is nothing real or something real is newly in that white thing, I deny the consequence as to each part. For besides those two members there is a third: namely, that something real is newly in the terminus which

newly became white, which terminus is in some way included or connoted by that which is the similarity under the notion and concept of similarity, and not under the notion of whiteness. To the fourth it is answered that these relative denominations are not merely extrinsic, as is rightly proved there. Consequently, we grant that such a denomination is from some intrinsic form, yet including or connoting some other extrinsic thing in the extrinsic terminus. And therefore the last consequence is denied: namely, that such a form intrinsically denominating with a habitude to the extrinsic must be distinct by nature, at least modally, from every absolute form. For, the extrinsic terminus being supposed, the absolute form itself, according to reality, suffices to confer such a denomination which can be taken away or cease by the mere removal of the extrinsic terminus, as has been said.

The Arguments Left Over from Section I Are Satisfied

24. First. Second. Third. From the things said in this section many points from the arguments proposed at the beginning of the preceding section are also solved. As to the first: it has now been explained how the very esse ad of a real and accidental relation is something in the thing itself which is said to be referred. It is false that "being-toward" is said univocally of relations of reason and of real relations. It is likewise false that the true esse ad can be so abstracted from an esse in that it does not intrinsically include it—according to the manner in which we said above that the modes of being cannot be so abstracted from being that they do not contain it in themselves. Concerning the second argument—that relation comes without a change in the foundation—enough has been said; for we grant that from this it is rightly concluded that relation is not something in reality distinct from the foundation, but not that it is not something real. Hence, to the third argument we deny the first consequence ("relation is nothing besides absolutes; therefore it is simply nothing")

if, in the antecedent, the word "besides" indicates an actual distinction by nature in reality. For although relation is not something in reality distinct from absolutes, it can be something distinct by reason; and therefore it does not follow that it is simply nothing. Nor does it matter that relation as relation is abstracted from absolutes, because it is not abstracted as something feigned by reason, nor as something in reality cut off and distinct, but as something true and real, cut off only by reason. There is often a distinction of reason between real and true extremes which suffices to constitute categories. Hence all the proofs adduced in that third argument are useful to declare how a real relation does not add to absolute things a thing or a real mode distinct by nature in reality from them, yet they have no force to conclude that such a relation is altogether nothing.

25. A Notable Point. Two cautions must, however, be observed in those arguments. First, when it is said that the relative denomination arises from the coexistence of several absolutes without any real addition, it is not to be understood that the denomination is equally and at once taken from several absolute forms—one intrinsic and another extrinsic. It is to be understood that the denomination indeed requires the consortium or coexistence of such things or forms; nevertheless, in each extreme it is taken from its proper form as bearing upon the other, which as such has the nature of relation, although in reality it is not other than the absolute form itself. Second (on account of the example adduced there of God insofar as He is denominated Lord, or Creator, etc.), one must beware lest anyone think that these denominations are of the same mode and ratio in all cases. That cannot be true, according to the common doctrine which distinguishes relations into mutual and non-mutual. That distinction would be nothing if the aforesaid denominations were of the same mode in all extremes. What this diversity is is not easy to explain according to the doctrine and opinion we defend. Wherefore, on this matter, a special section will be established below. For now we only say: when in the denominated thing there is some proper and

proportionate foundation of such a denomination, then it comes from a proper real relation; when, however, it is attributed to a thing without such a foundation, then the denomination is extrinsic or of reason.

SECTION III
HOW MANY KINDS OF RELATION THERE ARE, AND WHICH IS TRULY PREDICAMENTAL

1. This doubt is proposed because of the difficulty touched upon in the fourth argument of the first section. In order to resolve it, certain distinctions of relatives must first be set forth and explained, so that, when those things which do not pertain to this category are set aside, we may conclude what kind of real accident, diverse from others, can be, and thus constitute the proper category of relation.

The First Division of Relation into Real & of Reason

2. First, relation is usually divided into that which is real and that which is only of reason. Some interpret this so as to teach that the category of relation contains under itself both kinds of relation, and that therefore the division is univocal—even the division of a genus into species. St. Thomas seems to favor this opinion (I, q. 28, a. 1), where he says: "It must be considered that only in those things which are said 'toward something' are there some things according to reason only and not according to reality." He thinks, therefore, that those things which are referred according to reason only are truly and univocally "toward something." For if it were merely an equivocal or analogical denomination, things "according to reason only" would be found not only among those that are "toward something," but also in other genera—like blindness in quality, and so on. The same can be gathered from a. 2 of the same question, and from I, q. 13, a. 7;

Quodlibet I, a. 2; Quodlibet IX, a. 5; De Potentia, q. 2, a. 5, and often elsewhere. Hence Cajetan (on those places of the First Part) openly holds that "being-toward" (esse ad) is said univocally of real relation and of relation of reason; which Capreolus seems previously to have taught (I, d. 33, q. 1), and Deca seems to follow there (q. 1, notab. 4), and Ferrara (IV Contra Gentiles, c. 14), and more expressly Soncinas (V Metaphysics, q. 26, concl. 2), who adduces other testimonies of St. Thomas. Their foundation is that the definition of relatives which Aristotle gives, and all the properties that follow upon it, belong equally to relations of reason and to real relations. This is evident; for relatives are said to be those whose whole being is to be ordered toward another. This belongs altogether and most properly to relations of reason; for although their being is more imperfect and diminished than the being of real relatives, nevertheless that being—whatever it be—just as properly consists wholly in a habitude toward another as does the being of a real relation. Hence a relation of reason can neither be known nor defined without a habitude toward another, just like a real relation.

Only Real Relation Constitutes the Category of Relation

3. Nevertheless, it must be said that only real relations pertain to the constitution of the category of relation. This is sufficiently evident from what was handed down above concerning the concept of being and its division into nine supreme genera. For we showed that "being" is not only not univocal to real being and being of reason, but that it does not even have one common concept to them, not even analogical, but is either equivocal or, at most, analogical by an analogy of proportionality. For this reason we said that the adequate and direct object of metaphysics is not "being" common to real being and being of reason, but only to real being; and we also showed this to be divided into ten supreme genera. Since, therefore, relations of reason

are not real beings, and consequently not true beings, they cannot pertain to the (real) category of relation. I add further that they cannot have univocal agreement with real relations if we suppose those to be true real beings, as above is presupposed from the common opinion and will gradually be declared and proved in the course of this matter. The reason is that since being of reason is nothing, it cannot have a true likeness and agreement with real being, on which agreement univocity and unity of concept are usually founded; therefore no true and essential concept can be common to real being and being of reason. Thus, Soncinas (IV Metaphysics, q. 5–6) rightly approves the dictum of Hervaeus (though by a typographical error attributed to Henry), Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1 in fine: being cannot be univocal to real being and being of reason any more than "man" can be univocal to a living man and a dead man. This dictum has the same truth both in being in common and in such a being—namely, relation; for just as being of reason is not a true being but fictitious, so relation of reason is not a true relation but fictitious or, as it were, "painted" by the intellect.

4. An objection is answered. Someone might say that this is true of the whole and complete concept of relation, to which the above reasoning applies, because in that concept of real relation it is included that it is a true being and a real accident; but it does not proceed thus with the precise concept of the very mode or constitutive of relation which is signified by the expression "being-toward," because such a concept abstracts of itself from the notion of being and accident. In this sense the cited authors seem to have spoken, with whom Henry seems to agree (Quodlibet IX, q. 3), where he disputes most obscurely about this matter; among other things he says: "Being-toward another admits of no distinction or diversity from itself, whether it be in the divine, or in creatures, or in relations according to reality, or in relations according to reason." Nevertheless, the same reasoning has force against this evasion. For either that "being-toward," insofar as it is the mode constituting a real relation, is

also a real mode, or it is only a being of reason. The latter cannot be said; otherwise a real relation would not have a proper and formal constitutive that is real—which is a contradiction; for how can a real entity as such be constituted by that which is not real? We spoke much about this above in Disputation 2 when treating of the modes that contract being. If that "being-toward" in a real relation is a real mode, I again ask whether, in a relation of reason, it is also a true and real mode or only one feigned by the intellect. The first cannot be said, because it is repugnant to relation of reason whose essence is not to express a habitude existing in reality but in the mind's comparison or denomination. Again, it is a contradiction for a fictitious being existing only objectively in the intellect to be constituted by a real mode existing in reality. Therefore that "being-toward" in a relation of reason is a pure being of reason. Therefore, just as there cannot be a concept common or univocal to real being and being of reason, or to real relation and relation of reason, so neither can "being-toward," precisely conceived as such, be one common and univocal concept to the "being-toward" of a real relation and of a relation of reason. For there can be no more true likeness and agreement between these than between any other real beings and beings of reason; nor can one understand any more here than elsewhere what that concept is which abstracts from real being and being of reason, or what sort of contraction or determination of such a concept there could be to real being by a real mode and to being of reason by a mode of reason.

5. Only real relation is properly "toward something." St. Thomas is explained. Therefore it must be said that only a real relation is truly and properly "toward something"; a relation of reason is not, but is conceived as if it were "toward something." Therefore only real relations pertain to the proper category of relation; relations of reason are not constituted in a real category, but are declared by analogy and proportion to true relations—as we shall say more particularly in the final disputation of this work. Nor does St. Thomas intend the opposite in the cited places; for he never said either that a relation of

reason is univocally a relation with a real relation, or that "being-toward another" is not something real in a real relation. He only said that the nature of real relation is such that, by similarity and proportion to it, beings of reason can be feigned by the intellect after the mode of relations with some foundation in reality, rather than after the mode of quantity or quality, etc. He says that this arises because relation as relation signifies only a respect to another. Where the particle "only" does not exclude concomitances; hence it cannot exclude the transcendental notion of being or of accident if the relation be accidental. Because, however, relation, insofar as it is precisely conceived or signified as "toward another," is not conceived nor signified expressly as "inhering," St. Thomas says that as such it signifies only a respect to another—not that in reality it is not something in itself or existing in a subject, but because in such a way of conceiving and signifying nothing else is expressed. And for this reason also it comes about that beings of reason can more easily be conceived according to that mode of habitude—not that in such a relation there is a true habitude or a true "being-toward," such as there is in a real relation, but something is conceived after the likeness or proportion of it. Hence the same St. Thomas, after saying that relation according to its proper notion signifies only a respect to another, subjoins that this respect is sometimes in the very nature of things, but sometimes only in the apprehension of reason comparing one to another. The reason of that opinion is easily answered by denying that the proper notion of relation is truly found in relation of reason; for in such a relation there is neither a true habitude nor a true "being-toward," but only something is apprehended as if it were "toward something."

The Second Division of Relation: According to Being Said, & According to Being

6. A second division of relation is into relation according to being said (secundum dici) and relation according to being (secundum esse). This division has its foundation in Aristotle in the chapter on "toward something," where he first gives a definition common to relatives "according to being said," and afterwards gives the proper definition of relatives "according to being." Relation according to being said is usually defined as a thing which is conceived and explained, that is, said after the mode of a respect, although in reality it does not have a true respect; relation according to being is said to be that which truly has its proper being with a habitude toward another.

7. How relation according to being said is explained by some. From this some, not without verisimilitude, have opined that relation according to being said is the same as relation of reason. Henry (Quodlibet III, q. 4) signifies this from Avicenna (Metaphysics III), who says that relation according to being said is that which has its being only in the intellect and belongs to things which are not simply and absolutely "toward something," but only insofar as they are conceived by the intellect. This seems reasonable. For as we conceive, so we speak; and relations "according to being said" are not so called for any other reason than that we thus speak of them as if they were relations when they are not. Therefore that mode of speaking concerning these relations presupposes our mode of conceiving from which it arises—namely, that these things are conceived by us with relation and habitude, that is, after the mode of relation and habitude, when truly and in reality they do not have a habitude. But in this the ratio and essence of relation of reason consists; therefore relation according to being said is the same as relation of reason.

8. The true essence of relation according to being said. Nevertheless, this division is not commonly so understood. For relation of reason, insofar as it is such, is considered to be a relation according to being proportionate to itself; as is clear of the relation of genus and species and the like, because in the way in which these are

thought, they are not only said but are also "toward something." And conversely, relation according to being said is not limited to relation of reason; it is said of any real thing whose being is absolute and which is not conceived or explained by us except after the mode of a habitude or a relative relation. Thus we say that the divine omnipotence is relative "according to being said," not because of any relation of reason we feign in it, but because we do not conceive or explain it except with the concomitance of another to which it is power, and after the mode of something having a habitude to it. Hence, although it is true that this mode of speaking about relation "according to being said" presupposes a mode of conceiving, nevertheless that mode of conceiving is not such that a relation of reason necessarily results or is apprehended from it; for it is not a reflexive or comparative concept, but a direct concept of an absolute thing, yet imperfectly conceived after the mode of those things which have a habitude to another. In this mode of conceiving, no habitude at all—neither real nor of reason—is attributed to the object known; rather, only on the part of the knower there is a concept according to a kind of imitation and analogy to the concepts of respective things. As when a spiritual thing is conceived by us after the likeness of a bodily thing, we do not attribute to the object a real corporeity (else the conception would be false), nor do we feign or think in that object any being of reason—what sort would it be? We only conceive one thing by analogy to another. So at times we conceive an absolute thing after the likeness of a respective thing, and we speak of it as if it were respective, and therefore it is said to be relative "according to being said" only. Hence it is clear that relations only "according to being said" are outside the genus of relation and cannot of themselves pertain to the category of relation; indeed, under that aspect they pertain to no category. For from the fact that a thing is conceived or said by us imperfectly it does not receive a peculiar nature by reason of which it ought to be placed in a peculiar category. And therefore Aristotle, in the category of relation, as Boethius and others noted there, having excluded the prior

definition of relatives which was common also to relatives "according to being said," added a later definition which is proper to relatives "according to being."

9. Relations according to being said are different from predicamental and transcendental relations. There are some who think that this division of relation "according to being said" and "according to being" coincides with another partition of relation into transcendental and predicamental, so that a transcendental relation is only "according to being said," while every relation "according to being" is predicamental (we speak of created relations). This opinion, although common on many lips, does not please me. I think that transcendental relations include in reality and in their being true and real habitudes, which I shall show a little below; but relations which are only "according to being said," properly and strictly taken, are distinct from all relations "according to being," whether transcendental or predicamental. For they do not require in the thing so conceived, or relatively denominated, any true habitude which belongs to it by reason of its being, but only a denomination arising from our mode of conceiving and speaking, as has been explained. Thus, in the example adduced of the power of God, it is more probable that even a transcendental respect is not included, although it is called relative "according to being said." Therefore, a relation only "according to being said" is not the same as a transcendental relation; indeed, it is also distinguished from it if it be taken with the precision with which it should be taken. I add this because even a transcendental relation can be called a relation "according to being said," since it is also spoken of after the mode of relatives; indeed, a predicamental relation will be a relation "according to being said," because it too is said with a habitude to another. Therefore, to make a proper division, relation "according to being said" must be taken with exclusion and precision, so that it seems to have a habitude only in the very "being said," but has none in being—not transcendental and not predicamental. You will say: if a thing is so absolute that in being it has no habitude, not

even transcendental, why must it be conceived or spoken of with a habitude, since each thing can be conceived in the way in which it is, without anything that is outside its essence? I answer that this often arises from our imperfect mode of conceiving, because we cannot conceive things as they are. I add that it sometimes happens that a thing, even perfectly conceived, cannot be known without the concomitance of others even if they are outside its essence—not because of a habitude or dependence, but because of another higher connection in the notion of a cause eminently containing its effects; in which way theologians say that God cannot be perfectly seen or comprehended without creatures being known in Him; of which elsewhere.

Third Division between Transcendental Relation & Predicamental Relation

10. Third and most importantly, real relation, considered according to its being, is divided into transcendental and predicamental. This division is most necessary for concluding and clarifying what we intend in the present section. Up to now it has only been established that a relation belonging to this predicament of Relation must be real and according to being; now it remains to be seen whether every relation of this sort belongs to this predicament. From the fourth argument proposed in Section I it is clear that not every real relation, as relation according to being, can be referred to one determinate predicament. Hence this division is proposed, by which there is signified a certain mode of real relatedness that has a particular and definite mode of being, which constitutes a peculiar genus of being; such are predicamental relations. Besides these, there are also other true and real relations that essentially belong to various, indeed to almost all, genera of beings. These are therefore called transcendental and are distinguished from predicamental relations,

because they do not belong to any certain predicament but range through all.

11. First, then, this division, explained in this way, must be proved with respect to each member. That there are certain predicamental relations we presuppose from the received division of the predicaments and from the common judgment of all, as was said in Section I. That besides these there are transcendental relations which are not merely "according to saying," but true relations according to being, is sufficiently shown by the induction and reasoning made in that fourth argument proposed in Section I. It can also be confirmed as follows. In the genus of substance, matter and form have between themselves a true and real relation essentially included in their very being; therefore one is defined by relation to the other and from that takes its specific determination. The same holds for accidental powers first instituted and ordered per se to their acts, and for operative habits, which, as was shown above, are specified by their nature through relation to acts or to objects, since in their very being they include a true relation to acts and, through these, to objects. Therefore these transcendental respects are true and, according to real being, belong to the things to which they pertain. Accordingly, since the induction made rests upon the more common and readily accepted positions, this doctrine is to be judged commonly approved by the Doctors. Especially in its favor are the words of St. Thomas (I, q. 28, a. 1), where he writes: "Those things which are said to be relative, according to their proper notion, signify only a respect to another. Sometimes this respect is in the very nature of the thing, namely when two things by their nature are ordered to one another and have a mutual inclination; and such relations must be real, as in a heavy body there is an inclination and order toward the middle place." Hence there is in the heavy body a certain respect toward the middle, and similarly in other such cases. This reasoning of St. Thomas applies as much—or even more—to transcendental respect; for according to this mode things are especially found to be

ordered to one another. And indeed St. Thomas's example is best understood and verified of a transcendental respect: the inclination of gravity toward the middle place does not belong to the predicament of relation but to that of quality, since it is the very essence of such a quality.

12. Objection. First Reply. Truer Reply. You will say: no real respect is included in the concept of an absolute thing; but this transcendental respect is included in the concept of an absolute thing. Therefore it is not a true respect according to being, but only according to our mode of speaking and conceiving. On this argument especially rely those who think these transcendental respects consist solely in words. Some reply, and this may be taken from Scotus (IV, dist. 12, q. unica), that such respects follow upon absolute things, but are not of their intrinsic essence. For this reason Scotus denies that "aptitudinal inherence" belongs to the essence of an accident, since it is a true respect. According to that reply, these respects would not lie outside the latitude of the predicament of Relation; hence they could not properly be called transcendental, nor be distinguished from predicamental relations. For it is not contrary to the notion of a determinate predicament that things contained under it should have properties consequent upon things of other predicaments, provided these are not of their essence but consequent properties. A better reply, however, with Cajetan (De Ente et Essentia, c. 7, q. 15), is that it is not contrary to the notion of an absolute thing that, in its essential concept, it include a transcendental respect proportioned to its nature. In truth "aptitudinal inherence" is not a property consequent upon the nature of the accident, but belongs to its intrinsic essence, as was shown above. Indeed it is likely that among created beings none is so absolute that it does not intimately include in its essence some transcendental respect, at least inasmuch as it is a being by participation essentially dependent upon the Being by essence. For although actual dependence itself is something distinct by nature from the created being, nevertheless the aptitude and necessity of

depending are intrinsic and essential to it; and it does not seem possible either to conceive or to be without a transcendental respect and relation to that upon which it depends, in which respect the potentiality and imperfection of a created being, as such, chiefly consist.

13. Whatever one may say of complete beings, such as integral substances especially simple and immaterial—which among created things seem the most absolute—among all the remaining things that are called incomplete, none is so absolute that it does not essentially include some transcendental respect. The reason is that all those things by their nature are instituted for another or on account of another: matter is for form; form is for actuating matter and completing the composite; an accident is for substance; potency is for act; and act is for an object; and so with the rest. But each thing receives a mode of entity accommodated to its primary end and institution. Because therefore all these things are, per se and primarily, ordered to others, they receive such a mode of entity as to include intimately a relation to another; and this is the proper relatedness, or transcendental respect. Therefore among real relations according to being there are some transcendental ones that cannot be reduced to any special predicament, and are thus distinguished from predicamental relations.

SECTION IV

HOW THE PREDICAMENTAL RESPECT DIFFERS FROM THE TRANSCENDENTAL

1. A great difficulty now arises in explaining the difference between these two orders of respects, and consequently in explaining the reason why, besides transcendental respects, one must admit predicamental relations.

Some Differences Proposed Between the Said Respects

2. Various differences can be devised between respects of this sort. The first, and that which includes several, is this: a transcendental relation does not require the conditions that a predicamental relation demands, of which there are chiefly three, as we shall see below. First, a predicamental relation requires some real absolute foundation, as likeness requires whiteness, paternity the power of generating or generation. Second, it requires a real and really existing term. Third, it requires a real distinction, or at least a distinction ex natura rei, between foundation and term. A transcendental respect, however, per se requires none of these conditions. For divine knowledge, for example, says a transcendental respect to the divine essence as to its proper object, and the divine love to the divine goodness; yet among these there is no distinction ex natura rei, but only of reason. Again, a transcendental respect does not always require a real term; sometimes it can be to a fictive being, that is, an ens rationis, or to some extrinsic denomination. Thus a concept or thought of a being of reason, or of a privation as such, says a transcendental relation to that object, which nevertheless is not a real being. Often too this transcendental respect, even when it is to a real term, does not require the real existence of that term: knowledge of a future eclipse says a real transcendental respect to it, although it does not exist; and the same holds in any knowledge of a possible object, and in the case of potency with respect to an act not existing. Finally, this transcendental respect requires no foundation: the transcendental respect of matter to form has no foundation other than being intimately included in matter itself; the same is true of the respect of form to matter, of knowledge to its object, and the like. The reason is evident: this transcendental respect does not accrue to some thing already constituted in its essential and absolute being; rather it is as it were a constituting difference

completing the essence of that thing of which it is said to be a respect. And therefore, just as that thing, being absolute, requires no other foundation in order to be, beyond its proper subject (if perchance it is an accidental entity), so also this transcendental respect presupposes no other foundation, but rather constitutes the very thing, which can be the foundation of other predicamental relations.

3. From this there can be gathered another difference. A predicamental relation is a certain accidental form that accrues to a foundation fully constituted in its essential and absolute being; to that it is compared as a complete form in its accidental genus, affecting it and referring it to another. A transcendental respect, however, is compared neither as an accident nor as a complete form to the thing which it proximately actuates and to which it belongs as a respect; it is compared as an essential difference, and consequently as an incomplete being in that genus to which pertains the thing that it actuates or constitutes. It does not properly refer that thing to another after the manner of a physical form, but constitutes it, after the manner of a metaphysical difference, as ordered or related to another.

Objections Against the Proposed Differences

4. But these differences are partly not true, partly do not seem sufficient. As to what is said in the first difference—that a transcendental respect of the same thing to itself is found by reason of a distinction of reason alone—this is not true; otherwise one could say that the identity of a thing with itself is a transcendental respect and that a distinction of reason suffices for it. If you say that a distinction of reasoned reason (ratio ratiocinata), with a foundation in the thing, is required, then at least it follows that between the generic and the specific notion there is a real transcendental respect of act and potency, since genus and difference are distinguished by a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing. Likewise the examples adduced are false. For the knowledge or love of God does not say a

real, even transcendental, respect to God Himself as to the primary object; rather that knowledge and love are most absolute, devoid of every real respect, because per se and primarily they do not look to any object outside themselves. Hence, as in that case act and object are not distinguished except by reason, so no respect of act to object intervenes except of reason. The universal reason is this: since respect and relatedness are, as it were, a certain tending toward another, a true and real respect of the same thing to itself cannot be found unless there be some distinction in the thing, at least ex natura rei.

5. How a Transcendental Respect Can Be Terminated at an Ens Rationis. Some Transcendental Respects Require the Existence of Their Terms. As to what is further said—that a transcendental respect can sometimes be toward an ens rationis—this is indeed true when that respect is to something that stands under the mode of an object, for which objective being suffices in order to have the notion of the term of a transcendental relation. For the same reason it is also true that a transcendental respect can sometimes tend toward a real thing or essence not yet actually existing, because for the ratio of an object the being of the essence often suffices without the being of existence. Nevertheless, it is not universally true that no transcendental respect requires a real and actually existing term. First, the act of vision or of intuitive and natural intellection says a transcendental respect to a thing actually existing, and without that thing it cannot naturally be or be conserved. Next, the actual mode of union says a transcendental respect to the term or extreme of the union, in which it requires both reality and actual existence, so that an actual real union can neither be nor be understood unless the thing to which the union is is actually existing, as has often been touched upon above. Action, too, as action, and passion as passion, express transcendental respects to a real agent or patient actually existing, without which they could neither be nor be understood. Finally, a creature, with predicamental relation bracketed out, merely from the fact that it is a participated and dependent being, says an essential transcendental respect to the First

Efficient and to the Being by essence actually existing. Therefore it does not belong to the notion of transcendental respect that it should not require in its term a real and actual existence. From that difference only this is obtained: among transcendental respects there are some that do not require a real or actually existing term, although there are others that have and demand such a term; in these latter cases that second difference does not apply.

6. If you say that the difference consists in this, that a transcendental respect of itself does not require such a term, although by some special reason it can have it, whereas a predicamental respect, by its adequate notion, demands such a term, it can be urged in reply that this doctrine supposes that among respects to really existing terms some are transcendental and others predicamental, and that they differ in the reason for which they require such a term. But this is precisely what we are inquiring into and what does not seem sufficiently explained, namely, what this diverse reason is in these respects, since they alike require similar terms, and what need there is to multiply them. For the distinction between those transcendental respects that have real terms or not, existing or not existing, seems sufficient to explain any relations of things whatsoever.

7. Moreover, what was asserted about a real foundation is no less obscure and uncertain. First, not every predicamental relation requires a real foundation distinct by nature from its subject, but only that which belongs to a substance by means of some accident, as is clear in the relation of specific identity between two men or, for example, between two souls, which is considered a predicamental relation and is immediately founded upon the substantial nature itself, as will be treated more fully below. Then, a predicamental relation that belongs to a substance by means of an accident, although as compared to the substance it is said to have another proximate foundation, namely that accident by which it belongs to the substance, nevertheless with respect to the accident itself it belongs immediately and without another foundation, as likeness does to whiteness;

otherwise there would be a regress to infinity. But the same, analogously, is found in transcendental relations. Therefore there seems to be no difference in the necessity of a foundation between transcendental and predicamental respects. The minor is clear: those transcendental relations that are included within substances themselves do not require another foundation; yet many others do not belong to a substance except through accidents, and with respect to the substance they also have a foundation, although with respect to the accident they have none, but inhere immediately in such accidents. Thus the relation of knowledge to the knowable belongs to the knower by means of knowledge, but it inheres immediately in the knowledge itself.

8. Objection against the Last Difference Proposed. Finally, the last difference is also difficult to explain. A respect is compared either to the form and the essence proximally constituted by it, or to the subject of that form. If the comparison is made in the former way, then both predicamental and transcendental respect are essential to the form or to the essence constituted by it, and are compared to it in the manner of a constitutive difference. Hence, even speaking of the supreme genus of predicamental relation itself, it is said to be constituted by its very being-toward (esse ad), as by an essential mode determining the common notion of accident and formally and essentially constituting such an essence. Thus in this respect there is no difference between transcendental and predicamental respect. If, however, the comparison is made in the latter way, then just as a predicamental respect is accidental to some subject, so also can a transcendental respect be accidental to some subject. For example, the respect of knowledge to its object, though essential to knowledge, is nevertheless accidental to the knower. Hence, although that respect, considered metaphysically, is not a physical form referring the subject to another, but a difference constituting some form, still that form constituted by such a respect is a physical relative form, referring the subject to its term. For a relative form cannot inform a subject

according to its ultimate notion without referring it to the term which that form in its own way regards. In the example of gravity which we adduced above from St. Thomas, as gravity is an inclination to the lowest place and includes a transcendental respect to it, so by affecting or informing the heavy body it inclines it, and this very thing is to refer it toward the center. The same is true of any power and science and similar things. It is therefore quite obscure and difficult, from these differences, to gather the proper notions of transcendental and predicamental relation, their distinction, and the true necessity of admitting predicamental relations over and above transcendental ones.

Another Difference between the Said Respects Presented by Cajetan, Examined

9. Cajetan, then, in another way (De Ente et Essentia, c. 7, q. 15), touching upon this division of real respects into transcendental and predicamental, declares the difference between them on the part of their terms. A predicamental respect, he says, is one that regards its term purely under the notion of term; a transcendental respect, however, regards the other not as purely a term but under some other determinate notion—of subject, or object, or efficient cause, or end. This difference seems more apt for explaining this matter, because every respect takes its species from its term, that is, from the thing toward which it tends; and therefore, if there is any difference between these two orders of respects, it should be taken from their terms. Yet it is not easy to explain how the difference assigned is general and wherein it properly consists, or what it imports. The difficulty with the former part is this: motion, action, and passion express a transcendental respect to a term, and yet they do not regard it except under the pure notion of term. Likewise, the hypostatic union expresses a transcendental relation to the divine Word, and yet it regards Him only under the pure notion of term. The difficulty with

the latter part is this: every respect, taken abstractly and in common, says only a relation to another under the notion of term, abstracting from other notions; but when taken concretely and as determined—whether it be transcendental or predicamental—it says a relation to such-and-such a term, which is either cause, or effect, or object, or has some other particular notion of a term. Thus the respect of paternity, though said to be predicamental, regards such a term as is an effect or product from the father, and so with the rest.

The Proposed Distinction is Defended & Established

10. The reply to the first difficulty is that it trades on an equivocation. A predicamental relation is said to regard another as purely a term because, with respect to that other, it exercises no other function than that of regarding. Motion, action, or passion cannot be said in this way to be a pure respect to a term. For the respect of motion to its term is the respect of a path by which the term itself is constituted in being; hence it does not say a relation to a term as merely to be regarded, but rather to be constituted by it, and thus it does not regard it as a pure term in the sense proposed. The same holds proportionally of action and passion. As to the hypostatic union, theologians say that it "attains" the Word as a pure term, and by the word "pure" they exclude every proper causality which the Word as such has with respect to that union; nevertheless the Word is not a pure term of that union in the sense in which we here speak of the term of a predicamental relation. For that union, as a real mode of the human nature, does not regard the Word in just any way, but really joins the human nature to Him and really touches the Word Himself as the other extreme of that union, upon whom it intimately and really depends, though without proper causality. Thus universally it is proper to a form or absolute mode including a transcendental respect to exercise some real function with respect to that to which it says a

respect: either by causing, or uniting, or representing it, or effecting something else of the sort; and for this reason it is said not to regard it as a pure term. A predicamental relation, however, so regards the term that it exercises no other function with respect to it than purely to regard; as is clear in the likeness of one white thing to another. In this way it is proper to such a relation to regard another as purely a term.

11. From this the reply to the second difficulty is also evident, which likewise trades on an equivocation. To regard another as a pure term does not mean to regard the term abstractly and in common, as the argument seems to suppose. It is clear that specific predicamental relations of diverse kinds also tend to particular terms of diverse kinds. Yet all of them have this in common: with respect to those terms, even as such, they exercise no other function than to regard them; and therefore they always regard them as pure terms, even though they regard them under their proper notions. This is otherwise in the case of transcendental respect, as has been explained. Thus, explained in this way, the difference is true and universal, and it rightly unfolds the proper function of predicamental relation—which is formally to refer or to regard another—from the office of transcendental respect, which is to constitute a form or nature that causes something or operates in some way with respect to the thing to which it says a relation, or conversely.

Another Difference Drawn from the Preceding

12. From this there arises another commonly received difference, which, although it seems to be a posteriori, nevertheless helps to explain the nature of these respects. A predicamental respect is of such a kind that it is not of itself intended by nature, and therefore it is never produced per se by the force of any agent's action; rather, it follows upon the coexistence of foundation and term, as Aristotle testifies in Physics V, in which all agree. A transcendental respect, on the other hand, is often and most of all intended by nature per se.

Therefore a form that essentially includes such a respect is often produced formally and per se by its proper action: by heating, for example, heat, as inhering, comes to be, within which the transcendental respect is intimately included; by the act of seeing, an act comes to be that includes a transcendental relation to the object; by a unitive action, the mode of union comes to be, which includes a transcendental relation to things able to be united; and the same can be seen in many other cases. This is perhaps what Scotus distinguished under the titles of relations "arriving from without" and "arriving from within," saying that to the former a per se action can be terminated, but not to the latter, which alone are predicamental. Of that division, under those names, we shall speak in the next disputation, the first among the six last predicaments, on account of which Scotus seems chiefly to have devised that distinction. Under those terms the distinction is not necessary for us, and the fact itself is not limited to the six last predicaments, but is also found in others, as we shall see there.

13. The reason, then, for this difference between predicamental and transcendental relations is that a predicamental relation is not instituted in the nature of things to discharge some particular function of its own; it is said only to accompany things so that certain things regard one another by force of some rationale or real foundation presupposed in them. Therefore such a relation is nothing other than a respect arising upon the positing of the foundation and term, and it is never produced per se. A transcendental respect, however, belongs to some form or entity, or mode of being, insofar as it is instituted and ordered by nature per se to some particular function that can of itself be intended through some action; and therefore that respect also can be produced per se by an action, inasmuch as it is included in a form that expresses such a respect. For since such a form, in its proper and specific concept, includes that respect, that respect cannot be less intended per se or less produced

per se than the form itself, since the agent's action and intention tend per se to the whole form, down to its specific notion.

Another Difference Between the Said Respects

14. Hence too it follows that a pure predicamental relation is never a principle of acting, both because, as it is never produced per se, so neither does it act per se, and because, as we have said, it is not instituted by nature for some particular function per se necessary to a thing's being or coming to be, but is only a certain consequent respect that results therefrom. Principles of acting, however, are instituted per se and are ordered to a particular function. But a form that expresses a transcendental respect, even according to its proper relative notion, is often per se a principle of acting, as is clear in the case of knowledge, power, and the like.

A Fourth Difference, & Clarification of the Others

15. Finally, from these points it is understood that a predicamental respect must be conceived as a certain minimal and accidental form which gives the subject no being other than to regard another, nor serves for anything else in nature. A transcendental respect, however, is not to be conceived as an integral form whose function is merely to refer; rather it is an essential mode or difference of some form or entity, insofar as it is instituted per se for causing in some way or operating with respect to others, or conversely, insofar as it essentially depends upon another. According to this way of explaining these respects, the difference touched upon above can be reduced to the same sense: a transcendental respect is always intrinsic and essential to some entity (including under "entity" real modes as well), whereas a predicamental relation has its own proper rationale of accident. In this way too the other two differences, taken on the side of

foundation and of the reality or existence of the term, can be reduced to a fitting sense.

Which Relations Belong to the Predicament of Relation

16. From these differences it is concluded, finally, that transcendental respects—though truly in things according to their proper being—do not belong to any one special predicament, because the things or natures or essences to which they belong are ordered to various functions, and at times primarily diverse ones; therefore they are referred to diverse predicaments according to their diverse conditions and natures. Hence the predicament of Relation includes only those relations that are properly and peculiarly called predicamental; for all these agree among themselves, and are distinguished from others, by a peculiar mode of purely referring the thing which they affect. Accordingly they also agree in a general way in the mode by which they begin to be—through the coexistence of the extremes, that is, the foundation and the term—and in other conditions which they require, as will be clearer from the discussion in the next section.

Reply to the Fourth Difficulty Left from Section I

17. Whether Knowledge, According to Aristotle, Belongs to the Genus of Relation. Each Science Must Be Referred to Its Proper Object. From these points the difficulty raised in the fourth argument of Section I is also resolved. The respects in which induction is made there are all transcendental, and as such we admit that they do not belong to a special predicament. Hence, in that special example touched upon there, namely knowledge insofar as it says a respect to the knowable, I admit that the replies mentioned there from Aristotle

in the chapter on Quality have great difficulty. The first seems sufficiently refuted by the objections made there, which can be confirmed by the testimonies of Aristotle himself (Topics IV, c. 1, locus 4), where he says in general that genus and species must lie in the same division, namely the predicamental division; in particular he applies the example of Relation: "For the genera of things that are to something must have species which are also to something," and conversely; the same he says of Quality. He repeats the same in Topics V, c. 4, locus 39, where he writes: "Moreover, in the case of things that are to something, we must consider whether the genus has been assigned, and the species assigned to that genus, as when opinion and the opinable, and a certain opinion to a certain opinable. If it is not thus assigned, it is manifest that there is a mistake." The same is clear from the rules laid down by Aristotle in the Antepredicaments (c. 3), especially this one: "Genera not placed subordinately have not the same differences." And in the present case it is quite evident from the thing itself. For each science, according to its proper and specific notion, says a proper relation to its proper object. What Soto says on the predicament of Quality, expounding that passage of Aristotle—that although science as such says a relation to the knowable, as the measurable to the measure, nevertheless the particular sciences do not say proper relations of the measurable to their proper objects—this is false and against Aristotle's express words in the passage of Topics just cited and against manifest reason. For just as the truth of science in general is measured by the object knowable in general, so the truth of this science is measured by this object knowable. Likewise, a determinate science takes its species from its relation to its object; therefore not only as science, but also as this science, it says a respect to this knowable.

18. Therefore it must be said that Aristotle did not approve that first response, and on that account added a second: namely, that the same thing which is a science may be placed in diverse predicaments, namely Quality and Relation, to be sure under diverse

notions, since under one and the same it cannot be constituted in diverse predicaments. Against this second response, however, the objections set out above press not a little; and therefore some think Aristotle was not speaking there from his own position, but according to the opinion of those who embraced the first definition of relatives which he had given in the chapter On Relation, namely that all things which in any way are said to be to something belong to the predicament of Relation. According to that he had subjoined there that habit, disposition, and science are to something; later, however, he does not approve that definition, and therefore is not to be thought to approve everything that follows from it, although he intimates how, according to it, one should speak consistently. Nor does another reply satisfy, namely that these are only relatives "according to saying," since it is sufficiently shown that in the proper being of these things a respect is included. The true reply is the one proposed at the end in that fourth argument: namely, that science and other such entities, according to their essential notion, do not say a predicamental but only a transcendental respect, and therefore as such do not belong to the predicament of Relation. Insofar as there can be added to science some pure accidental respect, extrinsic to its essence, it will then, as such, not belong to the predicament of Quality but to that of Relation. In this sense, the second response of Aristotle can also be explained.

19. What Justifies Asserting Predicamental Relations. The last rejoinder in that fourth argument was an inquiry: what need is there to add and admit such accidental and predicamental respects over and above transcendental ones? For if one carefully considers the reasons by which the Doctors are accustomed to prove that there are real relations, these reasons indeed chiefly prove that in things there are such real respects according to being, as one may especially see in St. Thomas (I, q. 13, a. 7; q. 28, a. 1–2), in Scotus (II, dist. 1), and in the others cited above. But that besides transcendental relations there are predicamental ones distinct from them does not seem able to be demonstrated. Nonetheless the common consensus of philosophers

suffices so that one must by no means depart from that position. The reason for introducing and admitting such respects was that we find many accidental relative predications that are not drawn from transcendental respects alone, as to be father, similar, equal, and the like; nor do they arise from any apprehension or fiction of the intellect, but from the things themselves, in which there exist forms from which such denominations and predications spring. Nor are such denominations extrinsic, that is, drawn from extrinsic things or forms; for a thing is not said to be like another by what is in the other, but by what it has in itself; and so with the rest. Hence it was understood that such denominations are drawn from certain respects resulting from the coexistence of several things having a sufficient foundation for it, whose function is only to refer and order one thing to another so that one regards the other by reason of some foundation presupposed in it. And because these respects have a peculiar mode of being brought about, they have been placed in their own predicament.

20. I add that this common position and its rationale become easier and more plausible if we say that these predicamental relations are not new things or real modes distinct by nature from the things in which they are said to be founded, but that those very things have a twofold mode of giving denomination: one per se, and (so to speak) from their primary institution; the other as it were resulting from the coexistence of one thing with another. The former mode of denomination is either wholly absolute, or, if it includes a respect, it will be transcendental, which very often does not require the coexistence of the other extreme to which it tends; and when it does require that extreme, this is not because such a respect arises, as it were accidentally, from the coexistence of such extremes, but because such a thing is instituted per se to exercise some actual function with respect to another, which it cannot exercise except with respect to an existing thing. Explained in this way, one of the differences of transcendental relations touched upon above is excellent. The latter denomination is peculiarly relative and, in its kind, accidental; for that

one thing coexist with another—considering precisely the concept and rationale of coexistence—lies outside the notion of each thing; therefore the denomination which requires this coexistence, for no other reason than that from it such a denomination results, is accidental. And thus, although in the thing it is taken from the same entity, yet because it is accidental it has a sufficient foundation for distinction, so that the intellect conceives that entity after the manner of two forms. Finally, because that denomination is taken from the things themselves, it also suffices for constituting, by reason of it, a special predicament of real and relative accident. In this way, then, there seems to be given a sufficient account both of the aforesaid division and of the constitution of the predicament of Relation.

21. What Relations Are Like in the Divine. Here there arises a theological difficulty concerning the divine relations: how the doctrine given may be applied to them, and to which member of the said division they are to be referred. But this disputation does not concern us; nor is it necessary that all the preceding points have place in those relations, because those relations are not accidental but substantial. It is certain, however, that they are not merely "according to saying," but according to being; nor are they properly, strictly speaking, predicamental relations, because the divine substances are infinite and of a higher order, and thus are placed in no predicament. Hence neither do they have that imperfection or mode of being by resultant from foundation and term; rather they either are "from themselves," as the relation of producer (for example, paternity), or are produced per se by their proper production—or, to speak according to our mode of conceiving, are co-produced—and, speaking formally, are per se attained through the very origins themselves, as filiation and passive procession. Therefore those relations are of a higher order, eminently containing whatever perfection and property necessary to true real respect is found both in transcendental respect and in predicamental relation, the imperfections being excluded.

SECTION V
WHAT IS THE ESSENCE AND PROPER DEFINITION OF RELATION (AD ALIQUID), THAT IS, PREDICAMENTAL RELATION

1. What we have disputed hitherto is aimed almost entirely at explaining and defining the question whether there is a real predicamental relation, which is our subject here; along the way we have touched on many matters from which it will be easier for us to explain the essence of this relation and the definition that Aristotle approves in this matter.

Definition of Predicamental Relation

2. We must therefore say that relation (now we speak only of the predicamental) is an accident whose whole being is to be toward another, or to be disposed to another, or to regard another. This definition is taken from Aristotle in the Categories, in the chapter On Relation, where he presents two definitions of things that are relative, which differ only in one word. The former is that those things are relative which are what they are by being of others or are in some other way said to be of others. The latter is that those things are relative whose being is to be disposed toward another. The whole difference lies in the verb "are said." That verb, especially in philosophical usage, is often used for the verb "to be"; thus Aristotle himself said that quality is that by which some are said to be such. For this reason many think that there is little need to be concerned about the difference between those descriptions. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle's intention, it is clear that they are diverse, and in the first the verb "are said" is taken with strictness and propriety, and moreover placed under a disjunction: those things are relative which are what

they are by being of others, or which are in some way said to be of others. In this way Aristotle indicates that it does not belong to the notion of relation that it be toward another, but that it be, or be said to be. This he wished to correct in the second definition, so that in the proper definition of the predicament of Relation only relations according to being, and not relatives according to saying, be included. From that latter definition ours is taken, or rather it is identical with it; only for greater clarity it is cast and composed by a kind of proportion of genus and difference.

What the Genus in the Definition of Relation Is

3. "Accident" is placed in that definition in the place of genus. By this, first, the divine relations are excluded, which are not accidents but substances. Next, all created substances are excluded, which cannot be predicamental relations, as is plain from what was said in the preceding section. Further, relations of reason are excluded, which properly and simply cannot be called accidents, since "accident," strictly so called, is contained under real being. Nor do I approve what Cajetan suggests (I, q. 13, a. 7), namely, that the definition of relatives given in the Categories is common to relations of reason and real relations, because, he says, the definition is given of them insofar as they import "to another," and thus as they abstract from real being. This conflicts with Aristotle, who first divided real being and placed Relation as one of its members, and then defined it. Moreover, from that opinion it follows that either relations of reason would be constituted in the predicament of Relation, or the definition would extend more broadly than the thing defined. Although Aristotle did not expressly place the word "accident" in that definition, he tacitly understands it from the prior division of being into the nine genera—especially because even that latter clause, "whose whole being is to be toward another," properly and strictly understood, does not belong to relations of reason except by a certain analogous imitation or

proportionality, as was explained above. Therefore, by that clause, taken with propriety, relations of reason could be excluded; they are not so much as are as are apprehended to be toward another.

What the Difference in the Definition of Relation Is

4. The other part of that definition, which has the role of difference, separates this predicament from the remaining predicaments of accidents. For those, since they are absolute, have their being "in another" (esse in), not "to another" (ad aliud); the latter is proper to relation. Immediately two difficulties arise.

First Difficulty Concerning the Definition

5. First, the whole definition suits transcendental relatives; for knowledge also has its whole being toward another. To this difficulty the common reply is that such entities are excluded by Aristotle in the second definition by removing the word "are said," which was in the first. But this reply is not consistent with the doctrine we set forth in the foregoing section. For such entities, even when conceived precisely as they are in themselves, include in their essential notions a respect to another; therefore they are not merely "said to be," but truly are to another. Hence, even with the word "are said" removed from the definition, the definition truly suits them. Finally, that word was removed only to exclude relatives according to saying; but we have shown that these are not only relatives according to saying, but also according to their being; therefore they have not been sufficiently excluded. I think, then, that such transcendental respects must be excluded by the clause "whose whole being is to be toward another" if it is understood with that strictness which we declared at the end of the preceding section. For those entities which include a transcendental respect are not so "to another" that their whole being should consist in a pure respect to another; and therefore they do not

regard another under the pure notion of term, but under some other notion and by exercising with respect to it some function for which such things are instituted per se. A relation defined here, however, has its whole essence in pure reference to another; and therefore it is proper to it, in a special way, that its whole being should be to another as to the pure term of such a respect or relatedness.

If a Relation Has Being-In, How Is It Entirely Toward Another

6. A second difficulty then arises, which increases the preceding one. The latter part of the definition seems to conflict with the former: if relation is an accident, then its whole being cannot consist in a relatedness to another; for it is necessary that something of it be in a subject, in order that it be an accident, since the being of an accident is to inhere. Some answer that, when it is said that relation has its whole being toward another, this is to be understood of the proper being of relation as such, which is "being-to" (esse ad), not of the being it has in common with the other accidents, which is "being-in" (esse in). From this arose the opinion treated above, distinguishing in relation an esse ad and an esse in, and holding that "being-to," as such, abstracts from every real being and of itself is common univocally to relations of reason and to real relations. However, this reply has been sufficiently refuted by what has been said above against that position. First, because it belongs to the notion of an accident, as it exists in reality, not only that it inhere under some generic or common notion, but also under its proper notion, and as it is such a form in the nature of things. Indeed it is impossible that a form inform or affect according to a common notion and not according to some proper one, since these notions are not distinguished on the side of the thing. Second, otherwise relation would not impart to the subject its own proper formal effect as relation; for an accident gives a formal effect only by inhering and affecting. If therefore relation did not

inhere according to its proper notion, it would not confer its proper and specific formal effect. Third, if that proper being of relation which is called "being-to" did not inhere, it would be nothing real in the nature of things, and consequently a predicamental relation, according to its proper constitutive, would not be something real. Hence with good reason St. Thomas says (In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3) that a real relation, according to its proper quidditative notion, posits something in that of which it is the relation, although what it posits is not absolute. He teaches this more fully elsewhere on I Sentences (ad Annibaldum, d. 25, a. 4, ad 3): "Although relation does not, by that respect, posit something absolute, it nevertheless posits something relative; and therefore relation is a certain thing. For if, according to the notion of relation or respect, it posited nothing, then, since according to its being—by which it posits something as inhering—it would not fall under the genus of relation, there would be no genus of being."

7. Therefore, to the difficulty proposed, we must concede that relation as such is wholly an accident, for this ratio—as we said above—is quasi-transcendental with respect to the nine predicaments. Hence, when it is said that the whole being of relation is to be toward another, the exclusive force virtually contained there does not exclude concomitants or extrinsic and transcendental notions; accordingly, just as it does not exclude the notion of real being, so neither does it exclude the notion of accident and inherence. It excludes only absolute being, and indicates that the being of relation as such does not "come to rest" in the subject which it affects or denominates in its own way, but orders that subject to a term; and in this lies the whole formal notion of relation. Thus, although likeness, for example, according to its whole notion—even as relative—is to be conceived as a form affecting the thing which it denominates "like," nevertheless the entire affection it brings about consists in this, that it orders or refers that thing to another; and in this sense it is said that the whole being of relation is to be disposed to another.

8. Objection. It Is Resolved. You will say that this is common to those forms or real absolute modes that include a transcendental respect. For knowledge inheres and affects the knower in such a way as to order him in its own way to the knowable object, nor can it exercise its formal effect otherwise; and the same holds of power, of union, and the like. I reply by conceding that in this there is some likeness and proportionality, on account of which such forms are said to include some respect according to being, albeit a transcendental one. The difference, however, is the one so often touched upon: predicamental relations consist in pure respect, whereas other forms or qualities give some proper absolute being by exercising some function to which they are ordered by their nature; in this they include some relation, and therefore they do not have their whole being to another as predicamental relations do.

Does the Essence of Relation Consist in Actually Referring or Only in an Aptitude to Refer?

9. Finally, one may object that, if relation is considered in the abstract as a form referring its subject or foundation to a term, then it does not belong to its notion to refer actually, but to be apt to refer. Therefore its whole being does not consist in being to a term. The consequence is clear, because "being to a term" imports, so to speak, the actual exercise of such a relation to the term. The antecedent is clear both because the common notion of accident is not to effect actually but to do so by aptitude, and because the mind can conceive relation whole and entire as affecting the subject and yet as not yet actually referring. Thus theologians say that, in the divine, paternity can be conceived as constituting the first Person and as, so to speak, adhering to Him prior to referring. Therefore the notion of relation does not consist in actual respect.

10. I reply that the antecedent is false. A thing is not constituted apt to be referred by relation as such, but by the proximate

foundation of the relation; the proper formal effect of relation is to refer actually. Otherwise it would not be distinguished, even formally, from its foundation, nor would it require the coexistence of the term, nor would it be truly said that its whole being is placed in being toward another.

11. To the first proof of the antecedent I reply, first, that it is one thing to consider whether the formal effect of an accident is to constitute actually something of such a kind, and another whether it belongs to the essence of the accident to exercise its formal effect actually. These two are distinct. We truly say that the formal effect of whiteness is to constitute something actually white, and not merely by aptitude, although absolutely it does not belong to the essential notion of whiteness to confer such a formal effect actually. Hence one can also say that, although it does not belong to the notion of whiteness, speaking simply, to constitute something actually white, nevertheless, to the notion of whiteness as affecting and informing a subject, it does belong to constitute something actually white. Thus in the present case, in this latter sense, we say that the formal effect of relation is to refer actually, because this is what it confers of itself and formally upon the subject which it affects in its own way.

12. The Essence of Relation Lies in the Actual Affecting of the Subject. I add, next, that it is not common to every accident that it affect only by aptitude; there are some for which it belongs to their essential concept that they cannot exist in the nature of things without actually affecting, as we said above of accidental modes. Relations belong in this latter order; they cannot exist in the nature of things without actually referring, because they cannot be conserved separated from every subject, since in reality they are not distinguished from their proximate subjects, as has been shown. Although there are those who teach the contrary—such as Major (IV, dist. 12, q. 3) and Ledesma (on I of Part IV, q. 28, a. 2, dub. 4)—who say that God can conserve a created paternity without its proper subject, either separated per se or in another subject. They think that

paternity is a thing wholly distinct from the rest, and therefore they speak consistently, especially with respect to the former part. As to the latter, however, it seems impossible that this paternity be posited in one who did not beget this son; otherwise it would either constitute a father one who did not beget, or it would inhere in someone without giving him its formal effect—both of which are impossible. Just as it is truer that relation is not a thing distinct from its foundation, so also it is truer that it cannot be separated from it or conserved per se. If at times relation is really distinguished from a remote subject, this is so insofar as the proximate foundation of the relation is some thing distinct from the remote subject. In that respect, too, such a relation can be conserved as separated from that subject insofar as that thing which is its foundation can be conserved without that subject. Then the relation thus conserved affects its foundation after the manner of a subject and actually refers it; in this way a consecrated quantity is equal to another, and a separated whiteness would be similar to another. Thus a relation can never actually be without actually referring to another.

13. To the second proof I reply that it is impossible to conceive relation together with its formal effect fully and properly conceived without conceiving it as actually referring; just as it is impossible to conceive whiteness together with its formal effect fully conceived without conceiving it as constituting something actually white. For a thing cannot be conceived fully without what belongs to its essential notion. Yet it sometimes happens that our intellect, conceiving some form as affecting, does not conceive distinctly, properly, and fully its formal effect, but only confusedly, resting in this common notion of affecting or inhering. Because this notion is, as it were, transcendental and included in any mode or difference of a form, therefore the whole form can be conceived as affecting only confusedly as to its effect: for example, if one conceives whiteness in itself wholly as a form adhering to and informing a subject, he will not conceive it as constituting something actually white—not because

that is not the formal effect of whiteness, but because he conceives its effect in a diminished and confused way. In this way relation can be conceived, in itself wholly, as affecting or adhering or as constituting something, even if it is not understood as actually referring—not because the formal effect of relation is not to refer actually, but because then the formal effect of relation is not conceived by a proper and adequate concept, but by a confused and common one. Thus it happens to us when, in the divine, we conceive paternity as prior to actually referring to the Son; on which matter theologians dispute more at length.

SECTION VI

ON THE SUBJECT, FOUNDATION, AND TERMINUS REQUIRED FOR PREDICAMENTAL RELATION

1. Whether there is any final cause of relation. Whether it has an efficient cause. What is the material cause of relation. We have explained whether predicamental relation exists and what it is; we must now set forth its causes or principles—whatever they may be and insofar as they can belong to it. Since this relation is not intended in things for its own sake, it does not properly have a final cause, although in the manner in which it exists it can be said to be "for" its formal effect or for its terminus. By a similar reason, since relation does not come to be per se but results, or formally follows, once the foundation and the terminus are posited, it neither has nor requires an efficient cause other than those that produce the foundation and the terminus. Unless one wishes to attribute to the foundation or to the terminus some efficiency with respect to the relation, at least by natural resultancy—which would be plausible on the side of the foundation if relation were a mode distinct from it by nature—yet since we suppose the contrary to be true, we do not think an effective resultancy intervenes here, but rather a quasi-formal one. Again, since

relation itself is a certain form, it does not have another proper and physical formal cause, but it has its own quiddity and metaphysical formal account, which we have already explained. It also has a terminus which, insofar as it specifies the relation, participates in the character of form. The foundation and the subject seem to complete the material cause. Therefore, in these three—subject, foundation, and terminus—all the principles and causes of relations are set. We must speak of them in turn; from this it will afterwards be evident how, from the variety of these, different genera or species of relations can be distinguished.

On the Subject of Accidental Relations

2. First, then, it must be said that every predicamental relation requires some real subject. This assertion, taken generally, is clear. Relation is an accident, as has been said; every accident requires some subject. Likewise, relation is a certain form; every form informs something; and that which it informs is called its subject, especially if the form inheres in it and depends upon it—which we have shown to be true of relation even as relation. We must note that we can speak of relation in the abstract or in the concrete, as with other accidents: in general, the very name "relation" is abstract, and in particular "paternity," "similarity," and so on; correspondingly, "relative," taken in general, is a kind of concrete, and in particular "father," "like," and the like. When, therefore, we say that relation requires a subject, we must understand this of relation taken in the abstract; for a relative, taken in the concrete, does not properly have a subject. Rather, if "relative" is taken formally as such, it is something constituted out of subject and relation—so to speak, a composite of the relation and its subject. Sometimes the subject of the relation is called the "relative," but denominatively rather than formally—that is, as affected, not as constituted by relation—and therefore the name is more properly and formally said of what is constituted. For that which is affected by

relation is not properly called the "relative" itself, but the subject of the relation, and is often also called the "extreme" of the relation, because the relative ordering is, as it were, enclosed between the two subjects of the relations, as between two extremes.

That One Relation, Even as a Being-Toward, Can Exist in Only One Subject. Shown Against Henry

3. A question arises here whether one relation has one subject, and what that subject is. I ask this chiefly on account of Henry (of Ghent), who in Quodlibet IX, question 3, holds that a relation according to its proper being-toward (esse ad) is one and the same between the two extremes that are referred. For relation according to its proper notion is, as it were, a certain mean between the related extremes; and thus, just as Aristotle said that the road from Athens to Thebes and from Thebes to Athens is the same, Henry says that the mutual ordering of any two extremes that stand in relation to each other—namely, of father to son and son to father, or of two brothers, or of things similar to each other—is one and the same. If you object that the father's relation, for example, is paternity and the son's is filiation, and that in general relations must be distinguished by their foundations (since one and the same accident cannot be in different subjects), he replies that relations considered as existing in their foundations and as inseparable from them are multiplied according to the distinctness and plurality of those foundations; nevertheless, insofar as relation is a certain mean and, as it were, an interval of two things that have a mutual ordering, in that respect it is one and the same in both.

4. However, either this distinction and the whole opinion consists only in words, or it is unintelligible. How could one and the same numerically identical accident be in subjects really distinct, not united among themselves but wholly disjoined and even separated in place? Either this relation is said to be "one" by true and proper unity,

as a simple form—then the foregoing argument shows it is impossible for one and the same relation to exist simultaneously in both extremes. Or the relation is said to be "one" only by a certain collection—because, namely, the complete ordering and, as it were, linkage between both extremes is formed from the two relations existing in the two extremes—and in this way it is "one" merely in name, an unusual and therefore to-be-avoided way of speaking. Moreover, on that account one would have to say, consistently, that such an ordering, insofar as it is one, has a single subject not simply, but by a collection of both extremes ordered to each other. And if someone says that this mutual ordering is simply one in both extremes, yet it does not exist in them as in subjects but exists only "between" them—which is more what Henry suggests—this is plainly false and even less intelligible. For either that "interval" or mutual ordering is something of reason only, and thus irrelevant to real relation, as Gregory rightly shows against Aureolus (In I Sent., dist. 28, q. 1); or it is something of reality. If so, either it subsists in itself—which cannot be said—or necessarily it exists in some subject; and it can exist only in the extremes that are related to one another, or in one of them. Or finally it is something that abstracts from real being and being of reason, as Henry indicates; but this is simply false, as was shown above; and even if we granted that it can be abstracted in our concept, nonetheless in individual relations it cannot abstract. Therefore in real and accidental relations there must be something real and accidental, and thus the argument returns: it must be in one subject.

How a Single Relation Can Have Multiple Subordinate Subjects

5. The Order Relations Observe in Denominating the Subject. We must therefore speak otherwise and distinguish among subjects. There can be several subjects of different kinds, subordinate

among themselves—or of the same kind and equally immediately affected by the relation. In the latter way it cannot occur that one relation is in several subjects, as the argument made against Henry proves; that argument is universal for any accident having real and proper unity in reality. In the former way, however, several subjects of one relation can be distinguished: one proximate, another remote. Thus the relation of equality is proximate in quantity but remote in substance; the relation of similarity is proximate in quality, remote in quantity, and still more remote in substance. Nevertheless, such a relation per se and properly affects only the proximate subject, in which it inheres in its own way; it is compared to the remote subject only through the proximate, insofar as the proximate inheres in and is sustained by the remote. For we showed above, in Disputation XIV, that one accident can inhere proximately in another and not touch substance in itself, but only insofar as that accident in which the other inheres is sustained in the substance. In this way one relation can be immediately in some accidental subject and remotely in another or in the substance. Whether this is universal for all relations we shall see immediately.

6. Yet with respect to the denomination given by relation there is a certain variety among relations. Sometimes relation denominates the proximate and the remote subject equally or in the same way—as quantity is called equal and likewise the material substance; and whiteness is called similar, and "white" itself, or even the subject, as a man or a wall. Sometimes relation denominates the proximate subject and not the remote—as intellect is said to be referred by the relation of potency to its act, whereas the soul is not so denominated, and similarly in other cases. Sometimes, conversely, relation denominates the remote subject or the supposit itself and not the proximate—as filiation denominates the supposit "son," but not the humanity, although it is probable that it inheres proximately in the humanity; and paternity is said to be proximate in a power, yet it denominates not the power but the person "father," that is, the

supposit. The reason for this variety comes from the diversity of foundations: sometimes they are compared to the terms of the relations according to the same proportion; sometimes according to a different one, as will be clearer below when we explain the different kinds of relations. Sometimes it also arises because relation follows upon its proximate foundation and denominates it, not insofar as that foundation affects or denominates another subject, but according to its precise and abstract account—as it belongs to an accident to inhere relatively. Sometimes relation follows upon the foundation only insofar as the foundation affects or denominates such a subject or supposit; sometimes indifferently under either account. And so much for the subject of relation.

SECTION VII
ON THE FOUNDATION OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATION

1. A real relation needs a real foundation. First, regarding the foundation of relation, we must establish in general that every real relation needs some real foundation. Almost all who write on this matter take this for granted, with little proof or dispute. The reason seems to be that relation, of itself, does not have a proper entity, since it has been shown not to be a thing distinct from absolutes; therefore it must have that entity at least identically and in reality from something else. It does not have it from the terminus, for the terminus is something extrinsic and distinct, whereas the entity of a thing is intrinsic. Therefore a real relation has its entity from a real foundation; consequently it always requires such a foundation. This is further confirmed and clarified: relation is of such a nature that neither is it produced per se nor is it intended per se in nature; therefore it follows upon and, as it were, results in the subject once the terminus is posited. Therefore, in the subject it requires some real reason or cause

on account of which, when such a terminus is posited, such a relation results in it. Thus that cause is called the real foundation of the relation.

On the Distinction of the Foundation from the Subject of Relation

2. To explain this assertion further, we can first inquire whether this foundation must be distinct in reality from the subject of relation. This can be understood either of the proximate subject of inherence, or of the remote and, as it were, fundamental subject, which is the substance itself. With regard to the former subject it is certain that, besides it, there does not need to be a foundation of relation really distinct by nature from it; otherwise there would be a regress to infinity. Hence it is certain that the relation of equality, which inheres in quantity—even when separated from substance—has no other foundation besides quantity itself, because we cannot even feign what that other foundation would be; nor would we stop in that other foundation, for it would itself be the proximate subject, and with respect to it another foundation would have to be sought; or if we did stop there, a fortiori we should stop in quantity itself. The difficulty therefore concerns the principal and fundamental subject, namely, the substance. The question is whether, with respect to substance, every real relation requires some accidental foundation distinct in reality—at least by nature—from the substance itself. Many seem to think so. The reason may be that relation is an accident; therefore it ought to belong to substance by means of an accident in which it is founded. The consequence is clear: as said above, relation is not distinguished in reality from its proximate foundation; therefore, that it may be an accident, it must be founded proximately in an accident. For if it were to belong immediately to substance, it would be the same in reality with it, and thus would not be an accident but a substance.

3. Therefore St. Thomas, On Power, question 8, article 2, ad 1, says that no relation can be the same as a substance that is in a genus —that is, as created substance. And in Contra Gentiles IV, chapter 14, near the end, he says that in creatures relations have a dependent being, because their being is other than the being of substance, and later he says: "A relation which really comes to substance has a last and most imperfect being; last, because it presupposes not only the being of substance but also the being of other accidents from which the relation is caused." Therefore, in St. Thomas's view, relation always presupposes in the substance another accident in which it is founded. Thus in I, question 28, article 2, ad 2, he says that in creatures there is always posited something absolute, which is a thing other than the relation itself, as presupposed to relation. According to what has been said above, this cannot be verified solely on the part of the proximate foundation; therefore, at least on the part of substance—which St. Thomas chiefly intends there—there always intervenes some other foundation between substance and relation, by reason of which relation can be a thing other than the substance itself. This is confirmed from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, where, when enumerating the foundations of relations, he always posits something distinct from substance, namely quality, action, or something of the sort. A second confirmation: otherwise relations could be founded upon and rest upon matter alone; but this is false, especially according to the common sentence denying that any accident can exist in prime matter alone.

Some Relations Can Be Founded Immediately in Substance Itself

4. Nevertheless, it must be said that it is not necessary for the proximate foundation of relation to be some accident, or a thing, or a real mode, distinct by nature from the primary subject of relation. This is the common view, as I shall report immediately. I prove it first: there

is no cause or reason for such a necessity. For the reasons by which it was proved above that a real relation requires a real foundation do not prove that it is necessary for that foundation to be distinct in reality from the subject. For although in the subject there is required a real cause or reason on account of which, the terminus being posited, the relation follows, nevertheless that reason or cause can be the very intrinsic nature of the subject itself, and not some thing or mode superadded to it. Why, just as quantity, by its natural condition and nature, has a sufficient reason on account of which certain relations follow upon it—and similarly quality—can substance not have something similar of itself?

5. Second, I argue by induction. Just as two quantities or whitenesses are really related by the relation of similarity or equality, so too two substances are related by the relation of specific identity; therefore this relation inheres in substance without an accidental foundation distinct from it by nature. The consequence is clear, both because one substance is not of the same species with another by reason of an accident but by reason of its very entity and proper nature, and because just as nothing intervenes between whiteness and similarity, so nothing intervenes between substantial nature and the relation of specific identity. The antecedent is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2; and it is explicitly Aristotle's, Metaphysics V, text 15, where he judges of identity in substance in the same way as of similarity in quality and equality in quantity. From this there is also an argument from parity of reason: there is as much "convenience" (fit proportion) between two substances as between two whitenesses or quantities; likewise, the proportion is the same, because they are equally of the same order. Therefore the real relation of specific identity in substance is just as real as similarity and equality in quantity and quality. Thomists often teach thus; see Soncinas on Metaphysics V, q. 35, and Iavellus, Metaphysics V, q. 21.

6. Where the Relation of the Creature is Founded. Another example is the relation of creation. This relation (according to all) is

real and predicamental, and yet it is founded immediately in the substance. St. Thomas explicitly teaches this, On Power, q. 7, a. 9, ad 4, where he says: "A creature is referred to God according to its substance as according to the cause of the relation, but according to the relation itself formally; just as a thing is said to be similar causally according to the quality, and formally according to similarity." The same is gathered from On Power, q. 3, a. 3; and from Cajetan on I, q. 45, a. 3; Ferrariensis on Contra Gentiles IV, c. 14; Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 31; and Iavellus, q. 21. The reason is evident: the substance, as such, immediately terminates God's creative act; therefore through itself it is immediately referred to God by the relation of creaturehood. You will say that passive creation is a certain mode distinct by nature from the terminus, in which that relation can be founded proximately, and not immediately in the substance. I reply, first, that even if all this be granted, nonetheless there is no accident that is the foundation of that relation, because that creative dependence is not an accident, as we said above. Next, although it is true that upon that dependence a certain proper relation can be founded, this does not exclude the substance itself from being referred through itself causally or fundamentally to God, insofar as the substance, by reason of its very being, essentially demands that dependence and terminates it through itself.

7. This is confirmed in the relation of filiation, which cannot be founded in active or passive generation in such a way as to inhere proximately in it; for once the actual generation has passed, the relation of filiation remains. Nor can it be founded upon some other accident, for there is none that is its cause. Therefore it is founded in substance itself. The reason is that the substance of the creature, insofar as it is creatable or generable by another cause, is sufficient that in it relation may be founded, if it has been created or generated by such a cause.

8. What Accident Can Be the Same as Substance. As to the arguments on the contrary, we answer—on the basis of what was said

above concerning the division of being into substance and accident—that a proper and physical accident cannot be altogether the same in reality with substance; but a predicamental accident can sometimes be distinguished from substance only by a reasoned reason (ratione ratiocinata), as is clear in the case of duration. Thus we must say that relations which are founded proximately in substance are not accidents physically and as to their entity, but only predicamental accidents as to the figure and mode of predication. For according to their formal account they are outside the account of substance; consequently it is not unfitting that such relations are not distinguished in reality from substance.

9. The testimonies there cited from St. Thomas probably suggest that he thought a real relation to be distinguished in some manner by nature from its foundation—a probable opinion. But since in Contra Gentiles IV he says that a relation of this sort belongs to substance through another accident as a medium, which cannot be universally true even if that opinion be supposed, it is probable to me that he is speaking there of relations that are physically and really accidents; perhaps for this reason he calls it "a relation which really comes to substance." He speaks in that place thus, and therefore he gives examples of similarity and equality, not of others. Ferrariensis explains it otherwise, when St. Thomas says that relation presupposes in substance the being of other accidents, namely, that this is to be understood either according to the thing or according to the mode. But this is a forced interpretation and cannot be accommodated to all these relations—as is clear for the relation of act and potency between matter and form, for the relation of substantial union, and the like. As to Aristotle's testimony, it tends rather to the contrary; how his division of the foundations of relation is to be understood will be explained in the following section. Finally, to the last confirmation we concede that many relations can be proximate in matter, such as the relation of potency, of material cause, of union, of creaturehood, and the like. And whatever may be the case for physical accidents, it is no

inconvenience for these predicamental relations distinguished by reason alone to be proximate in matter—as seems self-evident.

On the "Reason for Founding" & Its Comparison With the Foundation

10. Reasons Proving that the Foundation and the Reason for Founding Are the Same. A further inquiry about the foundation of relation: is it the same as the "reason for founding," or, if these are different, what is the character and necessity of each? There is a cause for doubting, because the foundation of relation seems to be nothing other than that by which the relation belongs to the subject; but that very foundation is the reason for founding or for receiving the relation. Therefore these are not distinguished. Likewise, if besides the foundation another "reason for founding" had to intervene, there would be no end to assigning such foundations or reasons; for no reason can be given why there should be two rather than three or four. Hence we should stop at a single foundation which itself is the reason for founding. Indeed, as we said, neither must this foundation always be really distinct from the subject of relation; sometimes a distinction by reason suffices. For the "subject" is so called insofar as it is that in which relation inheres; the "foundation," insofar as it has such a character on account of which the relation follows when the terminus is posited, or insofar as the relation has its entity from it.

11. Reasons Urging the Opposite. On the contrary, authors very often speak of these as distinct and indicate that the "reason for founding" is something required in the very foundation, or beyond the foundation and terminus, so that relation may result. Thus, for the relation of paternity, the action of generating is necessary; this is not the foundation, because paternity does not have its entity from that action (since the action of generating is in the begotten son, whereas paternity is in the father). Therefore it is a reason for founding. Likewise, although whiteness is the foundation of similarity between

two white things, the proximate "reason for founding" is said to be the formal unity of the two whitenesses. Hence, although the foundations of relations may be innumerable, yet the reasons for founding are reduced by Aristotle to three heads, as we shall see in the next section. Therefore the reason for founding is something other than the foundation.

12. The Author's Intention. In this matter there may be some diversity in the use of words; for among authors these expressions sometimes seem to be confused and taken as the same, sometimes attributed to different things. Let us, then, first explain how the matter itself stands, and afterwards accommodate the usage of words. In every real relation there is required, on the part of the subject, some thing naturally apt and suited to found an ordering to another, so that the relation may have its reality from it proximately in the manner we have set forth. Such a thing is properly called the foundation of relation in whatever kind of relation. Yet in some relations it happens that, in addition to the whole entity of the subject and foundation, some other condition is required, mediating between foundation and terminus and in some manner distinct in reality from both, so that a relation can arise between them. In this way the action or generation is necessary for the relation of agent or father; perhaps in the same way matter presupposes the mode of union and the relation of union. That such a condition is simply necessary can be easily explained in the case of action. For if Peter and Paul (who are now father and son) had been created immediately by God with all the absolute properties they now have, if the action of generation, the procession of one from the other, had not intervened between them, no relation would have arisen between them, nor could it arise by God's absolute power. Now, with that condition alone adjoined, relation immediately results. Therefore that condition is simply necessary. Nevertheless it is not the foundation, if by this word we understand that in which and from which the relation proximately has its entity. For this reason such a condition has come to be called the "reason for founding"—either

because there is no other special name by which to name it, besides the common one by which it is called a "necessary condition," or because that condition is, as it were, the last or proximate thing required for relation to sprout forth. In reality, however, it is not so properly called a "reason for founding" as a necessary condition. For the "reason" of a thing is properly said of that which has some per se influx into such a thing—especially a formal or effective influx, according to thing or account; but this condition at present has no such influx into the relation of paternity, since it is outside the father himself and has no proper causality in him. Therefore it is more properly a necessary condition.

13. This is not general to all relations—that they require, as a matter of nature, conditions distinct in reality from foundations and from actually existing termini in order to arise. For between two white things a relation of similarity arises at once, whoever made them, wherever they exist, or whatever other conditions they have. The same is true of the relation of knowledge to the knowable, and the like. Thus a "reason for founding" of this sort—even if we choose to call that condition by this name—is not necessary in all relations. What is common to all foundations of relation is that they have some natural property or condition by reason of which they are apt to found a relation; that property, with respect to such a foundation, can be called the "reason for founding" a relation. For example, it is natural to created science to be measurable by a knowable object; by this it can found a relation to that object. Likewise, to such a form—for example, whiteness—it is natural to have such a formal unity as another form of the same species can also have; this, then, is the reason on account of which such a form can found a relation of similarity. In this way, even in the relation of paternity or of any created agent, beyond the action itself (which must necessarily be considered) there is some reason for founding that belongs per se to the foundation itself. Suppose the foundation to be the very principle of effecting—whether proximate or principal. In that very principle some reason must be considered for

which it is able to be the foundation of relation. For in God's action ad extra, although in God there is a true principle of effecting, nevertheless there does not result in God a real relation, because that principle is not an apt foundation for such a relation, as we shall say below. Therefore, if a created efficient principle is an apt foundation, there must be assigned in it some intrinsic and connatural reason on account of which it is by its nature an apt foundation of a real relation —for example, that it is a principle per se ordered to an action, or something of the sort, of which we shall speak below.

14. Thus, as to the matter itself, it is evident that in every foundation there intervenes a per se and intrinsic reason for founding; it is also clear that these two are not physically distinguished in reality, but are distinguished metaphysically, that is, by reason, in order to explain the accounts of things—and thus may also be named by different expressions. For our part, so as not to multiply entities, we include these "reasons for founding" within the foundations themselves. Hence some speak thus: the foundation, formally speaking, is not, for example, quality absolutely, but quality as one. See the Hispalensis, In I Sent., dist. 13, q. 1, a. 3, notab. 4. As for the necessary condition (when it intervenes), we call it by that common name. At this point a question suggested itself about Aristotle's distinction of foundations or reasons for founding, given in Metaphysics V, c. 15. Since this calls for a longer treatment, we shall devote a separate section to it after the next.

SECTION VIII
ON THE TERMINUS OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATION

1. A real relation requires a real terminus. First, it must be said that a predicamental relation requires some real terminus. This assertion, taken generally, is almost universally admitted, and can be

easily gathered from the intrinsic notion of relation. Since its essence is to be ordered to another according to its essential being, the terminus is included in this very notion; and since this relation is predicamental and real, its terminus must be real. Yet, in explaining the conditions required on the part of the terminus for the being of relation, and how such a terminus concurs in the essence of relation, many things are usually treated. We must indicate and resolve them briefly.

Whether an Actually Existing Terminus is Required

2. Reason for Doubt. The first question is whether the terminus of a real predicamental relation must be a real terminus actually existing. The difficulty is that a real transcendental ordering can be to a thing that does not exist—indeed, even to that which is not a true being but a being of reason, as was said above. Why, then, cannot a predicamental relation look to a similar terminus? This is confirmed and explained: science looks to the knowable just as well when the knowable does not exist as when it exists, because science abstracts from singulars and from existence. Likewise, the productive is related to the producible, as Aristotle testifies in Metaphysics V; but the producible as such does not require existence. Likewise, an image, a phantasm, and the like represent a thing whether it exists or not; and a whiteness that exists is in essence as similar to another possible whiteness as to an existing one, for it has the same agreement with it in nature and essence. Similarly, the effect of a final cause depends equally upon a final cause that exists and one that does not. Finally, there is a reason a priori: neither on the part of relation nor on the part of the terminus—considered simply in its office of terminating—does this actual existence of the terminus seem necessary. The former is clear because relation has its entity from the foundation; therefore, on its side, that suffices for the existence of the relation. The latter is clear

because to "terminate actually" says only an extrinsic denomination from the ordering of another to the thing that is said to terminate; therefore such a denomination can belong to a thing that does not exist, so far as depends on the terminus.

3. The Opinion of Some. Gregory of Rimini follows this opinion (In I Sent., dist. 28, q. 23). He even adds that, conversely, a non-being can be really referred to a being; for he thinks that real relatives are always mutual—a false foundation, as we shall see below. The consequent itself—that a non-being can be really referred—is very improbable. How can that which is nothing in act be referred by a real relation, or how can an accident exist without a real subject? Finally, nothing is real in act unless it exists in act; therefore neither can relation be real in act unless it belongs to a thing actually existing, because otherwise it cannot exist or subsist. Thus, as regards a real correlative that might be a non-being, that opinion is improbable, as is also clear from the two previous sections. With respect to the terminus, it is less improbable.

4. It Is Shown that an Actually Existing Terminus Is Required. Nevertheless, it must be said that an actually real and existing terminus is necessary for a predicamental relation. This is the common sentence, both of philosophers and of the interpreters of Aristotle on the Categories, "To Something," and in Metaphysics V, c. 15, and of Theologians, as is clear from St. Thomas, I, q. 13, a. 1, where he says that all relations that are between being and non-being are relations of reason, because the intellect, apprehending non-being as a sort of extreme, forms them. The same in I, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2; Contra Gentiles II, c. 42, reason 3; and On Power, q. 3, a. 3, ad 5, where he cites Avicenna, Metaphysics III, last chapter. All the Thomists agree—Cajetan and Ferrariensis in the places cited; Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 27; Capreolus on IV, dist. 7, q. 2, and more at length on dists. 13 and 20; Scotus and others on I, dist. 13; and Maironus on dist. 29, qq. 6 and 8—who, however, uses a certain distinction: he says that a "fundamental" relation can be to a non-being, but not a "formal"

relation. By the latter he understands a predicamental relation, and thus he himself explains it—in which he clearly agrees with the assertion set down. What he understands by "fundamental relation" he does not declare; but if (as appears) he understands some transcendental respect, I do not dislike his opinion. For we have already shown above that real transcendental relations can be to termini not only not existing, but even not real beings according to essence. Gregory's arguments sufficiently prove this as well: potency, which is per se ordered first to act, undoubtedly has a transcendental ordering to it even when it is possible and not yet existing; and science has a relation to the knowable which, strictly speaking, not only need not exist but is universal and abstracting from singulars—which in that mode cannot exist.

5. Some Reasons Commonly Used to Prove the Assertion Are Weighed. Wherefore it is not easy to adduce convincing reasons that prove the position in predicamental relations; for the reasons commonly alleged seem to hold equally for transcendental respects: that no real being can be ordered to a non-being; likewise, that otherwise it could be ordered to a being of reason—which is repugnant, since a being of reason depends upon the intellect's fiction; likewise, that relation is as it were a nexus between extremes, therefore it cannot be real unless it is between real extremes. These and the like reasons, if they are effective, have place also in transcendental respects. But clearly they do not have force there; for it is not repugnant that a real being have a transcendental ordering to a non-being in act. First, because potency can have an ordering to a possible being, although it does not look to it under its bare possibility, but in order to act; yet the ordering of potency itself is prior to and independent of the actual existence of the act or object. Similarly, the non-being, insofar as it can be thought, can also terminate a transcendental ordering of thought or science to it; and thus a non-being, although in itself it seems unfit to be the terminus of a real ordering, yet insofar as some action can be exercised concerning it—and the action itself, or the habit or potency

that is a principle ordered to that action—can express a transcendental ordering to what is not. For a similar reason, an act of intellect can express a transcendental respect to a being of reason, because that is a sufficient object of such an act. And therefore, for such an ordering, it not only does not hinder that a being of reason is fictive from the intellect, but in this very fact the transcendental respect is founded.

6. By that same reason it is rightly proved that no other things can have transcendental respects to beings of reason except the acts of the mind themselves, by which the very beings of reason are thought or feigned—among which I include certain acts of imagination, insofar as through them imaginary and impossible beings can be feigned and represented. The same will be true of acts of the will, insofar as they can be concerned with beings of reason—or, if Scotus's opinion is true, by which beings of reason can be made. Finally, this may be extended, in its own way, to habits proportioned to these acts, insofar as they express a per se ordering to the same objects. In all these there is found such an ordering because of the transcendental respect to the object. Other things, which cannot have beings of reason for objects, cannot have a real and transcendental respect to them. For, as we showed above, a transcendental respect is always according to some real function that is reduced actively or passively to some kind of cause; but with respect to a being of reason, no real function can be exercised, except insofar as it is taken under the notion of object. Finally, a predicamental relation is not properly a nexus or union, but only as it were a certain tendency that can be terminated to another only extrinsically; and therefore on this side it is not repugnant to be the respect of a being to a non-being. As these reasons are solved in transcendental respects, so they seem able to be solved in predicamental ones.

7. A Reason Convincing for the Assertion. Therefore a proper reason must be sought that proceeds specifically about predicamental relations. First we can argue from received principles concerning these

relations: relation and terminus are simultaneous in time; when the correlative or terminus is removed, the relation is removed; when the terminus is posited, if the foundation is already supposed, the relation arises. These points are taken from Aristotle and from the common sentence; but they all presuppose the real existence of the terminus, since they include the coexistence of the extremes, which presupposes the existence of both. The proper reason must be taken from what has been said above about the being and essence of this relation—namely, that it consists in a pure respect and has no other function in nature. Therefore it is not intended per se, but merely results as something that befalls things over and above everything that belongs to them of themselves and by the intention of nature. From the nature of relation thus explained, it is plainly gathered that, as such, it does not exist unless the coexistence of foundation and terminus is supposed, from which it results—both because it does not have the manner of production of natural things, and because only in this way can it have the character of an accident. For other respects that can be to non-beings are essential and pertain to the predicaments of those things of which they are essential differences. This reason has some force even on the opinion of those who think that this relation is some mode in reality distinct from the foundation and from the terminus; for they can easily accommodate to themselves the discourse made; only it is hard for them to give an account of such an entity or of such a distinct mode. On our view the argument presses more: if predicamental relation in reality is nothing other than the foundation itself giving the subject a relative denomination accidentally, then it cannot give that denomination in reality unless the terminus coexists. For any other denomination will either be altogether absolute and essential—and consequently at most a transcendental respect—or it will not be a denomination taken solely from the things themselves but from the comparison of our reason. For this cause, an actually existing real terminus is always necessary for a predicamental relation.

8. The contrary arguments, if attentively considered, proceed only about transcendental respect; the difference between it and predicamental relation has now been sufficiently declared. Hence to the last reason we answer that a real terminus is required for predicamental relation by the nature and mode of such relation, which consists solely in a pure respect arising from the coexistence of the extremes. Therefore, although it is true that the actual "terminating" puts nothing in the terminus, nevertheless it necessarily supposes in the terminus an entity suitable such that, from its position together with the foundation, relation can arise, and such that relation may have, as it were, an object toward which it can look. Hence, just as we said that on the part of the foundation the thing which founds relation and the aptitude for founding can be distinguished by reason, so on the part of the terminus the thing or form of the terminus and the reason for terminating—found in such a form—can be distinguished. At this point there suggested itself a question: what sort of form and reason for terminating there must be, and especially whether it is absolute or relative. Since this question is longer and presupposes many things to be treated in the following section, it will be discussed after that section.

How the Terminus Belongs to the Essence of Relation is Deduced from What Has Been Said

9. The Opinion of Some; Another Opinion. From the foregoing resolution and its reason it can first be understood that such a real terminus is in some manner of the essence of relation—though in this there is some diversity among the authors, more about the mode of speaking than about the matter. Some absolutely deny that the terminus is of the essence of relation—for example, Francis Maironus (In I Sent., dist. 49, q. 5); something of this is also suggested by Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 33, and Cajetan on the Predicables, chapter "On Species." The reason may be that the terminus is wholly

outside the relation itself and a thing distinct from it; therefore it cannot be of its essence, for what is of the essence is altogether intrinsic and the same as the thing whose essence it is. Others say that the terminus is of the essence of relation. This is the common Peripatetic sentence, as Cajetan reports above, and Niphus in Metaphysics V, disputation 16. The reason is that the whole being of relation is a being-toward the terminus; therefore the terminus is of the essence of relation.

10. The Author's View. Nevertheless, as I said, there can scarcely be any dissent about the matter. The terminus is not an intrinsic part, nor a genus or intrinsic difference of relation; hence it cannot be of its essence in that sense—and in this all agree. Yet it is certain that a predicamental relation, as such, is nothing except by looking and tending to the terminus—and in this its essence consists. Hence, under that aspect, it can be said to include the terminus in its essence in some way, because it cannot be separated from it nor be conceived according to its proper notion without the terminus being included in such a concept. In this sense all the ancients spoke and for this reason they say not so much that the terminus is "of the essence" as that it is "of the quidditative concept" of relation—a point admitted also by Cajetan and Soncinas.

11. A Predicamental Relative Cannot Be Defined Except by an Ordering to Its Terminus. With good reason they infer that relation, according to its proper notion, cannot be defined without the terminus of relation being placed in the definition. For a thing ought to be defined as it is essentially; but the essence of relation is such that it cannot be separated from the terminus; therefore neither can the definition be separated from the terminus; therefore it must necessarily include the terminus. In this Maironus is not right; he seems to say that relation can be defined without the addition of the terminus—in which he also disagrees with Scotus, as is clear from Scotus in I, distinction 30. It must be carefully observed that we have all along spoken of the terminus of relation, not of the correlative, so

as to abstract from the question whether the correlative itself is the terminus—of which we shall treat below. There we shall also see whether this can be extended to the correlative, so that even if it is not the formal terminus, and even when it is not, it must be included. There, too, we shall solve the difficulty that arises here—namely, whether the terminus is prior in knowledge to relation, and how correlatives can be simultaneous in knowledge and definition without committing a circle.

12. Transcendental Respects as They Look to a Terminus. Finally, it is to be observed that this doctrine is in some way general to transcendental respects; for even they, and the forms or entities of which they are the essential differences, cannot be adequately and essentially defined without adding the thing they look to—which, under that aspect, can be called the terminus. The difference is that a predicamental relation, by its special and proper notion, requires a terminus actually existing—both that it may result from it in its own genus, and that it may look to it under the precise notion of terminus. A transcendental relation neither results from the terminus, strictly speaking, nor looks to it under the precise notion of terminus, but always with some other notion added—of object, or cause, or something similar. Thus the respect to the terminus—especially an existing terminus—is in some way more intrinsic and formal in a predicamental relation than in a transcendental respect.

Not Even by Absolute Power Can a Relation Remain Without Its Terminus

13. A second question is resolved: is the dependence of relation on the existence of its terminus so great that it not only requires it by nature, but even by absolute divine power cannot be preserved without it? This seems difficult to believe. For since these are distinct things, as we suppose, and the foundation does not intrinsically compose relation, nor has a real influx into it, no sufficient

reason can be given why God could not preserve relation without the terminus. Nevertheless, it must be said that by no power can a predicamental relation as such be preserved without its actual terminus. So teach almost all writers. The reason is that the terminus in some way is involved in the very formal effect of relation. But it was shown above that a relation cannot be preserved in the realm of things without actually exercising its formal effect; therefore a relation cannot in act be preserved without its actual terminus. The consequence is clear, because a formal effect cannot be preserved without all that is per se and essentially required for it. The major is clear: the formal effect of relation is actually to refer to the terminus; but in this very effect the terminus is included—just as motion or action cannot exist without its proper terminus, because it is an actual way toward it.

14. This is much easier to understand on our view—namely, that relation is not a thing or real mode distinct from the foundation and added to it, but is the very entity of the foundation, giving the subject a denomination as such. Since that denomination is purely relative, it consists only in a certain habitudo arising from the coexistence of the terminus. It is not surprising, therefore, that such an entity of the foundation can confer that denomination in no way unless the coexistence of the terminus is posited. Thus the reason for doubting to the contrary is easily solved. For here there does not intervene any entity that God could not preserve without another really distinct one. God can preserve the whole entity of the foundation without the terminus; nevertheless, He cannot preserve that entity under such a formal aspect and denomination, because under that aspect it involves the terminus; indeed, in reality it adds nothing distinct except the coexistence of the terminus.

SECTION IX

WHAT DISTINCTION IS NECESSARY BETWEEN THE FOUNDATION AND THE TERMINUS

Section IX

1. This question, too, is easily dispatched from what has been said thus far. Some think that a real distinction between them is necessary—see Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 29—and he indicates that there must be a complete distinction, such that it does not suffice for them to be distinguished as whole and part. This is chiefly founded on the thought that otherwise a continuous whole would be referred by infinitely many real relations of different proportions of greater inequality to infinitely many proportional parts—which is an inconvenience. By a similar argument St. Thomas proves (Contra Gentiles II, c. 12, reason 3) that one quantity cannot be referred by a real relation to a greater possible quantity; otherwise it would have infinite relations at once, since numbers or greater quantities can be multiplied to infinity.

2. Others think that no distinction in reality is necessary, which can especially seem the case in the relation of identity of the same to itself. For a thing is as properly and on the side of reality—without the fiction of the intellect—"the same with itself" as it is "different from another" or "similar to another"; therefore that relation is as real as any other. Some are most inclined to this especially if it happens that the same foundation is in diverse subjects—as, for example, if the same numerically identical whiteness were in two men. They say that those men would be mutually referred by a real relation of similarity, because the foundation is distinguished from the terminus which terminates it, even if it is not distinguished from the very reason for terminating. Scotus holds this (In I Sent., dist. 31; and in the Quodlibet, q. 6).

Resolution

3. It must be said that for a real relation it is necessary that the foundation and the terminus, taken formally, be distinguished in reality. This is the sentence of St. Thomas, I, q. 42, a. 4, ad 3, where for this reason he denies that equality among the divine Persons is a real

relation; he also denies that the same thing is referred to itself by a real relation. All the Thomists follow him. And that some distinction in reality between real correlatives is required is almost a per se known principle in metaphysics. Correlatives are counted as really opposed; but the same is not opposed to itself; therefore correlatives must in reality be distinguished in some manner. Hence it is also necessary that opposite real relations be in some manner distinct in reality—both because of the opposition, and because each relation is in reality the same as its extreme, as was shown above. Therefore, if the extremes are distinct, the relations also are. Consequently, if the terminus of a relation is the opposite relation, this sufficiently shows that relation and terminus must be distinct in reality. If the formal terminus of relation is some absolute form, the conclusion still holds that a distinction in reality is required. For such a formal terminus can only be the foundation of the opposite relation, as I shall say below; but it is no less necessary for the foundation of one relation to be distinguished from the opposite relation than for the opposite relations themselves to be distinguished. The minor is proved, because relation and foundation are the same in reality; therefore to the extent that one relation is distinguished from the opposite relation, to that extent the foundation of one relation is distinguished in reality from that opposite relation; therefore likewise it is distinguished from the foundation of the opposite relation. Likewise, not only the relations but also the extremes or subjects of relations ought to be distinct in reality, for a real and true ordering cannot be understood between things that are not distinguished in reality. Every ordering, as is clear from the very notion of terminus, demands extremes; but extremes include plurality and, consequently, some distinction in reality. Finally, this is contained in the very definition of relatives: they must be "toward another." But if the subjects of opposite relations must be distinct from one another in reality, this is most of all true of the proximate subjects or foundations in which the relations inhere proximately; for to them the relations confer their proper and formal

orderings per se. Therefore such a distinction is most of all required between the very foundations of opposite relations—and consequently also between the relations themselves, and finally between relation and terminus.

How Great the Said Distinction Ought to Be

4. As to how great this distinction must be, there can be doubt. Briefly, I judge that it need not be the same in all cases, but must be weighed according to the nature of the foundations and the mode of the relations. Often this distinction must be real and supposital—as in the relation of father and son. For because such relations are founded in a real procession of one supposit, and one supposit cannot really proceed except from another supposit, therefore such a relation requires a distinction of real supposits. Similarly, the relation of specific identity requires a real distinction of substantial natures and, consequently, also of supposits—miracles excepted. The same holds, with due proportion, for the relation of equality or similarity: they require a real distinction of such forms and, consequently, of subjects, by the nature of the thing. For some relations, I think a modal distinction suffices; for just as there is a true efficiency or emanation between a thing and a mode, so there can also be a true relation. Likewise, a modal distinction is truly a distinction in reality and suffices for opposition or for an ordering—on account of which a distinction between relation and terminus is necessary.

5. Whether a distinction between whole and parts suffices can be doubted, because of Soncinas's argument about the infinity of relations. One might say, therefore, that although the distinction between whole and part, insofar as it is in some way real, is greater than a modal distinction, yet insofar as the extremes are not thus "co-distinct," but one includes the other, it is less sufficient for founding a real relation. This is difficult to believe. First, because that distinction, simply speaking, is truly in reality and greater than a modal

distinction. Likewise, because a material or formal cause seems to be really referred to its effect, which is the composite itself—from which, however, they are not distinguished except as a part from the whole. Likewise, two halves of the same continuum seem to be referred to each other by a real relation of equality. For in reality they are truly distinguished, and not as including and included, but as co-distinct; and if they were only contiguous, they would be referred by a real relation; union by continuation cannot impede this relation. For the union is greater between a thing and a mode, or between matter and form; yet union does not remove every distinction. If those halves are mutually referred by a real relation, the same will be true for their halves as compared to each other; and thus there will also be infinite relations. Nor does it seem to be any inconvenience that in a continuum there are thus infinite relations—just as there are infinite points or parts—since relations add nothing real to the foundations themselves.

Replies to the Arguments

6. The Same Is Referred to Itself Only by a Relation of Reason. Whether Two White Things with the Same Whiteness Are Really Related by Similarity. From what has been said, there is a sufficient reply to the first opinion. As to the second: the identity of the same with itself is denied to be a real relation, but only one of reason. If it is said that a thing is "the same with itself" without a relation of reason, this is false; for a comparison by the intellect is necessary, by which the same thing is compared to itself as though there were two extremes. Or, if that comparison is excluded, there is in reality only the thing itself and the negation of distinction—this alone can be added by that identity of the thing, as was seen above in Disputation VIII. I judge the same concerning "proper similarity" between two white subjects, if they had the same numerically identical whiteness. For that agreement which they would have in whiteness

would rather be an identity in the same numerical form. To make this clearer, we can distinguish the agreement as to the form of whiteness, or as to the union to the same form. The former agreement is a kind of identity and, therefore, not a real relation; the latter can be similarity and relation, because although the form is the same, the union to diverse subjects is necessarily diverse; and therefore, with respect to that union there is sufficient distinction for similarity or real relation to be founded. Thus, if two humanities were united to the divine Word, there would be no doubt that they would be truly similar in the hypostatic union, which would not be numerically the same in them but distinct; on that account they could, under that aspect, be mutually referred by a real relation. No argument can be drawn from this to the divine relations insofar as they terminate (to speak in our way) the same essence of God; for they do not terminate by union, but by most simple identity.

SECTION X

WHETHER THE THREE KINDS OF RELATION WERE RIGHTLY DISTINGUISHED BY ARISTOTLE ON A THREEFOLD FOUNDATION

1. In this section Aristotle's doctrine must be examined, from Metaphysics V, chapter 15, where, treating of Relation (ad aliquid), he refers all relatives to three kinds, which he distinguishes by a threefold foundation or reason for founding a relation.

The Partition & Teaching of Aristotle Are Set Forth

2. Which relations Aristotle places in the first kind. In the first kind he places those relations which he says are founded on unity or multitude, which he then subdivides into various species. For he says that equality, similarity, and, universally, the identity of those whose

substance is one are founded upon unity. Similar are said to be those that have one quality; equal, those that have one quantity; the same, those that have one substance. This can be understood either properly and strictly of substance itself, or more generally of essence, as we shall see below. He says that all relations which are said in some way according to quantity and depart from unity are founded upon number; such are all proportions between unequal numbers, whether these be signified indefinitely or in general, as "exceeding," "multiple," etc., or definitely, as double, triple, and so on. Hence, although such relations can also be found among continuous quantities, they are nevertheless said to be founded upon number inasmuch as they require diversity in quantity. For the same reason all relations of dissimilarity, distinction, and the like pertain to the same foundation, because in a certain way they are founded on number. Here unity and number are not taken in the strict quantitative sense, but more generally. It should be noted that Aristotle always speaks of these relatives in the plural, because, most properly speaking, both opposite relations of this kind are those which require in their foundation either number or a certain unity of many (for the unity is to be understood in this way). Hence, if we speak of each relation singly, each requires a foundation not simply as number, but as that which together with another composes a number or has a unity.

3. Which relations are in the second kind. In the second kind Aristotle places those relatives that are founded upon the power (potentia) of acting and being acted upon, or upon their actions; this he further distinguishes into various species, which he takes either from the fact that relations are founded upon power alone, abstracting from action, or upon power as it is under action. He applies examples: the heating and the heatable, the one heating and what is heated. In these examples two points must be noted. First, when Aristotle posits a real relation between power and the possible, he never speaks of a possible effect taken objectively, as Gregory (cited above) seems to have understood, who from this example of Aristotle would gather

that there are real relations to terms that do not exist but are only possible. Aristotle speaks plainly of a passive power or heatable subject, as he makes clear with these words: "And under one name the active to the passive"; and below: "The active and the passive are so called from active and passive power and from the actions of the powers, as the heating to the heatable." From this a second point must be considered: the real term of the relation of active power, taken as such and abstracting from action, is one thing; and it is another when the active power is under action, that is, as the agent. For in the former case the term is the passive power, and otherwise it cannot be a real term; in the latter case the term is the very effect as it now flows from the acting power. Aristotle further adds that this relation, which is founded upon power under action, varies according to different differences of time: one relation is founded upon present action, as the relation of one building, heating, and the like; another on past action, as the relation of a father; and another on future action, as that of one "who will do" (he says) to that "which is to be done," a point that will present a difficulty to be treated below.

4. Which relations are in the third kind. In the third kind Aristotle places the relations he calls measurable to measure, such as, he says, the relation of knowledge to the knowable, intellect to the intelligible, sight to the visible. He notes a distinction (which gives rise to weighty questions) between this genus and the two prior ones: in the former (he says) each of the relatives is said to be "to something," because that very thing which each is is said with respect to another, and not because another is said with respect to it; but in the third genus, although one of the relatives is said with respect to something because it truly is to another, the other, which corresponds to it, is not said to be "to another" because it truly is to another, but because another is to it. Thus knowledge and the knowable, although they are said to be to another, are so in diverse ways: knowledge is said so because it truly is to another; the knowable is not, but only because knowledge is to it; and the same holds of intellect and intelligible,

sight and visible, and the like. Aristotle proves this difference by no argument, but hands it on as manifest.

Whether the Division is Suitably Given

5. Reasons that introduce difficulty. First. Such is Aristotle's division and doctrine. Two points chiefly call for clarification, within which various difficulties will be touched. First, whether the individual members of that division have been suitably assigned. Second, whether that division is adequate to predicamental relation, such that it sufficiently comprehends the whole latitude of relation. Reason for doubting the first point is, first, that the relations of the first genus do not seem to be real; therefore. The antecedent is proved first with respect to relations of unity, because the unity in which they are founded is not real but only of reason; therefore a relation founded upon it cannot be real. The antecedent is clear, because that unity is not numerical; for numerical unity founds the identity of a thing with itself, which is a relation of reason, as we have said above; therefore it is specific unity, or some higher unity. But every unity other than numerical is a unity of reason. Nor does it matter if someone says that formal unity is real, for even this is not real except inasmuch as in the thing it is the same with numerical unity, although they are distinguished by reason; hence it is multiplied in things as numerical unity is, as was seen above; therefore it can no more be the foundation of a real relation than numerical unity. And this is confirmed and explained: the unity that is the foundation of relation must be the unity of many; for the unity of each thing as such does not found a relation to another. Therefore it must be the unity of many; but every unity of many really distinct is a unity of reason; therefore. You will say this is true of quasi-positive and universal unity; yet there is also a negative unity whereby one thing is not otherwise disposed than another in some form or property, and this unity is in the things themselves. This is how some Thomists answer—Capreolus in IV, dist.

30, q. 1; Soncinas, V Metaphysics, q. 34; and Cajetan, q. 7 of On Being and Essence. But on the contrary: a negation or privation can no more found a real relation than a being of reason, for privation taken in itself is a being of reason and posits nothing real in things; therefore it cannot found a real relation. This line of reasoning also seems to prove that a relation founded on number cannot be real, because its proximate reason for being founded is some negation; for number or multitude is constituted by distinction, and distinction or division formally consists in negation, as was seen above. This is illustrated by examples: inequality, for example, is proximate founded upon this, that this quantity lacks something which another has; but this is a negation. Likewise dissimilarity is proximate founded upon this, that this quality does not have the essence which another has, and conversely.

6. Second. I argue principally in a second way: if specific unity is a sufficient foundation of relation, many absurdities follow. First, that among things of each category, insofar as they are of the same species, there would arise a relation of identity or similarity; Aristotle himself seems to have conceded this when he said that the same are those whose substance, that is, essence, is one, and he places all those relations under this genus. Nor does it matter if someone, by the name "substance," understands not essence but proper substance, which is probable, because at least by parity of reason a sufficient argument is taken: two actions, or two "wheres," are as similar as two whitenesses. The falsity of the consequent is proved, because it would follow that even two relations of the same species, such as two paternities, are referred by a real relation of similarity; for the case is altogether the same. But the consequent is false, because a relation cannot be founded upon a relation; otherwise in any relation there would be infinite relations, for as the first would found a second, so the second could found a third; for it would be like, or unlike, or distinct from others; and the same would be true of the third with respect to the fourth, and so on to infinity. Second, it follows that between two

two-foot quantities there would be two real relations, one of identity insofar as they are of the same essence, another of equality insofar as they are of the same magnitude; and the former could be lost while the latter remains, for between a two-foot and a three-foot quantity there is similarity of essence, although there is not equality. Likewise one would have to say that an intense and a remiss heat are referred by one real relation of identity in essence and by another of dissimilarity in intensity, and the like—things that seem absurd.

7. Third, it follows that not only specific but also generic or analogical similarity would found a proper real relation. The reason is proportionate: although generic similarity is not as great as specific, nevertheless it is true similarity and unity; therefore it will found a real relation, although not of the same account and perhaps not so perfect. Again, if generic unity does not suffice for this relation on account of the various specific differences, neither would specific unity suffice on account of the various individual differences; for they retain the same proportion in real identity and distinction of reason. Therefore the reason is the same; and thus, as specific unity founds a relation of reason, so too generic unity. The consequent is false: first, because things specifically distinct, even though they agree in genus, are simply more dissimilar than similar, as whiteness and blackness; secondly, because otherwise, since the agreements and differences of things can be multiplied to infinity by the intellect's abstractions, there would be infinite relations of similarity or dissimilarity in one thing with respect to another with which it agrees in specific difference and in all the higher predicates, or with respect to various others, inasmuch as it is similar to one in species, to another in a nearer or remoter genus. A similar difficulty, proportion observed, is found in relations said to be founded upon number or discrepancy; for one relation will be to a thing distinct in the ultimate species, others to various things differing at one or another generic level, which can be multiplied almost to infinity. I add that it seems unbelievable that all the proportions which arithmeticians speculate about among numbers are real; first, because

one cannot assign one adequate subject of such relation, since the whole number does not have in reality a true and real unity; second, because those are rather comparisons and considerations of the intellect than real habitudes. Yet Aristotle enumerates all of them equally as species contained under this genus.

8. Third difficulty against the first genus of relations. A third principal difficulty concerns this same genus. Either relations of this kind are some things or real modes added to absolute forms themselves, or not. The first cannot be said, as was said above generally of this whole category, and in particular the first two difficulties here proposed seem to prove it sufficiently; for in the same thing infinite modes would be multiplied which are not only unnecessary, but cannot be understood nor reduced to any sure account. Likewise, because the unity among such things is nothing other than the things themselves, why then should there be any reason for some distinct thing to result from them? But if they are not modes really distinct in the thing, they cannot be real habitudes, but are mere co-existence of several absolute things of such conditions. This is proved because a real habitus cannot befit a thing unless it is either intrinsic and from itself or is added to it; but in the present case, when one whiteness becomes like another, no intrinsic real habitus is added to it; for if it were added, it would be distinct from the nature of the thing; nor can one understand an addition in the thing without a distinction between what is added and that to which it is added. Again, nor is that habitus intrinsic and essential to whiteness, both because whiteness can simply be without it, and because every intrinsic and essential habitus of an absolute thing is transcendental; but one whiteness has no transcendental habitus to another. And for this reason there is greater reason to doubt in absolute forms than in those which include a transcendental respect; for in the latter it can in some way be understood how without a real addition the same respect, under diverse notions, is transcendental and predicamental. Yet in the former absolute things it seems in no way possible to

understand a real habitus if nothing intrinsic is added to them, as indeed nothing is added. Therefore this first genus of relations seems at least to contain more relations of reason, or extrinsic denominations, and ways of speaking arising from our intellect's various comparisons among different things, than true and real habitudes.

9. Fourth. A fourth difficulty concerns the second genus, in which, to begin with the more difficult points, what Aristotle says seems plainly false, namely, that the relation of a cause about to effect with respect to a future effect is included under this genus. Such a relation cannot be real both because the term does not actually exist —for what is future is not yet, indeed is not yet becoming, otherwise it would not be the relation of a cause that is about to act, but of one acting—and because the reason for founding or the necessary condition, namely the action, is not yet present. That this condition is necessary is clear; otherwise there would in no way be a relation of an agent or one about to act, but only of one able to act. Next, it is also difficult in what way a relation founded on past action is real, both because that action no longer exists and therefore cannot be the foundation or reason of any relation, and because Peter, for example, "having begotten" Paul is only an extrinsic denomination from a past action. How, then, can a real intrinsic respect be founded in him? Especially since that denomination is predicated equally whether the son begotten is alive or not; it is always true to say that Peter "begot" Paul; indeed, if we pay attention to the manner of speaking, he is said in the same way to be his father. Hence again it is difficult that the relation of an agent, even in the present, is real in the agent itself, since the action is not in the agent but denominates the agent extrinsically. And this is confirmed: Aristotle says in the third genus that the relation of the knowable is not real, because a thing is called "knowable" from the habitude of knowledge to it; but the agent is likewise denominated from the habitude of the action which is in the patient to the principle of acting. Therefore, by parity of reason, there

will not result in the very principle of acting any relation intrinsic to the agent. Finally, regarding the relation of an agent in potency, as such, one can also doubt, at least when the principle of acting is not instituted per se for that function; for then it does not have a transcendental habitude to the thing in potency, or to the possible effect; therefore neither will it have a predicamental one. The consequence rests upon the third difficulty just proposed.

10. Fifth. A fifth difficulty concerns the third genus. First one may doubt the difference assigned by Aristotle between this genus and the others; but this requires a special section, which we shall treat below. For now this genus has its own difficulty, namely how the notion of measure can be the foundation of a real relation, since the very notion of a real measure is not real but only of reason, as was shown above when treating quantity. If you say that the discussion there concerned the measure of quantity, whereas here we speak of the measure of truth, this rather increases the difficulty, because this notion of measure can much less be real, as is evident from the fact that knowledge or the judgment of the intellect is measured equally by an object whether it exists or not. Likewise that measuring is not an action, nor is it something of the thing, as will be clear when we run through the individual categories.

Whether the Said Division is Sufficient

11. Sixth. A sixth and last difficulty is that not all relations seem sufficiently comprehended under these three members; for there are others which seem no less real than those contained in the aforesaid genera. The assumption is clear first in the relation of appetite to the appetible, and of all those contained under this head, as love to the lovable, desire to the desirable, and so on. These relations are not founded upon unity or action, as is clear, nor upon the notion of measure, because in love there is not "truth" which is measured by the lovable object. If you say that not truth but the perfection or

rectitude of love is measured by the lovable, then in this manner the relation of measure will intervene between every effect and its cause: either a formal cause, which is the intrinsic measure of a thing's perfection, or an efficient, exemplary, or final cause, which can be extrinsic measures. Imperfect species of one genus would also be referred by the relation of the measured to the supreme species as to their measure. Furthermore, the relation of union seems to pertain to none of the aforesaid genera; most of all it does not belong to the first (for concerning the others there does not seem to be any doubt). Nor does it belong to that one, because agreement and unity, of which there is speech there, are one thing, but union or conjunction is another, which can obtain among wholly distinct things, as is the relation of the union of humanity to the Word, and other similar cases. Almost the same difficulty appears concerning the relations of contact, proximity and distance, and finally concerning the relation of final, formal, and material causes; for all these lack the said foundations.

The Division Handed Down by Aristotle is Defended

12. These are the principal difficulties that occur regarding the said division; yet in spite of them Aristotle's doctrine or division should be embraced and suitably explained. All his interpreters and the writers of metaphysical questions follow it, and theologians as well, as is clear from St. Thomas (I, q. 13, a. 7; q. 28, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles II, chs. 11–12). On these places Cajetan and the Ferrariense dispute much about these relations; Capreolus and the Hispalenis do so in I, partly dist. 19, qq. 2–3, partly dists. 30–31, where also Scotus and other theologians treat the matter, and in the other places cited above. Besides the authority of Aristotle, the foundation is that the relations pertaining to each of these genera are real, as is clear from the common consent of all philosophers and from what has been said above about the entity of these relations. For if any

relations are real, surely similarity, or paternity, or the relation of knowledge to the knowable are real—which are relations pertaining to the three kinds mentioned. For if these relations are not real and predicamental, what relations could be so that might reasonably be thought such? This suffices, therefore, for these three genera to be constituted in the category of Relation, whether there are relations of reason that have proportion to these genera or not. For if there are not, it will be clear enough that these genera are wholly real; if there are, they will not pertain directly to these genera as dividing the category of Relation, but will have in them a certain analogy or proportionality.

13. That these genera are distinct among themselves in the account of relation seems first sufficiently known from the very denominations they bestow, for these are very diverse. Then the matter itself is excellently explained by Aristotle from the foundations or reasons for founding; since one of the most important causes of relation is its foundation—indeed relation has its entity from it—there can be no greater indication of the distinction of relations than the distinction of their formal and proximate foundations (for of these there should be question). The remote foundation, or rather the subject, does not concur per se in the same way to relation, and therefore the distinction of the subject is not so sufficient a ground for distinguishing relations. But that the foundations of those three genera are altogether distinct is in itself manifest; rightly, then, is the distinction of those relations taken from the distinction of their foundations.

14. You will say that rather the distinction of relations should be taken from their terms; for those that express an essential habitude to another take their specification—and consequently their distinction—from that other, as motion from its termini, powers and habits from their objects. I respond, first, that this is true of specific and ultimate distinction; but a generic or subaltern distinction can sometimes be taken from elsewhere. Second, I respond that in that distinction the formal terms are not omitted but are expressed or at

least implicitly signified in those three genera. For when the relation of the first genus is said to be founded upon unity, it is included there that it is also terminated to another inasmuch as it is in some way one; for, as I shall show below, what in one relative is the foundation of relation to another is also the reason for the other's being terminated. And by a similar reason, when in the second genus a relation is said to be founded upon power, this very fact indicates that it is also terminated to a power or to an effect, if the relation is founded not in bare power but as under action; for thus the relation of active power is terminated to passive power, and conversely; but the relation of the acting power is terminated to its effect. In the third genus it is clearer that the relation of the measurable to the measure is terminated. The distinction is therefore not so taken from the foundations as to exclude the terms. Since these are two principles, in their own way intrinsic to relations, neither can be excluded from their constitution and distinction; but the foundation is as it were material, while the term is as it were formal, for it is the ultimate to which the relation tends.

On the Sufficiency of the Said Division

15. First reason for sufficiency. How far the reason alleged is subject to difficulties. Finally, all the authors cited teach that this division is sufficient and embraces all the species of relations that can pertain to the category of Relation. St. Thomas gives the reason for its sufficiency (on Metaphysics V, lect. 17): only in three ways can one thing be ordered to another, namely, either according to being, insofar as one thing depends in being on another—and thus is the third mode—or according to active and passive unity, insofar as one thing receives from another or confers something on another—and thus is the second mode—or according as the quantity of one thing can be measured by another—and thus is the first mode. This reason is difficult. For a habitude to another according to dependence in being,

if taken generally, seems to pertain more to the second genus, since an effect depends in being upon its cause. If, however, it is taken according to the special mode of dependence which the science or the power has upon the object, then there would have to be as many distinct modes of relatives as there are modes of dependencies. Why should that mode of dependence constitute a peculiar genus of relatives rather than others? Likewise it seems false that quantity, insofar as it has the notion of measure, founds the first mode, because Aristotle does not assign there the notion of measure, but of unity or number, which is quite a different account. For when two quantities are said to be equal, the one is not the measure of the other, nor conversely, nor is this attended to between them, but the account of unity; and all the more so in the case of similarity or identity; and therefore, as we said, unity is not there taken quantitatively but more generally. Also the quantitative notion of measure is not per se apt to found a real relation, since it is only an extrinsic denomination of reason, as was touched upon above.

16. Second reason for sufficiency. What difficulties it contains. Alexander of Hales indicates another reason in the same place, saying that the division is taken from three universal modes of being, which are the same and the diverse (for the first), potency or act (for the second), and the perfect (he says) or imperfect (for the third), in the way the imperfect is measured by the perfect and the diminished by the complete; and because these modes sufficiently vary the nature of foundations, therefore there are three species of relation. But what he says about the third member being taken from the mode of being according to perfect or imperfect is difficult. For although sense is referred to the sensible according to that genus, it is not measured by it as the imperfect by the perfect; it is only said to be measured as by a specifying term, which at times can be more perfect, at times equal, at times less perfect, as is also seen in intellect and intelligible. Then, although he asserts that those three modes sufficiently divide the foundations of relations, he nevertheless does

not give a reason for the sufficiency, nor by that explanation shows their distinction among themselves. For potency and act also stand to one another as perfect and imperfect, and potency can be said to be measured by act, inasmuch as it is proportioned and commensurate to it; for this reason powers are said to be specified by acts. I think, therefore, that Aristotle had no other reason for sufficiency than a kind of induction, by which he understood that no relation is found that cannot be referred to some one of the said heads—a point which cannot be better made evident than by answering the difficulties touched upon. For if we find no relation that does not have one of these foundations, it will be a sufficient sign for us that the division is sufficient.

SECTION XI

ON THE FIRST KIND OF RELATIONS, FOUNDED UPON NUMBER OR UNITY

1. For the sake of greater clarity we shall answer the several difficulties proposed in the preceding section nearly one by one in separate sections.

2. To the first, then, it is answered that it is one thing to speak of the two relations of the two extremes which are said to be founded upon unity, and another to speak of each relation taken singly. For each of the two relations of similarity, for example, is founded upon a single quality insofar as in itself it has one formal unity—not as to that which unity adds beyond being (for that is a negation, and therefore cannot found a real relation, as the argument rightly proves), but as to that positive account of being which underlies that negation. But if we speak of both relations of the two extremes, they are said to be founded upon the unity of those extremes because the reason why those two relations arise together, given those two extremes, is not only that the single extremes have such unity between themselves, but

also because that unity is of the same account in both—which is the same as if one said that therefore they are referred to one another because they have a real agreement. And although this agreement is not some real unity of those two extremes between themselves—speaking of proper and formal unity, as the argument also rightly assumes—nevertheless there is in reality a foundation of that unity, whether as to the negation or as to the unity of reason, and that foundation suffices for such relations to arise in those extremes.

3. In a similar way one must answer the other part concerning relations founded upon multitude, distinction, or diversity. For although to many it has seemed probable, on the strength of that argument, that those relations are not real but of reason because they have no real proximate foundation or formal term, nonetheless, speaking with the common and consistent doctrine, it is truer to say that the same account holds for these relations as for those founded upon unity. For as distinction includes negation, so does unity; and conversely, as the negation signified by unity presupposes an entity that can be the foundation of relation, so too real distinction is between real extremes, in which the negation included there is founded; therefore in them, as such, a real relation can also be founded. Hence in the examples adduced there, although it is true that in a relation of inequality one extreme lacks some part of the magnitude of the other extreme, nevertheless the relation is not formally founded upon that lack, but upon the fact that this quantity is so much and that quantity is so much. The same holds for dissimilarity: it presupposes two essences, one of which is not the other; yet it is not proximally founded upon that negation, but upon the essences themselves insofar as, according to several formal unities, they are essentially distinct. This is clarified by the example: the lucid and the dark also have dissimilarity as regards that negation, because in the one there is not the form of light which is in the other; and yet there is not between them a real relation of dissimilarity, because on

the part of the one extreme there is neither foundation nor positive formal term of such relation.

The Relation of Unity Can Be Founded in Things of All Categories

4. In the second difficulty many points are touched upon, each of which could demand its own question; nevertheless we shall treat them briefly, lest we be overly long in explaining very minute entities. First it is asked whether the relation of similarity and others of this kind can be founded only upon quantity and quality, or also upon things of the other categories. As to substance, we have already seen in the preceding section that, for this point, quantity and quality stand on the same footing. The reasoning made there seems to me to conclude regarding any thing or mode or entity, especially an absolute one, leaving aside for the moment relations themselves. For why are two heats really similar, and as such really referred, and not two heatings, or two "wheres," and any other similar instances? Likewise there is true and positive contrariety between two actions; but this is a relation that pertains to this first genus, for it is founded upon a certain special mode of distinction. Therefore, as to the other categories besides Relation, we readily grant the inference there made. Nor is anything objected against this consequent in that place as regards this part. It is true that St. Thomas, on Metaphysics V, lect. 17, utterly excludes the last four categories as unable to be the foundations of relations, because (he says) they follow upon relation rather than cause relation. This can be explained as referring to those categories according to their own proper accounts, not as they have proportion or agreement with others under the notion of unity or distinction.

In What Way One Relation Can Found Another

5. First opinion. The greater difficulty concerns relations themselves, in which the second and general difficulty is insinuated—namely, whether a relation can be founded upon a relation. Many hold that a relation can never be founded upon a relation. Thus thinks St. Thomas (I, q. 42, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles II, ch. 13; De potentia, q. 7, a. 11; In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1), and the Thomists often follow him (Soncinas, V Met., q. 29, ad 1; Ferrariensis, IV Contra Gentiles, ch. 11). The principal foundation is the regress to infinity that would follow. For a similar reason there cannot be an action with respect to an action, nor a motion with respect to a motion; and, proceeding universally from formal effect to form, if the form itself somehow participates in the effect or its denomination, one must stop at that form so that it be such by itself—what is otherwise expressed by saying that when proceeding from the what in which to the which, one must stop at the which. Therefore, since relation is that by which a relative is referred, one must stop at it so that it not be referred by another relation. This opinion can be confirmed by a theological argument: otherwise among the divine relations there would be more real relations—namely, a real distinction and a quasi-specific dissimilarity in the relative notion, and a generic similarity in the same, and the like—which is against the common doctrine of theologians, who acknowledge only four real relations in the divine.

6. Second opinion. Scotus holds the contrary (In II Sent., d. 4, qq. 4–5; In IV, d. 6, q. 10), and he is followed by Lychetus and Mairon in these places, and Mairon also in IV, dist. 29, q. 6; Antonius Andreas, V Met., q. 13, and in the book De sex principiis, q. 10. The foundation was touched upon by us in the difficulty proposed above: there appears no sufficient reason why similarity between two paternities is not as true a relation as similarity between two whitenesses, since in reality they have the same mode of agreement and formal unity, and are denominated similar in the same way from the thing. For if someone wishes to say that two paternities are denominated similar only fundamentally or negatively, namely

because they do not have a different account, whoever so responds gives occasion for the same to be said of any similar things whatsoever, unless he supplies a sufficient reason of difference, which surely none appears. The same argument applies to the relation of dissimilarity between, say, paternity and the relation of knowledge. Likewise arithmeticians posit proportionality founded upon two proportions, because as four is to eight, so three is to six; but a proportion is nothing other than a relation; therefore proportionality seems to be nothing other than the similarity of proportions, which is a relation of a relation. These arguments seem truly to convince, speaking consistently, that one relation can be really referred to another by relations pertaining to this first genus. Wherefore, just as one and many transcend all the categories, so relations of this first mode can be found in the things of all categories, not as of their essence but as founded upon them.

7. Third opinion reconciling the two preceding. Some endeavor to reconcile these opinions, both for the authority of St. Thomas and for the force of the arguments. They say that one relation can be really referred to another, yet not by another relation but by itself, so that a regress to infinity be avoided and the same thing be both the by-which and the what-which. Thus properly a relation does not found a relation, since there is not another relation that is referred and by which it is referred; nevertheless in reason it can be said to found, insofar as it is distinguished in reason into that which is referred and that by which it is referred. Cajetan favors this opinion (I, q. 42, a. 1), drawing on the words of St. Thomas in the reply to obj. 4, which are these: "One relation is not referred to another by some other relation." On which Cajetan adds that from this condition of relation, namely that it not be founded upon another relation, it does not follow that relations of relations are not real, but only that they are not other than their foundations. Hence he subjoins that if the divine relations did not otherwise have identity in nature, they could be referred by a real relation of equality; then the equality of the Son to

the Father would be the very filiation, and that of the Father to the Son would be the very paternity.

8. The author's opinion. Nevertheless this opinion cannot be maintained universally. For in order that a form be sufficient by itself for receiving some denomination—so that (as they say) it be the by-which and the what-which—it is necessary that that denomination be both of the same account as the form and intrinsic and inseparable from it, as is clear in an action which is made by itself, because the account of action is that it be in becoming since through it something is made; and also in quantity, which is of itself intrinsically quantitative. But if one relation is really referred to another, that respect is often very different in account from the proper account and formal effect of such a relation, and is extrinsic and accidental to it; therefore that relation cannot refer itself by itself, but by another relation. The minor is proved: the formal account and effect of paternity is to refer to a son; but when paternity is said to be like another paternity, if it is really referred to it, that formal effect is of a very different account, since it tends to a term of a different account and has the account of founding a relation of a different account. Again, this denomination "similar" is accidental to paternity; for if in the world there were no other paternity, it would not be denominated similar nor be referred in that way; therefore when it is so referred, it is not referred by itself but by another relation.

9. And this is confirmed: when it is said that one relation is referred to another really, yet not by another relation, either the meaning is "not by another relation distinct either in reality or in reason." But this is clearly proven false by the foregoing argument; for what can there be a greater distinction of reason than that which arises from the terms of different accounts, and which suffices for one relation to be accidental to another? Or the sense is that it is not referred by another relation distinct in reality, but only by one distinct in reason; and this is not peculiar to relation. For we said above that relations by which absolute things are referred are not distinguished

from their absolute foundations except by reason. Or if someone contends that an absolute foundation is referred by a real relation really distinct in the thing, while one relation can be referred by a real relation not really distinct in the thing, first, he assumes what is false; then he must give some reason for this difference, which no one has yet supplied. For the claim that relation is the most minute entity and therefore cannot found another relation really distinct does not satisfy, both because the relation founded is also of a very minute entity, and because it is already supposed that the first relation is founded on an absolute, and there is therefore nothing surprising if it can found another proportionate relation, just as motion or time is of a quite diminished entity and yet can found a relation.

10. A distinction seems necessary, then. Some respects are intimately included in relations themselves and inseparable from them according to their proper accounts; others are accidental. The former are only to their proper terms or to the opposite relations; the latter are to other terms that are purely per accidens to the being of such a relation. The example is paternity, which, by the very fact that it refers a father to a son, intrinsically and inseparably includes opposition with filiation and consequently also distinction; for distinction is, as it were, something higher included in opposition, and opposition is something included in correlation. But the respect of one paternity to another in the account of "similar" is not thus included in the proper account of paternity; and another paternity is an accidental and extrinsic term with respect to the paternity in question.

11. Concerning the former respects, it is sufficiently consonant with what Cajetan says that, although according to all of them the same relation is referred, it is not referred by another relation but by itself, since in its adequate account it includes all those respects. But in respects of the latter kind I do not see how one can consistently deny that one relation can be referred by another, and thus can found another relation in itself. For neither can it be denied that in that way the relation is really referred, as the arguments show; nor can one say

that it is referred in that way by itself, as is urged by what we said against the last opinion. From this I further add that, just as I explained above St. Thomas's denial that relations are founded upon the last four categories, so it can be explained here with respect to relations. For relations, according to their proper and intrinsic account, are not referred by a relation distinct from themselves nor do they found such a relation; but insofar as they somehow participate in or agree with quantity in unity or multitude, thus it is not repugnant that they be referred by a relation of similarity and other such relations; and this alone do the foundations of the second opinion prove.

12. If one relation will found another, must one necessarily proceed to infinity? To the argument about a regress to infinity, one can first reply that it is not a great inconvenience to admit this in relations, as we said above about relations of parts or points. Although here it seems to have a somewhat greater difficulty, because between foundation and relation there is a per se order; but in per se ordered things one does not seem able to proceed to infinity, as Aristotle hands down in book II. One can reply, however, that this is true of those things which are distinct in reality, not of those that are distinguished by reason. Second, one can reply by denying the regress to infinity, because one must stop at that relation which receives the same denomination as that which the foundation bestows and of which it necessarily and intrinsically brings that denomination along with it. For example: although paternity is referred by similarity, and that similarity is similar to another of the same species, it is not necessary that it be similar by another relation, but by itself, because that denomination is of the same account and intrinsically accompanies it, since it cannot refer one paternity to another similar without there corresponding to it another relation to which it itself is similar. And to this at most the examples of action and motion and the like prove.

13. If it is pressed that any relation is capable of another relative denomination of a different account (for a relation of

similarity can be dissimilar to another, and conversely), I respond that relations founded on the same absolute foundation, since they are distinguished only by reason, can mutually refer and denominate one another in that fashion; whence, since those denominations of different accounts are finite, it is not necessary on their account to admit infinite relations or a regress to infinity. But for the divine relations the case is different. With the identity of essence set aside (in which a real relation is not founded but a relation of reason), they do not have among themselves a true and real similarity, but rather a distinction and dissimilarity which they include within their proper relations; therefore they are not referred among themselves by another relation, but by themselves. But this dispute belongs to another place.

On the Relations of Identity, Similarity, & Equality

14. Third, it is asked in that difficulty what the proper relation of identity, similarity, and equality is, and whether they can befit the same thing by different respects. Briefly it must be said that the relation of identity properly is essential identity, less than numerical identity, to abstract now from the specific and all higher identities, of which we shall speak immediately. This is clear from Aristotle saying that those are the same whose substance, that is, essence, is one. Therefore to the argument made there it must be conceded that two qualities, insofar as they are of the same essential species, are properly referred by a relation of identity; for the case is the same in them as in other beings of the same species. Consequently it must also be said that the proper relation of similarity (considering the thing itself, whatever be the usage of words) is that which befits qualities by reason of intensity; but the relation of equality is that which befits quantities by reason of actual extension. Finally (which explains the thing itself more), it must be admitted that in the same quality there is one relation of identity, founded upon its essence as such, and another relation of similarity, founded upon unity of intensity, to such a point

that this latter is separable from the former, because unity of essence can remain without unity of intensity. Indeed conversely, although with respect to another whiteness a whiteness cannot be similar in intensity without also being one in essence, nevertheless with respect to blackness, whiteness and blackness can be said to be similar in mode or degree of intensity, and yet be dissimilar—or rather diverse—in essence. Nor is there any inconvenience if relations of this sort are multiplied, especially if it is true that, on that account, things or real modes distinct by nature are not multiplied.

15. And in the same way one should think about the relations of equality and of specific identity in continuous quantity; for the proportional reason is the same, as is sufficiently declared in the argument cited. I say this of continuous quantity because in numbers there does not seem to be a different relation of equality and of specific identity; two twos, for example, from their proper essential accounts have equality, nor can the relation of specific identity be separated, not only in reality but even in reason, from the relation of equality between them. The reason seems to be that discrete quantity has no other proper essence or species beyond such actual extension, that is, numerability, nor is such species separable there from such multitude—which is otherwise with continuous quantity; for while retaining its proper essential extension, it can exist in a greater or lesser magnitude.

Whether Generic Unity Founds a Real Relation

16. Answered in the affirmative. Fourth, it is asked in that argument whether relations of this first mode that pertain to unity are founded only in specific unity or also in generic unity. And although either side can be argued easily, as was insinuated there, and conjectures can readily be multiplied for either side, nonetheless I judge we must briefly say that not only specific but also generic unity suffices for some relation of similarity. This is the express opinion of

St. Thomas (I, q. 26, a. 1, ad 2), where he says: "The relation imported by the name 'the same' is a relation of reason only, if it be taken simply as 'the same'; otherwise when things are said to be the same not in number but in the nature of genus or species." Antonius Andreas follows him (V Metaph., q. 13, ad 3). The reasons touched upon while arguing fairly persuade this. Nor does it militate that things differing in species are said to be more simply dissimilar than similar; for from this it only follows that the relation of generic similarity taken precisely is not (so to speak) as "strong" for denominating as the relation of specific similarity or dissimilarity; nonetheless it confers its own denomination, namely that of such similarity, that is, generic.

17. It seems rather sufficiently probable that these relations of similarity in species or in genus are not properly diverse unless with respect to diverse things, or when each is adequate to its own term and proper and formal foundation. For example, although two men are similar both in species and in genus, it is not necessary that they be referred by a double real relation, because in one adequate relation both respects are included—namely in the relation of specific similarity—since that relation as it exists in the thing is not founded only upon the ultimate difference, but upon that form which gives such specific being. The relation, however, by which a man is similar to a horse in the account of animal is diverse in species from that by which one man is similar to another; yet that relation too includes any other relation of similarity that can be conceived between man and horse in the higher grades included in the account of animal. And proportionally one should philosophize in other cases. In this way not only infinity but also an excessive multitude of relations is easily avoided; for they are multiplied only according to the multitude and formal distinction of terms or of unities.

Whether Analogical Unity Founds a Predicamental Relation

18. One can not without reason ask whether such a relation can sometimes be founded upon analogical unity, especially upon that which signifies one objective concept intrinsically common to each of the analogates. For the other modes of analogy certainly do not suffice for a real relation, because they are not founded upon any proper similarity or real agreement, but upon a metaphorical one which is principally made through our intellect's comparison. In the first kind of analogy, however, it is not improbable that a real relation founded upon such unity can intervene between the analogates, because there is some real agreement between those extremes. Hence St. Thomas sometimes signifies that God's effects are referred to God by some real relation of similarity or of image, as can be gathered from I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4, with what Cajetan acutely notes there; likewise from St. Thomas (I, q. 93, a. 1, ad ult.; De potentia, q. 7, a. 6), where he says that there are in creatures various relations to God, insofar as He produces them diverse from Himself, yet in some way made similar to Him. Antonius Andreas holds the same above.

19. Finally it is asked, in that difficulty, whether those relations which are founded properly in multitude and range among various numbers are real relations or only denominations arising from comparisons which our intellect makes. If we attend to Aristotle's common manner of speaking and that of other philosophers, there is no doubt that they judge of these relations as they do of other real relations that pertain to this first genus; for denominations of equality or inequality are taken in the same way from the things themselves. But if relation is a thing or a mode distinct by nature from its foundation, it is difficult to explain such a real relation founded in the number two or three, because it cannot be truly one and simple in the whole number. In what subject would it be? For it cannot be in one unit rather than in another, since there is no reason for disparity; nor in all of them together, because one accident cannot be wholly in many subjects and in each of them individually, as is evident of itself. Especially because no unit is double or triple, so that the whole

relation of double or triple could be in that alone. Nor can it be partly in one subject and partly in another; otherwise it would not be truly one and simple, but composite in the same manner in which number is composite. But it cannot be composite in that fashion if relation is a thing or mode distinct in reality; otherwise in each unit there would arise a special entity or mode which, taken in itself, would be a single relation, and with others would compose only a relation that is one secundum quid, in the way in which number is one. But this cannot be, because in no unit taken in itself is there an account or foundation whence such a mode should result. On the other hand, if relation is not some mode really added to its foundation, it is easy to understand how a number, in the way it exists in things and according to that imperfect unity which it has, can, as one extreme, be compared and referred to another number as equal or double or in some similar manner. For the foundation of that relation in individual numbers is nothing other than discrete quantity itself, as it has such unity or diversity from another; and that very quantity, in reality, is the relation itself insofar as it can bestow that denomination upon the subject in order to a similar or dissimilar term.

What Kind of Relations Pertain to the First Foundation

20. To the third difficulty it must be said that it is not necessary that a relation of this first mode be either really added to its foundation as distinct by nature from it, or a mere extrinsic denomination from the co-existence of another extreme. For a middle can be found between these two: namely, that it be an intrinsic denomination including the co-existence of the other extreme to which it signifies a habitude. But when it is asked about this habitude whether it is presupposed intrinsically in the foundation, even when the term does not exist—though then it would not have the nature of a predicamental relation but of a transcendental one—or whether it is

newly added when the term is posited, one must say that it is not presupposed properly under the notion of a habitude or of relation, whether predicamental or transcendental. For, as is rightly proved in that third difficulty, the foundation of this first genus does not of itself include a transcendental habitude; therefore no formal habitude is intrinsically presupposed in such a foundation, nor is one really and intrinsically added when the term is posited.

21. It must therefore be said that the habitude is presupposed fundamentally and, as it were, inchoatively by force of the foundation, but is completed by the positing of the term—completed, I say, not by an extrinsic addition but solely by the extrinsic positing of the term. For the foundation itself is of itself apt to bestow such a relative denomination; for this reason it is said to contain the relative habitude as it were inchoate. Yet in order to bestow that denomination actually, it requires an actually existing term; and therefore when the term is posited that denomination is immediately completed without any other intrinsic and real addition. The relative habitude in the present case is nothing other than this very relative denomination, that is, the form itself insofar as it actually bestows it. What condition is necessary in the foundation so that on its part it be apt to bestow this denomination we shall more conveniently say in the next section. Thus far concerning the first member of that division.

SECTION XII

ON THE SECOND KIND OF RELATIONS, FOUNDED UPON POWER OR ACTION

1. Regarding the second kind of relations, many points are touched in the fourth difficulty set forth above. Speaking of these relations in general, it is certain that they are real and predicamental; thus all Doctors think, and thus they explain Aristotle. For if among certain extremes all things necessary for such a relation concur, they

do so most of all here, as can be evident from what has been said and will be clearer from what is to be said. In particular two points here have difficulty. The first is whether all the relations which Aristotle enumerates by way of example in that genus are truly real and predicamental. The second is what the proper foundation of such relations is.

Whether All Relations of the Second Genus Are Real

2. As to the first point, the first objection urged in the fourth difficulty is truly difficult: it is made against the member concerning relations founded upon future action, which are said to be between that which is going to do and that which is to be done, for these are Aristotle's words. The objection, however, as I think, concludes that such a relation cannot be real because of the defect of the term and the lack of the proximate condition required. Hence I judge that not all the examples Aristotle puts there are strictly of real and predicamental relations. For he did not intend in that place to hand down the proper and rigorous coordination of the category of Relation, but to explain all the modes of relatives and to refer them to certain heads, whether they are proper real relatives or only imitate them according to our manner of speaking. This can be confirmed: for in that same place he says that certain relatives belong to this second genus which are said according to the privation of power, as "impossible" and the like; but clearly these are not true real relatives, since the privation of power is not a real foundation. They are therefore placed under this genus only by a kind of reduction. The same, then, must be said, I judge, of the relations said to be founded upon future action.

3. But as for the relation arising from past action which has left an actually existing term, one must judge otherwise. That relation is real and predicamental, and it lasts as long as the effect and the cause actually exist, as is the common opinion. For there intervene real

extremes apt to have a real order between themselves (I speak now of created causes), and all the things required for that order or relation have already been posited in reality, as will be clear when we solve the proposed difficulty.

4. In which it is first asked how the relation that remains can be founded upon a past action which no longer exists. It must be said that it is not founded on it as upon its proper foundation in which it inheres or from which it has its entity; rather, that past action is the reason for founding such a relation, or—as we said above—the condition requisite for such a relation to result. But it is not such that the relation depends upon it for both coming to be and continuing to be; therefore it is not surprising that, once the action is over, the relation remains. The condition is required not only because by it the term necessary for such a relation has been posited as to its absolute entity (for it could have been posited in the nature of things by some other action, and that would not have sufficed for the said relation to arise), but also because by that action the cause exerts an influence upon that effect; from this influx it remains ordered to that effect and relatively denominated either by the relation that has arisen or by its very power or virtue of acting, insofar as it has exercised its influence upon that effect.

On the Proximate Foundation of Paternity

5. Hence it is commonly disputed in what principle such a relation inheres proximately and with what it is identified: whether, namely, in the proximate and accidental power, or in the principal and substantial one. Many think it is in the proximate principle, that is, in the power of generating; this could be made plausible by arguments of appearance. Others think that the principal and substantial principle itself identifies this relation with itself. Perhaps the truth is that to each principle there follows a relation accommodated to it, because the case is parallel for both; for the relation of power taken absolutely,

abstracting from act, inheres in each; therefore in each, as it is under its act, some relation follows. The relation proper to paternity I think to be that which inheres proximately in the substance itself by means of the principal principle. For in the generated suppositum the relation of filiation undoubtedly affects immediately the substance itself, or even the suppositum itself, as many hold, about which I have treated at length in volume two of the third part. Since these relations proportionately correspond to one another, the relation of paternity likewise affects proximately the substantial principle and is identified with it. Likewise, even if every accident really distinct were separated, even by the power of God, if there remains the substantial suppositum which has begotten and that which has been begotten, the relation of paternity endures; otherwise no reason would remain for positing it; for that man will be truly and most properly said to be a father. This is, therefore, a sign that this relation is most intimately in the substance itself. Finally this is most consonant with its mode of denominating, for it denominates principally the suppositum itself that acts.

6. He who has begotten, if deprived of his son, does not remain a father. The relation of paternity will not remain when the son has died, contrary to what was falsely assumed in that fourth difficulty. Nor will he who has been bereaved of his children be truly and properly said to be a father, but to have been one—this is not only true in philosophical rigor, but seems also to be observed in common speech. Wherefore being a father is not the same as "to have begotten"; the latter is an extrinsic denomination from a past action and therefore endures even if the one begotten has died; the former is a relative denomination which includes the co-existence of the extremes.

Whether the Relation of the Agent Inheres in the Agent

7. Hence, a fortiori (as is further touched in that fourth difficulty) the relation of one actually acting or generating is also real; for if this is true after the past action, why not more so while the action is present and enduring? Two questions can be posed here. One is whether this relation intrinsically inheres in the agent itself or denominates only extrinsically, as the action does. The latter seems sufficient for a real relation and to be more consonant with the denomination of such a relation. For the action itself is real and really denominates the agent, and in this denomination there is included a certain transcendental habitude to the effect, because action as action regards a term, as we shall say below; therefore similarly the relation can be real, although it denominates the agent only extrinsically and through the action, as referred to the term or its effect.

8. Nevertheless one must say that the proper relation which per se refers the agent or generator from the instant in which it actually generates is intrinsic and immediately inheres in it. First, because if after the past action there remains in the agent a relation inhering intrinsically to the effect, much more will such a relation result and inhere even during the action itself. Then, because, as St. Thomas teaches (Contra Gentiles II, ch. 13), although in other forms extrinsic denominations are found, nothing is found to be denominated by relation as if existing outside, but only as inhering—the words of St. Thomas. Whence he adds: "No one is denominated 'father' except from the paternity which inheres in him." The reason seems to be that what denominates extrinsically is rather referred to that which it denominates than refers it; thus the action is rather referred to the agent than refers the agent, although it is an occasion or condition for a relation to result in the agent. Wherefore, although it is true that the action itself is referred to the term, nevertheless it does not properly refer the suppositum acting itself, because it does not denominate it as that in which it is, but as that from which it proceeds; and thus one can only say that the action flows from the agent with

respect to the term; but that respect is not the agent's respect except remotely, as will be clearer from the next doubt.

Whether the Relation in the Agent Is the Same While the Action Endures and After It Has Ceased

9. Answered in the affirmative. It can be asked again whether this relation of the agent in act, or in the present, is the same in species and in number as the relation of the agent in the past, for example, as paternity. Some think it is diverse, and Aristotle seems to favor this when he says that these relations vary according to time. This can be grounded in a different mode of denominating: one denominates as one actually acting, the other as one who has acted. Hence it seems that one relation lasts only as long as the action lasts, and with its cessation another relation arises. Yet I think it truer that in a father, for example (and the same holds in similar cases), the very same relation in number which arises in the instant in which he generates remains as long as such a father endures with the son. To argue theologically: who would say that the Blessed Virgin, in the first instant in which she conceived Christ, had one relation of motherhood and immediately after lost it and acquired another? Then, the action of generating is a reason or condition upon which, once posited, the relation of paternity results. I ask, then, whether it is such a reason or condition that the relation of paternity depends upon it for both coming to be and being preserved, or not. For if it does not depend upon it for being preserved, then after the action of generating has passed the same paternity will remain, because there is nothing whereby it should be varied. But if it does depend, then, the action having passed, that relation will pass with it; therefore there is no reason whereby another relation should result. For the cessation of the action, since it is a privation, is not a sufficient reason for a new real relation to result; nor can the past action be the reason for such a new relation, because that action, as present, already had its proportionate relation, while as past

it adds nothing except the aforesaid privation. It is better and easier, then, to say that it is one and the same relation which afterwards remains, because it does not depend for its conservation on the action itself but on the foundation and the term, which were explained in the preceding point. Wherefore paternity, as such, includes neither the denomination of the past nor of the present, but absolutely refers to him who has being from the one who is denominated father, abstracting from whether the action through which he has being exists or does not exist. For such denominations including these temporal respects are rather from the action itself as present or past.

On the Relation of the Agent in Potency

10. Lastly, in the same fourth difficulty it is asked that we explain what the relation of the agent in potency is. We have already said that this cannot be real and predicamental in an order to a merely possible effect as such, but only in an order to some real, actually existing passive power; for it cannot have any other real term; in this way everything necessary for a real relation intervenes. Some say that this relation does not pertain to this second genus of relations but to the first, because it is not founded upon action but precisely upon the proportion that is between two faculties, such that one can act upon the other and the other suffer from the one; but that proportion is a kind of unity, and therefore seems to pertain to the first foundation.

11. This opinion is not consonant with Aristotle, who in this second member never said that relations founded upon action belong to it, but rather at the beginning of the chapter said: "Others (namely are said to be 'to something') as the heating to the heatable, the cutting to the cuttable, and under the one name, the active to the passive," where he made no mention of action and passion but only of powers; later he joined both together, saying: "The active and the passive are so called from the active and passive power and from the actions of the powers." Then, the relation which is of the power of

acting to the patient is not founded upon unity (which pertains to the first foundation), but upon a virtue of acting; for that unity which is the reason for founding in the former mode consists in some real and formal agreement between those things which are said to be similar or the same; but between active power and passive power there does not intervene such unity and agreement, unless perhaps insofar as they agree in the generic account of power—under which account they are not referred by a proper relation of active and passive power but by a relation of similarity as regards the generic account. That proportion is therefore not true unity; if by analogy it be so named, it is by an account far different from the unity that founds the first mode of relatives. Wherefore this relation pertains not to the first but to the second mode; it differs from the other relation explained above because this one follows the account of power taken precisely, whereas that one follows it as it is under its act: hence the former is terminated to passive power as such, the latter to the effect.

12. Which powers are referred by a real relation founded upon action or passion. It is further asked whether this relation is found in any active and passive power whatever, whether it be a proper power from the genus of quality or of any other genus or of transcendental account. Indeed, as to predicamental powers which are per se and first ordered for one to act upon another or for one to suffer from another, there is no difficulty in understanding that they are most apt to found a relation between themselves, provided they are distinct in the thing; for by the very fact that they exist they mutually regard one another by a transcendental order which they have between themselves—by that, I say, as by a proximate foundation. I said "provided that they are distinct in the thing," for a power which is at once active upon itself and passive from itself, even if it be a proper and predicamental power and have both accounts per se and primarily by its institution, cannot have a real relation by virtue of those accounts because of the lack of distinction which is necessary for this relation. Hence it does not have those accounts by transcendental

habitudes of the same to itself, but by a certain eminent habitude to its act, which it regards under both accounts. If such a power, as active, needs another co-principle for acting upon itself (as the intellect needs a species), then by reason of that it can be really referred only to itself in the account of active to passive, yet not by reason of its own proper and intrinsic activity, for the reason alleged concerning identity. But where sufficient distinction intervenes and, apart from that, there is an intrinsic and natural coordination of powers, there is no doubt that all things necessary for a real predicamental respect concur, if the extremes co-exist.

13. Any active or passive power can be referred by a relation of the second genus. We must further add that this relation is not to be restricted to this genus of powers, but obtains among all created things (I shall speak of God below) which in any way have a real power of acting and of suffering among themselves. This is clear both from Aristotle's general expression and from his examples, which also include other genera of powers; from the common opinion of interpreters and philosophers; and lastly because, for a predicamental relation to intervene, it is not always necessary that a transcendental relation be presupposed in the foundation, as was said in the solution to the third difficulty. It is enough, therefore, in the present case that one virtue be of the same order with another power and that by its nature it have a force of acting—which is to have a kind of physical dominion upon that other—whence a predicamental respect or relative denomination can arise.

14. From this it is finally understood that the name "power" in this second foundation should not be taken strictly as it is distinguished from habit; for habit, insofar as it has a force of producing its acts, is commonly included by Aristotle under the name of active power, as we have often noted above; and, as such, it can be the foundation of a real relation, not indeed to the object (for this pertains to the third mode), but either to the act which it produces or to the power into which it can produce; and this account pertains to

this second genus, as is clear from what has been said by parity of reason.

SECTIO XIII
ON THE THIRD KIND OF RELATION FOUNDED IN THE NOTION OF MEASURE

1. It remains to explain what was asked in the fifth difficulty, namely, how relations of the third kind are said to be founded in the notion of measure. For almost all authors so speak, and they take it from Aristotle in this passage.

The Difficulty Concerning the Philosopher's Intention Is Proposed

2. Yet if one reads Aristotle attentively, he does not seem to say that these relations are founded upon the notion of measure; rather, among other examples by which he illustrates this mode, he says that one is that of the measurable to the measure. His words are: "Others, as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable to science, and the sensible to sense." In these words he declares no foundation of these relations, but, having adduced those three examples, he simply proposes this third kind of relation. Nor can one say that in the first words—"as the measurable to the measure"—he explains the common rationale of these relations, while the others are examples and species of this kind. This cannot be accommodated to the context: first, because Aristotle did not say "as the knowable to science," but only copulatively, "and the knowable to science"; second, because if he had adduced these later words as an example of the former, he ought not to have said "as the knowable to science," but rather "as science to the knowable." In fact, he did not so speak but—what deserves careful notice—he says in the same way that the

measurable is referred to the measure, the knowable to science, and the sensible to sense. But the knowable is not referred to science in the same manner as the measurable to the measure; for, in so far as any notion of measure can intervene between these, it is rather science that is measured by the knowable than the other way around. Add that, in this third kind, Aristotle seems to make no mention of relations of science to the knowable, or of sense to the sensible, but only of the opposite relations (so to speak), namely, of the knowable to science and of the sensible to sense, to which he adds the relation of the measurable to the measure as similar to them. Therefore he does not establish the common rationale of this third kind in this, that it is founded upon the notion of measure, but upon some other rationale common to the measurable, the knowable, and other such cases.

3. All this can be confirmed from the way in which Aristotle later explains this third kind of relations. He posits no other common rationale for it than this: other relatives are called relative by the relations they have in themselves, whereas these receive a relative denomination only because other things are said to be referred to them; and he repeats the same examples—measurable, knowable, intelligible—though he declares only the last, saying, "For 'intelligible' signifies that the intellect is conversant about it." Hence, taking Aristotle's text simply, he does not seem, in this third kind, to posit any new real relation which is intrinsically in a subject and makes it refer to something else, but only certain relative denominations taken from relations existing in the opposite extremes. Consequently, since science and the knowable, and the knowable and science, are said relatively to each other, according to Aristotle's mind thus expounded, there pertains to this third mode of relatives only the relation or denomination of the knowable itself, whatever it may be; but Aristotle does not seem to place the relation of science to the knowable in this third kind, because science is not called relative on the ground that something else is referred to it, but because it truly has within itself a respect to another. Aristotle, however, places in the third mode only

those which are called relative because other things are referred to them.

4. If you inquire, according to this interpretation, to what kind of relation the very relation of science to the knowable, and of sense to the sensible, and the like, should belong, it can be answered that it is the relation of a certain effect to its cause in some genus, and thus it is reduced to the second kind, as we shall immediately say in a similar case when we resolve the sixth difficulty. Or, if someone should wish to recall every relation founded upon proportion to the first mode, he will be able to say that the relation of science pertains to that mode, for it consists in a certain fitting and proportion to its object.

5. But an objection can still be made: according to this interpretation, the relation between measure and measurable will be intrinsic and real in the measure, whereas in the measurable there will be only a relation of reason, or a mere denomination toward the measure. This is against the common opinion and against reason; for that which is measured is inferior, and thus it is the thing measured, rather than the measure, which is ordered to the other. This is also evident by induction: science is measured by the knowable, and therefore in science there is a relation; cognition is measured, in truth, by the object; the creature, in its being or in the truth of its being, is measured by the divine idea; and all these relations are in the things measured. I reply: Aristotle pronounces the same judgment about the measurable as about the knowable and the intelligible, and of them all he says that they are spoken of as relatives because something else is said to be referred to them. Aristotle seems to be speaking of the measurable by an extrinsic and superadded measure, not by an intrinsic fitting or proportion such as is found in the examples brought forward on the contrary side. For that intrinsic commensuration consists only in a certain likeness or fitting (so to speak), or in dependence or specification, and thus it is reduced to the first or second mode of relations. Just so, an image is commensurated to its exemplar by a ratio of likeness, and an effect to its cause by a ratio of

dependence or even of likeness. But a thing is said extrinsically to be measurable, as it is said to be knowable or visible, because by the application of an extrinsic measure its quantity can be manifested. And in this way Aristotle says that a thing is called measurable by the relation of another to it, because, namely, through the measure its quantity can be made known.

6. Nor does it matter whether the measure is, as it were, natural or established by human convention. For in either case a thing is not formally measurable except by an extrinsic power and denomination, although the foundation or proportion which is presupposed for such measurability is often something intrinsic, and can be the foundation of some real relation of another kind. Likewise, the visible object presupposes some real and intrinsic foundation in the visible thing, indeed even an active power of producing species, by reason of which it is really referred to sight by a relation pertaining to the second kind. And even in quantitative measures designated by human convention there is presupposed some foundation of extension and of a certain real proportion which has some true relation conjoined, yet pertaining to the first mode, because it is nothing other than the relation of equality or inequality. Thus, for a thing formally to be measurable states only the relation of another to it, inasmuch as by the application of a measure its quantity can be made known, although fundamentally something intrinsic in the measurable thing itself is presupposed.

7. Finally one can object that, from the interpretation stated, it follows that one of the three members numbered by Aristotle contains no real relations but only relations of reason, and thus without cause it is counted among things that truly belong to the category "relative." The consequence is clear; for, according to that interpretation, in the third kind there are only those relations which do not belong to relatives because they are themselves referred, but because other things are referred to them; but such relations are only of reason. The answer is that, whatever may be said of these relations

of reason—whether such are necessary in these extremes, which we shall see below—Aristotle here is not treating of those relations, but of the various modes by which things are denominated as relatives from the things themselves. And so he distinguishes two general modes: some are denominated relative because they themselves are referred; others because other things are referred to them. And again he distinguishes the first member by a twofold foundation—of quantity, that is, of unity, or of power—and thus there come to be three modes of relatives. Accordingly, on this interpretation, those three modes of relatives are not three genera of real relations; the third mode does not add a new genus of relation, but declares only a special manner of denomination which, from certain relations of other kinds, redounds into their terms.

Resolution

8. Let this whole opinion and interpretation of the text be proposed only for the sake of disputation, since, taken simply, Aristotle's wording seems to have no small foundation, and in argument it could be defended not implausibly. Nevertheless we do not wish to depart from the common view, which holds that this third mode of relatives constitutes a third genus of real relations that are really in one extreme and, of themselves and primarily, refer that extreme to another which, in turn, is not referred by a proper real relation existing in itself, but only terminates the relation of the other and from that receives its denomination. That there are relations of this sort is clear from induction in the case of science and the knowable and the like; this will be treated more fully in the next section. That these constitute a genus different from the others and require a foundation of a different rationale seems probable in itself, because they have a very different manner of habitude. Just as we know causes from their effects, so we can understand that the foundation from which there arises an intrinsic relation in both

extremes is of a different rationale from that which can found a relation in only one extreme. Finally, this foundation has been called "measure and measurable," because these relations are chiefly founded in certain things whose perfection is had as commensurated to others, and thus they are referred to those others, even if there is not, in them, a similar or proportional foundation of a corresponding relation.

9. From this the solution to the fifth difficulty is easily clear. For "measure" is not taken here as signifying a habitude to our cognition, namely, inasmuch as it is a means which we can use to know the quantity or magnitude or perfection of something—wherein we said above that the notion of measure adds to things no real rationale. Rather, "measure" is taken for the real terminus or object to which some thing is said to have a habitude, according to which it is fitted or commensurated to it: just as science is compared to the knowable object, and judgment to the thing known, and so with others. Wherefore this commensuration is nothing in reality beyond the transcendental habitude of such things to their objects; yet that is a sufficient foundation for a predicamental relation. Nor does it matter if the terminus or object that is said to have the rationale of measure sometimes does not exist; for then the predicamental relation will not arise. We only say that in such a thing there is a sufficient foundation of a peculiar relation, which will be real if the extremes exist and the other necessary conditions concur.

SECTIO XIV

WHETHER THE SAID DIVISION IS SUFFICIENT AND COMPREHENDS ALL RELATIONS

1. This is the second principal doubt proposed above concerning this division, in which we must explain what was asked in the sixth difficulty set in Section 10, namely, how all real relations are reduced to these three modes.

On the Relation of Appetite to the Appetible, & of Love to the Lovable

2. First of all it was asked what sort of relation there is of appetite to the appetible and of love to the lovable. For Aristotle, although he set examples in the case of sense and intellect, said nothing about appetite and love. But St. Thomas, touching on this point (I, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3), says that the rationale of the relation of science to the knowable is different from that of love to the loved object. For, he says, the former is real in one extreme only, whereas the latter is real in both. And he gives the reason: the relation of science has its foundation in science, not in the knowable, because that relation is founded upon the apprehension of the thing according to the spiritual being which it has in the knower, not in the thing known; the relation of love, however, is founded upon the appetite for the good. But the good is not only in the soul; it is also in things (Metaphysics VII, text 8). Thus this relation has a real foundation in both extremes, and therefore the relation is also real in both. In this opinion St. Thomas follows Avicenna (Metaphysics III, c. 10).

3. St. Thomas, however, does not explain in which of the members posited by Aristotle the foundation of the relation of love to its object, and conversely, is to be placed. For it cannot be located in this third kind, since Aristotle says of that entire kind in general that the relation belongs only to one extreme, while the other is called relative only because something else is referred to it. Nor can it pertain to the second kind, because the object is not compared to love or appetite as to a passive potency, nor as to the effect of any action, but only as to an object or "the matter about which," in which it is like the knowable and sensible object. Hence perhaps one will say that it is reduced to the first mode, because love is founded on some fittingness and proportion. Yet, as I said above when treating of active and passive power, that is not the mode of fittingness or unity which founds the

first kind of relations. Moreover, the same mode of proportion is found between science or sense and the object—and indeed to a greater degree, inasmuch as cognition is said to take place by a kind of assimilation.

4. Furthermore, it does not appear why science or sense are said to be measured by the object, and not love as well; for the perfection of love is no less measured by the object—indeed, in a certain way more so, because love tends toward things as they are in themselves. Nor is it enough to say that the foundation of this third kind is the measure of truth, because this is not an adequate foundation. In sense there is not the formal truth of cognition; nor is the intellect, as a potency, measured with respect to truth by the intelligible object, but with respect to entitative perfection. Next, if the measure of truth is a sufficient foundation of relation, why not the measure of the moral goodness or rectitude of love? Therefore I do not see a sufficient reason why the relation of love should not be constituted in this third kind; nor why it should be denied that, according to this genus of foundation and relation, there is among all those things that have a habitude to objects, and are specified by them, a special conformity by reason of which they constitute one subordinate genus of relations—since this is affirmed, in the case of some, namely sense, intellect, and science.

5. As to the relation of the lovable or loved, although Avicenna's opinion is probable, the opposite seems more in conformity with Aristotle's doctrine. First, because either one will have to exclude the relation of love from this third kind—which is against what has been said—or admit mutual relations within it, which is against Aristotle. Second, because the difference established between science and love does not satisfy. For if the knowable object and the lovable object are compared as to their foundations (so to speak), each is something intrinsic and real in the object itself; for just as a thing is good in itself, so too it is true according to being and apt to be understood. Aristotle says in Metaphysics II, text 4: "Each thing

is true and intelligible according as it is a being." And in Metaphysics IX, c. 7, he said that act is more knowable than potency. These cannot be true except of intelligibility insofar as it is founded in things themselves. If sometimes the rationale for reaching a knowable object can be extrinsic, so too the rationale for loving is often extrinsic to the object itself, as is clear in the love of a means for the sake of an extrinsic end; therefore, as to these, the proportion is the same. But if speech be about the knowable and appetible, or about the known and the loved formally, insofar as they are such, each is completed by an extrinsic denomination from a power or act—as can easily be gathered from what we said above about goodness in the tenth disputation. Finally, if we consider transcendental habitudes, neither object, according to what it really is, says a transcendental habitude to the powers or acts of understanding or loving; rather, only conversely do the powers or acts say habitudes to their objects. Therefore we must speak of them in the same proportion: just as the knowable is not said to be referred except because something else is referred to it, so neither is the lovable.

Whether a Relation of Measure Intervenes Between Every Effect and Cause

6. According to this opinion, which appears more probable, we must answer the sixth difficulty as follows: those relations that pertain to the acts, habits, and powers of appetition with respect to their objects belong to this third kind, which can be founded not only in the measure of truth but also in the measure of perfection—that is, in the commensuration and proportion of some thing to its object. To the rejoinder made there—namely, that all effects could be placed in this kind inasmuch as they can be measured by their principles or causes—one may first reply by conceding the consequence, if the ratio of measure and measured be considered precisely in them, even if otherwise they are referred by a relation of dependence pertaining to

the second kind, or by a relation of likeness pertaining to the first. For it is not incongruous that between two things, under diverse rationes, diverse relations arise; this is especially admitted by all in the case of the relation of the exemplified to the exemplar. Nevertheless, because apart from the dependence of effect on cause, or the likeness between them, I think the notion of measure adds no real rationale but only a denomination from an order to cognition, I do not think there can intervene there any special real relation distinct from that which is founded in causality or dependence or in likeness. And therefore a second reply denies the consequence: in this third kind there are placed only the relations of certain things that have a peculiar mode of specification from a tendency and, as it were, a commensuration to another as to an object, terminus, or intrinsic end to which they are primarily and intrinsically ordered—such as powers, habits, acts, and the like. For such objective termination, as such, is neither a proper likeness (as is evident in itself) nor a proper causality, as we touched on above (disp. XII, sect. 3, n. 17); and therefore the relations founded in this commensuration to the object do not pertain to the second kind of relations. Conversely, the commensuration or proportion that is between an efficient cause as such and its effect does not pertain to this third mode, because that is either mere causality or effective dependence, or is only a likeness that can intervene between cause and effect.

On the Relation of Union

7. To the other part of that difficulty concerning the relation of union and similar cases, one can reply in two ways. First, that this relation and the like pertain to the first kind of these relatives; for union truly is a kind of unity, or is as it were a way to unity. Indeed, specific or generic identity itself is also a kind of union of many in the same essence or formal ratio; much more, then, will a proper and real union between extremes that are really distinct in reality be able to

found a relation belonging to that genus. Wherefore, although the numerical unity of a simple thing with respect to itself, or the numerical unity of a composite even with respect to the whole composite, cannot found a real relation, nevertheless the numerical unity of a composite, inasmuch as parts otherwise really distinct are united within it, is a sufficient foundation of a real relation pertaining to the same genus. By the same reasoning the relation of contact belongs to the same genus, as does the relation of nearness, because it is as it were an imperfect likeness in place; likewise, coexistence pertains to that genus because it is a certain likeness in existing, and the same is true in similar cases. And according to this way of speaking, the relations of causes can be distributed so that only the relation of the efficient cause belongs to the second genus; the relations of the material and formal causes belong to the first, because the proximate rationale for founding them is union, since those causes do not cause except by means of union, as we have seen in their proper places; but the relation of the final cause belongs to the third genus, both because by its special rationale it is a non-mutual relation, as we said above with probability (disp. XXIII), and because it causes only insofar as it is the rationale by which the effect is ordered and commensurated to it.

8. Or, second, one might say that all the relations of causes pertain to the second mode. For although Aristotle especially explained that mode by active power and efficient causality, which are better known, nevertheless, with proportion kept, it can be applied to each of the causes, insofar as in each there is an aptitude toward its effect and a proper causality whereby it in its own way has an influx into the effect and the effect depends upon it. And with respect to the material cause this opinion seems consonant with Aristotle, who in that genus places the relation of passive potency, of which material causality is one. The same reason seems to hold for the relation of the "informative" power (so to speak) and its causality, and for the relation founded in it. Consequently the same will be said of the relation of

effects to these causes; and the same can be said of the relation of the effect as such to its final cause. For on the part of the cause I think that relation is not real, as I have said. And according to this way of answering, the relation of union—which presupposes causality or some imitation of it—would be reduced to the second genus of relations, whereas the other relations of nearness, coexistence, and the like undoubtedly pertain to the first genus. Therefore, in my judgment, no relation will be found that cannot be easily reduced to these genera.

SECTIO XV

WHETHER RELATIONS OF THE THIRD KIND ARE NON-MUTUAL, AND IN THIS RESPECT DIFFER FROM THE RELATIONS OF THE OTHER KINDS

1. Relations can be called non-mutual in two ways: first, according to their specific rationes of relation; second, in the supreme and most general sense. In the former way a relation will be called non-mutual which is not of the same specific rationale in both extremes; in the latter way a relation will be called non-mutual which is a true and real relation in one extreme but not in the other. The former signification is unusual and improper; for if each extreme is referred to the other by its own proper relation, they truly and properly are referred mutually, even if they are referred by relations of different rationes. Hence such relatives are rather called "of different rationes," or, as others speak, "relations of disquiparantia."

The Division of Relations of the Same or of a Dissimilar Rationale

2. Thus mutual relations are accustomed to be distinguished into relations of aequiparantia and of disquiparantia. All relations of

the second kind are of disquiparantia, because the rationale for founding them is in some way different in the extremes: in one there is active power, in the other passive power or dependence upon its cause. From this it also follows that the terms of such relations are of different rationes, because they correspond proportionately to their foundations, as was touched on above and will be said more fully below. The relations of the first kind are sometimes of the same, sometimes of different rationes in the two extremes: relations of unity are of aequiparantia, as Alexander of Hales rightly noted (on Metaphysics V, text 20); this is clear of the relations of equality, likeness, identity. Relations founded upon number or diversity, according to their proper and specific rationes, are of disquiparantia, as is clear of double and half, and of other proportions which in one extreme express excess and in the other defect. I say "according to their proper and specific rationes," because in a generic rationale they can agree and, according to that, be said in like manner of both extremes; thus both extremes, greater as well as less, are said to be unequal to the other. Likewise whiteness is said to be unlike blackness, and conversely, although it is plausible that the proper relations, according to their specific rationes, are distinct, for the foundation and the terminus are very different in the one and in the other. But relations of the third kind are judged to be more than disquiparantia, because aequiparantia and disquiparantia are properly said between extremes in which there is a real relation in both; whereas in this third kind Aristotle judges that there is not in both extremes a real relation, and therefore they are called non-mutual.

The Difficulty Concerning Non-Mutual Relations Is Proposed

3. The present question is to be understood of these properly so-called non-mutual relations, in which Aristotle's view is difficult on a twofold count. First, it does not seem true that relations of the third

kind are non-mutual; for if this were true in any case, it would be especially so in the knowable and the sensible; but in these there is as true and real a relation as in science and sense. Therefore. The minor is proved: the denominations "knowable" and "sensible" are relative; indeed they belong per se to the category "relative," as Aristotle himself admits in the same place. This is evident from the reciprocity: just as there is "knowable science," so there is "science knowable." This reciprocity and correlative denomination is not crafted by the intellect but arises from the things themselves; therefore in both extremes there is a proper form and real relation.

4. Second, if for some reason this relation is not real in the knowable object, either it is because in the object itself there is no real foundation, or because the being-known in such an object is not something in it nor is it known by any change of it, but by a denomination from a form existing in another; for apart from these, no other plausible reason occurs. Neither of these satisfies. The first assumes what is false; for the fact that an object is intelligible or sensible has a foundation in the things themselves and in their real properties. Light is visible because it is of such a nature that it has the power thus to affect the potency; and an immaterial thing, because it is spiritual, is said to be actually intelligible. The second reason infers badly; otherwise even the relation of an agent in act would not be real in the agent, because it becomes actually an agent without any change of itself and without the addition of any absolute form that is in it. If you say that the very power of acting is intrinsic, although the condition which is action is extrinsic, the same can be said of the object: the aptitude to be known is intrinsic, and that can be a foundation even if the condition, which is actually being known, is something extrinsic. All the more because the very act of understanding or sensing has a real dependence upon the object, just as action has upon an agent, although not in the same genus of cause. You will say that the object, insofar as it is of itself apt to be known or seen, does not have a habitude to science. If this is understood of a

predicamental relation, the principle is begged; for we are inquiring into the rationale of this. If it is understood of a transcendental habitude, it has already been shown above that this is not always necessarily presupposed for a predicamental relation; for even in an agent the principle of acting does not always have a transcendental habitude to the effect, as is clear from what we treated above concerning potency and act.

5. Third comes the principal difficulty: the terminus of a relation is another relation existing in the other extreme; therefore it is impossible that a relation be real in one extreme and not in the other. The consequence is clear, because a relation cannot be real without a formal real terminus. The antecedent is clear because relations are said to be simultaneous by nature, definition, and cognition, for the one is the terminus of the other.

6. From the second point no lesser difficulties arise. For if non-mutual relations must be admitted, they will be found not only in the third but also in the other genera. The antecedent is clear. First, the relation between God and the creature in the rationale of efficient cause and effect is of the second kind, and yet it is non-mutual according to the view more received among theologians. Likewise, in the first kind many relations are found between God and creatures: the relation of real distinction, or of likeness in being, or in the rationale of substance, or in intellectual degree. Although the likeness is analogous, it is nevertheless true and real and sufficient to found a real relation, as I have said above; and yet such a relation, although real in the creature, cannot be in God. One can also take an argument from the relation of union between the Word and the humanity, which is non-mutual and yet belongs to the first or second mode. Moreover, among creatures there is a particular difficulty about the relation between final cause and effect, which we said is non-mutual and yet belongs to the second kind. Finally, the relation of right and left between a man and a column is held by everyone to be non-mutual,

and yet it does not belong to the third kind; for no notion of measure intervenes there.

7. Because of these and similar reasons Gregory (I, dist. 18, q. 1) thinks there are no non-mutual relations; some Nominalists follow him.

Assertions Concerning Non-Mutual Relations

8. Two points must nevertheless be said briefly. First, that there are some non-mutual relations, that is, relations that are real in one extreme and not in the other. This is Aristotle's opinion in this place, which all interpreters admit, and almost all theologians, especially St. Thomas (I, q. 13, a. 17) and others soon to be cited. It is a view received with such consensus that philosophers are not permitted to call it into doubt. The reason for it will be evident from the following assertion and still more from the solutions of the difficulties. Second, that these non-mutual relations are found of themselves and, as it were, from the proper rationale of their foundation in the third kind; in the other kinds, not at all, unless materially, as it were, from some peculiar condition of a subject or of an extreme. Thus I judge Aristotle's opinion is to be interpreted. The reason for the first part is to be taken from the peculiar mode of specification and commensuration which powers, habits, and similar realities have to their objects. For formally their whole being consists in the habitude which by their nature they have to objects, according to which they are commensurated to them. The object, however, under this aspect has no proper causality, but is the terminus that specifies. For although in other respects it can be a mover, actively or finally, nevertheless as the terminus of this relation it is considered under none of these rationes, but only as that to which such a thing is commensurated. Under this ratio the object does not concur as "ordainable to another," but only as that to which another is ordained; and therefore, by force of such a rationale of founding, a relation does

not arise in both extremes, but only in that which is commensurated to the other. For this reason relations of the third kind, from the proper formal rationale of their foundation, are non-mutual. In the other kinds this does not occur, as is clear from what has been said, because more frequently and almost always the relations of those kinds are mutual. If sometimes they are non-mutual, that arises only from the peculiar nature or condition of some thing, as will be clearer from the solutions of the arguments.

Whether, in Non-Mutual Relatives, Each Extreme Is Really Referred

9. To the arguments proposed in the first point, which proceed against the former assertion and against the first part of the second assertion, we must respond. To the first, Cajetan (I, q. 13, a. 7) answers by conceding that even in non-mutual relatives each correlative is real, and, for example, the knowable is really referred to science. He places the difference between these and mutual relatives in this, that in the mutual both are referred by intrinsic relations, whereas in the non-mutual it is not so: one extreme is referred really by the relation existing in the other, which extrinsically denominates the first. This response seems to have a foundation in Aristotle, both because among those things that belong simply to the category "relative" he numbers the knowable as referred to science and the sensible as referred to sense: but nothing belongs simply to "relative" unless it is really referred, as we said above; therefore these too are real relatives according to Aristotle. Next, because a little below, in the same chapter, he says that these are called relatives because other things are said to be referred to them; he does not say that these are relatives because reason feigns or considers it so, but because other things are said to be referred to them—something found in the thing itself. Moreover, somewhat further on he says that all these are said to be relatives "per se," including the three kinds treated in the previous

sections; but those that are referred only by reason are not "per se" relatives but are relatives by reason. Finally, the metaphysician does not consider relations of reason, whereas those three kinds per se belong to the category "relative," as Aristotle testifies, and per se also fall under metaphysical consideration. Therefore. And Gregory seems to have taught this opinion before Cajetan (IV, dist. 23, q. 3).

10. But this response of Cajetan is singular, and it contradicts St. Thomas (Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 13), where he expressly proves that the relations of God to creatures are not certain realities existing outside of God by which he is extrinsically denominated relatively. Since the relation between God and creatures is non-mutual, if Cajetan's view were true, God too would be really referred to creatures—not indeed by a real relation existing in God, but by a relation existing in the creature. Thus, in his second reason, St. Thomas expressly adopts a principle contrary to Cajetan's interpretation: that something is not denominated relatively by a relation existing, as it were, outside of it, but by an inhering relation. The Ferrariense rightly interprets this to be understood of the relative denomination by which something is said to be referred to another; for by another kind of denomination it is not incongruous that something be denominated by an extrinsic relation, as we shall say later.

11. Furthermore, if the knowable is really referred to science by the relation existing in science, I ask whether this is to be understood of the relation by which science itself is referred to the knowable, or of some other distinct relation. It cannot be the first; one and the same relation cannot give different subjects denominations of different rationes, such as those of science and of the knowable, nor can it refer them to opposite formal termini. Otherwise, by the same reasoning, the same filiation existing in the son could intrinsically denominate the son and refer him to the father, and extrinsically denominate the father as father and refer him to the son. Finally, one form, specifically, has one formal effect; but a relation is a form whose formal effect is to refer one thing to another. Therefore one and the

same relation cannot have two modes of referring of different rationes. Nor can one say the second, namely, that there are in science two distinct real relations: one by which science itself is referred to the knowable, the other by which it refers the knowable to itself. No one has ever said this, and it has no foundation in Aristotle; indeed it is repugnant to him. He says that the knowable is so called because science is referred to it; he does not, therefore, acknowledge between these any other real relation than that by which science is referred to the knowable. Nor is it consonant with reason; such a plurality of relations is neither necessary nor has any foundation in science itself, since in science there is only one fitting and transcendental habitude to the knowable.

12. It can be said that there are two relations distinct only by reason. Since this multiplication is not of things and not properly "in reality," it can easily be admitted and suffices for the aforesaid relative denominations, even of different rationes; just as the same mode or the same dependence, because of a distinction of reason between action and passion, bestows diverse denominations of agent and patient—one intrinsically, the other extrinsically. Nevertheless, even this distinction of relations should not be admitted in the present case; for even to posit such a distinction of reason some foundation in reality is required, and here there is none. Hence the example from action and passion is not parallel: in change there is a true and transcendental habitude both to the principle from which it flows and to the patient which it alters; thus there is a great foundation in it for distinguishing by reason action and passion after the manner of two accidental forms. Add the universal principle on which St. Thomas's dictum is founded, that relation does not denominate extrinsically; for since its denomination is by a habitude to another, it is repugnant that a form which denominates in that way be in that to which the habitude is; if it is not in that, it must be in that which is referred, because in a relation other extremes do not per se concur. Finally, it is hardly conceivable what there would be in science by reason of which

it would make the knowable to be really referred to itself, since the whole rationale of science is to be conversant about the knowable, and from that it does not, strictly speaking, have the power to ordain it to itself.

13. To the first argument set at the beginning, then, it must be said that the knowable can denominate in two ways: first, merely terminatively and, as it were, passively; second, correlatively to science. In the first way it is denominated extrinsically by science itself, which is real; and thus such a denomination can be said to be "in the things themselves" and not crafted by the intellect. Indeed, this very denomination is taken not only from the predicamental relation that is in science, but also from the absolute form itself, as including a transcendental habitude to the object—which Aristotle sufficiently intimated when he said that "intelligible" is said because the intellect is conversant about it. It is conversant, not by the sole predicamental relation, but by its proper act, upon which a relation follows. The second denomination of the knowable is a relative one, and this is only by a relation of reason; for our mind, in order to explicate that relation which science has to the knowable, conceives the knowable as the correlative of science. The argument therefore proceeds only about the former denomination. When Aristotle places the knowable, the sensible, and the like among things that are "relative," it can first be explained that by these he does not understand only these extremes, but the relation intervening between these and their correlatives, in whichever of them that relation is. Or, second, it may be said that he places these extremes among relatives insofar as they have such denominations from certain real relations. In the same sense we can understand what he says, that these are relatives because other things are said to be referred to them—that is, they are relatives not as correlatives but as termini passively denominated by these relations. Or, again, when Aristotle says that these are said to be relatives because other things are said to be referred to them, it can be understood causally: if the knowable, the sensible, and the like are

taken and conceived by us correlatively, it is because other things are referred to them, not because they themselves are truly and really referred. Gregory says that the same interpretation holds even if the relation of the knowable is real, because it does not belong to it except because science is conversant about it; but this is not rightly said, for if the foundation of that relation is only the habitude of the other—that is, of science—to the knowable, the relation founded upon it cannot be real.

14. To the second argument it is answered that the reason why this non-mutual relation is not real in the other extreme in this third kind is that, in one extreme—for example, in the knowable object—there is no real foundation of such a relation. Nor is it enough that in the intelligible or sensible thing there is some foundation by which it is apt to be understood or sensed; for that foundation, considered precisely under the ratio of "measure," is not taken as something ordainable to another, but only as the terminus or object to which something is commensurated. And thus we say that in it there is no foundation of relation—not because there is nothing real in it, but because in that thing there is no rationale for founding a relation—which is required for the foundation of a relation, formally speaking, as was explained above (sect. VII). The third argument asks the grave difficulty concerning the terminus of relation, which we shall treat in the following section.

Concerning the Second Difficulty, the Relations of God to Creatures

15. In the second part of the arguments, the first difficulty sought is whether between the creature and God there is always a non-mutual relation, even if the relations seem to belong to the first and second kinds. This is a theological question and is usually proposed in other words: whether the names which are attributed to God from time, by a relation to the creature, signify in God a real relation or only

a relation of reason. Some names that seem to import a relation to the creature are said of God from eternity; at times they are said to import a free respect, at times an absolutely necessary or natural one. Thus "science," "power," and the like signify a natural and necessary respect; "predestination," "providence," and "science of vision" signify a free or non-natural respect, because, absolutely speaking, they might not belong to God. Concerning these relations there is no doubt that they are not real in God, because from eternity they have no real termini. It is true that some theologians think that the respect of science and power, even in God, is a real transcendental one, and thus can be independent of the existence of a terminus and not variable or accidental, but pertains to the intrinsic substance of God. More truly, however (as is to be treated more fully elsewhere), I think that these do not posit in God a true transcendental respect, but only "secundum dici," being signified after the manner of relative things, because we conceive them after the manner of those things which include similar transcendental respects. For otherwise God, as to his essence, is a wholly absolute reality; and since his science and power are his very essence, they are also absolute from every transcendental respect—which we also touched on above when explaining the divine attributes. We also gave the reason: God's power is not such as to be primarily ordered of itself to an external work, but it has that efficacy, as it were concomitantly (to speak according to our way of conceiving), and without any ordination. Likewise, God's science and will are primarily conversant only about his own essence; from that they then reach or can reach other things without a transcendental respect. Therefore these respects are either only "secundum dici," or, if they are conceived as relations "secundum esse," they are only relations of reason—at least as long as their termini do not exist in reality. Concerning these the argument proposed above does not proceed. The question is about certain respects that include the coexistence of the terminus and therefore belong to God from time,

because creatures, which are the termini of such respects, exist only from time—as are the relations "creator," "lord," and the like.

The Nominalist View on God's Real Relations from Time

16. Concerning these, many theologians think that they are real relations. Thus holds Ockham (I, dist. 30), and there Gabriel (q. 5), Durandus (q. 3), Gregory (dist. 28, q. 3, a. 4), Marsilius (I, q. 32, a. 1). The foundation of these authors is that a real relation adds nothing real to the subject or to the other thing that is said to be referred by it, but is either a denomination from the concomitance of the extremes, or is the very absolute thing which, with the other coexisting, of itself regards that other because of some bond or connection found between them. Hence it follows that a real relation can newly accrue to something without any imperfection, because it accrues without any real and intrinsic addition and without composition, and consequently also without any dependence on something extrinsic—at most only as to this mode of denomination. Only such imperfections can here be devised; therefore every imperfection is excluded. Moreover, in God there concur all the things necessary for a relation; for he is the true efficient cause of the creature and has true power and action with respect to it. Therefore, the other extreme being posited, there will be in God a true real relation. The common manner of denominating God from these relations also favors this view: for he is as truly and really the agent or creator of the creature as one man is the father of another; the same is true of the relation of "distinct," "like," and so on. Therefore either all these relations are real in God, or there is no foundation for admitting real relations in creatures. Finally, St. Anselm favors this view (Monologion, c. 24), where, after saying that nothing can happen to God because he is unchangeable, he objects to himself: "How is he not a partaker of accident, since even this—that he is greater than all other natures and

that he is unlike them—seems to happen to him?" And he replies: "But what repugnance is there between the susceptibility which some call 'accidents' and natural unchangeability, if no mutability of substance follows from their being assumed?" And he adds below that relations are of this sort. Lest one think he is speaking of relations of reason, he adds an example of created relations: "For I am neither greater, nor lesser, nor equal, nor like to a man who is to be born a year hence; yet, when he is born, I shall be able to have all these relations without any change in me." He adds further that these which are said to happen without change of the thing are improperly called "accidents," and therefore it is simply true that no accident newly accrues to God.

The Contrary View Is Proven

17. Nevertheless more and graver theologians deny that such names signify in God real relations to creatures that belong to him from time. This is the view of St. Thomas (I, q. 13, a. 7; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 12); the same is taught by Cajetan and the Ferrariense in these places, and by the other Thomists; Capreolus (I, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 3; and a. 2, concl. 2–3), and there the Hispalensis (a. 1); St. Bonaventure (a. 1, q. 3); Richard (a. 1, q. 4); Scotus (q. 1); Aegidius (q. 2); Henry (Quodlibet IX, q. 1); and Alexander of Hales (I, q. 35). Some think this view so certain that the opposite clashes with sacred doctrine. Yet it is one thing to speak on the supposition that a relation is a thing or a mode by nature distinct from its foundation or from the subject referred, and consequently newly added to it when it begins to be referred or begins to be denominated relatively; it is another thing to speak of relation supposing that it is not something distinct from absolute realities. On the former supposition it would be, without doubt, most absurd and almost erroneous to say that real relations to creatures arise in God from time when creatures are produced, or are lost when creatures change. For on such a view one posits in God a

true accident—since a mode by nature distinct from substance, which can inhere in it and be absent from it, is an accident; consequently one must posit in God a composition of substance and such a distinct mode, and finally change and potentiality, and the like.

18. Nor can one say that such a relation is real and yet is not in the creature and really refers God to the creature, while nonetheless it is not in God but "assists" him—as Gilbert of Poitiers imagined, as Alexander of Hales and others report. This is easily refuted. If that relation is real, it must be in some subject; since it is not in the creature, it will be in God—unless someone invent that it is subsistent, which cannot be said; otherwise it follows that there is a certain created substance "assisting" God from time, since it is a temporal and consequently a created relation—a plainly false and unintelligible position. How could such a substance refer God? There would also be in God another relation toward that substance, because he would be its maker; thus one would proceed to infinity. If it is said that that relation is subsistent, but not with any subsistence other than the divine, I will ask whether it is in God by hypostatic union—which would be so absurd as not to require refutation—or by identity. If by identity, I will further ask whether by an all-embracing identity that excludes even a modal distinction; in that case the hypothesis we premised is abandoned—namely, that every real relation newly accruing is a mode distinct by nature. But if it is a real identity with a modal distinction, the inconveniences previously alleged follow, nor is it avoided that such a relation inheres in God, not by a distinct inherence, but by itself, just as in created substances accidental modes affect them and inhere in them.

19. Nevertheless, the whole certainty of this view—in this sense—is rather conditional, a certainty of the consequence than of the consequent: namely, that if a real relation is such as that view supposes, it cannot be in God. But since that antecedent is uncertain and perhaps false, that conclusion is not sufficiently certain insofar as it absolutely denies God's real relations to creatures. Nor do the

authors of the first opinion speak in that sense, nor do they admit the supposition just mentioned.

20. If, however, we suppose that these relations are not something actually distinct from all the absolutes, then it cannot be certain that these relations cannot be attributed to God; nor is the question of great moment, but almost one of manner of speaking. Indeed, those who think that these relative denominations—which can newly accrue from the sole change of the other extreme without any change in the thing that is said to be referred—are only extrinsic denominations from the coexistence of extremes, speak quite consistently when they attribute these relations to God; for there is no inconvenience in God's being denominated from time by some real form existing in the creature, as is evident in creative action and in other works which God operates ad extra. St. Anselm certainly seems much inclined to this view in the passage cited, although at the end of the chapter he passes over that manner of speaking as uncertain. Nevertheless, we left that view above as less probable and less consonant with Aristotle. We can now confirm this from the fact that, on that view, there would be no non-mutual relations, and what Aristotle says would be false: that some things are called relative because other things are referred to them, while others are called relative because they themselves have within themselves that by which they are referred.

21. Further, even supposing that relation is something intrinsic yet not distinct in reality, and consequently causing neither change nor composition, the inconveniences previously alleged do not follow even if one says that God is referred from time to creatures. Therefore that opinion, in that sense, is not worthy of any censure. Hence even among Thomists, Soncinas (on Metaphysics V, q. 25, ad 4) admits that the relation of dominion which God has to creatures is real, because it is founded upon a true real power; something similar is thought in part by Hervaeus (I, dist. 10, q. unica, a. 3), although in his manner of speaking he tries to accommodate himself to the common

opinion, which he explains with difficulty. Nor is this surprising; for it is in truth not easy to give a reason why this should be denied, the said opinion being supposed, since no imperfection follows in God, as is clear from what has been said.

22. Nevertheless, I do not think we should depart from the manner of speaking of St. Thomas and of the graver theologians. For although the above-alleged inconveniences do not follow from attributing to God a real relation in the said sense, still I do not think that God can be referred by his intrinsic form and entity to creatures. This is proper to beings of the same order; but God and the creature are altogether of different orders, as is sufficiently clear of itself.

23. Things are said to be of the same order that are either beyond every genus and beyond all dependence—as are the divine Persons—or are under the same genus—as created substances, quantities, and the like—or at least such as are under different genera one of which can be perfected through the other and conversely, as are the genus of created substance and the genera of accidents compared among themselves. For this reason all created beings, so far as is relevant here, are said to be of the same order (for the uncreated Persons, as they are referred among themselves, do not pertain to the present disputation). If they are of the same genus, they have a univocal agreement among themselves and mutually help one another in some way toward the perfection or complement of their nature—whether in the individual, the species, or at least the genus. Hence it follows that even the causality which intervenes among such beings redounds to the perfection not only of effects but, in some way, also of causes—either because they are ordained to acting, or because they are conserved in their effects at least according to their species, or at least because, according to genus, they are perfected by a variety of differences or species. If created beings are of different genera, all have among themselves some connection either according to generic rationes or specific ones, comparing them with proportion. In this sense, then, we say here that all created beings are of the same order.

24. This can be expounded otherwise from Cajetan (I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4), who says that those are of different orders which have between themselves an essential dependence under the ratio of cause and caused; in this way all creatures are compared to God, though not among themselves. For although sometimes they cause one another, they do not do so according to a proper essential dependence. This exposition, although probable and satisfactory as regards extrinsic causes, does not seem to have a place in intrinsic causes, namely the material and the formal; there is a special rationale there, because they are compared to the effect as parts which are ordered to composing the whole, and in this respect they are of the same order with it. Hervaeus has another exposition in the place cited, but it is more obscure and less satisfactory, and so I omit it. In the said sense we assert that nothing is truly and really referred to another by an intrinsic form unless it is of the same order with it. The reason is that a real relation consists in the order of one thing to another; therefore it is fitting to such a relation that it be between extremes of the same order.

25. This can be confirmed from what has been said about science and the knowable. Under the ratio in question they are judged to be of different orders, inasmuch as science is ordained to the knowable, whereas the knowable as such is not ordained to science. Much more, then, is God of another order than every creature; therefore, much less is he of himself really referable to creatures than the knowable to science. St. Thomas uses almost this very line of reasoning in the places cited, and more fully in De Potentia q. 7, a. 11. The divine nature, power, and the other attributes are so absolute in themselves, so abstract and independent of every order of creatures, that whether creatures exist or not, neither according to reality nor according to any true real formality do they refer God to creatures. Hence they cannot truly be conceived as denominating or referring God as such; every denomination which is conceived in God as

relative to the creature is only according to reason and our mode of conceiving.

26. Nor does it stand in the way that God is denominated really "creator" or "lord." He is denominated really—extrinsically, indeed, from the real action, and thus he is called "creator"; intrinsically from the real power which he has in himself over the created thing, and thus he is called "Lord," or from real science or love, and thus he is said to know or to love what he makes. Finally, these denominations are not real except insofar as they are taken from some forms or quasi-absolute forms; insofar as they are formally relative, they are founded only in our mode of conceiving.

27. Therefore to the principal difficulty set at the beginning we concede that there are between God and creatures non-mutual relations, which not only pertain to the third kind or foundation of relations, but also to the first or the second. Nor is this incongruous; for we need not distinguish relatives of the third kind from the others by this, that in the third kind all relations are non-mutual and in the others never, but by this, that in the third kind they are always non-mutual, whereas in the others not always but rather rarely. Hence Aristotle is rightly expounded, as I said, that in the third kind, by force of the formal foundation or rationale of founding, the relations are non-mutual; in the first and second kinds, if sometimes they are non-mutual, that arises, as it were, from the material thing or subject—or quasi-subject—of the relation. For example, in the relation of cause and effect between God and creatures, if we consider formally only the rationale of power and action, there can be a sufficient basis for a mutual relation; yet in God, because of the eminence of his entity, that relation is non-mutual. The same can be said of the relation of "like" or "distinct," and the like.

28. The relation between final cause and effect, if it is non-mutual, can rightly be reduced to the third kind; for means are fitted to the end, and thus they take their species from it and are measured by it in their own way.

29. As to the relation of right and left between a man and a column, it is quite doubtful whether it is real on the part of either extreme. For although the form or power from which that denomination is taken is real and intrinsically existing in the animal, while in the column it is only extrinsic, still it does not sufficiently appear why from that there should arise a real relation even in the animal, since that denomination is not founded upon any unity or quantity, as is clear in itself; nor upon the rationale of active power as such—otherwise the relation would be mutual, because there would correspond in the column a passive power, or sometimes even an active one is lacking, since it is not necessary that the motive power of the right part be sufficient to move the column. Nor is the relation founded upon any commensuration, because the right-hand power of the animal says no transcendental habitude to the column, nor is it in any way commensurated to it. Therefore there does not seem to intervene any true rationale for founding a real relation; rather, that denomination seems to have arisen from the comparison of the intellect by a certain proportion or proportionality to the right and left part of the same man or animal. For between these parts there is a real mutual relation taken from diversity of positions together with diversity of real powers existing in each part; from this a similar denomination has been transferred to an inanimate thing occupying the right or left place. In respect of denomination this is like non-mutual relations, because the foundation of that denomination is only in one extreme and from it redounds into the other; for this reason such examples are customarily used to illustrate non-mutual relations, although a true and proper real relation does not seem necessary there. For mere diversity of position as such does not suffice for the denomination "right" and "left," as is clear in itself; the diversity of power there is only privative, because in the animal there is a proper power, whereas in the column there is only a privation of it. Therefore in neither extreme does it seem sufficient for a real relation. If,

however, someone should absolutely wish to defend that it is a real non-mutual relation, let him use the general response set above.

SECTIO XVI
WHETHER THE FORMAL TERMINUS OF A RELATION IS ANOTHER RELATION OR SOME ABSOLUTE RATION

1. This question arises from the preceding section and is in itself quite necessary for explaining the nature of relation, which in its own way depends both on its foundation and on its term. It therefore belongs most fittingly here. In the two immediately preceding sections we explained the formal foundations of relations. It remains, accordingly, to declare in like manner the formal terminus.

Exposition of the Title of the Question, & What It is to Terminate in Act

2. We are not dealing here with the formal denomination of the term as actually terminating, but with the ration or form that is required in the thing which is the term in order that it be apt to terminate. For under the prior aspect, namely of being a term or of terminating, there is nothing in the terminating thing itself, but only an extrinsic denomination taken from the fact that another tends toward it. Thus for a wall "to be seen" is not something in the wall, but a denomination from the vision that looks to it; for "to be seen" is the same as "to terminate a vision in act," even if the words differ. Nonetheless a certain form is presupposed in the wall, by which it is constituted apt to terminate vision. In the same way the terminus of a relation is to be understood. It is said to terminate in act only because it is looked toward by another, and that denomination is not a prerequisite for the relation, but a consequence of it, and in this all

agree. But some ration or quasi formal cause is necessarily presupposed in the term, by reason of which it is (so to speak) terminating of a relation; for not every being can terminate just any relation whatever. Hence in each case some ration is required by which it is naturally fitted to terminate this or that relation. It is this formal ration of terminating that we inquire into here. And since above it was said that the terminus of a relation must be a real being and, in order to terminate in act, it must actually exist, we further inquire whether it ought to be formally relative or absolute. From this it will easily be clear, in each kind of relation, whether the proportionate terminus ought to be something absolute or something relative.

Different Opinions

3. First opinion. There are three opinions on this matter. The first affirms that in all relations, both mutual and non-mutual, the formal terminus must be relative. Cajetan teaches thus (on Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 7); and the Archbishop of Seville (Hispalensis) seems to speak according to the same opinion, although he neither argues the question nor speaks expressly of the formal ration of terminating. Several modern Thomists have followed this view. It can be proved, first, because every relative is formally terminated at its correlate; therefore the formal ration of terminating one relation is the opposite, corresponding relation in the other extreme. The consequence is evident; and the antecedent is proved because relatives are simultaneous by nature, by knowledge, and by definition, as is clear in Aristotle (Categories, ch. On Relatives), and will be said below. They would not have any of these unless one relative were formally terminated at the other. The minor is proved, as regards the first part, thus: if the father, as father, is not terminated at the son as the son is relative, but at "this man begotten by that father," then the father, as father, would not be simultaneous by nature with the son as son, but with this man as begotten; but this man is, by nature, begotten of

another prior to having the relation of filiation to him, for filiation is a property resulting in the begotten man. Therefore the father, as father, would be prior by nature to the son as son. This point is confirmed: relation, as relation, depends only on foundation and term. Therefore, if the formal term is not another relation, it does not of itself depend on that relation nor require it; hence it is prior by nature to it. By a similar argument the other two parts are proved: a relation is perfectly known when its foundation and term are known, and nothing else is required. Therefore, if the term of one relation is not another relation, one does not depend in knowing on the other; hence they are not necessarily known at once. Finally, for the same reason, only the formal term is placed in the definition of relation, because the whole being of a relation is toward its term. Therefore, if the term of one relative were not another relative but something absolute, one relative would not be defined through another, and conversely; and that is what is meant by being simultaneous by definition. This is confirmed especially in non-mutual relatives, where a greater difficulty seems to arise. Otherwise, in order to know the relation of a creature, one would have to know God's absolute entity and nature; and similarly, to know the relation of knowledge or sense one would have to know the absolute nature of the knowable or sensible object—which seems plainly false.

4. Second opinion. The second view uses a distinction. For mutual relations it says the same as the first opinion, for the same reasons. For non-mutual relations, however, it affirms that they are terminated at something absolute and not at something relative, because such relations formally terminate at something real, while in their terms there corresponds nothing relatively real, but only something absolute. This view is held by Ferrariensis (Contra Gentiles II, c. 14), and with respect to its latter part is inclined to by the Archbishop of Seville, for he often says that some absolute divine attribute—namely power, might, or something of the sort—is the reason why God terminates the creature's relation to himself. Niphus

follows this opinion as well (Metaphysics V, disp. 14). We shall later confirm it for non-mutual relatives; for mutual relatives it has the same bases as the first view. One commonly adds an argument taken from the divine relations, which are mutual and yet one is terminated at the other.

5. Third opinion. The third teaches universally that all relations, mutual and non-mutual alike, are formally terminated at something absolute. This is held by Scotus (I, dist. 36, q. 1), and the Scotists Lychetus and others; Capreolus follows plainly (q. 1, a. 2, ad 3), and Soncinas imitates him (Metaphysics V, q. 30, ad 2). They say that the absolute is the ration of terminating, yet it requires a concomitant relation or correlation when it terminates in act—which is simply true in mutual relatives; in non-mutual relatives it holds only according to our mode of conceiving, as we shall explain. I judge this opinion to be true, understood formally and per se. Why I add this will be clear from what follows. For this opinion must be set out distinctly and proved for mutual relations and for non-mutual relations. It is not equally certain in both, although from non-mutual relations one can draw no slight argument to mutual ones.

The Third Opinion is Confirmed by Two Assertions

6. First assertion. Reason for the assertion. I say first: in non-mutual relatives, the ration that exists in one extreme, by which it terminates the relation of the other, is not some opposite relation corresponding to the other, but is the very entity or some absolute property of that term. This is proved by the argument used for the second opinion, which seems to me most powerful. For this relation has a real terminus really existing; but in that terminus there exists no real, corresponding relation opposed to the other relation. Therefore that terminus is constituted apt to terminate, not by a relation, but by some absolute thing. The consequence is evident by a sufficient

enumeration of parts; and the major and the minor were proved above.

7. Cajetan's evasion. Rebuttal. To escape the force of this reasoning, Cajetan devised the opinion that we refuted above— namely, that even non-mutual relatives are really referred to each other, although the relation does not inhere in both. Thus he tries to defend that even that extreme in which there is no relation does not terminate the relation of the other except insofar as it is in turn referred to it. But that view is false, as we showed, and contributes nothing to the point at issue. For even if we grant that the knowable is really referred to knowledge through the relation existing in knowledge, nevertheless Aristotle's dictum remains true: one of these extremes is not referred to the other except because the other is referred to it. Therefore it is necessary, prior in rational order, to understand that the relation of knowledge is terminated at the knowable before we understand that the knowable is referred to knowledge; the former is, as it were, the cause or foundation of the latter. Hence, the ration of terminating on the part of the knowable cannot be that relation by which it is referred to knowledge. Moreover, although to terminate in act— as we said above— is an extrinsic denomination, nevertheless the aptitude to terminate a predicamental relation cannot be an extrinsic denomination derived from the opposite relative; for the ration of terminating is presupposed in the thing prior to any denomination from another extrinsic to it, since actual termination is included in that extrinsic denomination. Therefore the aptitude for such denomination is presupposed, above all when the term must be a real thing actually existing. For this reason it cannot be understood how one extreme is made proximally apt to terminate another's relation by the very relation that is in the other extreme, since every predicamental relation arises with the foundation and term presupposed—not, to be sure, as actually terminating, but as apt to terminate; for as actually terminating it is not presupposed, but constituted by the habitude of the other to it.

8. Rebuttal of another response. Others are accustomed to reply: although in the knowable, for example, or in the creator, there corresponds only a relation of reason, nevertheless the relation of knowledge or of the creature is not formally terminated except at its correlate as such; and consequently a relation of reason is the real ration of terminating. But this reply is easily refuted from what was said above about the term of a real, predicamental relation: we showed that it must be a real thing actually existing. This, indeed, is true with equal or greater reason of the form which is the ration of terminating, and of the quasi-material subject of that denomination. For if the term must be real, it must in like manner be apt in the thing itself to terminate; otherwise it will be a term neither in act nor in aptitude. Therefore this aptitude must belong to it by some real ration existing in it.

9. This is confirmed. A real relation does not exist unless the foundation and the term exist; but the relation of a creature exists and is in fact terminated at God, with no relation of reason existing in God —not only because a relation of reason never truly exists, but also because, in the way in which it can exist (namely objectively in an intellect), it is not necessary that it actually be, i.e., that it be considered, for the relation of the creature to be terminated at the Creator. For even if no intellect were to feign or consider such a relation, the relation of the creature would nonetheless truly be terminated at God. You will say it is impossible that such a relation not be objectively in some intellect—at least the divine intellect—whether God immediately posits it or knows it as a kind of object that can be conceived by the human intellect. I reply that whatever of this be true is irrelevant to the matter at hand. For although it be necessary on account of God's infinite knowledge, that is not something the relation of the creature per se and formally requires; the creature's relation does not regard God as contemplating (so to speak) a relation of reason, but as imparting being to it. Hence, if it has this, that suffices for such a relation to be terminated at him. But the relation of reason

as known by the divine intellect is irrelevant. The same holds for sense and the sensible, and for knowledge and the knowable: even if, per impossibile, no intellect were to consider them, the relation of sense would be terminated at the sensible, and that of knowledge at the knowable.

10. Some reply that this argument proceeds rightly only regarding a relation of reason as actually existing in its own mode; nonetheless they claim that the relation of reason, insofar as it is in proximate potency in such a term, is the ration of terminating the real relation of the other extreme. But this too has no weight. For what do they mean by "relation of reason in proximate potency"? Either they mean the real foundation itself which provides the occasion for the intellect to conceive it in the manner of a relative—a thing which is not so much the true foundation of the relation as the proximate cause or occasion that leads the human intellect to that mode of conceiving. In this sense, the relation of reason "in proximate potency" is nothing other than an absolute thing existing in such a term; as, for example, in God there is the power by which he actually imparts being to the creature, and so with others. Therefore, when they say that the creature's relation is terminated at a relation of reason insofar as it is only in a proximate foundation on God's side, this is really to say that it is terminated at something absolute which is in God. Or else by "relation of reason in potency" they mean the relation of reason itself according to its "being of essence," such as can be in it or, rather, be feigned; and in that sense the reply seems to me improbable. For a relation can be in that way, and in it there can be feigned some "being of essence," only insofar as the human intellect can conceive an absolute thing under the mode of a relative. But this is irrelevant and extrinsic to the nature and essence of the creature's real relation and to its being terminated at its term. Therefore it cannot be the ration of terminating. This is confirmed and clarified thus. God as Creator can terminate the real relation of the creature not because he can be conceived by us under the mode of a correlate, but because by his

omnipotence he truly and really imparts being to the creature. Finally, in other real termini and in mutual relations, a "being of essence" in the term does not suffice for the relation to arise unless it be reduced to existence; otherwise it is a merely potential something, and simply nothing. Much less, then, could the "being of essence" or potential being of a relation of reason suffice to be the ration of terminating a real relation.

11. How Fonseca tries to solve the argument. Fonseca, to solve the argument, adds another reply (V Metaphysics, c. 15, q. 5, s. 4), namely, that a relation of reason can belong in act—say, to the Creator—even if it does not exist in act in its own manner, that is, objectively in an intellect, and that this is sufficient for a real relation to be able to be terminated at it. For, by the very fact that a real relation exists in the creature, the relation of reason of the Creator belongs in act to God even if it does not exist in act. He proves that these two can be separated by noting that "animal" belongs in act to man even if man does not exist. But this reply is no more probable than the others. First, what he assumes— that a form can belong in act when it does not exist in act— either contains a great equivocation or is simply false. To "belong in act," properly and really taken, is to inhere in act in the way a form can inhere— namely, either by inherence, or by denomination, or by reference, or in some similar way; but that which belongs in act in this way must exist in act in the way in which it can exist. If, however, "to belong in act" signifies only the truth of a proposition by connecting extremes abstracting from existence, that is not to belong in act but rather in potency; and insofar as in those propositions an "actual" truth can be understood, they do not have it unless they are actually in some intellect, as was touched upon above. Moreover, taken in that sense, it cannot truly be said that the relation of reason belongs in act to God by the very fact that the creature exists. For, as the same author rightly argues, such a relation belongs contingently and from the outside to God even after the production of the creature; but contingent predicates do not belong in act unless

they exist; that is proper to predicates that necessarily belong to their subjects. The limitation with which he qualifies his proposition, excepting these relations of reason, seems at once arbitrary and contrary to reason. For, with the exclusion of actual existence proportioned to each predicate, a predicate cannot be said to belong in act to a subject unless either it is of the subject's essence or at least it flows from that essence so as to have a necessary and per se connection with it. Therefore whenever a predicate is not of this kind but merely contingent and deriving from an extrinsic cause—whether it be a real predicate or a predicate of reason— in no true sense can it be said to "belong in act" when it does not exist in act. This is confirmed. The very notion of "belonging in act" requires at least the truth of the proposition; but such propositions as "God has a relation" or "God is actually referred to a creature" are false as long as that relation in no way exists in act. Indeed, according to dialectical principles such propositions cannot truly be abstracted from time, since they are simply contingent.

12. I add, finally, that even if we grant all that is assumed in that reply, it still does not satisfy. For that mode of "belonging in act" does not suffice for the term of a real relation. Otherwise, Peter actually existing could have a real relation of specific identity to Paul existing only in potency, because "to be a man" belongs in act to Paul even when he does not exist, since he is a man from what is intrinsic. Therefore a real relation of specific identity to Peter will also belong in act to him even if that relation does not exist in act. Conversely, for a real relation to exist in Peter it will be enough that another, similar relation and its foundation belong in act to Paul, even though they do not exist.

13. There is, then, no room for evasion. Granted the common doctrine about non-mutual relatives, it follows evidently that the term of such a relation is something absolute—formally and per se speaking. I add these last words because it can sometimes happen that the term of some non-mutual relation is a certain real relation, not

however the relation opposed to the other nor its reciprocal. For example, knowledge of a relation, or love that directly and per se first tends toward some relation, is really referred to that relation as to its object or measure. Hence it is clear that just as the object of such knowledge is a relation, so too the term of the relation of that knowledge will be a relation—not, however, formally as the relation opposed to that knowledge, but rather as the matter about which such knowledge is engaged and which is presupposed to its relation. It is therefore, as it were, something material that the thing known is a relation. In this way we say that an absolute thing terminates a relation of this kind—that is, something which behaves as an absolute; in a word, the thing known or loved, whatever it may be. You will ask: what if the object known is some relation of reason? I reply: even then the transcendental relation of that knowledge will be terminated at it; however, that knowledge will be incapable of a predicamental relation to its object because of the lack of a real term.

Second Assertion

14. Mutual relations are terminated at what is absolute. I say secondly: even in mutual relations, the formal ration of terminating is not the opposite relation, but some absolute ration which is the formal foundation of the opposite relation. I understand this assertion per se and formally, as I explained the previous one. A general rule is this: that thing or that formal ration which in one mutual relative is the proximate ration of founding the relation to the other is also the proximate and formal ration of terminating the other's relation at itself. For example, if in Peter the proximate foundation of having in himself the relation of filiation is his whole substance as produced through a given generation by Paul, this same is the ration by which Peter can terminate Paul's relation of paternity to him; and conversely, since in Paul the power of generating— given such a generation as a necessary condition— is the proximate foundation of the relation of

paternity, it is also the proximate ration by which Paul can terminate Peter's filiation toward him. The same holds in relations of the first kind: the whiteness which in this white thing is the foundation of similarity to another—by formal unity with it— is also the proximate ration terminating the other's relation of similarity toward this. Consequently, if it is true that one relation can sometimes be the proximate ration of founding another relation— as, for example, paternity can found similarity— then that paternity which in one father founds the similarity to another will be in him the ration of terminating the other's relation to himself. Yet in this it does not function formally as a relation, nor is it relatively opposed to the relation which it terminates through itself; rather it is opposed through another relation that it founds in itself. In that case it behaves as if it were an absolute form. In this sense we say the formal term is, per se speaking, something absolute.

15. This assertion is usually proved from the point that, since relation is defined as an accident whose whole being is toward another, that "other" cannot be understood to be another relation; otherwise either there would not be one supreme genus of relation but two, or the same thing would be placed in the definition of itself. A similar argument is that "similarity in general" cannot be referred to "some relation"; otherwise it would be referred to another similarity, since it is a relation of the same ratio, while beyond similarity in general there cannot be another similarity. I omit these arguments, both because they are taken from extrinsic considerations and do not clarify the thing, and also because they touch a difficulty to be handled in the next section. That difficulty will be more easily and conveniently solved according to our opinion, although perhaps for that reason alone it is not simply necessary.

16. First reason for the conclusion. The present conclusion is proved first from the preceding one. From the fact that in non-mutual relatives we see the relation of one extreme not to be formally terminated at the relation of the other, we can gather that although in

mutual relatives there is a real relation in each extreme, one does not tend to the other formally; rather, simultaneously and concomitantly each tends toward the subject or foundation of the other, and conversely. This inference is proved thus: if, per impossibile, in the other extreme the relation were impeded while its entire foundation was conserved, nevertheless the relation of the first extreme could be terminated at that other. This is a sign that those two relations are simultaneous by concomitance and not by a formal termination of one at the other. The consequence is evident; the antecedent is plain because, as was seen above, not only in relations of the third kind but also of the second and the first, when one extreme is such that it cannot found a relation, it is nonetheless apt to terminate the relation of the other— as is clear in God as terminating the creature's relation as such. Therefore, for whatever reason it happens that the other extreme remains with its foundation but without a relation, it nonetheless remains sufficient to terminate the other extreme's relation; for the same reason obtains. Whether an extreme is apt to found its own relation or not is accidental with respect to terminating the other's relation. Hence, if the intellect by precision separate the relation from such an extreme, it is understood to remain equally sufficient to terminate another relation— just as that extreme which is incapable of relation. It is therefore a sign that mutual relations are simultaneous because of concomitance and because of the condition of the extremes, which are apt to found relations, and not because of the formal termination of one relation at its opposite.

17. Second reason for the conclusion. Secondly, the common axiom is that, given the foundation and the term, a predicamental relation (and none other) results. Therefore the term of one relation cannot be the opposite relation. The antecedent is certain by everyone's agreement and follows from what was said above about the nature of relation. Hence even Scotus, although he excepts relations he calls "adventitious from without," nonetheless consistently denies that they belong to this category. In the following disputation we will show

that such relations are either nothing or at most something different from transcendental relations. That axiom must be understood of the formal and proximate term— as it were, "in first act"—about which we are also disputing in the present question, as was said. For it cannot be understood of the term as terminating "in second act," so to speak; of that term as such it is not true that, given it together with the foundation, a relation follows. Rather, the term itself is constituted as a term actually terminating by the relation itself as actually tending toward it and extrinsically denominating it by a terminative denomination. Nor can it be understood of the material and remote term; for given only that, together with the foundation in the other extreme, a relation does not necessarily result, as is clear and can easily be shown by examples. Therefore the principle must be understood of the formal term as it were in first, proximate act. From this the first consequence is easily proved: one relation does not arise from the position of another; for the phrase "from" indicates some priority of nature or origin. Now one predicamental relation does not precede another corresponding relation, nor does one have its origin "from" the other— as is obvious in all created things of which we speak; otherwise they would not be simultaneous. When a relation is said to result once the foundation and term are posited, the indubitable sense is that the position of foundation and term precedes or is presupposed by order of nature, and that from these the relation immediately results. This is manifest from the propriety of the phrase and from the thing itself, since in mutual relatives each relation results simultaneously once the foundations and terms are posited.

18. Third reason for the assertion. Thirdly, I argue by confirming and clarifying that principle: that which in each extreme is the ration of founding its own relation is the ration of terminating the other's correlation. For just as the ration of founding is that by which the proximate cause is fittingly given, by reason of which such a thing has a relation to another, so the ration of terminating is that by which the proximate cause is given, by reason of which the thing is such that

the other can be referred to it. Now in mutual relatives this cause is taken from the same form or ration; therefore. The major seems per se known from the terms. The minor is shown by induction: just as the white is apt to found a relation of similarity because it has whiteness, and that whiteness is an apt foundation because it has such formal unity, so too the same white thing is apt to terminate another's relation because it has a whiteness of the same ration or unity as the other's whiteness. One white thing is not referred to this because there is in it a relation of similarity, but because in it there is whiteness as in the other; otherwise there would not be similarity in whiteness but similarity in similarity. From this one can perceive the a priori reason: similarity as such is in whiteness, for example; therefore it is engaged among white things as such and refers them as similar. Hence, as on one side it is founded upon whiteness, so on the other it is terminated at whiteness.

19. The same is easily seen in relations of dissimilar ratio. Peter, for example, is referred to Paul as to a father because Paul begot him, not because Paul is referred to Peter— formally distinguishing relation from generation. For standing precisely in that ration we understand that the cause on the generator's side is sufficient for the son to be referred to him. The same cause, on Paul's side, is that by which the relation of paternity arises in him. And the same holds for paternity itself, if we give its ration on the side of the term: the relation of paternity that is in Paul is therefore terminated at Peter because Peter was begotten by him, and in this precisely we conceive the sufficient cause on the part of the term. Thus in general, since relation essentially requires two things, namely foundation and term, from either side one can give the ration of any relation, and that which is truly and proximately given on the part of the term as such is the ration of terminating, just as that which is given on the part of the subject is the foundation or ration of founding.

20. The ration which can be given on the part of the term is never "another relation," if we speak formally and not merely

concomitantly or by identity. Although a father is not referred to the son unless the son is referred to him, this is not the ration that can be given on the part of the term why the father is referred to the son—namely, that "the son is referred to him"—but precisely that "the son is begotten by him." For one relation is by no means the ration of the other—neither on the part of the term nor on the part of the foundation; otherwise they would not be simultaneous by nature. That which were the ration of the other would, as such, in some way be first, especially since we are speaking of a real and formal ration in some mode on the part of the term. The ration, therefore, is always something distinct from the relation, and consequently something absolute. In mutual relatives, this is nothing other than that which in each founds its relation, for that is the ration of terminating the other's relation. Once relation is set aside, there is no other ration more proximate or more necessary, as the induction sufficiently shows.

21. Objection answered. You will say: in non-mutual relatives this rule cannot be preserved, because in the term of one relative there is no real foundation of any relation. I reply that something proportionate is always to be understood. For example, if the non-mutual relatives are of the second kind, as between Creator and creature, the ration of terminating the relation of the creature on God's side is God's very power of creating as actually producing. For if God were not otherwise incapable of relation, that very power should be the foundation of the relation of Creator to creature. And if we wish to give a ration on the part of the term of the creature's relation, there is no other but this: God by his omnipotence created it. The same is easily understood for mutual relations that can be of the first kind, as is the relation of similarity or of distinction between a creature and God. In the third kind, the ration of terminating on the part of the knowable, for example, and like objects, is the entity of each considered insofar as there is in it a certain objective aptitude such that around it a given act, habit, or power can be engaged—an aptitude which can be named truth or goodness or something similar.

That aptitude is the ration that can be given on the part of the object or term of such a relation. For that is why knowledge is engaged with such an object—because it has such truth or intelligibility; and so with the rest.

22. Why a ration that cannot found a relation can nonetheless terminate one. If you ask why such an aptitude or ration, which is not sufficient to found in itself a proper relation, is a sufficient ration to terminate another's relation, the cause is this: to found a relation, there is needed (so to speak) an ordainability to another on the part of the very foundation; and so it requires that the extremes be of the same order. To terminate a relation, however, it is not necessary that the term be ordainable to another, but that another be ordainable to it; and therefore the term can have a real aptitude to terminate even if it is not of the same order with the other extreme that is ordered to it.

Answer to the Grounds of the Other Opinions

23. It remains to answer the grounds of the other opinions. First, then, we deny that a relative is formally terminated at its correlate as such—something manifest in non-mutual relatives, because where there is no correlate one relative cannot be terminated at its correlate. From this we understand that even in mutual relatives, although the relative is terminated at its correlate, it is not so formally that the relations themselves tend to one another; rather each tends to the foundation of the other, and conversely, as has been made clear.

24. How relatives are simultaneous by nature. To the first objection, concerning simultaneity by nature, we reply that one should rather infer the contrary; for the relation is posterior by nature to its term considered "in first act," i.e., as sufficiently constituted to terminate. For the relation arises from the foundation and the term, as was said. Indeed some authors who hold that a relation is something distinct think it is efficiently caused by the term. If, therefore, one relation were the term of another, then from the position of the one

the other would result, and so they could not be simultaneous by nature. They are said to be simultaneous by nature, when they are mutual, because when one results from its foundation and term, the other results altogether concomitantly without any order of prior and posterior between them—and this is to be simultaneous by nature. This simultaneity is grounded not in a formal habitude of the relations to each other, but in the necessary connection that they have with their foundations and terms. Neither can arise unless its foundation and term are already posited; and when those are posited, both immediately and necessarily arise. Moreover, the formal foundation of one is the formal term of the other, and conversely. Hence there is of necessity a simultaneous placement in reality of the foundation and term of each, for they are the same, with the proportion inverted, as I have explained. Thus, finally, it comes about that the relations themselves necessarily arise at the same time— both in duration (for each results with equal necessity from term and foundation as soon as these are posited) and by nature (for they have no order between themselves). In this way, then, correlatives formally taken, as correlatives, if mutual, are simultaneous by nature; if non-mutual, since they are not simultaneous in duration, neither can they be so by nature.

25. Objection met. If, however, the comparison is made between one relative and its term "in second act," i.e., considered as actually terminating, then indeed they may be said to be formally simultaneous by nature. For, as was said above, the term as terminating is constituted by an extrinsic denomination from the relation that tends toward it; with that denomination in place it is so called, and with it removed it ceases to be a terminus in this way— without losing anything intrinsic, as is obvious. A relation is not prior by nature to being terminated at another. Therefore it is simultaneous by nature with the term as terminating. You object: the relation itself is as it were the formal cause of that denomination of the term as actual. Hence it is prior by nature. I respond: it is not properly a formal cause, although

because of the denomination we conceive it in that way; therefore no true priority of nature intervenes here. For the relation, without any other causality, by the very fact that by its intrinsic essence it looks to the term, denominates that term as terminating. As vision denominates an object seen without true causality, but solely because of such an intrinsic habitude; hence, just as vision is not prior by nature to that habitude, so neither is it prior by nature to the denomination of the object as seen.

26. This is particularly true when speaking of these forms in concrete, that is, of the relative or the seeing subject. Speaking abstractly, however, one can in a sense conceive a relation as prior by nature to the relative in the way that, between an inhering form and its formal effect, there can be a priority of nature. For relation is the form of the relative; relation abstractly conceived is not itself properly referred to the term, but is that by which the subject is referred. Hence so long as it is conceived as prior to actually affecting the subject, it is not yet conceived as referring to the term, and therefore it is not surprising that as such the relation be prior to the denomination of the term as terminating. Perhaps here one can apply the distinction Cajetan uses elsewhere, between relation "signate" and "exercised," since then the relation is conceived as not yet exercising the act of referring, but only according to its abstract ration. Yet even conceived thus, it is simultaneous by nature with the opposite relation in mutual relations, since relations taken in the abstract arise altogether simultaneously once both foundations are posited.

27. Finally, so as to omit nothing, one may add that even abstractly conceived, although not as "that which," at least as "that by which," a relation tends toward its term; for it is the form by which the relative regards the term. And because, however abstractly it is considered, its essence always consists in a formal habitude to a term, under this consideration— although in some way it is understood as prior to the relative— it nonetheless tends in its own way toward the term and consequently denominates it as actually terminating, not the

entire relative, but the relation itself. From this it is sufficiently clear how opposite relations are simultaneous by nature, as are the relation and the term as actually terminating, though not the relation and the term "in first act" or as regards the ration of terminating; in that respect the term can even be prior in time, when the foundation in the other extreme has not been posited; and even when it has been posited, the term is always prior in order of nature, for from that foundation the relation results, as has been explained.

28. To the argument for the first opinion, we respond by denying the inference—namely, that the father as father is not simultaneous by nature with the son as son but with this man as begotten. Indeed, just as this man as begotten is prior by nature to this man as son, so also he is prior by nature to the father as father, although he is posterior by nature to "this man as generating." And thus, although the father as such is terminated at this man as begotten by himself, nevertheless he is not prior by nature terminated at him than that filiation be in the son—not because of a formal termination at filiation itself, but because of a wholly necessary simultaneity of concomitance, as has been explained. Wherefore, although this man as begotten is prior by nature to this man as son, nevertheless, in that prior as such, paternity is not yet understood to be in the father. Indeed, it is most true that this man as begotten is prior by nature to the existence of paternity in the father; for from the position of this term together with the foundation that is in the generator, paternity results.

29. In the confirmation I concede that, formally speaking, one relation does not depend on another; yet I deny that it follows that they are not simultaneous by nature, speaking naturally. I confirm the first point by a theological example, according to a certain opinion of St. Thomas. In Christ the Lord, according to St. Thomas, there is no real relation of filiation to his Mother, while in the Virgin there is a real relation of maternity to Christ. This is a sign, therefore, that one of these relations does not depend essentially and formally on the other;

otherwise one could not remain without the other, even by absolute power. It is likewise a sign that one is not the formal term of the other, for a relation cannot be conserved without its term. All these principles are certain in the doctrine of St. Thomas. I therefore judge this argument very effective ad hominem against Cajetan and the Thomists who follow him. I say that formally one relation does not depend on the other; concomitantly, however, they can be said in some way to depend on each other, because by nature one cannot be without the other—indeed not even by absolute power—unless in some way the foundation in the other extreme be changed and made incapable of relation; and let us, for the present, set aside the opinions concerning the relation of filiation in Christ. From this it is easily explained that from the kind of independence just described it does not follow that the relations are not simultaneous by nature. Rather, if one formally depended on the other, one could not but be prior by nature to the other, because dependence itself involves a certain posteriority of nature. But since they have a necessary concomitance by which one cannot exist without the other, and yet without any order between themselves, they are simultaneous by nature.

30. How relatives are simultaneous by knowledge. From this, moreover, it is clear what should be said of simultaneity by knowledge, which was alleged in the second argument for the contrary. For proportionally the same must be said: formally and immediately the cognition of a relation depends on its term as such, and not on the opposite correlate as such— which the argument rightly proves. In non-mutual relatives this is manifest. To know the relation of servitude of the creature to God, one need not know a real relation of lordship in God, for none exists; nor is it necessary to feign a relation of reason in God. That does not pertain per se to the cognition of the other relation; and if we posit it in ourselves, it arises from our imperfect mode of knowing. For an angel, and God himself, comprehend the relation of servitude in the creature without feigning in God any relation of reason. You ask: is it not necessary to know God

as Lord, in order to know the creature as servant? I answer that it is necessary to know God as Lord really, not relatively according to reason. God is really Lord simpliciter, as St. Thomas often notes (see De Potentia, q. 7, a. 10, ad 4). First, because of the real power of coercing subjects; second, because the real relation of servitude in the creature is terminated at him. In both ways it is necessary to know God as Lord for knowing the relation of servitude in the creature. The first— God's power to coerce subjects— is on God's side the ration of terminating the relation of servitude, and therefore the cognition of it, as it were antecedently and causally, is the ration for knowing the relation of servitude. For just as that relation arises by force of that term and foundation, so it cannot be known unless that term and foundation be known. But the second belongs to God by the actual relative tending of the creature toward him, by an extrinsic denomination only; and because a relative as such cannot be known except as terminated at its term, therefore under that aspect God is known as Lord not antecedently but concomitantly. What has been explained by this example applies to the relation of the creature and to all non-mutual relations.

31. Nor has the earlier argument any force against this. We concede that the relation of servitude cannot be known unless some absolute ration in the term be known— not only simultaneously, but even antecedently and causally, as I said. Yet it is not necessary that that absolute ration be known exactly or as it is in itself. It is enough that it be apprehended abstractly or under some confused ration, although the more perfectly the term is known, the more perfect will be the knowledge of the relation. All this is easily made clear by the example already given. To know the relation of servitude that the creature has to God, it is necessary to know, at least in general, that God has some higher power over the creature, by which he can command it or dispose of it at his will; and the more fully the amplitude of this power is known, the more perfectly will one know what that servitude is. Nor can it be that an angel or God himself

knows this servitude without knowing in God such a power. It is not necessary, however, that an angel— who naturally intuits the relation of servitude in the creature— naturally also intuits God's power in itself. It suffices that he know abstractly and from effects such power of God. Much less is it necessary to know the whole nature of God or other attributes, speaking formally and per se; for those, as such, are not the ration of terminating such a relation. In the same way one can easily understand this in the relation of the creature as effect of God, and in knowledge or sense, and in other non-mutual relations.

32. In mutual relatives, however, the situation is in part the same and in part different. It is the same as regards the formal dependence of cognition on the term as such and not on the correlate as such. This is true also of mutual relatives. To know in some man the relation of fatherhood, it suffices to know that there exists in the world another man begotten by him, even if one stops there and does not know in the other the relation of filiation. And according to St. Thomas's opinion, a (bad) angel by natural power (if not impeded) could intuit in the Blessed Virgin the relation of maternity to this man Christ, and yet not intuit in Christ the relation of filiation. Therefore he had a cognition of one relative with an intrinsic dependence on its term, without a cognition of the correlate as such. Nor is it probable that it was necessary for the angel to feign another relation of reason in one extreme in order to know the other. The same, therefore, holds in any other mutual relation; in this respect the case is the same for all.

33. As regards concomitance, however, there is some difference. By nature, once one mutual relation is known, the other is necessarily known at the same time, at least concomitantly. For just as a relation arises by a kind of resultancy once the foundation and the term are posited, so it is known when those are known and compared with each other. Therefore, since these mutual relations at least concomitantly arise together once the foundation and the term are known and compared, for a similar reason they are known together once the foundation and the term are known and compared. Because

this is necessary for knowing each relation, it follows that, once one is known, the other is known at the same time concomitantly. This is especially necessary for us because we do not know these relations as they are in themselves, but only by knowing and comparing foundations and terms among themselves. From this further arises that we conceive even extremes that do not have a mutual relation under the mode of mutual correlatives; and from this also it happens that, where to one relation there does not correspond another real relation, we conceive a relation of reason so that in this way we may concomitantly know each extreme under the mode of a correlate. In the perfect knowledge of things as they are in themselves this is not necessary for non-mutual relatives, as was said. For mutual relatives, however, there is the same or greater necessity—either because relations are not actually distinct on the part of reality from their foundations, or if perhaps they are distinct by nature, they are so joined and connected with the simultaneously existing foundations and with each other that one cannot know the reference of one to the other without also knowing, conversely, the reference of the other to the one. In these ways it must be understood that a correlative is simultaneous by knowledge with its term or with its correlate.

34. How relatives are simultaneous by definition. As for the third part of that foundation—namely, about simultaneity by definition— we must reply in exactly the same way. For a definition is nothing other than a kind of cognition if it is in the mind, or a sign of cognition and consequently of the thing known if it is in speech. Therefore, to the extent that relatives are simultaneous by knowledge, to that extent they can be simultaneous by definition. It must be said proportionally: one relative, formally speaking, is not defined through its correlate but through its term, which it essentially regards. Scotus even thinks this necessary lest there be a circle or futility if in place of the name put in the definition we were to put its definition, or lest the same thing be prior and posterior to itself; for that which is put in the definition is in some manner prior to the defined. These

considerations do not press greatly if one considers what Aristotle touched upon in Metaphysics VII, c. 5, concerning such definitions by addition, and what we noted there; and the same difficulties readily arise in transcendental relatives such as matter and form (see above, Disputation 43, last section). Not to avoid such inconveniences, but because of the thing itself—since each thing is defined formally and precisely through that to which it has a habitude— it is true that in the definition of one relative the other extreme is not per se placed except under that ration which is necessary in it for terminating such a relation. Concomitantly, however, as relatives are simultaneous by knowledge, so also by definition; and because we more easily conceive and explain them thus, it is commonly said simply that one relative is defined through another and vice versa. In this sense we must understand the common saying that correlatives are simultaneous by definition.

On the Termini of the Divine Relations

35. To the last argument added in the second opinion, taken from the divine relations which mutually terminate each other, I reply first that the case is dissimilar. For those relations have no foundation outside themselves, since they are substantial and subsisting according to their own rationes. Therefore it is not surprising that, just as they are founded by themselves (so to speak), so each terminates its correlate by itself. In this, rather, a proportional rule is observed: we said that the foundation of one relation is the ration of terminating its correlation. Thus the foundation of divine paternity is the ration of terminating divine filiation. But just as the foundation of that paternity is nothing other than paternity itself, so the ration of terminating filiation is also nothing other than paternity itself.

36. Add that, although these things are thus according to the reality, if, however, they be conceived according to reason or our imperfect concepts as distinct— in the way in which one conceives

relations and foundations as distinct— one must also conceive, correspondingly, that the ration of terminating one relation is not the other relation as such but the foundation of it. For example, if one distinguish by reason relations and origins, and with St. Bonaventure hold that the persons are constituted by the origins, while the relations come to them and are founded in them, he will consequently say that the formal term of paternity is passive origin in the Son; conversely, that the term of filiation is the active generation in the Father. For the Father regards as such the one whom he has begotten, and the Son the one by whom he was begotten. Similarly, one who with Cajetan distinguished paternity as conceived and as exercised, and under the first aspect held that it constitutes the person, under the second that it refers the person, and thus that this latter aspect is founded in the former, must consequently say that one relation as exercised is terminated at the other as conceived, and conversely. Indeed, whether we use those words or others, a relation does not have the ration of a term as it regards another, but as in itself it is something apt to be regarded by another. Thus, even according to our mode of conceiving, in whatever way a distinction is made there between foundation and relation, or between a person constituted and a respect, there will also be a distinction between the ration of terminating and the relation.

37. This is clearer with respect to passive spiration and active spiration. The Father and the Son, besides active spiration, have their proper relations by which they are constituted in their personal being; and thus constituted they are one principle spirating the Holy Spirit. From that production (speaking in our way) there results in them the relation of active spiration, which on that account can more properly be said to have a foundation and a ration of founding according to reason, because it neither constitutes a person nor perhaps has its own subsistence. Thus there it is easily understood that the passive relation of spiration which is in the Holy Spirit is not terminated at active spiration formally, but at the Father and the Son as they are one spirating principle, to which there comes— in our mode of conceiving

— the relation of active spiration. For the proper and formal ration by which the Father and the Son terminate, or can terminate, the Spirit's relation is not that they are referred to the Holy Spirit, but that they produce the Holy Spirit and are his one principle, whence concomitantly they have that they are referred to him. If, however—whether by "possible" or even by "impossible"—we were to understand that this relation did not result in the Father and the Son, provided that they produced the Holy Spirit, that would suffice for them to be able to terminate his relation.

38. From this a theologian will readily understand, in passing, how in fact the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit, not first by the relation of active spiration, but by filiation by which he is completely constituted in personal being and consequently is distinguished from any other person. And nonetheless it is true that if the Son did not produce the Holy Spirit, he would not be distinguished from him, because then, on that hypothesis, filiation would not be the foundation of active spiration nor the ration of terminating passive procession; consequently it would not have with it the opposition of origin. But now it truly has all these, and therefore it is a sufficient principle of distinction. Let these matters be left to the theologians.

On Relative Opposition

39. Finally, from what we have said in this section, one can understand in what relative opposition consists and what its proper kind is. Above we deferred this to the present place. This opposition can be understood either between a relation and its term, or between one relation in one extreme and the corresponding relation in the other extreme, that is, between one relative and its correlate. The former opposition is common to all relations, even non-mutual ones, as is clear from what has been said; hence it most formally belongs to relation as such. It consists in this, that the relative as such and the

term have between themselves such a habitude and conditions so different that they necessarily require a distinction between themselves. For the relative is that which looks to another; the term is that which is looked to by another; and thus by their own rationes they require "otherness," so to speak.

40. The latter opposition, however, is not universal to all real relations truly and in reality; for it does not belong to non-mutual relations, although according to our mode of conceiving it could be feigned as if it did— which is irrelevant here. Between real and mutual relatives, and between the relations themselves, there is a relative opposition. It does not consist in one relation's looking to the other as its term, but in this: that one looks to, as its term, that which is the foundation of the other, and conversely; or (what is the same), because they have opposite rationes: one refers its subject to the other, while the other, conversely, refers that other to that which was the subject of the first. From this they have such a repugnance between themselves that both relations cannot inhere simultaneously in one and the same subject; for one and the same cannot be foundation and term with respect to the same thing. Although this mode of opposition appears more clearly in relations of dissimilar ratio (as between paternity and filiation), it nevertheless belongs in its own way even to relations "of the same ratio"; for although they are of the same species, they can in the individual be in a certain sense opposites relatively, since they affect their subjects according to opposite habitudes and from this they have a repugnance in the same subject. Although this opposition is in some manner of diverse ration,—with respect to the term and with respect to the correlation— nevertheless, because they go together wherever they are found, they are named and judged as one. One may say that a relation is opposed to its term terminatively, and to the other relation relatively. The latter is quasi the formal opposition, for it is between the proper forms insofar as they mutually exclude each other from the same subject. The former is properly the repugnance of relative and term, because they require a

distinction of extremes— as St. Thomas also indicated (De Potentia q. 7, a. 8, ad 4).

SECTIO XVII

HOW THE CATEGORY OF RELATION CAN BE CONSTITUTED UNDER ONE SUPREME GENUS, THROUGH DIVERSE SUBORDINATE GENERA AND SPECIES DOWN TO INDIVIDUALS

1. We have explained nearly everything that seemed necessary for understanding the essence of relation, its causes, and its formal effect (for it has no other). To complete the matter it remains to say a little about the subordination, agreement, and distinction of the relations themselves, so that, as it were, the constitution of the whole category may be set before our eyes. Three points are suggested in the title of the question. Others treat them at great length; we shall dispatch them very briefly.

On the Supreme Genus of the Category of Relation

2. The first difficulty is how all relatives can be reduced to one supreme genus. The reason for doubting is that the essence of relation is for its being to be toward another. Therefore the relative cannot be so abstracted that another corresponds to it adequately. Therefore there cannot be one supreme genus; at least there must be two, which regard one another. The consequence is plain: the same thing cannot be that which refers and that to which it refers, both because the definition itself contains that it must be another, and because the same thing cannot really be referred to itself. Finally, if the essence of the relative in general were to be referred to itself, this would be of the

ration and essence of any particular relation, since the essence of the superior is included in the inferior. This difficulty is common in this matter and gives great trouble— especially to those who think that one relative is formally referred to another correlate as such. For according to that view, when one says that the relative in common is "that whose being is being-toward-another," it is necessary to understand in the definition "toward another correlate." Since the same thing cannot be referred to itself by a real relation (which is our subject), it will be necessary that there not be one supreme genus, but two, which regard one another adequately and are really distinct.

3. There is, nevertheless, one supreme genus of relation. It is certain that there can be one supreme genus of all relatives. It matters little whether we speak of abstract or concrete terms; from the one the other can also be inferred. For if there is a most general concept of real, predicamental relation in common, there can be a relative in common as well—both by a proportional reason and because every abstract form can have a constituted concrete adaequate to it. That there can be one supreme genus of relations is clear, first, from the manner of speaking about relation in common as such; for this common term is predicated of all relations and is distributed for all, because it is said of all univocally and in quid. Secondly, because the definition of relation in common is one and is fitting to all predicamental relations. Thirdly, if anyone were to feign those two supreme genera of relatives, he would find an essential agreement between them in the ration of "being-toward-another." Therefore he could abstract from them a univocal, essential concept common to both, in which he would also easily find differences outside of that ration and which are not complete relations. Therefore, etc.

4. How some solve the ground of doubt. To the difficulty alleged, some respond that in the definition of the relative in common — when it is said to be "toward another"—by that "other" the correlate is indeed understood, and that it cannot be the very same thing which is defined as such (for the reason alleged, that the same

cannot really be referred to itself), nor can it be some other relative equally common and not contained under that which is defined (because of the difficulty just mentioned about one supreme genus). They therefore say that by that "other" the singular correlatives of particular or specific relations are implied. This is the reply of Albert the Great (Metaphysics V, tract. 3, c. 7) and, on Categories, of Simplicius and Boethius. It can be explained thus: although relation in common is defined by "being-to-another," it does not exercise that "being-to-another" except in determinate relations; and therefore it is not necessary that, insofar as it is conceived most abstractly, it be understood to exercise the office of relation with respect to another correlate adaequate to it. For as such it is conceived rather as the essence of relation "signing," as it were, that in which it consists, than as exercising that habitude to something across its whole community. It is to be understood, rather, that the ration thus abstractly conceived exercises its habitude to another only in its inferiors.

5. This is also to be understood differently in relations "of the same ratio" and of "a dissimilar ratio." In relations of dissimilar ratio, at least in their common specific rationes, one common relative can be understood to be referred to another equal and opposite to it— as father to son, greater to lesser. The reason is that since these relations are of dissimilar rationes, they are not conceived by one common specific concept; hence two common concepts, equal, opposite, and corresponding, can be abstracted. It is otherwise with relations "of the same ratio." Since they are of the same ration, they have the same common concept of species; hence no common objective concept can correspond to that concept as a common opposite. Thus "similar" in general is not said to be "to another similar" in general; nor "equal" to "another equal" in general, but only with respect to individuals, in which there is one equal distinct from another. About these St. Augustine said well (on the Categories, c. 11): "especially and regularly, that this category may be more clearly recognized, a thing is not rightly said to be relative unless a singular is referred to a singular."

It is true that Augustine immediately gives examples not only in relatives of the same ratio but also in those with different names and rationes; yet in these latter there is no impediment, as I said, to one being understood to be referred in common to another common correlate. Scotus noted as much (I, d. 21), and others.

6. This doctrine is probable. Although it supposes one false foundation— namely, that one relative is formally terminated at its correlate— it is nonetheless useful for explaining how correlatives can be assigned when they are abstracted by our concepts and conceived in common. Thus it is rightly said that only in relations of dissimilar names and rationes can a common relative correspond to another common relative; whereas for relations "of the same ratio" or for the relative in general, this cannot be done. For since the latter are abstracted either from relatives of the same ratio or simply from all relatives, each relative is conceived by the mode of one in respect of that in which they agree; hence no equal correlative can correspond to such a relative conceived in common. Thus it is rightly said of a relative conceived in common that it does not belong to its essence to have immediately corresponding to it—so conceived— an equal correlate; it is enough that, when it is contracted to its inferiors, this reciprocity of relatives be found in them. Indeed, speaking of the relative in common, it does not belong to its essence even that mediately and in its inferiors it exercise that relatival reciprocity, because the common ration of predicamental relation as such does not require that there correspond to it— even when contracted to inferiors— another relation in the other extreme. For if this belonged to the essence of relation in common, it would have to belong to all specific relations. But this is false, for it does not belong to non-mutual relations. Nor does it matter that to these there may correspond a relation of reason in the other extreme, for that is not from the natures of things and therefore cannot pertain to the essence of a real relation.

7. The relative in common is not to another as to a correlate. From this I further infer that, when the relative in common is defined

as "being-to-another," that "another" cannot be taken for a correlate. For by that definition something essential to the relative as such is given; but it is not essential to the relative that a correlate correspond to it— neither immediately in the common concept nor in all of its particulars, as has been shown. This is further confirmed: if that "another" is the correlate, I ask whether it be a real correlate or of reason, or indifferently either according to the exigency of the inferior relations. None of these can be said. The first two are easily excluded, since neither can be universal to all relations, as is quite clear from the foregoing. The third is not very likely, both because in that case "another" would be taken very equivocally, since a relation of reason is almost equivocally a relation, and because (as I said) the correspondence of a relation of reason is not from the natures of things and therefore cannot belong to the essence of a real relation.

8. I therefore say that the "another" in that definition signifies the term of relation as such, which does not signify the correlate as such but the other extreme insofar as in itself it has a sufficient ration of terminating. That ration is almost always absolute; and if it is sometimes a relation, it is not as it exercises the office of a relation opposed to another relation, but insofar as in itself it has some unity or a ration similar to the ration common to absolute things.

9. The relative in common has a term in common corresponding to it. From this I infer further that relation in common can be conceived as having another to which it says a habitude, not only in its inferiors but also as conceived by that most common concept. For there corresponds to relation in common a term in common as well. From this it does not follow that there are two supreme genera, because the term in common is not some relative as such and therefore does not constitute some genus in the category of relation.

10. Why the common ration of the term does not constitute a proper category. You will say: at least it would constitute some common genus of another category; which is plainly false, for that

ration of the term ranges through all the categories—indeed even beyond the categories, since it belongs to God himself. I reply, denying the consequence. For the ration of the term is not in things some real ration or property in any way distinct from them or an accident of them, but is the very entity of each thing insofar as it is apt to terminate another's relation. This ration is quasi transcendental and perhaps not univocal, especially since it belongs both to God and to the creature. Under that aspect it is not placed per se in any category but can be reduced to the category of relatives as a kind of addition—as it is placed in their definition. This can be clarified by a similar case: just as it belongs to relation in common to have a term, so also to have a foundation. Nor is there any doubt that this common ration of the foundation of relations can in some way be conceived in common as adaequately corresponding to relation conceived also in common. For in the very nature of predicamental relation as such there is included that it presupposes a foundation and in it some ration by reason of which it arises or "results." It is not necessary that this common ration of the foundation be some genus; it is a quasi transcendental ration which ranges through all the categories. Thus Aristotle attributes to quantity, as by way of property, that it is a sufficient foundation of equality or inequality; to quality, that it is a foundation of similarity or dissimilarity (for thus we explained these properties there). This ration of foundation as such is not in those things some respect-ration nor some absolute ration distinct from them; it is the very entity of each thing insofar as it has of itself such an aptitude. Therefore, it is reduced to the category of each form by way of property and indirectly could be reduced, under that aspect, to the category of relation as its foundation. Thus I judge that the same must be said of the term of relation. Let this suffice for the first point.

How the Supreme Genus of Relatives Descends to Inferiors

11. The second point of this section is how this highest genus of relation descends through various genera to the lowest species, or is divided. This matter has already been declared for the most part above, where we touched on and explained various divisions of relation. The first and principal division was a threefold one by generically different foundations which are commonly listed under the names of unity, action, and measure. From this it is easily understood that under each of these members one can proceed further: in the first, through the various modes of unity— and because under unity multiplicity is understood— relations of unity are first to be divided from relations of multiplicity or diversity; then, according to the various modes of real unity or multiplicity, relations under each genus will be divided as well. The same, proportionally, must be said of action and consequently also of passion, of active and passive power, or more broadly of cause and effect, if all these are comprehended under that heading. Finally, the same is true of the ration of measure; for in that genus too relations vary according to the diverse proportions of measures and measurables.

12. The division of relation into mutual and non-mutual, and its character. From this division other divisions arise which were also touched upon above, namely the division of relation into mutual and non-mutual. This was explained rather at length. From what has been said, however, it is clear that this is not a subdivision of some member of the preceding division, but rather another adequate division of relation in common—comprehending under the one member (non-mutual relation) the third member of the prior division and also certain relations contained under the prior members; and under the other member comprising almost the first two genera of the preceding division. These two divisions could be subordinated as follows: first divide relation into that which by force of its formal foundation is non-mutual and that which by force of its foundation or of its genus does not have that characteristic. The latter is then subdivided into relation founded on action or on unity, and so proceed until, in those two

genera, one reaches the relations between God and the creature which are non-mutual, not so much by the formal ration of the foundation or of founding as by the special nature and condition of God. It will thus be easy to constitute this category by subordinated divisions.

13. A dictum of St. John Damascene explained. It is noteworthy that St. John Damascene, in his Dialectica (c. 50), although he proposes many other divisions of relations, omits this one. Indeed, he seems to suggest that this division does not agree well with the nature of relatives, since (he says) "a mutual habitude produces the things that are ad aliquid." These words are not to be understood of individual relatives, but of the complex of the two; that complex truly consists in a mutual habitude. It is not necessary, however, that such reciprocity—at least real reciprocity—intervene in all relatives. Or, if the words be applied to single relatives, "mutual habitude" is to be understood with proportion: on the side of relation it is necessary that it tend to another; on the side of the term it is necessary that it be that to which another tends. As for Damascene's omission of that division, it is not surprising; he did not say all that can be said about relations, and perhaps the reason was that, according to our way of conceiving, all relations are apprehended as mutual.

14. The division of relation into those "of the same denomination" and of a "different denomination." Another division touched upon above is the division of relation into those "of the same denomination" or of a "different denomination," that is, into relations "of the same ratio" and "of a dissimilar ratio." Damascene treats this at length (c. 50), subdividing it into relations of excellence— to be a lord, to be greater, to be a cause— and relations of inferiority— to be a servant, an effect, or lesser, etc. These subdivisions pertain to relations of dissimilar ratio; for in relations of the same ratio, since they are of the same kind, there cannot be that diversity. Perhaps among created things a relation of dissimilar ratio is never found without that diversity; yet among the divine Persons it is found without pre-eminence or inequality—unless one wish with the Greek

Fathers to call the very order of origin a "dignity," which is another question. This division, taken strictly and properly, is not a division of relation in common, but of mutual relation; for a non-mutual relation, since it is not reciprocal, is neither of the same nor of a different ratio "in both extremes." Unless one extends the language to the denominative correlative that is taken from a relation of reason. For then all correlatives will be of the same or of a different denomination. Finally, this division, as can be seen from what has been said, is not given by what per se and formally belongs to the ration of relation; for, as we said, one relation formally does not terminate the other; hence neither does it give it species or essential diversity. When, however, to one relation there corresponds another of the same or of a different ratio, this is an indication of a diversity of foundation and formal term. Therefore, as to the constitution of this category, this division must be referred back to the preceding ones.

Whence Essential and Specific Difference of Relations Is to Be Taken

15. One question could remain concerning this second point: whence is the specific and essential distinction of relations to be taken down to the lowest species? Is it from the foundation or from the term? Some distribute the roles thus: they say that the relation has its entity from the foundation, its species or essence and essential distinction from the term. Others attribute both to each, each in its own way. This does not displease me; I think that, rightly explained, each way of speaking contains truth. Thus, formally and intrinsically relations are constituted in their proper species by their proper differences and are essentially distinguished thereby— for this is common to all things. Yet, because a relation has its whole essence in its ordination to its term, it therefore takes its specification from the term, as from the ultimate extrinsic form; and therefore by the term it is distinguished and defined, as was said above (sect. VIII). Since,

however, the formal foundation is per se and intrinsically required for relation, it can also be said to concur in the essence of relation, as by way of an extrinsic, quasi-material cause. Thus St. Thomas sometimes attributes this to the foundation, sometimes to the term (see Summa Theologiae III, q. 35, a. 5; I, q. 32, a. 2), where he simply attributes it to the term, because this is quasi ultimate and more formal with respect to relation. See Soncinas (Metaphysics V, q. 32) and what was said above, sect. VIII, n. 9, and sect. X, n. 14.

Whether Several Relations, Different Only in Number, Can Exist Together in the Same Subject

16. Concerning the third point, there occurs here the question about the individuation of relations. It is certain that, as in the other categories the constitution of the line of predication descends from the supreme genus to individuals, so also in this. It is disputed, however, whether, just as the term in its own way concurs in the essential constitution and specification of relations, so also in individuation. From this also depends the decision of the common question whether the same subject, under the same specific ratio, is referred to several terms by one numerically identical relation or by different relations. I treated the question sufficiently, I think (for the matter is not of great moment), above in Disputation V, sect. 8, where I discussed in general the individuation of accidents and whether several numerically distinct accidents can be in the same subject.

17. According to the principles posited there, one can without difficulty concede that several relations differing only in number, and respecting diverse terms, can be together in the same subject—for example, two paternities in the same man respecting two sons. For the formal effect of one is not entirely similar to the formal effect of the other, as I declared in the place cited. Likewise, once one term is given, some relation results that altogether depends on that term; once another term is added, a new respect is added, which will

remain even if the other term is removed. Likewise, each term is the total term of some relation when, that term alone being posited, some relation results. Similar reasons can easily be multiplied, for which Scotus and others (whom I cited there) embrace this opinion. Nor is there in it any difficulty of moment, beyond the general one that accidents are individuated by the subject—of which I spoke at length in the place cited.

18. What must be said consequently on this matter if relation is distinct in reality from its foundation. Since in this matter there can be a great difference in the mode of speaking according as we hold that relation is a thing or real mode distinct by nature from its foundation, or that it is distinguished only by reason, procedure will differ accordingly. Under the former opinion, it cannot consistently be denied that with the multiplication of terms respects are really multiplied, and that with the addition of a new term something real is added to the pre-existing relative. Thus, when a father begets a second son, he acquires something relative which he did not have before, as distinct from him as was the paternity that he had before. This is convincingly shown, on consistent principles, by the reasons already given. The case is altogether the same. If when Peter begot his first son he needed a new thing or new real mode distinct for him to be really referred to, why not also when he begins anew to be referred to the second? For it cannot be said that the prior entity or mode suffices, both because the formal effect cannot increase unless the form really increases, and because the prior relation adequately referred to the first son and depends on him in being and in definition and in cognition. This relation is not known as this numerically determinated relation except as referring to this numerically determinated term, as Aristotle clearly declared (Categories, ch. On Relatives).

19. Now if once the admission is made that a real addition is made in the relative upon the addition of a new term, perhaps the question is one of words: whether that added item is a distinct relation or composes one with the pre-existent relation, as a second degree

composes one heat with the first. Some explain in this way the unity of this relation, lest they seem to multiply relation to infinity and so that they may universally defend the axiom that in one subject there is only one accident of one species. Nevertheless, those who speak thus cannot sufficiently explain that unity except denominatively by reason of a single subject or supposit. For consistently speaking they must say that there is as much distinction between paternity toward the first son and that which is added to the father upon the begetting of the second, as there is between paternity itself and its foundation. Therefore, if these are distinguished really or modally, so too must be those. This is proved because paternity toward the first son is comparable to that which is added with respect to the second in such a way that that paternity can exist without this addition and, conversely, this addition can remain and constitute a father without that first paternity. Therefore if paternity is a real mode distinct because it is separable from its foundation, these two modes will also be actually distinct by nature from each other, because one is separable from the other and conversely. Similarly, if paternity is a proper entity really distinct from its foundation, those two respects will also be really distinct from each other, as Scotus rightly and consistently teaches, because they are mutually and reciprocally separable. We showed above (Disputation VII) that whenever two things are so distinguished in reality that each can remain without the other, and otherwise they are not modes of a subject with which they have a real identity, then this is a sufficient sign of real distinction between them. But relations, under that opinion, are not modes but proper entities really distinct from their subjects; and the respects of the father to the first son and to the second compare in such a way that the former can exist without the latter and the latter without the former; therefore they are distinguished between themselves by a true real distinction.

20. Once this distinction is admitted, no reason can be given why they should not be distinguished as two relations, or why they should be called two degrees or two parts of one relation rather than

two relations. First, they are not rightly equated with degrees of intensity. For between those degrees there is a per se subordination, and in them there is a proper composition and unity by a proper latitude or by proper indivisibles, as was declared in the preceding disputation. Those two relations have no per se subordination; one does not per se suppose the other or depend on it, nor does each of them have any latitude in itself, but each is merely indivisible in order to its term. Hence they do not properly compose some quasi continuous latitude, because this is not composed of indivisibles. Moreover, no other genus of union can be imagined between these two entities on account of which they might be called two parts of one relation. For they do not compare mutually as potency and act; nor do they have any other habitude to each other except that they are in the same subject. This can be confirmed a fortiori from what we said above about the similar unity or physical composition of habits. Indeed, that artificial unity or composition which is considered in habits can hardly have a place in relations; hence nothing about it is treated.

21. In another way one could imagine the unity of this relation to many terms, not by a real addition or composition, but by a change of relations, such that each relation in itself be indivisible. They would nonetheless differ because one has as its adequate term one thing (say, one son), another has two, another three, etc. According to this view, when a father begets a second son, a new relation is indeed acquired, yet it is not added to the pre-existing one; rather the latter perishes and another arises which indivisibly and adequately refers that man to two sons and not to more or fewer. If he begets a third, he will lose that relation and acquire another which refers him to three in the same way. That one relation can adequately regard many terms indivisibly seems certain; thus, in real predicamental relatives, a whole is referred to many parts, or unity to a binary by the relation of submultiple; and in transcendental relatives the same intellect regards many intelligibles inadequately, and in relatives the same relation of

genus regards many species. Thus one can understand that in any genus or species of relations some in the individual are indivisible and adequately regard many terms; those will be partial with respect to these relations, and from them there will arise an adequate, one term which is a unity by a certain collection. Therefore such a relation does not arise unless the adequate term is posited and not when one or another partial term is posited. Conversely, it is removed or changed with the removal or addition of any partial term because the total term is thereby changed.

22. In this way many think of the relation of one child to father and mother. They consider that relation to be one and indivisible, since father and mother concur as one cause, per se necessary, and by one action (especially if the mother concurs actively). Hence, with one parent dead, that relation necessarily perishes; for if it indivisibly regarded both, it can neither be divided into parts nor remain whole when it no longer has its adequate term nor refers to both. Thus the whole perishes. It will therefore be necessary for another to arise that refers the child to the one surviving parent— if there be such— since truly and really the child is referred to that parent.

23. Although this mode of speaking, in that opinion, seems cleverly devised for consistency, it is in truth arbitrary and without foundation. What necessity is there to introduce that frequent change of relations? Otherwise, as often as a new white thing came to be, all other things that were white would change their relations of similarity with respect to all and would acquire new relations. Further, why would the father lose the relation to the first son when the second is begotten, since none of those things is removed which were necessary for the being of that relation? For, notwithstanding the second son, the first is always a sufficient term of that relation. Moreover, although it is true that one relation can adequately regard several when this is required per se and by force of its species for its arising or conservation or for exercising its formal effect—as happens in the

relation of the whole or of submultiple— yet when a relation does not demand this by its ration and the terms are multiplied only per accidens (as happens in paternity, filiation, similarity, etc.), it is altogether gratuitous to say that one indivisible relation arises which adequately regards a collection of many terms— especially because many sons are produced by distinct generations. Why, then, would there arise one indivisible relation that embraces both terms?

On the Relation of a Son to Father & Mother

24. Ferrariensis's opinion is rejected. What was said about the relation of a son to both parents is also uncertain. Some think that in the son there are two relations not only numerically but also specifically different, because they think that the relation to father and to mother differ specifically, the father concurring actively, the mother only passively. Ferrariensis holds thus (Contra Gentiles II, c. 11), although he adds that these relations are two "formally" but one "really or materially"—which I do not see how one can consistently say if one supposes, as he does, that relation is something distinct in reality from the foundation.

25. Fonseca's opinion is not approved. Others say that there is one relation to both parents even if the father concurs actively and the mother only passively; and they add that the very same relation remains wholly unchanged even if one parent dies. Fonseca speaks thus (Metaphysics V, c. 15, q. 5, s. 3). But both parts are hard to believe. The first, because if the mother concurs only passively, then the relations of father and mother to the son will be specifically different, since they have foundations so distinct. Therefore one relation cannot correspond to both in the correlate—a principle St. Thomas teaches (Summa Theologiae I, q. 32, a. 2). For correlatives specifically diverse are either formally diverse terms or indicate such; and relations have their diversity from their formal terms. Likewise, the relation of an effect to a cause of a different genus is also different

—whether the cause be material, formal, or efficient. If, then, the causalities of father and mother differ, as efficient and material, the relations in the effect will be different. Hence, under this supposition, father and mother do not so much compose one total cause (since they do not cause in the same genus) as a collection of many causes of different genera such as matter and efficient. Secondly, it is hard to believe under that view that the relation be one and indivisible to both father and mother as they complete one total cause, and yet that the same relation remain entire when one adequate term is removed. For relation depends on its adequate term. I explain: with one parent removed, the relation of the son can no longer have its adequate formal effect, since it cannot refer the son to both parents. Therefore absolutely it cannot have its formal effect; for since it causes that indivisibly, it cannot confer one part of it and not the whole; nor can it remain whole without conferring the whole effect, since it does not remain except in the subject and inhering.

26. Others' opinion. Others, who with Galen, Scotus, and others with good probability judge that the mother concurs actively, think that the son is referred to father and mother by two relations of the same species and that the diversity in the paternal and maternal concurrence is only accidental. Although father and mother together compose one total efficient cause according to this opinion, still, since they are not one cause except by a collection of partial causes, it is enough that one correlate correspond by a collection of many relations. Here, however, with some probability one could say that those relations compose one relation— not by a proper physical unity but by a kind of artificial unity accommodated to the unity of the term. Whatever be thought among these modes about the relation of the son, it does not affect the opinion we are opposing. I find no author who has said that when a child is deprived of one parent he loses the relation he has to both and acquires a new one by which he is referred to the survivor alone; nor has this any likelihood.

27. Thus it seems to be held concerning the multiplication of relations differing only in number in the same subject with respect to several adequate terms of the same ration. Under the opinion that we judge true, namely, that relation is not a thing or mode by nature distinct from the foundation, this is more easily managed. For there can be no doubt that respects toward really distinct terms— each of which can be without the other and conversely— are distinguished by a "reasoned reason," which has a foundation in the thing. As this distinction suffices for relation to constitute a peculiar genus and to be considered quasi another form besides the foundation, so it suffices that those respects to diverse terms be called many relations numerically distinct, according to that kind of distinction which obtains in such relations— namely, the "reasoned reason." Thus the admiration about the multiplication of relations is easily removed. All the arguments usually objected to the contrary have no difficulty, especially on the suppositions we made about the principle of individuation; nor need one multiply reasons to persuade this opinion in this sense; besides being quite plausible of itself, the reasons already suggested suffice.

28. Finally, in this sense St. Thomas does not greatly oppose this opinion. For in Summa Theologiae III, q. 35, a. 5, ad 3, he says that in one child there is one relation to two parents and two "according to reason"; and conversely he says that in many men drawing a boat there is "one relation," which cannot be understood of unity in reality since the subjects are really distinct. Elsewhere too, although he says that in one father there is one relation to many sons, he nonetheless says that there are many respects in him. In the same way speak the Archbishop of Seville (III, dist. 8, notab. 3) and Capreolus in the solution of the arguments. Those "respects" are called "many" only because of a distinction of reason; therefore in like manner they can be called "many relations." Finally, this is made clear by a similar case: theologians simply call paternity and active spiration in the divinity two relations because of the distinction of termini—

even though in themselves they are distinguished only by reason. What wonder, then, that in the present case they be called many relations toward many really distinct termini?

SECTIO XVIII
WHAT COMMON PROPERTIES BELONG TO ALL RELATIVES

1. Aristotle says nothing on this point in the Metaphysics. In the Dialectic, however, he sets down certain properties of relatives, which must be briefly explained, although some of them have already been treated. We could also extend the discussion to the common attributes of being, especially unity and goodness, for they involve a particular difficulty in the way they belong to relations. But enough has already been said about unity. As for goodness, there arose the question whether relation signifies a perfection, which we treated above in Disputation X, and we showed that relation signifies perfection to the extent that it has entity. Hence, if relation is a thing distinct from its foundation, or even a real mode distinct by nature, it necessarily adds some real perfection to it. If, however, relation adds nothing real and is distinguished only by reason, it will indeed signify a real perfection, but not one distinct in reality; consequently, speaking simply, it will not add a perfection to its foundation, but will indicate the same perfection under a different aspect. The rest was sufficiently discussed in the place cited.

Whether a Relation Has a Contrary

2. Proceeding, then, to the properties of relatives assigned by the Philosopher, the first is that relation has a contrary; for virtue is contrary to vice. But Aristotle does not present this as his own view; he states it as a consequence of the first definition of relatives, which

encompassed all things said "relatively" in the sense of mere predication. Rather, it can be numbered among the properties of relation that, precisely as relation, it has nothing contrary—just as the Philosopher said in the chapter on quality. Relation does, however, have its own proper kind of opposition, which has already been explained.

Whether A Relation Admits of More & Less

3. The second property is that relation admits of more and less. Aristotle says this belongs to some relations, not to all. "Double," for example, is not "more double" or "less double," whereas "similar" or "equal" is said to be more or less. It should be noted that this property is attributed to relation otherwise than to quality. Quality truly is intensible and remissible, as was treated in the preceding disputation. Relation is not intensible in that way, neither per se—since it does not come to be per se, nor is it per se increased—nor by reason of its foundation. For although the foundation can be intensified, it is not necessary for the relation to be intensified. Two white things, intensified from the ratio of four to the ratio of eight, are not thereby "more similar" than before; conversely, sometimes they become more similar by a remission of the foundation or of the term, and sometimes similarity is diminished.

4. This "more or less" in relations does not arise from an intensification of the relation, but from variation, as Fonseca rightly noted (V Metaphysics, c. 15, q. 5, s. 2). The relation of equality strictly so called (and the same is true of perfect similarity) does not admit of more and less, because it consists in an indivisible. If, from two equals, one increases, they do not become "less equal"; rather, equality perishes. Inequality, however, can be greater or lesser because of a greater or lesser departure from perfect equality; and in the same way equality or similarity, taken broadly and in common speech, is said to be greater or lesser. Yet those relations of greater or lesser inequality

are in reality diverse relations, not the same one intensified or diminished. Their terms and foundations are different, and the proportions in which they consist are also different; thus each degree of inequality consists in its own indivisible. Therefore some relatives are said to admit more and less in the sense that they are denominated more or less such by approach to, or recession from, one perfect terminus, not by intensification or remission.

How Relatives are Said by Convertibility

5. The third property is that relatives are said "by convertibility." Some explain this as if it meant the same as being mutually referred, that is, that to one relation there always corresponds another. But, as is clear from what has been said, in that sense this property will not belong to all relations unless one extends it to relations of reason. This is not Aristotle's meaning. He means only that, according to a certain denomination, one thing is denominated with the addition of the other, and conversely; thus "knowledge" is called "knowledge of the knowable," and the "knowable" is called "knowable by knowledge." And therefore Aristotle says that this convertibility sometimes occurs in the same grammatical case, sometimes in a different one. Hence this property pertains more to the mode of speaking about relations than to the thing itself, although that linguistic mode has a foundation in reality. Nor is this property peculiar to predicamental relations; it also belongs to transcendental relatives and even to relations of reason.

6. The fourth property is that relatives are simultaneous by nature. The fifth is that they are simultaneous by knowledge and by definition. These have already been explained by us; let what has been said suffice for the present disputation.

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